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Abstract 
In this thesis I conduct an analysis of international law as an institution with the aim of revealing its 
deeper structure. I proceed by distinguishing between two modalities of international law – one 
‘disciplinary’ and another ‘dissident’. This institutional-structural analysis attempts to delineate how the 
ordering of limits and thresholds, the lines of normative inclusion and exclusion of the institutions of 
international law, are set and reset, particularly in response to historically situated events which threaten 
to modify, and indeed, transform them. Methodologically, this leans upon Hans Lindahl’s theory of legal 
ordering, as well as the spatially mediated thought of Deleuze and Guattari.  
 In examining the structures of international law, I make use of some thematic spatial devices 
such as ‘horizon’, ‘ground’ and ‘globalisation’. Alongside this, theory is made concrete through the 
invocation of two historical events both constitutive of and contemporary to international law: the effect 
of the national liberation movements of postcolonial countries during the 1950s–70s in modifying the 
modern international system, and the sixteenth-century encounter between Dominican theologians and 
Amerindian nations. The context of the latter, its discourse and terminology, is rendered familiar as a 
fundamental precursor to international law in its modern guise via proximity in this thesis to more recent 
debates on global security and development. 
 Finally, I deconstruct this institutional-structural analysis through the radical dualism of 
Amerindian cosmology. The point here is to show how that which is excluded from law and ordering, 
namely the un-orderable, returns as a manifestation of immanent or liminal justice to reconnect 
disciplinary institutions to its triadic outside. Hence, the justice practised by the other (Amerindian or 
social movements in the Global South) brings forth the uncontainable multiplicity or triadism of the 
earth, which promises to transform the disciplinary through the dissident.   
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Introduction 
Roman emperors before Hadrian were reputedly obsessed with expanding their territorial reach for the 
greater good of the empire. It was under Trajan of Spain that the empire underwent its longest and most 
intense period of extension and expansion. By contrast, when Hadrian came to power, his intention was 
to go back to a more Augustinian model of governing that would emphasise the need for stability over the 
aims of extension and expansion. This continuity and contrast entailed retracting the boundaries of the 
empire to its core, which Hadrian did primarily through the building of walls. Thus, he provided the 
empire with an interiority for the first time, while at the same time projecting or positing an outside or 
exterior to it as ‘barbaric’ or strange.1 
Instead of establishing military operations as the basis of the governing of the empire, Hadrian 
opted for the establishment of an economic core at the centre of a commercial network that could flow in 
and out of the walls positing the empire. The regulation of these flows of people and goods would then 
take the place of, without abolishing, the machinery of war.2 Law and administrative measures put in 
place by the emerging bureaucracy – which came from within the same equestrian ranks of the army that 
had produced both Trajan and Hadrian3 – became the preferred way of coding otherwise un-coded flows. 
The building of walls as well as legal and administrative coding – of goods and people – allowed imperial 
Rome not only to acquire a sense of itself, a subjectivity of sorts as Romans distinguishable from others 
(barbarians, gentium, etc.), with whom they would have to relate, and whose relations would also need to 
be coded, but also to produce a way of reaching out and bringing within sight. This was no easy feat, as 
Romans had grown accustomed to the idea that the boundaries of the empire would continue to expand 
ad infinitum. Coupled with this belief was the worship of the Roman God Terminus: it was said that once 
Terminus had set down a new boundary not even Jupiter could move it. The hallowed, eternal nature of 
expanding boundaries was something firmly planted in the Roman psyche. Hadrian’s policy of 
retrenching and bringing in the threshold of empire was, then, a risky one, and was seen as an offence to 
the Gods by the senatorial class.4   
After the Spanish-born Trajan and Hadrian, the empire created an apparatus of inclusion and 
exclusion, one that could be applied to every subject without exception, but which nevertheless would 
draw lines of selection and relegation. Between the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and in the wake of 
the decisive encounter with Amerindians, Spain and Portugal would recover that model of operation and 
organisation, in order to procure for themselves a scheme for the relations between the emerging Holy 
Roman-Germanic Empire and Amerindia, against a background of planetary expansion. In the process, a 
specific model of spatial organisation would set itself to become the model of practical thought, 
recognised and theorised by Iberian and Dutch theologians and jurists,5 and in their wake Scottish 
Enlightenment writers such as David Hume6 and, inspired by the latter, Immanuel Kant, with his lifelong 
concern with geography as well as practical reason and the philosophy of law. 
The theorisation of this developed spatial model of organisation, assumed by the structure of 
international law, would emerge via the seminal Chiapas–Valladolid debates of the sixteenth century. 
This is precisely the reason we wish in this manuscript to invoke the spirit of these debates, in which 
Dominican and Jesuit theologians and jurists played such a leading role. The discussions that took place 
on the ‘affair of the Indies’ and more generally on the ‘Indian Question’ can be considered to be both 
constitutive of and contemporary to international law in its modern guise. What we mean here is that the 
trans-historical alliance-structure of a ‘disciplinary’ international law owed a considerable amount to the 
influence of precursors or antecedents to its modern historical manifestation, noticeable in the 
                                                            
1 Mike Duncan, ‘Hadrian’s walls’, History of Rome Podcast (episode 82, 2010).  
2 Ibid. 
3 Hans Julius Wolff, Roman Law: An historical introduction, University of Oklahoma Press (1951, pp. 15, 46). 
4 Duncan (2010).  
5 See Nicholas Wey Gomez, The Tropics Of Empire, MIT Press (2008), Machina Mundi: The Moral Authority of 
Place in the Early Transatlantic Encounter. Wey Gomez cites the jurists Thomas Aquinas, Albertus Magnus, Pierre 
d’Ally, Francisco de Vitoria and Anotni Vieira. 
6 See Gilles Deleuze, Empiricism and Subjectivity, trans. Constantin V. Boundras, Columbia University Press (1991), 
and What is Grounding? trans. Arjun Kleinherenbrink, eds. Tony Yanick, Jason Adams, Mohammed Salemy, &&& 
Publishing (pp. 25–30, 2015): ‘…without Hume there would not have been Kant to retain the legitimacy of ground.’ 
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aforementioned debates. Thus, we should emphasise this study as a ‘diacritical’7 account that expatiates 
on the limits, ordering and structure of the planetary institutions of international law. Hence, it is no part 
of our work to justify any historical linearity (in any transcendental manner); rather, the goal is to 
articulate how legal institutions are assembled in the light of events, of which two are principally 
considered here: the already referenced affair of the Indies (encounter with the Indian), and the rise of 
postcolonial liberation movements of the 1950–70s.   
In respect to the former, Dominican theology, and its elaboration by leading exponents such as 
Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas and Francisco de Vitoria, is considered fundamental to the nascent 
structure of a disciplinary international law. In fact, many of the ostensibly up-to-date theories of legality 
today, such as law-as-plan and the security-developmental complex,8 seem less so when brought into 
contact with the Dominican paradigm of natural law; for example, what immediately comes to mind here 
as a point of comparison is Aquinas’ ‘supreme’ plan in the mind of an ordering God, and Vitoria’s 
justification of colonialism on the basis of perfectibility and humanist concerns. Thence, we shall render 
familiar the unfamiliarity of the debates surrounding the Indian Question, and its associated terminology, 
familiar by analysing modern-day institutions of international law (Part One) through the lens of the 
contextual framing of its precursors (Parts Two to Four). One could say that the debates that surrounded 
the affair of the Indies still haunt international law today.  
 
Whilst the periods of international law that primarily concerns us here are in the sixteenth-century 
encounter between Amerindians and Iberian theologians and the global expansion of the UN into Third 
World, beginning in the 1950s, we should also index some of the major intermediary events that define 
the genealogy of international law. It is important to take note of some these historical ‘pivots’ that 
transformed international law, so as to preclude any temptation to imagine the periods that lie outside 
theorisation in this work as existing in a state of bracketed stasis. We should therefore point to the treaty 
of Westphalia in 1648, which is commonly seen as the commencement of the states system in Europe 
(significant in the thought of the legal theorist Carl Schmitt for the development of the Jus Publicum 
Europaeum); to the Congo Conference in Berlin of 1884–5 as an initial attempt to organise the League of 
Nations; to the 1919 inter-war restructure of the League of Nations; and finally to the Human Rights 
Declaration in 1944.9 All of these constitute pivotal points that signify a continuous process of structural 
mutation in the evolution of international law.  
Prior to us moving on to consider in more detail the main propositions of this thesis, as well as 
the methodological tools deployed, let us provide the necessary critical background in respect to which 
this thesis can be situated. A review of the ‘spatial turn’ within legal critical theory, as well as its key 
advocates, is most appropriate here in light of the spatially mediated thinking, in relation to law, which is 
so integral to this manuscript (this is elaborated on in the rest of the introduction).  
In the legal theorist Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ understanding,10 the ‘spatial turn’ 
denotes a cross-disciplinary approach to law that incorporates elements of, and has a crucial engagement 
with, critical geography, radical (‘open’) ecology and urban studies. The key synergy at play here, from 
                                                            
7 An account critical of linear deterministic narratives (dia, from the Greek ‘passing through’, as in the sense of the 
diameter of a circle) such as the ‘progressivistic’ telos-orientated type. 
8 See: Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the world of peoples, Polity (2007), and 
Global Governance and the New Wars: The merging of development and security, Zed Books (2001); David 
Plunkett, ‘Legal Positivism and the Moral Aim Thesis’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (vol. 33, no. 3, Autumn, 
2013), pp. 563–605. 
9 See Covenant of the League of Nations (1919), in Malcolm D. Evans, Blackstone’s International Law Documents: 
12th Edition, Oxford University Press (2015), pp. 1–7; Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1944, pp. 192–230. 
Also see Antonio Cassese, International Law: Second Edition, Oxford University Press (2005), in which he asserts 
that the 1919 system resembled the 1648 Settlement of Westphalia, p. 36  
10 Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, ‘Law’s Spatial Turn: Geography, Justice and a Certain Fear of Spaces’ in 
Law, Culture and the Humanities, Vol. 6 (2010); ‘Law, Space, Bodies: The Emergence of Spatial Justice’ in Laurent 
de Sutter (ed.), Deleuze and Law, Edinburgh University Press (2011); ‘In the Lawscape’ in Law and the City, 
Routledge (2007); ‘Spatial Justice: Law and the Geography of Withdrawal’ in International Journal of Law in 
Context 3, 1–16 (2010); ‘“…the sound of a breaking string”: Critical Environmental Law and Ontological 
Vulnerability’ in Journal of Environmental Law and Human Rights Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 5–22 (2011); Absent 
Environments, Routledge (2007); ‘From Space Immaterial: The Invisibility of the Lawscape’ in Griffith Law Review 
Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 438–453 (2008); ‘Fear in the Lawscape’, in Jiří Přibáň (ed.), Brauman’s Liquid Law and Society, 
Routledge (2007), pp. 79–99 
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the perspective of the geographers Luke Bennett and Antonio Layard,11 is between legality and 
geography, a combination that helps to draw out the ‘co-constitutive relationship of people, place and 
law’. We can chart the spatial turn in legal theory, according to Yishai Blank and Issi Rosen-Zvi,12 from 
the mid-1990s onwards: a point that saw the consolidation of a more unified, if still diversified, 
methodology brought together under what they term ‘legal geography.’ Prior to that, as stated by the legal 
geographer Sandy Kedar, there were few references to and very little literature exploring the possible 
intersection between law and geography, although, of course, there are notable exceptions.13  
The literature from the mid-1990s to the present day (see below) strongly suggests that space is 
increasingly becoming a necessary intermediary in critical standpoints of legality between, for example, 
objects and subjects (both of which it subverts or are ‘confounded’), universality/ global flows and the 
particular/ territorial, justice and the law, the material and the ontological, and the inside and outside. The 
important place that space occupies as a mediating concept, in the literature of legal theory, means that it 
has become a necessary component of a critical methodology that is able to disclose the complex and 
contingent relationality of social relations and the uncertainty, unpredictability and disorientation it 
frequently throws up. In other words, the dynamism and active nature of space (or at least an aspect of it 
which challenges representations) is utilised in a manner that continually forces law to question itself, in 
the sense of its own grounding assumptions, in order that it may reconfigure itself or at least reveal itself 
as a ‘productive force with a life if its own’. Allied to the latter view is the notion that law has the power 
to incentivise or discourage certain ‘spatial formations’ (such as legal spatial hierarchies), and that it is in 
part the responsibility of the spatial turn to bring to light the hidden processes that set the background of 
human norms and preferences.14  
In Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’ work, an engagement with spatiality, drawing on the critical 
geographer Doreen Massey and Deleuzian theory, results in the reconceptualisation of justice as ‘spatial 
justice’. He envisages justice as a permanent state of oscillation between the emplacement and 
withdrawal of bodies in space, to the extent that any determined identity is foreclosed as the ‘alter’ and 
the ‘ego’ continue to exchange places, precluding the onset of dominant normative perspective. In his 
other closely associated works, he develops an understanding of law as assemblage or ‘lawscape’ that 
combines space, law and bodies in a complex assembly of constantly interacting elements. It was the 
legal geographer Nicole Graham who initially developed the concept of the ‘lawscape’15 and we can see 
echoes of it in David Delaney’s theorisation of the ‘legal landscape’, or what he has more recently called 
the ‘nomosphere’.16 With the latter concept, Delaney attempts to envisage a new way in which to suspend 
the disciplinary boundary between law and geography in order to offer a method that can more 
effectively capture the dynamic interplay between the socio-spatial and socio-legal – something he 
considers the spatial turn was previously struggling to achieve.17   
In considering the relations proper to a spatialised justice, Sarah Keenan’s angle incorporates a 
spatially subversive way of looking at property relations.18 Her methodology makes use of 
phenomenology19 (particularly Sara Ahmed’s Queer Phenomenology), critical geography and empirical 
                                                            
11 Luke Bennett and Antonio Layard, ‘Legal Geography: Becoming Spatial Detectives’ in Geography Compass, Vol. 
9, No. 7 (2015), pp. 406–422; also see ‘Legal Geography: An Australian Perspective’ in Geographical Research, 
Vol. 51, Issue 4 (November 2013), pp. 339–353  
12 Yishai Blank and Issi Rosen-Zvi, ‘Introduction: The spatial turn in legal theory’, in Pnina Motzzafi and Michael 
Feige (eds.), Hagar: Studies in Culture, Polity and Identity, Vol. 10, No., 2010, pp. 37–60 
13 See the section on ‘Legal Geography: An emerging field’, in Sandy Kedar, ‘On the Legal Geography of 
Ethnocratic Settler States: Notes towards a Research Agenda’ in Current Legal Issues Vol. 5, pp. 401–441 (2003) 
14 See, for example, Blank and Rosen-Zvi (2012), p. 406 
15 Nicole Graham, Lawscape: Property, environment, law, Routledge (2011). Also see Lawscape: Paradigm and 
place in Australian property law, University of Sydney (2003); and Bennett and Layard (2015), pp. 409–10 
16 For more on this see David Delaney, The Spatial, the Legal and the Pragmatics of World-making: Nomospheric 
Investigations, Routledge (2011) 
17 Also see the review of Delaney’s work offered by Melinda Benson in Antipode, May 2012. It can be accessed 
here: https://radicalantipode.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/book-review_benson-on-delaney.pdf  
18 Sarah Keenan, Subversive Property: Law and the Production of Spaces of Belonging, Routledge (2015); 
‘Subversive Property: Reshaping Malleable Spaces of Belonging’ in Social and Legal Studies, Vol. 19, Issue 4 
(December, 2010); ‘Property as Governance: Time, space and belonging in Australia’s Northern Territory 
Intervention’, in The Modern Law Review, Vol. 76, Issue 3 (May 2013); also see, with Emma Patchett, Spatial 
Justice and the Diaspora, Counterpress (2017) 
19 Blank and Rosen-Zvi (p. 51) explain the importance of phenomenological works (such as those of Bachelard and 
de Cetreau, and I may add, Merleau-Ponty) for the spatial turn by stating that they are able to ‘demonstrate the 
indistinguishability of the mental-subjective aspects of space from its material and social ones. Indeed, 
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socio-legal work, and draws upon the work of Divina Cooper, as well as the indigenous Australian 
understanding of property. Property relations, rather than being subject to dominant and exclusive legal 
definitions, are conceived as networks of relations embedded and held up by the space surrounding a 
property (whether an attribute or personal belongings). These malleable or spatially contingent networked 
relations are affective as they are linked to feelings of belonging which result in the merging of object 
(property) and subject (owner). The subversion occurs when these networked relations of space find 
themselves out-of-place in their extra-legality, where property relations are not simply, conventionally 
and hegemonically, rights over things, but unrecognised forms of belonging and new relations that 
unsettle established spaces of legality.        
In the critical literature, Divinia Cooper20 is also of the utmost salience, particularly in relation to 
the attention she pays to communal modes of property and its implication more generally for property 
relations. In her empirical analysis she looks into various cases, from democratically run, self-governing 
free schools to the establishment of Jewish eruvs, in which space and property become complex means of 
belonging that enable subjects to navigate or challenge the boundaries between a civil, public life and a 
private but textured social life. Her focus on the social relations of belonging allows her to challenge the 
conventional notion of property as merely an object severable from the relations that gave rise to it, 
instead highlighting the complicated co-existence between the two.  
 Nicholas Blomley21 is also commonly cited in the literature as one of the most important 
contributors to the spatial turn in his use of geographical concepts to deconstruct legal relations – such as 
property relations – so as to lay bare their contested history, and in order to reveal the ‘geographies of 
property’.  This is apparent in his elucidation of concepts such as ‘hedging’, linked to the material reality 
of land division and acting as a signifier of law in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England, 
and associated with the enclosures of private land that entailed the spatial division of common, open land. 
Using the example of the hedge, he is able to demonstrate how it came to be an instrument of 
dispossession regulating social relations and the traffic of bodies across land formerly held in common. 
He is further able to show how it acted as a means of maintaining a boundary, enforced through violence, 
separating the legitimate holder of property rights from threatening rogues: the disorderly and irrational; 
and the poor bodies of people and predatory animals that signified the beyond of a legality proper to the 
social order. Overall, a major part of Blomley’s project is to capture the entanglement between property, 
space and corporeal violence, through, to provide more examples, exploring geographical concepts such 
as ‘frontier’, the ‘survey’ and ‘grid’ and deploying the disjunction between outside and inside 
(law/nonlaw, property/non-property etc.) to explain how legal violence functions.  
 We can also refer to Richard Ford,22 who articulates a conception of political geography in order 
to show how racial segregation, existing in local government jurisdictions, is enforced in the USA. In his 
analysis, jurisprudential and quasi-jurisdictional boundaries play a pivotal role in creating, naturalising 
and concealing the manner in which political influence and economic resources are distributed, aiding in 
the construction of racially identified places.  
Furthermore, Sandy Kedar applies an approach he labels ‘critical legal geography’ to the study 
of ‘ethnocratic settler societies’. The focus is on the role of law in enabling the endurance of land 
                                                                                                                                                                             
phenomenology stresses the inseparability of the subject, the object and the intentionality of the former towards the 
latter. Hence, material spaces becomes wholly entwined with the experiencing subject and the intersubjective 
mediation of the two.’    
20 Divina Cooper, Everday Utopias: The Conceptual Life of Promising Places, Duke University Press (2013); 
Governing out of order: Space, law and the politics of belonging, London and New York University Press (1998); 
‘Talmudic territory: Space, Law, and Modernist Discourse’ in Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 23, No. 4, December 
1996, pp. 529–548; ‘Opening up Ownership: Community Belonging, Belongings and the Productive Life of 
Property’ in Law and Social Inquiry, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2007), pp. 625–664; ‘Out of Place: Symbolic domains, religious 
rights and the Cultural Contract’ in Nicholas Blomley, David Delaney, Richard T. Ford (eds.), The Legal 
Geographies Reader: Law, Power, and Space, Blackwell Publishers (2001)    
21 Nicholas Blomley, Law, Space and the Geographies of Power, The Guildford Press (1994); ‘The Territory of 
Property’ in Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 40, Issue 5, pp. 593–609; ‘Making Private Property: Enclose, 
Common Right and the Work of Hedges’, in Rural History, Vol. 18, Issue 1, pp. 1–27, Cambridge University Press 
(2007); ‘Landscapes of Property’ in the Law and Society Review (1998); ‘Law, Property, and the Geography of 
Violence: The Frontier, the Survey and the Grid’ in Annuals of the association of American geographers (2003); 
‘How to turn a beggar into a bus stop: law, traffic and the ‘function of place’’, Urban Studies, Vol. 44, Issue 9, pp. 
1697–1712 (2007); Unsettling the City: Urban Land and the politics of property, Routledge (2004)  
22 Richard Ford, ‘The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis’, in Harvard Law Review, Vol. 
107, No. 8, pp. 1841–1921 (June 1994); also see ‘Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction)’ in Harvard Law 
Review, Vol. 97, No. 4 (Feb 1999), pp. 843–930   
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regimes, with one of the principal case studies centring on the state of Israel. In his account, the spatial 
order of the ethnocratic state is maintained by ‘freezing’ initial property distributions so as to reproduce 
social relations of dominance – that is to say the domination of an elite (‘the founders’) over indigenous 
and immigrant groups. According to Kedar, implementation of a new land regime in Israel’s formative 
years, which was imposed through the use of technical legislation such as Absentee Property Regulations, 
conforms to this ethnocratic model, and acted as a means for dispossession.23 Alongside this, and 
working on case studies within a similar geographical area, the political geographer Oren Yiftachel,24 
examining indigenous Bedouins and their engagement with the state of Israel, identifies ‘grey spaces’ as 
sites for a new transformative identities and a rejection of imposed citizenship. These are places that fall 
between the zones that are subject to urban planning and become marked by ‘criminality’ in the eyes of 
the state. In short, ‘grey spaces’ are sectors in which political subjectivities can be generated and 
autonomous zones set up, as the by-product of an urban geography that produces places beyond its power 
to control. More generally, Yiftachel is concerned with showing, throughout his work, how space, power 
and development create new forms of citizenship and identity. 
 The current work can certainly be seen to sit comfortably within the ‘spatial turn’ in critical 
legal theory. However, it also seeks to, tentatively, move beyond it by framing the ‘turn’ as more of a 
‘return’. To address firstly what this manuscript has in common with what the commentators cited above 
have enumerated as the characteristics of the turn: there is a great deal of affinity between our own 
theoretical position and Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos’, most specifically in his emphasis on a serious 
engagement with (Deleuzian inspired) spatial theory or spatiality from an ontological perspective, to 
redress the balance in a literature skewed towards case studies. Moreover, this present work also shares 
Blank and Rosen-Zvi’s, and indeed Bennett and Layard’s, focus on the importance of materiality, which 
they discern to be integral to the originality of legal geography, evident in the emerging literature. In 
addition, we wish to render explicit the link between the drawing of legal boundaries and use of law as a 
technology of power, utilised as a method of dispossessing the ‘other’ of their milieu and limiting their 
subjectivity, as demonstrated by the works of Kedar, Yiftachel, Ford and Bromley.    
The point of the ‘return’ in this thesis is then to demonstrate how an engagement with geography 
– most crucially with a speculative geography – absorbed medieval and renaissance theologian-jurists, as 
it acted as an intellectual backdrop to the early development of thought on the framework of international 
law as well as ‘world-making’. Some of the components that make up the ‘turn’ can thus be found in the 
work of these figures who were indeed engaged with questions of spatiality and ordering in relation to 
law (the legal framework for this is addressed below). To provide an example, in looking at the 
contribution of the now obscure theologian Albertus Magnus to the tradition of natural law, we are 
immediately struck by the importance he places on geography, which is uppermost in his thinking in 
explaining the diversity of nations in the world. In fact, following Aristotle, Albertus connected the 
spatial organisation of the city-state/polis with the varying geography and climate of the world known to 
Europeans at the time. In his framework, the psychological standing of nations were somewhat 
determined, and the quality of their civic organisations heavily shaped, by the primordial elements. The 
elements involved, such as light radiation, were, in a similar manner to Bromley’s hedge, explicitly 
theorised as instruments which could be used to distinguish between the degree of political development 
of nations in terms that established the boundary between those who realised legality and those who were 
unable to. In this respect, the enduring power of Albertus’ speculative geography and its technologies of 
power can be seen in its great influence over Iberian theologians during the Age of Discovery. In this 
thesis, we endeavour to show that Vitoria approached the ‘Indian Question’ at the time of the ‘discovery’ 
of the Americas with Albertus’ speculative geography in mind. For Vitoria, a fundamental issue at point, 
in relation to the contentious nature of the Amerindians, was whether they were able to exercise the right 
of dominion over their own lands. In Vitoria’s final judgement, and this can be read as a rationalisation of 
the Spanish conquests, the Amerindians had forfeited this right, partially because of their lack of legal 
and political development, but also owing in part to the relationship with their fertile climes, or in other 
words, their intimate proximity to the earth. As we have already seen in the critical literature, property 
                                                            
23 Kedar (2003), pp. 420–37 
24 Oren Yiftachel, ‘Critical Theory and ‘gray space’: Mobilization of the colonized’, City, Vol. 13, No. 2–3, June–
September (2009), pp. 240–256; ‘Planning and Social Control: Exploring the ‘Dark Side’’, Journal of Planning 
Literature, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1998), pp. 395–406; ‘Symposium: New Paradigm or Old Myopia? Unsettling the 
Communicative Turn in Planning Theory, Journal of Planning, Education and Research, Vol. 19 (2000), pp. 101–
110  
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relations today can be understood as having a clear spatial dimension. The same can be said of the Age of 
Discovery in relation to the exercise of dominion over the earth, which was an idea that intrinsically 
linked law with land. In the case of the Amerindian, for example, the fault lay with his inability to 
divorce himself from the primordial giveness of the earth (a point referred to as the ‘inconstancy’ of the 
Indian by Iberian Jesuits and Dominicans), and for not treating natural phenomenon as extractable objects 
divorced from their environment (i.e. exercising mastery over the land). As a result, Amerindian society 
was seen to be lying on the verge of lawlessness and in constant danger of being consumed by the 
contingency of the earth. Whilst acknowledging the focus on dominion and mastery, the link between 
land and law and the contingent quality of the earth in this argument can be seen as evoking Cooper’s and 
Keenan’s project of revealing property relations as contingent networks rather than reified artefacts, as 
well as the extra-legal status (out-of-placeness, or ‘a-legality’ in our parlance) of relations of property that 
do not require the realisation of an exclusivist rights claim. Here we are able to suggest that the past still 
retains its resonance in the present, or that there is a certain degree of contemporaneity in the spatial 
orientation and attentiveness of the works of the theologian-jurists we have cited, respecting of course 
their very different historical contexts.  
While legal theorists such as Peter Fitzpatrick have demonstrated the salience of Aquinas and 
Vitoria to the early, emerging framework of international law on the basis of natural law, this work is 
concerned with highlighting the link between the aforementioned theologian-jurists and a speculative 
geography through the vital but largely overlooked intermediary of Albertus, to whom they were 
intellectually indebted. Overall, the primary innovation here is to bring into dialogue more obscure forms 
of medieval speculative geography – and its relation to, as well as influence over, natural law – with more 
contemporary forms of critical legal geography. In many ways then, we are in agreement with Delaney 
that critical legal geography needs to continue to find new means to push beyond its disciplinary impasse 
so as to reconstitute and re-energise the interaction between geography and law (of which the ‘lawscape’ 
and ‘nomosphere’ are examples25). We intend to do this is by demonstrating that the questions that 
Albertus, Vitoria and Aquinas grappled with are not simply relevant to contemporary forms of legal 
theory, but also enable us to reimagine the theories currently in vogue in critical legal geography in novel 
ways via a re-examination of the aforementioned theologian-jurists’ scholarly oeuvre. This entails an 
engagement and relationship between ideas of the theologian-jurists and contemporary critical theory, as 
opposed to a temporally-rooted hierarchical relationship where the contemporary merely utilises a 
‘lifeless’ past as a source-base or object of study. Indeed, as noted above, elements of contemporaneity 
can be found in both the ‘past’ and the ‘present’, and the works of Albertus, Vitoria and Aquinas need to 
be seen as having an active place in the generation, criticism and transformation of contemporary theory, 
just as contemporary theory shapes and reshapes them. 
 
If spatial organisation did indeed became the model of thought in modern law,26 then the question that 
concerns us here is the extent to which law re-territorialises thought itself – through its reliance on such 
practices as the drawing of lines between subjects and objects, nature and culture, own-ness and strange-
ness. We must also concern ourselves with the implications of such re-territorialisation of thought in and 
through its modern legal forms. Chief among them are Western international law, the democratic state 
and human rights. This implies taking stock of the fact that the modern West, and only the modern West, 
‘extends and propagates its centres of immanence’ planetarily.27 Hence, the legal question must also be 
concerned, specifically, with the sort of spatial phenomena indexed under such terms as ‘globalisation’ 
and ‘colonisation’, both old and new. 
This is not to be understood in terms of a ‘spatial turn’ in law and legal thought, or, for that 
matter, any other attempt to build up an abstract, a priori or theoretical ‘model’ (as opposed to empirical 
research, in the Humian-Deleuzian sense) that could then be applied to the problematic at hand. The role 
of theory and method in this thesis is not conceived of as that of representation or abstract modelling, for 
what will be put into question is precisely the aprioristic approach that consists in the application of 
frames and models reputedly lying in wait in the mind of the observer to produce knowledge of the 
                                                            
25 My own formulation of the interaction between law and geography is mediated through the Amerindian 
schematics of the diametric and concentric dualisms, and their complex relation with a triadic root. See Part One, 
Chapter Four ‘Diametric and Concentric, Smooth and Striated’.  
26 Immanuel Kant, Geographies, trans. M. Cohen-Halimi, M. Marcuzzi, and V. Seroussi, Aubier (1999), p. 39  
27 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy? Verso (2003), p. 97 
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observed object,28 including their implicit set of lines of division (ground and limits, nature/culture). 
Rather, the point of this thesis is to make visible the acts of framing and modelling – in the concrete sense 
of drawing lines of division upon the earth’s global surface, i.e. ground or horizon, or walls – as 
themselves part and parcel of the spatial organisation of thought that is re-territorialised in the juridical 
forms of globalisation and coloniality. Theory and method in this thesis are, therefore, not external, but 
rather immanent to the problematic as well as being a tool or a set of tools with which to deal with it. 
This is to be understood in the sense that there are certain specific tools that are apposite to the aims of 
this thesis – and called for by the problematic itself as proposed in the previous paragraph – and others 
which are not.  
In this respect, it is appropriate to determine the specific set of methodological choices and tools that 
are appropriate or immanent to our problematic. Let us do this in the form of a number of sub-clauses, 
which follow on from or develop the main proposition of this thesis: 
 
1. Rather than a ‘spatial turn’, the problem considered here is, if anything, a matter of ‘return’.29 
This is so in the sense in which Immanuel Kant, the inventor of modern critique, first observed 
that spatial organisation was the model of thought.30 In doing so, Kant situated himself and the 
problematic of the territoriality and deterritorialisation of thought (which he understood as a 
division between the empirical/transcendental) on the threshold of ancient forms of speculative 
geography and modern physical geography.31 We locate our research project precisely in that 
threshold, for it is also the threshold between forms of legality that depended upon diametrical 
dualisms32 (a spatial representation that divides into two symmetrical yet distinct category 
‘halves’ such as east/west, north/south, Romans/gentium and so on), which in turn were based 
upon the distinctive forms of speculative geography, and forms of legality that relate territory 
(centres, centralised political organisations, perfectible communities or states) not only to other 
(foreign) centralised organisations, but moreover, with the earth and those who exist in its wild 
peripheries, in accordance to the distinctive forms of physical and human geography. To think 
law, under the aegis of spatial organisation, is not to focus solely on the line drawn between a 
familiar state and another familiar state (or within states, between the subject of law and the 
objective law that subjects him/her) and their reciprocal relations. Rather, thinking takes place in 
the transformational relationship between territory and earth.33 
 
2. This is to say that in law, all primary diametrical dualisms or basic lines of division (our 
sovereign/their sovereign; national/foreign; subject/object) sit in a decisive relationship with a 
second, often unacknowledged, form of dualism. The latter can be called a concentric dualism34 
(see the pictorial representation below) that figures territory – the surface of the earth – as 
lacking a diametric axis, and expresses a contrast between a centre (populated by recognisable 
states that recognise one another, reciprocally) and a profane, darker, but also domestic, child-
like or feminine periphery. This organisation has long been known to ethnographers, and this 
thesis takes stock of that fact. It was also well known to Kant, the geographer, who referred to it 
explicitly in his Lectures on Geography and implicitly in his attempts to establish a stable 
                                                            
28 Deleuze (2015), p. 35 
29 Cf., Miguel Abensour, Democracy Against the State, Polity (2010), xiii, xviii, xxviii. Here, ‘incessant self-return’ 
can be thought in very different terms – as the power of the ‘insurgent’ demos in its continuous self-institution, the 
‘redirection of constitution to constituent power’.   
30 Deleuze (2015), p. 15: ‘Cognition is in the milieu and almost in the milieu of what it knows.’ 
31 See: Stuart Elden, ‘Reintroducing Kant’s Geography’ in Reading Kant’s Geography, eds. Stuart Elden and 
Eduardo Mendieta, State University of New York (2011b), pp. 1–19; Stuart Elden, The Birth of Territory, University 
of Chicago (2013b), pp. 15, 330; David Harvey, Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom, Columbia 
University Press (2009), pp. 17–36; Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The reassertion of space in critical 
social theory, Verso (1989), p.125: ‘[The] Kantian legacy of transcendental spatial idealism pervades every wing of 
the modern hermeneutic tradition…and has been central to the modern discipline of geography since its origins in the 
late nineteenth century.’ 
32 Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, Radical Dualism: A meta-fantasy on the square root of dual organisation, or A 
savage homage to Levi-Strauss, Hatje Cantz (2012c), p. 8  
33 Deleuze and Guattari (2003), pp. 85–7, Viveiros de Castro (2012c), pp. 7–8 
34 Viveiros de Castro (2012c), p. 7 
 
 
8 
ground for thought.35 Although Kant has been more often understood as a prisoner of the 
subject/object relationship, who stabilised the thought of the thing-in-itself (the noumenon) in 
the well-grounded position of the subject, ‘his idea of the Copernican Revolution puts thought in 
a direct relationship with the earth’, as Deleuze and Guattari say.36 Legal theories after Kant, 
following his model of spatial organisation, do indeed attempt to establish legal production and 
the hierarchy of sources based on the position of a stable ground, which post-Kantian jurists like 
Hans Kelsen denominated the ‘Grundnorm’ or the constitution of a well-established, centralised 
state, with established borders and lines of division, whose sovereign produces the ground and 
limits37 upon which the subjects of the law will base their behaviour. But just as in Kant, the 
critical model puts legal thought and practice in a direct relationship with the earth. 
Additionally, in post-Kantian legal modern theories one can observe the placing of the grounds 
for legality against the backdrop of the entire earth. The point is to make that seemingly invisible 
background and its function as frame (behavioural frame) apparent. Put otherwise, our 
methodological procedure consists of bringing the background to the foreground, thereby 
dissolving the illusion that only dual reciprocal relations between horizontally divided entities 
matter to law.38 Rather, our methodological choice is to make such dualism enigmatic. 
 
3. One of the enigmas that this thesis intends to solve is that diametric dualisms, despite their 
reciprocal or symmetrical forms (reciprocity being the ‘golden rule’ of international law) often 
oppose halves according to asymmetrical qualities (weak/strong, etc.). This enigma suggests the 
need to recognise that every central space of reciprocal relations always relates asymmetrically 
to a peripheral space characterised as having asymmetrical qualities. Indeed, the term 
‘coloniality’39 refers to such a recognition, and introduces the question of uneven power 
relations in every schema of reciprocity. Crucially, however, it is one of the most important 
points of this thesis to observe that the relationship between these two forms of spatial 
organisation – diametric dualism and concentric dualism – is one of transformation. Put 
otherwise, the one is latent in the other, and moreover, a triadic structure is latent and in 
complex coexistence with forms of dual organisation. 
 
4. In order to make sense of the transformational relation between forms of spatial organisation 
often conceived of as abstract, trans-historical and non-spatial, one requires the use of both 
figures and concepts such as ‘ground’ and ‘horizon’.40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Therefore, methodologically speaking, this work proceeds in close proximity to: (a) the kind of 
spatial thinking that has philosophical geography at one end, and what Deleuze and Guattari call 
                                                            
35 Elden (2011), pp. 6–8; Soja, p. 125: ‘The vision of human geography that it induces is one in which the 
organization of space is projected from a mental ordering of phenomenon, either intuitively given, or relativized into 
many different ‘ways of thinking’.’ Also see Christopher Kerslake’s Immanence and the Vertigo of Philosophy: 
From Kant to Deleuze, Edinburgh University Press (2009), pp. 3–5, for an alternative interpretation of Deleuze’s 
theoretical relationship with Kant and post-Kantians.   
36 Deleuze and Guattari (2003), p. 85, Deleuze (2015), pp. 30–6. Also see Hans Blumenburg, The Genesis of the 
Copernican World, trans. Robert M. Wallace, MIT Press (1998), p. 74 
37 In the same manner in which the Kantian ground ‘imposes a limit on knowledge’ as the categories only provide the 
‘conditions for phenomena’. In the post-Kantian legal sense: closure (limits) is necessary for disclosure (the 
stabilised normativity of law). See Deleuze (2015), pp. 35–6 
38 Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, After Kant’s Declaration. On Hans Lindhal’s Fault Lines of Globalisation, paper 
delivered at the Fault Lines of Globalisation Workshop, Birkbeck College, University of London (December, 2013) 
39 See Román Grosfoguel, ‘Colonial Difference, Geopolitics of Knowledge and Global Coloniality in the 
Modern/Colonial Capitalist World-System’, Review (vol. 25, no. 3: pp. 203–24, 2002), and ‘Transmodernity, Border 
Thinking, and Global Coloniality’ in Eurozine (July, 2008) 
40 The diagrams of the dualities and triadic schemas are taken from figure 1 in Viveiros de Castro (2012c), p. 9   
Diametric dualism Concentric dualism Triadic dualism 
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‘geophilosophy’ at the other (with both European and Amerindian sixteenth-century 
perspectives as well as eighteenth-century Kantian critique as intermediaries or thresholds); (b) 
ethnomethodology and specifically structural and post-structural anthropology, as related to the 
search for the emergence of state and its legality in the work of Tim Ingold and Eduardo 
Viveiros de Castro, inspired by Lévi-Strauss and Pierre Clastres.41 These anthropologists will 
help us to interpret the ethnographic material of the sixteenth-century missionaries in the 
Americas, in light of Amerindian cosmology and radical dualist thinking. In terms of thinkers 
who bring these and other related perspectives to bear upon the question of the spatial 
organisation of legal thought, this thesis shall declare its proximity to the work done by such 
writers as Doreen Massey, David Harvey and especially Hans Lindhal.42 
 
In addition, a key theme of this manuscript is to render the question of the spatial organisation of legal 
thought in terms of exploring two modes or paradigms of international law and to examine their 
interrelation. On the one hand, it is possible to consider what will be called here the ‘disciplinary’ 
paradigm of international law. This will be presented here as a form of dualist spatial organisation that 
both sublates and conserves previous forms of symmetrical dualism while innovating in respect to them 
in order to bring within sight the entire surface of the earth. Disciplinary forms of law function as 
apparatuses of capture, in Deleuze and Guattari’s parlance.43 On the other hand, I shall consider the 
‘dissident’ paradigm of international law. The latter not only makes it apparent that triadic classifications 
are always more or less present and in complex coexistence with the dual forms of the ‘disciplinary’ 
paradigm. No less important, dissident approaches imply that the real opposition is between diametric-
cum-symmetrical dualism and asymmetrical or disciplinary triadism. Importantly, for our purposes, the 
latter is a transitional or nomadic figure. Dissidence, then, is here not only critical, but furthermore, on 
the move.  
‘Disciplinary’ international law is at once ‘grounded’ and continuous with the old imperialism 
and colonialism which have dominated the Third World since at least the period between the sixteenth 
and nineteenth (in the case of the Americas) or twentieth (in the case of Africa and Asia) centuries. We 
will explain later what precisely is meant by the terms ‘ground’ and ‘groundedness’. For now, it will 
suffice to distinguish between classical and modern appeals to soil and origins as the grounds of 
legitimacy and rule, and also to point out that, as the foundation or ‘groundedness’ of modern/colonial 
imperialism was shattered by the revival of Third World utopian and remedial justice energies and 
struggles, particularly during the 1960s and 1970s, embodied as it was in national liberation movements 
and emancipatory internationalism, international law sought a new ground on which to base its budding 
judicial universality. 
 The difference between classical appeals to soil and origin, based upon the dualism between the 
autochtonous and the stranger, and modern divisions based on geographical, racial and class thinking 
applicable to territorial units and the planet as a whole, is that only in the latter is the legitimacy of a 
people to rule over a territory understood to presuppose the absence of other peoples from that territory; 
the latter must either assimilate or be gone, one assumes to some ‘wild’ outside or to face extinction. If 
the first is a clear example of a diametrical dualism, the second appears as a form of concentric dualism. 
Disciplinary international law innovates over the classical model of ‘ius gentium’ (the Roman law of 
nations) precisely insofar as it not only distinguishes between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (the recognisable ‘them’ 
being subject to relations of reciprocity), but also establishes such symmetrical alliances in relation to the 
earth as a whole, in the form of a centre and its wild periphery. If such peripheries remain a case of the 
stranger, that is to say if they do not convert or ‘integrate’, then their bodies and specific genealogy can 
(perhaps must?) be erased from the face of the earth so as to ‘purify’ the legitimacy claim of a ruling 
                                                            
41 The French ethnographic tradition, emerging from French colonial activities in the Americas during the sixteenth-
century (particularly in the Brazilian Amazonia), links the likes of Jean de Léry, to the more contemporary Levi-
Strauss, Hélène Clastres, Pierre Clastres, the latter having inspired Deleuze and Guattari’s thoughts on nomadology 
and the war machine. The French intellectual tradition in ethnography has also influenced Brazilian anthropology, of 
which Viveiros de Castro is a notable contributor. See Hans Staden, Hans Staden’s True History: An account of 
cannibal captivity in Brazil, ed. and trans. Neil L. Whitehead, Micheal Harbsmeier; Introduction, xli–xlii, xlvi 
42 Doreen Massey, For Space, SAGE (2005); David Harvey, Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom, 
Columbia University Press (2009); Hans Lindhal, Fault Lines of Globalisation, Oxford University Press (2013) 
43 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi, 
Continuum (2012), pp. 468–9 
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people.44 Crucially, such ‘purified’ or grounded legitimacy, as a people, can be projected over the entire 
earth as the very measure or norm for apportioning terrestrial space. The ground of legitimacy is no 
longer simply being of the space, but rather being in this or that space unimpeded by others. This is to say 
that it is not just local but actually trans-local. The ground of legitimacy becomes then the obliteration of 
all others who appear as an obstacle in the horizon of ‘our’ march forward in space and time.45 
This means that, historically and analytically speaking, we must add a third to the two well-
known elements of any law and politics that begins with the sovereignty of a demos (the people as mass) 
over a topos (a place). The study and consideration of the first two elements has been the main concern of 
modern political philosophy and the social sciences to this day: the first element is the present state of the 
regulator, conceived of in more or less hierarchical fashion as being able to use a set of decision-making 
procedures and established forms, whose function is to filter the variety of interests and settle public 
opinion. This first element occurs simultaneously with the second, namely, the present state of the 
regulated environment. Since these two elements or their states are coincident, neither can be said to 
cause the other. It might be better to say to say they are directively correlated, meaning that their relation 
will result in an outcome in the world largely dependent on the factors antedating this present moment 
which influence or perhaps generates both states in the now, when we study or observe them. The 
standard notion in the political philosophy or scientific study of such elements in established democratic 
institutions is that management (the regulator) can read the world situation, act upon it and produce 
results which are susceptible to correction by error-controlled feedback. However, the standard view fails 
to account for the fact that when we read a situation we use low-variety models (like tinted glasses, or 
forms of the mathematical projected geographically, architectonically) that diminish our ability to deal 
with a high-variety environment.46 Because of this, the spectrum of options to choose and to act from 
tends to be squeezed down. Impotence ends up by defining the boundaries of consensus (what must and 
what must not be done as well as what can and cannot be ordered). This is precisely what is meant when 
people say that politics and law take place at the level of ‘the art of the possible’. It means that 
eventually, both the options to choose from and the options to act (tend to) become unitary for managers 
and regulators, even if these final options are ludicrous and lethal. If one adds to that the important 
insight that warnings of incipient disaster cannot be registered in the language of the low-variety model, 
the conclusion is that models of sovereignty almost always end up making choices and acting in ways 
both ludicrous and lethal.  
Hence the need to add a third element when we analyse the modern sovereignty of a people over 
a place: squeezed-down choices and actions end up selecting and de-selecting or de-specifying who or 
what counts as a people or, within the recognisable boundaries of the surrounding environment, as ‘one 
of us’. As the political philosopher and legal theorist Oscar Guardiola-Rivera has observed,47 this can be 
seen not from the perspective of a dialectics of recognition (which is the basis of current concepts of law, 
analytic or socio-legal) but from perspectives that see failures of recognition. This is the view that places 
the addition or subtraction of bodies to the demos – not only public opinions or the finality of interests – 
at the centre of the operation of democratic legal institutions and the functioning of rights.48 Let me 
explain this further by pointing out that we tend to forget how law not only establishes the boundary 
between what we must and must not do,49 as well as policing the limits between order and disorder, but 
also declares who counts as orderable and who does not (the so-called ‘uncounted’50 in politics).51 The 
latter – said to be lacking of any interests or future horizons of their own, any set of normal desires or the 
                                                            
44 See Duffield (2013), pp. 189–190 
45 Duffield (2014), pp. 2–3 
46 Oscar Guardiola-Rivera, À Fonds Perdu, delivered at the II International Seminar on Institutional Theory: 
International Courts and Political Reality, Universidade federal do Rio de Janeiro (unpublished manuscript, 7 
November 2013), p. 17 
47 Guardiola-Rivera (2013), p. 18 
48 A thorough articulation of this theory of legal ordering can be found in Hans Lindahl, Fault Lines of Globalization, 
Oxford University Press (2013), pp. 117–56. The ordering process of a legal institution effectively ‘tames’ the 
excesses of, in Claude Lefort’s terms, a ‘savage’ or, in Abensour’s (2010), ‘insurgent democracy’. 
49 Deleuze draws the distinction between law that limits actions, and institutions that act as ‘a positive model for 
action’. See Gilles Deleuze, Desert Island and Other Texts: 1953–74, ed. David Lapoujade, trans. Michael Taormina, 
Semiotext(e) (2004), pp. 19–20 
50 Abensour, xviii 
51 Lindahl, pp. 37–8  
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ability to calculate – are thrown into or relegated to the obscure realm of the rogue or un-orderable.52 Law 
and political institutions aggregate and include, but also select and relegate. Put in deliberative terms, 
legal as well as political institutions not only place the rules for dialogue, but also prescribe who can take 
part in the conversation and who cannot. The latter may be deemed biologically, pathologically or 
culturally backward, or unable to speak an intelligible language, a rogue or fanatic. Put simply, legal and 
political institutions prescribe who counts as ‘one of our own’.53 Notice, however, that this operation 
(adding and subtracting bodies and languages or public opinions) depends on the postulation of the not-
one-of-us as zero, non-being, rogue or abnormal, as impurity or inexistence (the ‘below-otherness’).54 
This is, in fact, an act of ‘original displacement’ and dispossession,55 of one occupying or taking the place 
of another. The Caribbean psychiatrist and political activist Frantz Fanon called this act ‘damnation’.56 
For him, such acts define colonialism beyond the master/slave dialectic or struggle for recognition.  
One can call this zero-ground of the operation that adds or subtracts bodies and interests-desires, 
as well as public opinions, the ‘victim’, if and when compared with a beneficiary who may or may not be 
the same as the perpetrator. In a time and trans-local sequence this can include the successors of the 
perpetrators, and in a parallel but different sequence the successors of the victims. These two groups 
might share the same space but in fact they might just as well belong to different planets. They are 
‘mutually exterior occupants of the same ground’, and thus, what characterises their situation is their 
prior lack of relation.57 This is how Fanon sees the (colonial) situation of native and settler. According to 
Fanon, this is also the root of genocide.58 
If this is the case, then genocide as rooted in a prior lack of relation should be understood not 
only as a violation of human rights or the institutional pact of democracy, an exception to the rule or 
contract, but actually as the disavowed ground of the rule and the frame of a certain practice and 
conceptualisation of international law, rights and politics as a planetary ‘culture’ of human rights, 
international rule of law and democracy. This is what is meant here by the ‘disciplinary’ mode of 
international law. 
The disciplinary mode of international law is based on early imaginations of ground, 
exemplified by the role played by the ‘horizon’ in the linear perspective. The invention of both the linear 
perspective and the horizon, as both a visual technology and a physical geographical dividing line with 
normalising and normative implications upon the planet as a whole, can be traced back to the beginnings 
of circumnavigation and the possibilities this generated for thought and the practices of government, and 
thereafter. Indeed, it can be argued that the invention of the linear perspective, which makes both space 
and time calculable or predictable and thereby manageable, also played a crucial role in the emergence of 
international law. The notion of horizon for early navigators was enabling of the linear perspective and 
orientation; this regime of visuality came to dominate international law before postcolonial countries 
gained formal independence. Post-independence, a politics of verticality and containment would 
predominate, aided by the prevailing and pervasive discourse of development.  
 The ‘dissident’ mode of international law proves to be a persistent challenge to the disciplinary 
paradigm outlined above, particularly because it is disruptive of its ‘anchoring’ orientation and constructs 
local orientations in its place, which nevertheless have global effects. The national liberation movements 
that emerged in the 1950s–60s, as well as the Amerindian nations of the sixteenth century, constitute 
useful examples of what I am terming the ‘dissident’ mode of international law, insofar as they question 
                                                            
52 Lindahl, p. 157 
53 Guardiola-Rivera (2013), p. 18 
54 See Lewis R. Gordon, ‘Through the Zone of Nonbeing: A reading of Black Skin, White Masks in celebration of 
Fanon’s eightieth birthday’, C.L.R. James Journal (vol. 11, no.1, Summer, 2005), p. 32. Also see Maria 
Aristodemou, ‘Does the Letter of the Law Always Arrive at Its Destination? A Study in Feminine Psychology’, in 
Law and Literature (vol. 22, issue 3, 2010), p. 399: ‘Freedom outside the law…runs the risk of psychosis’.  
55 See Robert Nichols, ‘Disaggregating Primitive Accumulation’, Radical Philosophy (November/December, 2015) 
for analysis of the term ‘dispossession’ used here.  
56 In Lewis R. Gordon’s analysis, the etymology of ‘damnation’ can be traced back to its Latin and Hebrew roots, it 
can be thought of as describing a process of ‘falling’ not just to ground, but further still – to a place below ground, 
i.e. to hell, the realm of disappearance and non-recognition. See ‘Through the Hellish Zone of Nonbeing: Thinking 
through Fanon, Disaster and the Damned of the Earth’, Human Architecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-
Knowledge (Summer, 2007), pp. 9–11 
57 Guardiola-Rivera (2013), p. 19 
58 See Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Les Damnés de la terre), trans. Constance Farrington, Penguin 
Books (2001), p. 28 
 
 
12 
the key assumption behind ‘disciplinary’ modes of international law: that the legitimacy of a people to 
rule over a territory is correlated with, or even dependent upon, the emptiness of such territory.  
To be clear, it is true that law and politics have been obsessed with ground and origins for quite 
some time.59 The normative idea that people sprung from the earth itself, and are the original inhabitants 
of a country as opposed to foreigners and strangers, and those of their descendants who kept themselves 
free from admixture, ‘is perhaps as old as history itself’.60 We can provide as an example of the classical 
version of this obsession, Isocrates’ Panegyricus, in which the so-called myth of autochthony is 
elaborated. Consider, for instance, the oration, in which Isocrates tells his fellow Athenians: ‘we did not 
become dwellers in this land by driving others out of it, nor by finding it uninhabited, nor by coming 
together here a motley horde composed of many races’. The implication here is that the first person plural 
could only be properly attributed to and used by ‘we of a lineage so noble and pure that throughout our 
history we have continued in possession of the very land which gave us birth, since we are sprung from 
its very soil and are able to address our city by the very names which we apply to our nearest kin’.61 
Because the land endures, as well as our connection with it, there is a ‘we each’ as well as a ‘we 
together’.62 
Dissident approaches to international law take stock of this fact, and question disciplinary modes 
of international law from the standpoint of such critique in theory and practice. Thus, for instance, Third 
Worldist movements in the 1960s and 1970s disclosed how the political legitimacy of planetary rulers, 
and the disavowal of the existence of those subjected to their rule, as well as the system of rules they 
created in order to maintain such a relationship of subjection, including mainstream international law, 
was in fact based upon a prior lack of relation. As such, the system of rules in place can be said to be 
‘groundless’, and its appeal to physical or metaphysical grounding can be judged as, in fact, obscuring or 
disavowing this prior groundlessness. Conversely, those subjected to ‘disciplinary’ rules of international 
law find themselves in a situation that can be characterised as ‘free-fall’. That is the meaning of the term 
‘damnés’ or ‘wretched’ in Frantz Fanon’s analysis of the modern/colonial situation.63 Therefore, their 
self-affirmation can only have as its starting point an acknowledgement of groundlessness, of being de-
based (the native always ‘presumed guilty’), in ‘free-fall’. This amounts to the radical contingency and 
self-constitution of the people as nation, taking place from within the global institutions of international 
law and against them. This could also be said of the Indians in the sixteenth century whose molecular-
becoming and embrace of the other suggested their ‘free fall’ from normative set standards of a planetary 
jurisprudence (ius gentium, ‘ius civile’ – Roman civil law). These Indians were essentially a curious case 
of perceiving oneself and the lands one inhabits as in perpetual transformative movement. The dissident 
paradigm of international law is thus defined by its groundlessness and embrace of absolute contingency.    
We can understand how these two paradigms of international law work by looking at the 
geographical imaginary and spatiality underlying them. The work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, 
who are among the contemporary thinkers and observers of legal and political phenomena pointing 
towards our contemporary condition of groundlessness, is useful in this regard. Their conceptualisation of 
‘striated’ and ‘smooth’ space can be a useful paradigm to examine how the geographical imaginary of 
international law and its related categorical and geographical cuts, divisions or fault-lines, work. The 
spatial cut between the Global North and South can be said to be parallel to the cut that legal institutions 
in general, and those of international law in particular, make between subjects and objects of law. These 
spatial cuts created the grounding for the geometric matrixes of striated space that provided a toolkit to 
colonise the world, and for Western domination as well as the domination of Western concepts. By 
contrast, the smooth space of nomads and Third World social movements here offer a challenge to the 
geometric matrix of capture in which disciplinary international law and its institutions would like to 
plunge the globe.   
These distinctions and clarifications may help us to understand the basis of the legal problem 
that underpins Part One: does the geographical imaginary of the disciplinary mode of international law 
stymie the postcolonial search for justice? And vice versa, how might dissident discourses which 
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underpin an alternative understanding of international law lead to a re-emergence of justice as struggle,64 
albeit from a local level? We argue here that spatialising justice is one of the ways in which we can 
theorise a renewed conception of justice as struggle against the attempts of international law to stymie 
Third World or ‘global southern’ claims. The new identities of social movements in the Third World, 
from the 1960s to the present day, are based on an alternative conception of ‘time-spaces’. This 
emphasises the radically incalculable nature (contingent, groundless) of their dissident discourses, which 
effectively escape the capture of the singular progressivist narrative of First World development.  
Part Two deals with the geographical imaginary as specifically formulated by the medieval 
Dominican Albertus Magnus. The discussion of the latter’s speculative geography occurs in the context 
of an innovative revision of Aristotelian ontology and ethics. Most significantly, Albertus’ adaption of 
Aristotle’s theory of place (topos) involves the suppression of its capacity to act as a meeting point for 
immanent forces. Through this method, Albertus is able to partially revoke the self-ordering capacity of 
Aristotle’s nature (phusis) and push the claims of an arresting form over the movement of matter. The 
drafting in of Neo-Platonism through Arab optics provides for the fixity of the land and the management 
of the earth from above – from the location of a heavens-in-flux. Albertus thus creates the conditions for 
Aristotle’s immanent cosmos to be folded back into human law (nomos): ‘mutual affordability’ channels 
the formative power of the heavens back into a ‘perfectible’ normative legal order of the ‘polis’ and its 
institutions. Within the enclosure of the polis, rationality (logos) and agency are realised through control 
over the setting of normative boundaries. From the planetary perspective, Albertus proclaims the thesis of 
the moral authority of place by positing the tripartite world-machine, or ‘machina mundi’, signifying the 
grafting of a psycho-geography upon the orb of the earth. The privileged middle nations are located in the 
optimal place for the transmission of perfect form from above, and the ethical motion of the polis 
consolidates the citizen as a ‘perfect’ being and master over the earth. The citizen of the middle nations is 
therefore invested with the political power to rule over those imperfectly formed beings of the periphery 
nations. This, crucially, sets up the groundwork for Dominican and Jesuit perspectives on the Indian 
Question, and the most accomplished attempt, by the theologian-jurist Francisco de Vitoria, to justify 
colonialism in the Age of Discovery.    
 Vitoria’s response to the normative challenge thrown up by the encounter between Amerindian 
nations and the conquistadores is examined in Part Three. Vitoria’s jurisprudence, and the spatial form of 
organisation it appears to assume, seemed an answer to both the exclusionary violence (‘Anthropo-
centric’ thinking) propagated by the colonist and the problematic psychology of the Indian. While the 
diametrical duality of animal and man was the schema through which the coloniser perceived the Indian 
as an unrecognisable ‘stranger’, Vitoria’s juridical move is to integrate the Indian into his legal system 
through the use of canon law’s ‘Humanitas’ category of mankind, in addition to old Roman law’s ius 
gentium and ius civile. The integration of the Indian into a planetary jurisprudence bound indigenous 
societies to normative standards set by the Spaniard, thus legitimising within legality the violence that 
had previously existed beyond it. A common framework of law and jurisprudence held out the hope of 
the Indian becoming a fully functioning part of Humanitas, and by implication liberating him from the 
imperfections that were implied by a proximity to the un-orderable earth or the open totality of the given. 
Vitoria’s jurisprudence was thus envisioned as a way to save the Indian from the fall into ‘non-being’ by 
placing him on the ‘child-like’ periphery of the disciplinary system. In summary, we argue, Vitoria’s 
reasoning legitimised the folding of Amerindian nations and their cosmologies back into the positive law 
of Spanish imperialism with its established set of molar institutions. 
  Part Four is concerned with Vitoria’s brand of natural law, derived as it is from St Thomas 
Aquinas. In appraising the ‘profane’ habits indulged in by the Indian – namely cannibalism, polygamy 
and so on – Vitoria worked within Aquinas’ conceptual apparatus, the ‘chain of being’. The latter is 
theorised by Aquinas as an immense cosmic spatial arrangement (what Doreen Massey identifies as a 
‘power-geometry’) or ladder from God all the way to the lowest inanimate beings. The chain thus not 
only acted to order and organise the natural world, but contained a prescriptive normative force 
governing man’s relations with others, such as predatory animals. The onto-theology here is brought 
together and contrasted with Amerindian cosmology and Perspectivism to demonstrate how the latter not 
only acts to destabilise natural law theory and its associated representational conceptual structures, but 
also how its prohibited ontology could herald the return of a form of immanence and dissidence. In this 
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spirit, the shaman as a carrier of animal perspectives demonstrated how an immanent justice emanating 
from indigenous cosmology could act as a way to deconstruct the representational and contracted 
perceptual notions underlying natural law. The alliance-becoming between the free-falling Indian and 
other creatures imprisoned in the chain intimated a way in which indigenous cosmologies and practices 
could curb the stratifying effects of disciplinary institutions and their related anthropocentricism.   
   
 
 
 
 
 Part One: The Horizon of International Law 
Development and Discipline in the Post-National 
Liberal Context 
Chapter One: The Horizon of International Law in its 
Disciplinary Mode 
The idea and image of the horizon have played a central role in the development of the linear and 
progressive perspective that characterises the disciplinary paradigm of international law. The ‘horizon 
line’ came from techniques of measurement used by early Arab navigators as a means of helping them 
orientate themselves upon the roughness of the seas.1 It would prove to be the embryo of the kind of 
linear perspective that has ‘long dominated our vision’, as well as the techniques of management, 
regulation and control based upon the architectonic projection of the mathematical upon the states of the 
world.2   
This is so as the geometric horizon, from its inception as an early navigational concept, has 
entailed the flattening of the space of the globe into an ‘abstract flat line upon which the points on any 
horizontal plan converge’.3 In order to act as an effective object or device of orientation, the horizon can 
be thought of as linear, something which is abstracted from, as well as suppressive of, the virtual 
curvature of the earth. This movement suggests both the construction of an objective 
‘mathematical…infinite, continuous, and homogeneous space’ and the production of a ‘one-eyed and 
immobile spectator’.4 The result is not only the linear horizon that reduces the states of the world to a 
mathematical and measurable perspective, but, in addition, the perceiving subject imagined to be static 
and rooted (well grounded, or with a fixed body and position5). The ‘groundedness’ of the perceiving 
subject vis-à-vis the horizon was indeed crucial to the development of technologies of circumnavigation 
as it posited a stable subjective perception (of the horizon) on a surface that is always moving, flowing 
and sinuous. What is ultimately created here is the fixed point of the horizon/object relative to the 
subject.   
The productive capacities of this invention, the horizon, as a navigational tool as well as a means 
of measurement and control of the risk associated with open spaces, resonate with what Deleuze and 
Guattari would describe as the striating of the smooth space of the seas. It was constructive of an 
orientation, ‘an anchor’ that grounds, holds and creates a sense of direction which would, historically as 
well as conceptually, make possible the emergence of the mainstream or control-‘disciplinary’ paradigm 
of international law. The latter functions, precisely, as an anchoring orientation in a globalised, moving 
world. Put otherwise, it produces a surrogate world, calculable, anchored, divisible and low-variety. It 
orients and grounds by splitting and categorising between the subjects and objects it posits, or as visual 
theorist Hito Steyerl says, observing the political implications and controlling tendencies of political 
technologies of grounding, it reinvents ‘subject, time, and space’ as a ‘tool kit for enabling Western 
domination, and the dominations of its concepts – as well as redefining standards of representation, time, 
and space.’6  
The horizon, as Claire Colebrook relates, is made up of two presumed universals. Firstly, there 
is the encompassing horizon itself, which acts as a ‘Whole’ or final ground for being. Secondly, there is 
the subject. The subject ‘converts being into being for us’.7 The idea here is that the stable subject posited 
by the horizon is not merely a subject, it is the transcendental subject relatively freed from its immersive 
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surroundings. The ‘toolkit’ of Western domination is all too evident here, as the transcendental subject 
within international law is clearly a universalisation (in a geo-political sense) of an all-too-Western 
subject (as will be rendered explicit throughout this work).   
It is important to understand how the concepts related to the horizon work here. For Deleuze, it 
is possible to say that concepts are always orientating,8 that they provide a direction for the movement of 
thought. Concepts are fluid, and ideas provide an orientation and direction for empirical reality to push 
beyond itself. However, the difference to the concepts of disciplinary international law is that they are not 
only foundational – as in their capacity as the key tenets, laying the basis for an international law – but 
productive of the foundation itself. This is what the anchoring orientation consists of; it is creative of 
several legal concepts, which endure through the continued reproduction of their configurations. 
However, the concepts that maintain the foundation (and thus verticality) of international law abandon 
the need for external reference points outside their own (conceptual, coherent) configurations, as they 
claim transcendence.9 This is essentially a form of territorialisation amongst concepts. Transcendent 
concepts, such as the those which go unchallenged in shoring up the foundations of international law, cut 
themselves off from linking with those ‘neighbourhoods’ or configurations of other/alternative 
concepts.10 For the most part, connections between concepts from different or alternative configurations 
have the deterritorialising effect of transforming not just the concepts we are familiar with, but also the 
configurations in which they are embedded. This process helps to continually reactivate a sense of 
contingency amongst concepts, as well as their connections. Transcendence amongst certain legal and 
economic concepts, to put it otherwise, is the result of their ghettoisation as they eschew bridges and 
links to other concepts and their allied neighbourhoods. This only serves to reinforce their power and 
force – particularly in their attempt to create a ground and lay down origins. However, this anchoring 
orientation that is produced from, and is productive of, the dominant Western concepts of international 
law, can only be thought of as a momentary ‘stoppage’ in movement or direction/directional orientation 
(i.e. an orientation which is not wholly fixed).11  
The kind of linear perspective Steyerl refers to, legitimised by the invention of the horizon as 
ground and anchor, would be appropriated by the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century founders of 
international law in terms of justifications for (Western) extension, trans-locality, appropriation and 
dispossession as well as the calculation and management of space and time. It would develop, eventually, 
into the primary or predominant narrative of the politically grounded or control-disciplinary paradigm of 
international law: the narrative of development. As a quasi-ontological narrative (in the sense that it 
provides a name for the fullness of being, that of the ‘us’ or the ‘West’), development is dependent on the 
linear perspective, which draws a horizon line separating the familiar from the hazardous unknown and 
then defines space as ‘calculable, navigable, and predictable. It allows the calculation of future risk, 
which can be anticipated, and therefore, managed.’12 In this way, the narrative of development posits the 
capacity of anticipation/forethought, or the calculable future, as the exclusive space of the West. The 
space which the linear perspective transforms also allows the introduction of a ‘linear time, which allows 
mathematical prediction and, with it, linear progress.’13 The projected space of the horizon would just as 
well project a temporality, which is inherently disciplining in that its raison d’être is to manage the future 
in such a way as to ensure the continuity of the fixed stability of the present orientation. Essentially, this 
would be akin to contemporary forms of cost–benefit analysis14 or risk management, which attempt to 
prevent any destabilisation that would result in a loss of direction for the navigator or a loss of profits for 
the financier.    
It must be noted, then, that the construction of the horizon created a ‘groundedness’, or 
foundation – with the by-product of letting loose a proliferating array of properly disciplinary and 
hegemonic concepts. An example of this is the way in which the control-disciplinary/grounded paradigm 
of international law can act as a ‘horizon’, a navigational tool allegedly helping ‘underdeveloped’ 
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(formerly colonised or Third World) countries steer themselves to calmer tides, thus accepting in the 
process a host of associated concepts – development, the nation-state as engine of economic development 
or protector of the ‘free’ forces supposedly unleashing economic development as well as political 
maturity – and their associated space and temporality, which tame their emancipatory potentials.   
 
The concept of the ‘disciplinary’ can be further explained with recourse to Deleuze and Guattari’s 
allusion in Capitalism and Schizophrenia to ‘Binder gods or magic emperors, One-Eyed men emitting 
from their single eyes signs that capture, [and] tie knots at a distance’.15 This is a description of the linear 
perspective. It produces the horizon that captures the subject, as well as the object, within a static space. 
Talk of ‘bonds’, ‘knots’, ‘nets’ echoes the rubric of the seas and circumnavigation used by Steyerl. The 
act as the horizon does, producing the subject and object through the imposition of social relations of 
dominance between them. An example that Deleuze cites is that of Romulus, who in his mythical 
founding of Ancient Rome, tied and bound brigands and surrounding tribes to the city. We could also 
mention the Gorgon Medusa, whose line of sight made men turn to stone and thus arrested them in a 
static space (‘at a distance’) seemingly without direct violence.  
The capturing process includes the integration of an element into a greater whole or 
configuration. This ‘knot’ is a form of verticality (‘vertical being’) or transcendence16 that leads to the 
formation of a hierarchy predicated upon relativity and comparability. It mirrors the transcendental aspect 
of international law, which in the commitment to relations and comparative narratives (nowadays, 
development, assisted by an assortment of aided indicators and other similar data visualisations) retains 
the force or moment of ‘imperium’17 – which continues to form one of its dimensions. The moment or 
event of capture, which is also a form of deterritorialisation, is reterritorialised within a geometry which 
divides between sections in a relative/comparative order so as to integrate its constitutive elements into a 
value-metric.18  
Alongside Deleuze and Guattari’s Binder Gods of capture, there is the ‘jurist-priest-king’ who 
‘proceeds by treaties, pacts, contracts’.19 He is the creator of law, which he makes into an institution as 
well as subordinating it to politically centralising ends (‘arché’), thereby making law into an 
establishment and not just into an institution, even if and when the diverse sections of the law look like an 
archipelago. In fact, the centralising operation takes place via the division of alliance-structures into the 
‘dividual’20 components, giving international law the combinatory look of an archipelago. The space 
occupied by the institution of law is the same as that which is made possible by the process of capture. 
The law must continually legitimise and justify capture/inclusion, both after the event and as grounds for 
the event. Deleuze and Guattari state that ‘the second pole, the evolved pole, must be in resonance with 
the first, it must continually recharge it in some way.’21 Thus, the Binder Gods and the Jurist-King 
constitute the two poles of sovereignty, which for Deleuze and Guattari comprises the authority of the 
state and the combination of states/markets. Similarly, it can be said that these two interconnected poles 
make up the disciplinary mode of international law. The unity of these poles represents a ‘magical 
capture’ or combination of dividual elements, as the movement of capture/inclusion is always pre-
accomplished and self-presupposing – it is magical in that it has no cause, and always reveals itself as 
self-justifying. 
Thus, we are able to say that Disciplinary International Law (DIL, hereafter) encompasses this 
complex two-way movement, excluding as it captures (‘seizes what comes into reach’22) and integrating 
(and combining) into a greater whole. The integration/capturing process consists of bringing a 
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multiplicity of flows together and making them hold together.23 In addition, lines of escape must be 
anticipated and pre-empted, in order to control from within a posited whole.  
The common space of universal law is the outcome of a ‘deterritorialisation’ in which spatial 
regions of the globe (East/West, North/South) are brought into the global institutions of international law. 
From this point onwards nation-states of the Third World have had to navigate between one international 
legal institution and the next. The outcome mirrors Foucault’s notion of ‘disciplinary societies’ (which 
Deleuze elaborated upon while also building upon Guattari’s original analysis of institutions as dispositifs 
or apparatuses of control24), in which people venture from one enclosed space of imposed normativity 
(the school, the university, the psychiatric institute, the prison, etc.) to the next.25   
It is this common continuum, productive of a ‘relative deterritorialisation’, which integrates by 
creating reciprocal relations between nations within a common framework or relative ‘immanence’. The 
immanence is due to the supposedly horizontal exchange between nations in the making of law within the 
institutions of international law. However, the deterritorialisation is accompanied by a resulting 
reterritorialisation. The process of reterritorialisation is one in which nation-states, which are 
simultaneously created (and recognised) by and transcended through international law, now find 
themselves subject to a global market and its associated metrics – the archipelago of states/markets and 
its visualisation as future-directed data flows. The metrics of macroeconomics are hugely dependent on 
the future-directed productivity of the nation-state, despite the fact that the world can be seen as an 
integrated global marketplace. The metrics have the effect of re-emphasising temporal and spatial 
boundaries, limits and divisions between nations; in other words, metrics ensure comparability. They also 
seek to tame risk or contingency by sustaining the time and space directionality of such boundaries, limits 
and fault-lines as ahead or in a linear narrative. This has its ultimate conceptualisation through the 
economic dividing lines between ‘developed’, ‘developing’, ‘emerging’ countries, etc. (further elaborated 
upon below). 
 Notice however, that future-directed productivity is paired with and conceptualised also as a 
bundle of contingent claims with a payout dependent on the realisation of some future contingent event 
(hence the centrality of the notion of risk, around which current discourses of security and development 
tend to be construed). In turn, the future prices of these contingent claims can become new future events 
on which further contingent claims are written. The security and development complex that increasingly 
shapes the form of DIS depends on this seemingly endless and more or less material chain. A dilemma 
arises here, as DIS and the combination of states fuses itself to the market, defined as such an endless 
material chain. For on the one hand lies the challenge of reducing risk through security/development 
mechanisms, taming contingency or anticipating disaster, while on the other the endless chain of future 
claims and prices, benefits or ‘returns’ (another navigational metaphor) mean that at some point time 
drops out of the equation altogether and the future, literally, is no longer ahead. At this point we can only 
point towards the peculiarity of the dilemma of contemporary DIL, as any attempt to solve it would go 
beyond the confines of this thesis.  
At this point, let us move on to an elaboration of the concept of deterritorialisation, which can be 
described as the freeing of the perception of space from its own locale, and of time from its own 
bounds.26 Put differently, an individual or community’s perception of local space is transcended by a 
more holistic comprehension of space through the process of integration within a larger structure (global-
historical). This is exactly the movement of DIL: at the point where nation-states are integrated within its 
global institutions, those in the Third World are seen to be granted the partial ability to transcend their 
petty particular interests. This is well demonstrated by the eroding of contingent claims presented in 
terms of reparative justice by decolonised countries (to be repaired now rather than in some endless 
future) throughout the years since the national liberation movements of the 1960s. The process of 
reterritorialisation within DIL, then, is best described in this instance by the universalisation of the 
Western consciousness within the horizon of a common space and the totality of time.27 It is the attempt 
to conceptualise global spatiality from within a local sense of space and a total sense of time, which is 
why it focuses on avoiding or more precisely deferring the end (as an example of the security-conscious 
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efforts in international law that re-present the West in the guise of the Christian katéchon, who constantly 
defers the end by avoiding or taming ultimate risks28). Conversely, de-territorialisation efforts such as 
‘permanent decolonisation’ would focus less on the purely local (understood through the myth of 
autochthony, leading to the damnation of the migrant stranger) and on imagining the end of the world, as 
well as how to defer such an end, and more on making sure there will be a world to come.29 It is the local 
sense of space that dominates Western thinking, which following what has been said above could be 
described as apocalyptic, and which has been universalised via international law. This is precisely the 
reason why disciplinary law always tends towards absolute territorialisation: its universalism is built 
upon a particular local/Western perspective. The common space created by international law is 
representative of a spatiality produced by the Western subject made transcendental, and the Western 
consciousness made global. The conceptualisation of the nation-state, in itself, is suggestive of the extent 
in which Western legal concepts have penetrated the global. The dominance of nation-state thinking and 
the ever-increasing communication between nation-states through disciplinary law all serve to shore up 
the common horizon and space30 that supposedly ground international law.  
It can be said that the disciplinary mode of international law is a form of movement itself, in a 
Deleuzian and Guattarian vein. It is an orientation, a moving away as well as a moving ahead. What 
makes disciplinary law so fascinating, however, is that it is perpetually seeking to ground itself, to create 
its own foundations through the process mentioned above, all the while fleeing towards a future that 
never comes. This is its most salient quality and what differentiates it from the movements of bare earth 
(the tendency towards absolute deterritorialisation). While the discovery of any origins or foundation of 
international law is illusionary, the positing of it as grounded/horizon (the transcendent concepts) 
strengthens the illusion of its supposed universality over the earth as the latter’s deferred end – either an 
earth without us, or us without the earth. The nomadic movement of thought and the related absolute 
deterritorialising effects of the earth are effaced by global institutional law’s stratifying and territorial 
attempts of theorising the world (i.e. in terms of nation-states). The positing of an origin or foundation is 
the orientating movement of what Deleuze and Guattari dub a ‘paranoiac transcendental law’31 towards 
an absolute (re-)territorialisation which it cannot completely grasp. DIL is exactly that which captures, in 
order to reduce to origins so as to deny contingency and becoming.  
What disciplinary law actually does is to continually straddle the divide between relative 
deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, which helps constitute the awareness of its own limits. Hence, 
the boundaries of nation-states, which are fundamentally the threshold constituting the limits of their 
existence, fluctuate in the face of international law. Despite this, reterritorialising aspects of international 
law ensure that the geometric grid of lines drawn between nation-states always re-asserts itself. It is this 
re-assertion that demarcates the limits beyond which the institutions of DIL will cease to exercise its 
power of verticality or transcendence.  
 
For the sake of completeness and clarity, let us add some more precision to our definition of the term 
‘disciplinary’ before we move on to considering DIL in the context of development.32 We are deploying 
the term here in the way it is defined by Lewis Gordon, that is to say, in the sense of ‘disciplinary 
decadence’.33  So, we can state that DIL possesses this tendency towards disciplinary decadence, in that it 
turns away from ‘living thought, which engages reality and recognises its own limitations’. Its 
preoccupation and obsessions are solely concerned with transforming its discipline – as in a field of study 
such as development economics – into the world and of justifying itself as ‘right’ through simply 
‘applying, as fetish, the methods correctly.’ Its manner of appraising all other disciplines is thus from ‘its 
supposedly complete standpoint’ or its propensity to lean heavily on its own fetishised terms.   
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To place this in a legal context, we can identify DIL with what the Canadian lawyer Edward 
McWhinney dubs ‘Classical International Law’.34 It is the sort of law that is highly constrained by its 
conservative and unimaginative nature, and which can offer up no novel or radical solutions to the 
complex problems facing the world (of which, for example, climate change is one of the most severe to 
date). In reaction to these factors threatening the world, DIL’s move is to fetishise a duality of terms 
(such as those mentioned above); to posit a hierarchy of sources in respect to treaties, charters, 
declarations, customs or contracts35; and to advance a linear, teleological conception of ‘progress’ as a 
historical fact drawing upon the accumulated wisdom of a West/Europe, which as developed in isolation 
from the empty background of the world – that is, without any interaction with Third World nations. It 
also manages to institutionalise the imagined divide or hierarchy between grown-ups and children – such 
as in the mandate system pre-Second World War and latterly, and most appropriately for this part of the 
thesis, the division between the UN Security Council with its powers of veto and its basis in its members’ 
atomic/nuclear might and capacity to police the world, and the UN General Assembly (UNGA), with its 
seemingly playground indicative votes. To look at it from a different angle, Disciplinary International 
Law is, properly speaking, the ‘object of the challenge to international law’. The latter phrase is revealing 
as, while it is the aim to this thesis to explore the complexity behind its institutional structure, DIL only 
transforms itself when it is effectively challenged by forces it cannot initially contain or counteract. 
Looking at the sources of DIL, we can see that it was able to shape the emerging discipline of economic 
international law post-second world war through: the altering, watering down or constraining of the 
codifying force of UN resolutions and multinational treaties, such as the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States in 1974, in order to protect First World economic interests and to help undermine and 
render contingent the claim of postcolonial nations to sovereignty; the promotion of bilateral treaties 
protecting Western investment overseas and preserving global economic imbalances; international 
arbitration cases favouring Western corporations operating in the Third World; the use of UN economic, 
monetary institutions and development programmes to render postcolonial countries indebted to the First 
World, through, for example, the ‘structural adjustment’ programmes so prevalent in the 1980s, which 
thus reinforced necolonialism or coloniality amongst nations.    
This can be contrasted with ‘contemporary International Law’ (although we must note here that 
McWhinney was writing at a time prior to the point in which the reaction of the Global North to Southern 
claims for restorative justice really took hold through law-as-development and the security-development 
complex in the 1980s) or, in my rubric, Dissident modes of international law. This ‘contemporary’ sort of 
law promises to usher in a ‘new rule of reason’; one that is better equipped to grapple with the pressing 
issues confronting the world and that is more likely to solve problems through experimentation as the 
quickest route to success. It is the law of continual examination and validation; one which is genuinely 
representative and pluralistic, in which the ‘discipline’ and methods or processes of law are not unhinged 
from the exacting requirements to confront a reality demanding radically different means of engagement. 
Despite the institutional power-structure of an international law which gives the UN Security Council 
overruling control, we can point to the spate of significant resolutions that embodied Third World 
intentions of remaking international law into this far more dynamic force: a law that takes into account 
different histories and understandings of law or, to put it another way, the ‘perspectives’ postcolonial 
countries which fall outside Eurocentric legal conceptions.36  
A demonstration of Dissident international law can be perceived in the power of national 
liberation movements accelerating the break away from the old colonial powers, as was signified 
formally through the momentous 1960 UN Resolution, ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples’, which fully recognised that ‘the people of world ardently desire the end 
of colonialism’, that the fetters of imperialism held back the potential and legitimacy of international law, 
and that the self-determination of formerly colonised countries called out for official acknowledgment. 
The right of postcolonial nations to self-determination would be further embedded and consolidated with 
the joint treaty or ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in 1966 and the 
‘Declaration on Social Progress and Development’ in 1969. Further, the assertion of economic rights of 
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newly independent nations was upheld by the resolution at the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development (hereafter, UNCTAD) in 1972 to draw up a charter to ‘protect the rights of all countries, 
and in particular the developing states’ so that a ‘just order and stable world’ may be possible. This was 
an important step in paving the way for the 1972 UNGA resolution establishing the ‘Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States’ (see the case study below) in 1974, complementing the resolution on the 
New International Economic Order (NIEO) of the same year. Moreover, in 1982 the UN Convention on 
the Law of the Sea was finalised, which was the result of a decade-long period of discussion, and 
declared with some justifiable gravity that the seabed is the ‘common heritage of mankind’. These 
resolutions, detailed below, can be thought of, in part, as the expression of a dissident international law37; 
one that places the emphasis on the permanent decolonisation of international law and the self-
determination of the Global South; a fair economic distribution of wealth through economic cooperation 
over competition; the salience of continually establishing a new consensus and producing new rules; a 
nation’s sovereignty over its natural resources, all the while respecting the commons of the earth such as, 
for example, the seabed as a benefit to all and the duty of all to preserve.38  
All that is left for us to say in this chapter is that Dissident international law does not, 
categorically, exist in any ‘pure’ or reified form, but always in complex interaction with DIL. Thus, it is 
for the next section to show how, despite the utopian energies behind the resolutions adumbrated above, 
DIL reasserts its juridical framework in order to limit the genuine achievements of postcolonial nations in 
their critical engagement with international law.          
 
Chapter Two: The Dominant Structuralising Discourse of 
International Law: Development in the Post-National 
Liberation Context 
There was much debate amongst legal theorists concerning the context of DIL in the period following 
decolonisation, and again at the time national liberation movements in parts of the Third World seemed 
to lose their initial momentum. During the 1960s and 1970s a host of postcolonial countries joined the 
United Nations (UN), and this fanned hopes of a newfound global universality of international law.  
To pinpoint the historical moment more precisely, let us refer to the 1960 UN Resolution, 
‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples’, as a pivotal moment 
that announced in its passage through the UNGA that ‘the process of liberation is irresistible and 
irreversible and that, in order to avoid serious crises, an end must be put to colonialism…’39 Prior to the 
Declaration, a number of contextual factors defined the period leading up to this moment of affirmative 
self-determination for the Third World and the effect it had in transforming international law. To 
comprehend this better, we can, in order to heuristically aid us in providing us with more historical 
specificity, follow S.K Chatterjee by dividing international law into sub-periods of law-making. In the 
immediate post-war period, that is, 1945–55, the UN set out as international norms the key principles of 
decolonisation and self-determination. Antonio Cassese has produced a useful summary of the factors, 
which influenced the direction of travel of the UN during this period, and we can list them here as: (1) the 
pressure brought to bear from Soviet states on the West; (2) colonial peoples insistence on ‘rights’ and 
vocalisation of it in Resolutions and Declarations in the UNGA, as well as through national liberation 
movements on the ground; (3) the cost of colonialism to European powers; (4) the rise of anti-colonial 
social democratic parties in Europe.40 Indeed, by 1955 the pressure of these factors broke the ‘logjam’ on 
                                                            
37 Although this is not to say, as will be made clear below, that aspects of these resolutions are not problematic.  
38 The Mexican delegate, speaking in favour of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States at the UNGA’s 
twenty-ninth session, 2315th Plenary meeting on the 12 December 1974, put it eloquently: ‘The world does not lack 
the physical resources or the spiritual energy to create a sound shared economy. The problem is poor distribution and 
poor use, and that is why there is an urgent need for an ethic of international solidarity…we speak of a new 
international economic order based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence and cooperation among all States, 
of a legal order that requires for its development strict respect for such principles of law as non-intervention, peaceful 
co-existence, the obligation not to commit aggression…in a word, we speak of an international morality which will 
really bring together the powerful and the weak, and form the bridge for a genuine international coexistence.’ See 
A/PV.2315, pp. 1377, para.158 
39 From text on Res. 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples 
(1960), recorded in Evans, p. 81 
40 Cassese, pp. 328–9 
 
 
22 
admission of new members to the UN, permitting sixteen states ‘representative of all main ideological 
systems’ to join the UNGA, largely altering its composition and the balance of power in international 
law.41 Bearing this historical context in mind, with the expansion of the legitimacy of DIL, the major 
debate hinges around the question of whether postcolonial states proceeded to accept the prevailing 
Western paradigm of DIL or, at least, did little to challenge its hegemony.  
We shall argue in this section that postcolonial states did in fact attempt a number of challenges 
to the ‘imperial’ (colonial, or postcolonial disciplinary) framework of DIL, but many of these ended in 
disappointment. The failure of postcolonial states post-independence to radically assert themselves and 
transform DIL away from Western hegemony is constitutive of several tensions. Firstly, there was a 
tension consisting of the strategic errors of postcolonial countries, which took place at the level of DIL. 
These involved the unwitting acceptance of the epistemology of their former coloniser.42 However, 
alongside this, there was still a refusal to accept Western values wholesale, as well as a partial rejection 
of the affirmation of reason and ‘truth-as-groundedness’ (or Enlightenment) as universal.43 After all, 
Third Worldism emerged from the attempt to challenge certain aspects of DIL. Secondly, tensions existed 
between the initial successes of postcolonial national liberation movements in breaking away from the 
coloniser and the eventual ceasing up of these movements’ momentum, followed by their failure and 
fading out. This resulted in the acceptance of state structures geared towards development in ‘one world’ 
flattened by capitalism and the disciplinary rule of law.     
In the second period of international law making from 1956–65, characterised by the gaining of 
independence by many of the former colonies, the desire of many postcolonial states to move towards 
economic self-sufficiency became a major issue. This was embodied in and accommodated through the 
setting up of many UN representative bodies, building on the establishment of the Bretton Woods 
Institutions (BWIs) in 1945. In addition to those bodies, First World nations, in order to advance their 
own interests, set up the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1960 to 
represent the organised industrial might of the Western world, representing twenty-six states in total at 
this point. It acted as a forum ‘for cooperation, especially with regard to the coordination of economic 
and monetary policies for its members.’44 In the same year, the first UN development decade was 
proclaimed and regional economic organisations such as OPEC were founded to organise the major oil 
exporters in a single forum, challenging the power of US oil multinationals. Four years later, to 
complement the OECD, UNCTAD was established to represent the economic interests of developing 
nations, including the Group of 77 ‘non-aligned’ Third World nations. These institutions, representing in 
varying degrees the economic interests of First and Third World nations, were operating and competing 
with each other to shape the emerging discipline of economic international law. Even prior to the creation 
of these institutions, a number of resolutions had passed from 1952–8 which mandated various UN 
commissions to look into the validity of Third World nations laying a claim to PSNR.45 
 According to legal theorist and international lawyer Sundhya Pahuja, the accession of DIL and 
its related structures by the late 1950s (recalling the expansion of UN membership in 1955 and its steady 
increase up to the 1960 resolution) had created a ‘universal juridical frame covering the globe’.46 One of 
the major outcomes of this was the acceptance that ‘nation-statehood was the only way to claim legal 
personality’ in this juridical framework. This would result in ‘heterogeneous movements for 
decolonisation’ being ‘smoothed over into a coherent story to be contained within the broader framework 
set by Western interests.’47 For former colonial states to have access to what Pahuja calls the ‘promise of 
international law’ and to be seen as legal actors in the world at large, tacit acceptance of the ‘national-
state’ was required. This conception of statehood, heavily loaded with Western tones, makes use of a 
perspective of a central observer (the Western subject), organising around him an ‘outside’ that might be 
brought within sight, and at the same time, and in the same move, kept at a distance. It is thus that the 
renewed, so-called post-war, structure of DIL ‘captured’ postcolonial countries within a legal political 
framework which was very much part of a Western colonising lineage.   
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While the acceptance of nation-statehood would have later consequences for postcolonial states, 
the benefits of shaping DIL in a Third World direction seemed promising. It is this ‘promise’, as 
described by Pahuja, which held out hope to the Third World that it could shape international law by 
effectively using it as a ‘site for struggle’ for its interests.48 These interests would focus on the hope of 
postcolonial justice, a justice that would pivot around the repair of the economies of countries ravaged by 
colonialism. Essentially, DIL promised a kind of additive (as opposed to subtractive) or reparative 
justice, which would be inclusive of the claims of the Third World.    
As former colonial countries broke away from imperialism, the resulting nationalism can be 
considered a double-edged sword, according to Pahuja. On the one hand it was a challenge to the 
domination of the coloniser; such a conception of national liberation is championed by thinkers such as 
Michael Neocosmos and will be discussed below. On the other hand, Pahuja argues that it ‘required an 
acceptance by the colonised of the coloniser’s epistemological frame’ because of what was, in fact, the 
particular perspective of the nation as a social-organisational form based on procedures for decision-
making and public opinion-making that remained blind to its own genocidal logic.49 With the nation-state 
becoming a mainstream category in DIL, one that disavowed its own dependence on procedures to empty 
lands and minds (e.g. the ‘vanishing Indian’ in US legal and political history, or the ‘Indian’ and ‘Negro 
problem’, as well as the disavowal of slavery in the case of the trans-Atlantic nations), it would be easy to 
posit it as a universal entity, one whose alleged ‘universality’ would depend upon, and be the direct result 
of, its ‘purification’. This is to say that the race/class division (conceived of here as two hands on an 
ideological clock, moving at different historical speeds, but functionally coinciding in the case of 
historical, catastrophic events) acts to erase the particularity of the nation-state as a ‘Western’ or 
‘colonial’ socio-political entity, turning it instead into a ‘global’ or at least ‘international’ and 
‘metropolitan’ (or even cosmopolitan) entity.  
This is true to a certain extent. However, the nationalism that Pahuja attributes to the 
postcolonial states did not necessarily, at first, wholly accept the Western model of the nation-state. The 
period of national liberation struggle actually constituted a challenge to mainstream models of social 
organisation. Although Pahuja does not consider it in detail,50 national liberation movements at the time 
of decolonisation did provide some significant resistance to the eventual acceptance of the 
‘epistemological frame’ of the coloniser. 
Indeed, whilst on the stage of DIL former colonial countries had accepted the nation-state as 
their mode of socio-political organisation by the late 1970s, observers like Michael Neocosmos chart a 
slightly different story in respect to what occurred within the national liberation movements of the 
postcolonial states in Africa.51 Major nations in North Africa had gained political independence in the 
1950s and 60s, with Libya doing so in 1951, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan and Ghana in 1956, and Algeria 
following suit in 1962 after a protracted war with their colonial overlords, France.52 Within the UN, 
important debates were taking place on Permanently Sovereignty over National Resources (PSNR) from 
1952–8, with the resolution passing in 1962, while UNCTAD, throughout its heightened period of law-
making from 1969–74, had pushed for the economic self-determination of Third World nations to be 
recognised through the UNGA, by way of NIEO and the Charter of 1974. The resultant discourse had 
strongly attached the idea of the nation state to development (see below); however, the idea of national 
sovereignty was still a pivotal rallying cry which acted as a counterpoint to the asymmetrical nature of 
international economic relations.  
For Neocomos, during this period of national liberation struggles in North Africa from roughly 
1951–62, the fight for decolonisation had led to the conception of the nation not as the nation-state, as 
would become ubiquitous post-independence, but as ‘the people making themselves as they make the 
nation…a subjective becoming’, or an emergent political body out of the debris left after colonisation.53  
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This idea of national liberation rejected any notion of the nation based on ‘social entities such as 
indigeneity, ethnicity or race’.54 National liberation was a matter of the politicised collective subject 
producing itself as an inclusive people or nation. The nation is here understood as an inclusive notion that 
links a particular people to the oppression that humanity as a whole faces through subjugation to 
hierarchical and exploitative structures. In the words of Fanon it is a ‘universal politics concerning 
humanity as a whole and not a matter of attaining independence in a particular country’.55 This concept of 
the nation is couched in similar terms to what some legal theorists denote as ‘bare sovereignty’, or the 
idea that a community of people can make the ‘decision to be in common’ and give to itself the law 
outside of any particular forms of political community.56       
While national liberation movements remained popularly based on the politicised masses, the 
nation as an entity did not necessarily equate itself with a particular centralised socio-political 
organisation such as the nation-state. This particular hegemonic political ‘sequence’ of the nation would 
not let such a centralising conception take hold. Indeed, it was a form of rupture or event that was 
successful in producing a reconfiguration of social relations, in this case a break from colonial rulers. The 
linear perspective which had dominated the old imperialism was ruptured as ‘the central viewpoint, the 
position of mastery, control, and subjecthood…[was] abandoned and [started] tumbling and tilting, taking 
with it the idea of space and time as systemic constructions.’57 The new self-constituted subjecthood of 
the postcolonial subject was breaking away from the ‘groundedness’ of DIL as old imperialism by 
proclaiming that only the people could create themselves in light of an absence of ground.58 The logical 
conclusion of such an emancipatory situation would be the rejection of the concepts of development, 
nation-state and so on, which were so vital in ensuring the predominance of DIL as grounding or 
foundational. The position of the people/nation here can be described as in a state of ‘free-fall’, ‘floating 
over an absent ground’59 in the downfall of the linear perspective. The free-fall of postcolonial peoples 
could only prove to destabilise the (linear) perspective of the fixed (Western) subject of the old 
imperialism of DIL. Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Mask is illustrative here. In a memorable passage, 
he describes how the black person’s encounter with the white observer ends up disturbing the latter’s 
sense of perspective, leading to their disorientation.60 In this fashion, national liberation movements had 
the force of the event for DIL, emphasising, on the one hand, the contingency upon which the old 
imperialism and its rule of law was based, and on the other, the Third World’s taking into its own hands 
the construction of its own political subjectivity, without reservation or ground.61 As the horizon of the 
old imperialism/DIL was fading away, postcolonial subjects could become free to navigate and chart their 
own course, as ‘perspectives assume mobile points of view and communication is disabled within one 
common horizon’.62 
At the time of these social movements, the politically active collective subject was linked tightly 
together with the sense of justice embodied by emancipatory politics. It was the same longing for the 
injustices of the colonialism of the past to be put right in the present that would draw the Third World 
into the structures of DIL. In the same vein in which DIL captured postcolonial states through the 
acceptance of the nation-state form, ‘the decline of the emancipatory politics of the people-nation’ was 
replaced ‘by state politics, by the politics of the nation-state’.63 The political ‘sequence’ (in Neocosmos’ 
terms) of national liberation movements was to fizzle out right at the moment when many former colonial 
states had won their independence. A major reason for this is pointed out by Fanon, who observes that 
‘the economic interests of the national bourgeoisie’ dictated that ‘they move into the posts and the 
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businesses vacated by the departing Europeans’.64 The creation of the nation-state post-independence 
chimed with the needs of national elites to maintain a type of concentrated power in the vacuum that the 
Europeans had left behind. As these elites used the nation-state to concretise their power, ‘nationalism’ 
became less a universal politics against oppression, and more ‘based on race and indigeneity in order to 
exclude’.65 The trick here was to use a sometimes ethnically-based nationalism in order to (re)direct 
anger against the foreigner; it proved an effective way for national elites to monopolise access to 
resources and then direct the incriminations elsewhere. These claims are reinforced by Balakrishnan 
Rajagopal, who points out that ‘it is well known that the Europeanized elites who led these countries 
choose to follow western models of polity and economy.’66 The universalism that Fanon had equated 
with national liberation had broken down into a pervasive type of particularism, strangling the Third 
World’s claims to justice.   
The emergence of the nation-state form was also abetted by what Neocosmos sees as the 
political party’s co-option of the people as nation. With independence, the idea that ‘the party has the 
effect of fusing popular consciousness with that of the state’ became irresistible.67 Justice as the struggle 
for reparation, which underpinned national liberation, had now given way to the social programme of the 
governing party of the state. This had the effect of making emancipation as it was conceived of in 
national liberation redundant; the new consensus would be one based on the political agency of party 
officials over that of the people as nation. The party was now said to represent the people rather than the 
people constituting themselves.  
The ascendancy of the nation-state form was the outcome of a two-way movement. The first 
movement was on the level of DIL, which was the acceptance of the nation-state form in order to be 
included within the budding new global universality of the juridical framework. The second parallel 
movement was within postcolonial countries themselves, as the internal tension that initially manifested 
itself in national liberation ended up in the propping up of the nation-state as it suited national elites.  
The formulation of postcolonial states, and the Third World more generally, into nation-states 
had many salient consequences for these countries and their standing within DIL. The integration of these 
countries into the structure of DIL may have offered the hope of some Third World influence over its 
orientation, but it also subsumed them within a paradigm still dominated by Western thinking. The 
particular values of the West, or First World, were embedded within a framework that claimed the 
universal quality of those values. Hence, DIL is both liberatory and imperial, a continuity of the old 
imperialism but also a break from it. In Pahuja’s words it ‘did not bring the new equality it promised, but 
did in fact effect a shift from the old rationality of rule to one which in the operative mode of that 
rationality was precisely the assertion of universality.’68  
The break with the old imperialism was really testimony to the growing strength of the Third 
World through the national liberation movements (discussed above), to such an extent that Rajagopal 
suggests that ‘the emergence of ordinary people of the Third World as political actors could no longer be 
ignored – [it] was transforming the relations between the West and the Third World.’69 Legal theorists 
such as Rajagopal and Upendra Baxi agree that the national liberation movements not only espoused 
alternative modes of socio-political organisation (as Neocosmos alludes to), but were also a ‘world 
historic rupture, in turn resulting in alternative visions and paths of development’.70 However, the 
political sequence or event which led to the surfacing of the Third World in acts of resistance against the 
old imperialism would have to be contained, and subsequently ‘the relationship between the West and the 
Third World would not be governed by colonialism, but by a new discipline called development.’71 
The emergence of development, or developmentalism, as the dominant discourse of DIL had its 
seeds in the formation of the new nation-states of the Third World. Western governments could now 
proclaim the universality of the nation-state as a legal category. From this would flow various concepts 
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that would help contain the Third World within a Western paradigm, concepts that would take the nation-
state as their foundational category. 
Within the new structure of DIL, ‘development rejected race-based distinctions without 
challenging hierarchical organisation or foreign domination per se.’72 In principle, the old hierarchy of 
imperialism based on race had no place within new structures of DIL, in principle. However, a new 
hierarchy of nations based on the ‘scientific measure’ of GDP had taken its place and the ‘new’ 
framework did not do away with the essential identification between lack of future (or the capacity to 
calculate it, i.e. forethought) and the almost presumed backwardness of certain peoples located south of 
the equator.73 The ostensible sovereign equality of nations which drew the Third World into DIL was, in 
reality, subservient to a new world order based on the modern ‘master discourse’ of macroeconomics 
underpinned by a geopolitics whose origins are much older, as we shall see later on. The former 
(economics) operates as ground, whereas the latter is in fact part and parcel of a metaphysics linking 
moral as well as political authority to place, and serves as background (the earth as background). The 
potential of DIL, embodied in the voting power of Third World nations in the UNGA (after postcolonial 
countries had joined the organisation), was contained by the supremacy of economics over law and geo-
politics over international law. In the realm of economics, structures such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB) and International Development Association (IDA) proliferated. We can 
identify these as the international economic and monetary institutions that first emerged out of the 
Bretton Woods Agreement in 1945.  
The first two decades of IMF and WB lending were focused exclusively on industrial countries, 
but this facility was largely extended to developing nations at the time of the ‘oil shocks’ of 1973–4 and 
1979–80 and the Latin American debt crises that followed. The establishment of a new arm of the WB, 
the IDA, also enabled a far greater degree of lending. While in the early years of the decade First World 
industrial nations had participated in the ongoing dialogue on worldwide economic management and 
North-South relations,74 it was only in the latter part of the decade that, in response to an emboldened 
Group of 77, a more solidified and penetrative, if still preliminary, prescription for managing the global 
economic international order would emerge. This was the ‘Washington Consensus’.75 Named by the 
economist John Williamson, it developed in the OECD, where, according to the former, ten policies, 
including adhering to fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditure, privatisation, deregulation and 
promotion of property rights among others, had become ‘accepted as appropriate.’ The tenets of 
monetarism, supply side economics and minimal government were also a basis for shaping economic 
international law and international relations, particularly in regard to sweeping aside ‘old ideas of 
development economics’ that had taken root in Latin American countries, in order to implement plans for 
‘structural adjustment’ – the first structural adjustment loans programmes were launched by 1980 – on 
the basis of the aforementioned tenets.76  
In parallel with the UNCTAD activity in the 1969–74 years, an early form of the Washington 
Consensus would become influential in the IMF and WB, whose operations the United States would have 
an effective veto over. This was due to the watering down of the initially equally weighted voting system 
that applied to all lending nations. The reality was one of American influence, able to direct lending 
towards or away from developing nations depending on geopolitical considerations, as was exemplified 
in its threat to withdrawn its substantial funds from the WB if it lent to Vietnam during the height of the 
Cold War in the mid-1970s, or the extensive funding offered to the Somoza regime in Nicaragua to act as 
a bulwark against socialist governments in the region.77 For countries going through economic 
depressions the conditionality of accepting loans would involve the above-mentioned policies of 
structural adjustment, and in this period more specifically it followed the ‘Polak model’ (‘the first 
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rendition of the Washington Consensus’).78 The model linked the solution to balance of payments issues 
with the need for debt-ridden countries to reorder their economy through reduction in government 
spending and selling off of public assets – a policy that further exacerbated crises in borrowing 
countries.79 In the context of Latin America, a combination of over-exposed commercial banks, increased 
volatility and what was perceived as political instability creating a climate of economic uncertainty, is 
said to have informed the IMF approach of prioritising the ‘stabilisation’ of finances through 
liberalisation of the nation’s economy (all spelled out in the Kissinger Commission Report of 198480) in 
return for acceptance of loans.81 This also allowed the BWIs to paint themselves as the protectors of the 
world economy, a discourse that echoes the position of industrial nations vis-à-vis the Charter of 1974. In 
the case of Mexico, after years of resistance to loans from the BWIs, repeated refusals to join the GATT 
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and to hand over economic data to the WB, the government 
was forced to accept loans from the IMF in 1982 – during which process it was also coming under 
pressure from the US with whom it was negotiating a bilateral treaty – under the conditions of structural 
adjustment and cuts to public budgets. As an incentive for changes in macroeconomic policy, the IMF 
and WB continued to offer the Mexico extensive loans that were taken up, despite dissent inside sections 
of its government. The WB proceeded to institutionalise itself in the country in an advisory capacity to 
Mexican financial institutions, even offering regular analysis and proscriptions on economic performance 
on a six-month rolling period to the country’s central bank.82  
Another case epitomising the BWI’s approach, this time in Africa, concerns Zambia.83 The 
country was the largest recipient of IMF loans in 1973, and took out further loans in 1976 and 1978. The 
nation’s desperation for these loans was borne out of conflict with neighbouring Zimbabwe and the 
resulting closure of the border between the two countries, which caused significant disruption to transport 
links and adversely impacted Zambia’s economy. The condition of the loans was a steep reduction in the 
country’s deficit. Despite the initial success of the country’s debt reduction strategy, a severe cut in 
capital expenditure ended up decimating its public finances and fuelled a political backlash. The response 
of the IMF directorate to this crisis was to call for a programme of far deeper structural adjustment, not 
just in Zambia but throughout the whole of Africa.84  
It was very much the ‘discipline’ meted out by the economic organs of the UN, dominated by 
First World industrial powers, first and foremost amongst them the US, which moulded economic 
international law and the world order so as to counteract the dissident effects of UNCTAD activity. The 
disciplinary elements here are in respect to debt obligations and contracts between the IMF/WB and the 
‘debt colonies’ that appeared in the 1973–82 period (alongside bilateral treaties agreed in the 1980s, see 
below for the specific cases), particularly in Latin America and Africa. The narrative of the Washington 
Consensus and its preliminaries placed international institutions of law in the hands of a fetishised 
economics which accentuated the following of programmes, or, in short, the correct ‘method’ of 
development, in an attempt to hold in place the asymmetry of North-South relations.      
 
The expansion of these structures further entrenched the extension of surveillance capabilities for DIL, 
and that chimed from the get-go with what Steyerl calls ‘the politics of verticality’.85 With the ‘free-fall’ 
and contingency that characterised, for a short period of time, Third World national liberation 
movements, the disciplinary paradigm of international law came into full swing, in order for the ‘new 
subjectivity’ of those movements to be ‘safely folded into surveillance technology’,86 serving the 
purposes of development and security. But unlike the linear perspective which still dominates aspects of 
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international law, particularly the linear temporality of development, the new surveillance of BWIs87 
would take a ‘God-like perspective’, ‘the view from above’ and ‘a perfect metonymy for a more general 
verticalization of class relations in the context of an intensified class war from above – seen through the 
lenses and on the screens of the military, entertainment and information industries.’88 The view from 
above is demonstrable of the new power of macroeconomics and pseudo-scientific indicators like GDP, 
which take on an uncontested and divine trajectory, specifically in their capacity to arrange nation-states 
hierarchically from a seemingly global/universal perspective. This vertical view, like the linear 
perspective, presupposes a horizon or stable ground, and constitutes a privileged subject taking an aerial 
perspective.89 The ‘free-fall’ of national liberation movements may have enacted the partial downfall of 
the linear perspective and its alliance with the old imperialism, but the new verticality of DIL ensured 
that the Third World remained constrained by the acceptance of its new ground/foundation and 
corresponding subjectivity. This ground is consolidated and built upon by the master discourse of 
macroeconomics as it utilises its power to view societies from above, in order to ensure that they are 
‘surveilled aerially and policed biopolitically’.90 However, it is still fundamentally the case that while the 
politics of verticality provides the renewed orientation of DIL, it does so ‘in a condition in which the 
horizons have, in fact, been shattered’.91 The importance of this is that alternative paradigms of 
international law, such as those articulated by ‘dissident discourses’92 and social movements, can still be 
seen as viable and as having the potential force of an event.  
Despite this, BWIs and associated structures would maintain the hierarchy of nations. This 
would be ‘a scalar, or graduated, organization of states secured by positing an ostensibly universal end 
point in the status of the “developed.”’93 Pahuja notes that this graduated hierarchy is slightly different 
from what went before, particularly in comparison to previously rigidly based racial hierarchies, which 
were held in place by an essentialised geography. This new hierarchy held out a promise that one could 
get to the end point and gain acceptance; one could claim the covetous title of a ‘developed’ nation. Baxi 
calls this temporality the ‘enduring time’94 of development, an indefinite waiting period the 
underdeveloped country must experience in order to enter the league of the developed, the First World. 
The indeterminateness of the time that must be spent in the ‘historical waiting room’ is a way in which 
the First World (‘the centre’) ensures that the Third World (‘the periphery’) remains in a state of 
‘backwardness’ and thus within the ambit and influence of global economic institutions. Put simply, the 
Third World will never be able to catch up and will always lag behind the First, despite the promise of 
ultimate salvation in development.95  
The triumph of the nation-state form in postcolonial countries was, then, problematic, 
specifically because the dominant development discourse of DIL intrinsically linked the nation-state with 
development through GDP (and macroeconomics in more general terms). The universality of the nation-
state had created a milieu in which nations could be legitimately compared to one another, in terms of 
economic development; this assumed the ‘difference in wealth between countries could be described as 
inequality’, and further ‘presupposed the existence of a global economic system in which the Third 
World was ready to participate’.96 The Third World nation-state had now become the developmental 
nation-state. The nation had become a legal category that was now intimately intertwined with a global 
system posited by the First World and was held up by DIL’s privileging of development as a way to 
renew itself in a globalised world. While the nation had crucially resisted its structuralisation into a 
particular socio-political form in the period of national liberation, the nation-state was, at this point, 
easily co-opted into the domain of developmental discourse.  
The problem was further compounded by the fact that many Third World lawyers accepted 
development discourse as a way to renew DIL, as Third World ‘problems of poverty, illiteracy and social 
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backwardness provided the raw materials for the renewal of the discipline.’97 The thinking of these Third 
World lawyers focused upon the social component and possibilities of DIL, which could continue to 
ensure its relevance in a globalised context. UN delegates from various parts of the Third World 
condoned this, as they were content to confine their ‘backwardness’ to the economic sphere, while 
claiming political and cultural independence and sovereignty.98 The embrace of ‘backwardness’ had 
much to do with demands that the Third World be taken seriously in its claims for justice. Justice here 
was seen as the righting of economic wrongs, largely the exploitation of resources which took place 
under colonialism. The problem lay with the fact that these legitimate claims for justice were largely 
reduced to issues around development. In other words, development remained ‘tethered to the notion that 
the Global North owes nil obligation of global reparative justice’ to the Global South.99 
The irony is that all the claims to justice that the Third World would make within DIL would be 
twisted by the ‘ruling rationality’,100 which would transform claims to justice into claims regarding the 
promotion of development. On many occasions in which the Third World has used the structures of DIL, 
as Rajagopal would have it, as ‘terrains of resistance and struggle’,101 the result has been to expand and 
extend the reach of developmental intervention and surveillance through provoking the proliferation of 
such structures.   
 
The period of 1969–74 proved to be particularly productive for Third World nations in terms of the 
‘many important resolutions, draft conventions or reports and declarations adopted by the UNGA’.102 
During these years, significant progress was made towards the drafting of the Charter of the Economic 
Duties and Right of States, and it was indeed adopted in December 1974.103 The debates and 
manoeuvrings that took place in preparation for the Charter are of especial importance to us as they 
demonstrate effectively the clash between dissident and disciplinary modes of international law within 
the organs of the UN. Alongside the Declaration on New International Economic Order and its 
Programme of Action, the Charter’s adoption can be considered a watershed moment, constituting a sort 
of inflection point in the history of international law.  
 Much of the discourse around the package of suggested economic reforms in 1974 was 
propelled by the momentum of the Group of 77, the grouping of Third World nations that were 
increasingly asserting their economic and social rights in the lexicon of sovereignty and self-
determination. For our purposes and for the sake of providing the necessary context for our primary case 
study, we can track the Group of 77’s influence from the establishment of the UNCTAD in 1964. 
UNCTAD, according to S.K. Chatterjee, made efforts towards the ‘modification of rules in almost every 
kind of economic and financial transaction, including private foreign investment, based on their own 
rationale.’104 The purpose of UNCTAD was to act as forum for Third World nations to push their 
economic interests and to shape the direction of developmental discourse in the emerging field of 
economic international law. At the 2315th plenary of the UNGA, December 1974, in which the resolution 
on the Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States was discussed and voted on, the Argentinian 
delegate speaking in its favour confirmed that the Charter was to be ‘an instrument of economic 
international law, a branch of law in which there is considerable creative momentum because it reflects 
urgent needs felt by both [Third World] Governments and peoples.’105 The newly developing realm of 
economic international law was a discipline that promised to benefit postcolonial nations by equalising 
disparities in resources. However, UNCTAD’s work not only offered alternative economic reforms to 
redress the balance between the First and Third World, it also intended to rectify more generally the 
social power imbalance across the Global North and South which had emerged from years of colonialism. 
 Certainly, the worsening global economic backdrop at the time accentuated the need for a new 
framework of cooperation between the First and Third World. Peter Malanczuk expresses the view that 
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the widespread monetary issues of the time such as inflation were conducive to forms of non-tariff 
protectionism and catalysed the movement towards integration into regional economic blocs; 
developments that were seen as a tendency away from the policy of liberalising trade and the removal of 
tariff barriers favoured (although not solely) by industrial nations.106 This climate was encapsulated by 
the oil crisis in 1973 driven by the Arab-Israeli conflict, heightening the suspicious regard in which many 
postcolonial countries held the traditional economic order. The conflict itself resulted in a series of 
resolutions from 1972–5 in which Arab states invoked the principle of PSNR and referred to the 
declaration of the NIEO in calling for ‘restitution of and full compensation’ for damage inflicted on 
natural resources.107 Another time-appropriate case concerns the dispute that rumbled on throughout the 
1970s between the US oil multinational Texaco and the Libyan Arab Republic over compensation due 
because of the latter’s nationalisation of US owned oil refineries and related infrastructure: an 
international arbitration process not resolved until 1979 with a judgement in favour of the former. 
Beyond this period, as a sort of epilogue, we can refer to American International Group Inc. v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran (1983), dealing with, again, the nationalisation of US investments overseas and the 
infamous case of US v. Nicaragua (1986), in which the latter had its accusations of infringement of 
sovereignty through armed intervention upheld.108  
Many of the issues of the early 1970s fed into UNCTAD, and in its third session in April 1972 
in Santiago, Chile, the Mexican president Luis Encheverría kick-started the process of addressing the 
need for a radically new framework of international economic and social norms through an appropriate 
and legally binding resolution:  
 
“We must strengthen the precarious legal foundations of the international community. A just order and a stable world 
will not be possible until we create obligations and rights which protect the weaker States. Let us take economic co-
operation out of the realm of goodwill and put it into the realm of law. Let us transfer the concrete principles of 
solidarity among men to the area of relations among countries.” 109 
 
The power harnessed by UNCTAD had already initiated, directly and indirectly, a host of measures and 
resolutions geared towards addressing some of escalating issues outlined, a few of which I shall mention 
here in addition to those above. These included measures on advancing peace and security in 
international relations, such as through the Declaration on the Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States (adopted on 24 March 1971); on common sovereignty 
over natural resources beyond the jurisdiction of any given state with the Working Paper on the Regime 
for the Seabed and Ocean Floor (13 December 1969); on redressing imbalances in economic power in 
trade with the Decision on Generalised System of Preferences (January 1970; November 1972); on 
protection and conservation of the environment with the Declaration of the Human Environment (June 
1972); on anti-discrimination with the Draft Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime 
of Apartheid (28 October 1971); reports on the Impact of Multinational Corporations on Development 
Problems and on International Relations (4 October 1970); and on further delegitimising foreign 
intervention with the  Draft Definition of Aggression (April 1974).110    
 The intense activity of UNCTAD during this period had naturally led to the need for an 
overarching framework to deal with issues relating to the entire economic system. The Charter, as has 
previously been alluded to, was meant to be a binding multinational treaty and hence codified into 
international law. This is attested to by the UNCTAD Working Group tasked with carrying forward the 
Charter from 1972–4. In drafting the Charter, a number of paragraphs originally inserted by the Group of 
77 were subsequently removed in order to narrow the area of disagreement between the 77 and First 
World nations. At the Working Group meeting of the 1 August 1974 in Mexico City, the ‘transitional’ 
paragraph is recorded as supported by the 77. It states that ‘The General Assembly solemnly adopts this 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States as a first step in the codification and progressive 
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development of this subject…’111 The paragraph was removed from the substantive prior to the draft 
resolution being presented for adoption at the twenty-ninth session of the UNGA. Additional evidence is 
given by the Commission of the European Communities in 1974, which confirmed that the ‘significance 
of the Charter’ was such that it would ‘provide guidelines that states will henceforth observe in their 
economic relations’. It would also have a ‘certain influence’ on the direction of the ‘evolution of 
international law’.112 This would be, albeit not in a binding fashion, captured in the preamble, where the 
accent was placed on the ability of the Charter to induce and fashion the evolution of international 
relations and norms – in it’s own words, to ‘evolve a substantially improved system of international 
economic relations’. Any mention of codification is also confined to the preamble, and only then in 
relation to the aspirations of previous resolutions and not relating to the substantive.    
 For some experts on the history of international law, the fact the Charter was drained of its legal 
force, in the absence of consensus, much diminished its influence.113 In light of this, reoccurring disputes 
still arose as to whether it could be a source of customary law, but perhaps this misses the point 
somewhat. Despite the inability for a binding framework to emerge, the Charter was still invested with a 
significant degree of normative force. This speaks of its dissidence; it’s potential and constitutive 
power/‘law-making capacity’ as a ‘moral force’ and beyond that a ‘nascent legal force’.114 In this respect, 
it was imbued with the capacity to produce new norms and to upend the traditional consensus with its 
basis in the status quo. In fact, as the Mexican delegate noted, the Declaration of 1960 and the UN 
Human Rights Convention also failed to gain a consensus, yet still heralded the transformation of 
international law, and, we can add, not in spite of lacking consensus of it but because of it.115       
 
Before we look at the text of the Charter and the discussions that took place around it, let us continue to 
flesh out the context. There are two important earlier and in a sense preliminary contributions or 
precursors to the 1969–74 period of UNCTAD activity that deserve mention, but I shall restrict myself to 
a précis of them here. These contributions relate to the Calvo and Drago doctrines, and here we shall 
draw on McWhinney’s description of them.116 Both doctrines arose in Latin America and became 
recognised on a regional basis as a principle of law, even as they were disregarded by the First World on 
the international level. The first doctrine was articulated by the Argentine jurist Carlos Calvo in the mid 
nineteenth-century and was an attempt to tackle the injustice of European and US governments 
continuing to apply the terms of economic development contracts that had been negotiated previously at 
times of increased vulnerability for Latin American nations, such as, for example, at points of political 
instability and civil unrest. The Calvo doctrine established the practice of revoking the privileged 
diplomatic status of those US and/or European citizens coordinating business activities in Latin America 
and acquiring special access to natural resources. The point was to level the playing field in regards to 
who could have access to these resources and to constrain First World nations’ special rights over them. 
The second doctrine, named after a fellow Argentinian, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina from 
1902–3, Luis Mariá Drago, asserted the sovereignty of nations in the face of a rationale that justified 
armed intervention on the grounds that a foreign power held the right as a creditor to recover debts from a 
Third World nation. Drago – in the public announcement of the doctrine in 1902 – insisted on the 
principle of the illegitimacy of such actions that could seemingly override the self-determination of 
nations. Both these doctrines, in placing value on a nation’s economic sovereignty and on self-
determination as a means to thwart the impunity and aggression accompanying vastly unequal power 
relations on the level of the international, were important early precursors to the period of time we are 
now focused on.         
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Much of the spirit of these regional doctrines would be embodied many years later in the Third 
World’s claims to PSNR in the landmark 1962 UNGA resolution that proved an extraordinary yet less 
comprehensive version of the Charter of 1974.117 A few years prior to remarkable years between 1969 
and 1974, these claims saw the Third World attempting to assert its national sovereignty over natural 
resources, assets and economies, following the large-scale plundered during the time of colonialism. 
Power over natural resources was seen as key for countries to lay a basis for their future development.118 
However, this was problematic for First World countries attempting to promote their investments in the 
Third World, as foreign investments would require protection at all costs. If PSNR asserted the 
legitimacy of Third World countries in nationalising the manufacturing and productive capacities used to 
extract natural resources, this would be a major concern for First World investors and multinational 
corporations. So, while PSNR remained unresolved due to a deadlock between the First and the Third 
World on the issue, a ‘nascent regulatory framework dealing with foreign investment’119 pushed the 
radical claims of PSNR to one side. This framework advanced the position that foreign investors who had 
their assets in the Third World nationalised should be subject to compensation. Essentially, the Third 
World would have to compensate the First World for loss of profits. This worked in parallel with the 
‘extended…reach of the BWIs in a spatial, conceptual and juridical sense’.120 PSNR was articulated as a 
political manoeuvre by the Third World, and the ensuing response from the First World was to grasp the 
opportunity to extend the reach of BWIs into the political sovereignty of nation-states, in order to more 
effectively lead in the developmental process. The Third World’s approach of using international 
institutions as a way of ‘occupying and politicising the space of international law’121 only increased the 
legitimacy of BWIs intruding into Third World political structures.  
To arrive at the time in which the Charter was in the process of its final revisions, in May 1974 
the UNGA adopted the resolution ‘Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order’ and quickly afterwards the Programme of Action on the Establishment of NIEO.122 The NIEO can 
be considered as a complementary measure to the Charter, which would be adopted eight months later. 
The essential demand of the NIEO was to ‘broadly call for structural changes in the world economy’123 
and posit a third way in economics between the First (capitalist) and the Second (socialist) World. Again, 
proposals were based loosely on re-orientating international law in a Third World direction by resisting 
the current power relations. The NIEO attempted to do this by challenging the GATT,124 calling for a new 
type of cooperation between independent and sovereign nations and demanding the reduction of 
inequalities between states through exploring the benefits of nationalisation, producer associations and 
preferential trade agreements.125 Like PSNR, this was doomed to failure (it was in fact blocked by the 
USA) and once again resulted in an extension of the institutional role of DIL. Rajagopal suggests that the 
Third World’s focus on the reform of legal institutions expanded their space as ‘autonomous actors’ in 
the legal field.126 It seemed that the Third World critique of DIL, through the use of the latter’s 
institutions, did not contest the underlying notion of development. The failed attempts of the Third World 
resulted, with little difficulty, in the accentuation of the view that a proliferating number of international 
institutions were required to intervene more substantially in the Third World to ensure development. The 
political sovereignty of postcolonial states seemed to be ripe for transgression due to the fact that 
development economics was beyond political contestation (i.e. accepted by First and Third World) and 
hence was not seen as an intrusion of domestic politics.  
 
To come to the Charter itself: we are able to examine the dissidence in the resolution manifesting itself 
through the articulation of radically new norms, alternative ways of organising economic international 
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relations and the ‘reordering’ of social relations across the global North/South divide through a more just 
and equitable legal framework. The Charter was a far more comprehensive and consolidated resolution 
than all that came before it, for example PSNR (see above).127 Despite some overlapping concerns with 
the resolution of 1962, the Charter was designed to be considerably more far reaching in its impact on 
international relations and as was explained earlier, it was initially supposed to form the basis of a 
codified multinational treaty. To add to this, it allowed for the integration of a wider variety of principles, 
such as that of the ‘common heritage of mankind’ and the preservation of the environment.  
In chapter 1 of the Charter, the section on the ‘Fundamentals of Economic Relations’ expresses 
the principles of restorative justice through ‘remedying injustices which have been brought about by 
force’ and the need to level the economic playing field through de-incentivising the ‘attempt to seek 
hegemony and spheres of influence’. Here we see inextricably linked the need to address the impact of 
the history of classical imperialism with the future endeavour to persistently limit the emergence and 
maintenance of new economic relations of domination and subordination.  
 This is elaborated upon further, and in more concrete terms, in the Article 2 of the Charter, 
where three controversial and live contextual issues are addressed: namely, preferential treatment for 
foreign investment; the encroachment of transnational companies on the sovereignty of the nation-state; 
and the right to nationalise foreign property in order to assert national sovereignty over natural resources.   
 In respect to permanent sovereignty over natural resources, Article 2(c) in the final Charter, let 
us turn firstly to the alternative paragraphs put forward by the Group of 77 in the UNCTAD working 
group session of August 1974: 
 
‘Every State has full permanent sovereignty over the wealth and natural resources whether on land within its 
international boundaries, or in the sea or continental shelf within the limits of its natural jurisdiction and, 
consequently, has the inalienable right to the full exercise of its sovereignty freely and effectively dispose of them, 
including the right to nationalization.  
 
Every State has the right and the duty to take all effective measures, inter alia, through the full exercise of permanent 
sovereignty over all its natural resources, to put an end to all forms of foreign occupation, apartheid, racial 
discrimination, colonial, neo-colonial and alien domination and exploitation. ’128 
 
The alternative proposed by the 77 was absolute in upholding the sovereignty of nation-states to 
nationalise any foreign infrastructure involved in the exploitation of resources within a domestic 
jurisdiction. There is also an explicit connection between this right and safeguarding the integrity of a 
state from all types of colonialism, whether economic and/or through armed intervention. Through the 
processes of negotiation between nations within the working group, the alternative paragraphs were 
filtered out in favour of the right to nationalise with the caveat that appropriate compensation is paid, 
although any resulting controversy over the enactment of this proviso was to be subject to the domestic 
law and legal organs of the host state. Many of the Latin American delegates at the UNGA plenary, while 
praising the sentiments behind Article 2 as a whole, expressed their misgivings over the lack of precision 
in the paragraph concerning nationalisation. The Brazilian delegate put this forcibly, telling the UNGA 
that such a right ‘cannot brook restrictions’ that would water down its normative and discursive force to 
transform international relations. He further reflected that some of the Western industrialised nations had 
‘expressed themselves accordingly on the subject, [that] these concepts are interpreted and regarded in so 
broad a manner that they would at once constitute a grave, unacceptable limitation to the principle of the 
free sovereignty of the States over the natural resources within their own territory.’129 Indeed, the position 
of compensation was a non-negotiable one for many of the industrialised states, as taking up the contrary 
position would condone ‘confiscation’, as was aptly stated by the Canadian delegate.130    
                                                            
127 With the exception of a few passing references (pp. 188, 187(116ff.), 234), Pahuja does not actually examine the 
Charter at all in her study. Her main concern is PSNR of 1962 and NIEO of May 1974, for which she looks at the 
primary sources. For her, the main discussions take place prior to the Charter. However, my contention is that the 
Charter was a watershed moment for all that the Group of 77 and postcolonial nations fought for in this period, not 
just as a complementary measure to NIEO, but also as a substantial resolution in its own right, and that there is much 
merit in turning to it, in order to examine it through its first hand sources.  
128 TB/B/AC.12/4, p. 7 
129 A/PV.2315, p. 1369, para.77. Similar sentiments were also expressed by the Bolivian and Paraguayan delegates, 
see p 1366, paras.34, 36    
130 A/PV.2315, p. 1374, para.126 
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 In many ways, it was the conflict expressed between the economic self-determination and 
absolute sovereignty of nations and the so-called dictates of the world economy – in the terms of and as 
pushed by the First World industrialised nations – which defines much of the dispute around the Charter. 
This is not to say that many of those Third World nations which participated in the Charter did not couch 
their positions in terms of the international, which was the case particularly with regard to cooperation 
between developing and developed states in order to ‘achieve a just and rational development of all parts 
of the world’. It is more the case that First World nations, which for the most part voted against or 
abstained on the Charter, and thus obstructed the achievement of any consensus around it, responded by 
reasserting the ‘discipline’ of orthodoxy through macroeconomics, under cover of the international, and 
grounded upon the sovereignty and reality of the industrial might of First World nations. For instance, 
within the Working Group draft, while many of the 77’s alternative paragraphs revolved around the 
nation’s alleged predominance over foreign capital, much within the suggested amendments from 
industrial nations’ centred on the need to pay attention to the ‘harmonious development of the world 
economy’ while accommodating developing countries.131 Part of this tension around the discipline of 
development was captured by the UN International Development Strategy 1970, to which the Charter was 
broadly aligned, and which states that 
 
‘Developing countries will adopt appropriate measures for inviting, stimulating and making effective use of foreign 
private capital, taking into account the areas in which such capital should be sought and bearing in mind the 
importance for its attraction of conditions conducive to sustained investment. Developed countries, on their part, will 
consider adopting further measures to encourage the flow of private capital to developing countries.’132      
 
The Development Decade strategy was in line with the liberalisation of trade policy taking place at the 
time. It made the case that developing nations needed to ensure that they were ‘conducive’ and attractive 
to foreign investment. However, the responsibility for development still firmly rested on the developing 
nation133 – a principle reiterated by the Mexican delegate134 – and a nation-wide plan had to be in place 
for the furtherance of this desirable goal. The discipline of planned development on the level of the 
nation-state was interlinked with obligations due to the world economy, represented by the necessity to 
reduce the barriers to private capital from the First World (a firmly held position of the OECD). This 
rationality was perfectly summed up by the delegate from Thailand – placing on record his government’s 
differing views from the 77 while voting in favour of the Charter in solidarity with other Third World 
nations – who explained of ‘the desirability and indeed usefulness of foreign investment’ to his country’s 
economic development and the need to ‘continue to endeavour to foster’ a favourable ‘investment 
climate’.135 The intention here was to uphold the orthodox and fetishised methods of economic 
international law, over and above its radical potential to reorder international relations, at least as 
conceived by much, if not all, of the 77 (even with admitted points of contention of this group 
acknowledged). We can contrast this with the Brazilian delegate’s reference to the Declaration of 
Asunción (as he spoke out in a dispute with the Argentinian delegate over Article 3), a regional treaty 
agreed between Latin American countries along the River Plate Basin (Rió de la Plata Basin).136 
According to the representative, the question over which country held the right over the Basin as a natural 
resource resulted in discussions concluding in the treaty, generated as an ad-hoc legal norm, which 
                                                            
131 Some accommodation was crucial, not just because of the voting power of Third World nations in the UNGA, but 
also because in the Cold War context First World nations did not want to push Third World nations into the waiting 
embrace of the Communist bloc.   
132 UNGA, 25th Session, Res. 2626(XXV) 
133 Res. 2626(XXV), para.11 
134 TB/B/AC.12/4, p 1377, para.159: ‘…the responsibility for the development of every country rests primarily upon 
itself.’  
135 A/PV.2315, p. 1372, para.104. The delegate was quoting his government’s Minister of foreign affairs, speaking at 
the Ninth Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of South-East Asia in November 1974. This 
underlines the reality that there were many disagreements between regional economic blocs and individual Third 
World nations on the appropriate strategies that they should take in regard to international relations. Nonetheless, 
there remained a great deal of natural solidarity for the sentiments behind resolutions advanced by the Group of 77. 
The Mexican representative addresses these fellow developing countries in para.155, p. 1377. 
136 The Declaration was signed on 3 June 1971 and established ‘each State may use the waters in accordance with its 
needs provided that it causes no appreciable damage to any other State of the Basin.’ The River Plate Basin was 
subject to an ongoing dispute between Brazil and Argentina. The countries involved in the declaration include 
Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay. See UN Doc. A/CN.4/274(vol.1), p. 178  
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proclaimed a regional norm to exercise shared sovereignty.137 This suggested that the application of 
PSNR did not simply imply the consolidation of the territorial boundaries of a nation-state, but could be 
an avenue down which Third World nations could collaborate, not in order to conform to a discipline or 
predetermined method, but in the generation of new means of cooperation and law. The notion of shared 
sovereignty over natural resources between neighbouring countries intimates a different type of economic 
relationship over that which simply seeks to construct relations, founded on the appealing nature of a 
‘favourable investment environment’ for private capital from First World nations.  
In respect to the Charter, it is true to say that the Group of 77 had accepted the key tenets of 
economic development, namely growth, but even so the choice to abide by alternative or ‘different 
economic growth models’ to those offered up by industrialised nations was seen as the prerogative of 
developing nations, and the need to respect this policy is repeated through the Charter (as well as more 
generally speaking, the UN Charter of 1945) as the ‘inalienable right’ for a nation ‘to choose its 
economic system’. The extinguishing of this idea foreshadows the (re-)imposition of the ‘discipline’ 
associated with reasserting the correct economic policies. This can be seen in exemplary fashion by the 
stirrings taking place in South America during the 1970s. For example, during this period of international 
law-making, General Pinochet’s US-backed coup d’état, which overthrew Salvador Allende’s Socialist 
government in Chile in 1973, constitutes a remarkable historical event that foreshadowed the rise of 
neoliberalism, and more specifically the structural adjustment policies applied throughout the 1980s and 
carried out with US support under Ronald Regan. Likewise, in the years following the adoption of the 
Charter, the Argentinian Junta had by 1976 installed itself in power and was regularly briefed by US 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as how best to avoid UN scrutiny over its human rights violations. On 
the trade side of things, despite the Charter’s proclamation for the international to grant preferential 
treatment to developing countries in bilateral and multilateral trade treaties (Articles 14, 18, 19, 21), the 
terms of the bilateral trade treaties such as those between the UK and Yemen in 1982 and the US and 
Egypt in the same year, and furthermore between the US and Turkey in 1985, stipulated that investments 
in the host countries had to be protected at all costs and due compensation was demanded in the event of 
nationalisation.138  
Moving beyond PSNR and compensation to Article 2(b), the Charter touches on the effective 
regulation of the activities of transnational companies operating in Third World nations, perceived to be 
wielding an undue influence to the point of intervention, and thus undermining the right to self-
determination. The Article declares that transnational companies have to abide by the laws of the host 
state and respect its sovereignty, as well as economic and social policies. The precedence of state law and 
the integrity of the ‘internal legal order’ over that of transnational corporations was an important principle 
here, as the implication of supranational bodies settling these disputes was, in a sentiment echoed by a 
variety of national representatives, to put the corporation on a par with the standing of the nation state.139 
Moreover, this is exactly what took place in the aftermath of the Charter, as the fears expressed here were 
borne out in reality with international arbitration taking place in the case of Texaco v. Libya (1979) and 
America Int. Group Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran (1983), both of which ruled in favour of the 
transnational companies. As opposed to the respective merits of the states involved, it was the precedence 
these cases set that is most worthy of note here. In the terms put forth in the 2315th plenary meeting, 
placing nation-states on an ‘equal footing’ with predominantly Western transnational corporations was to 
grant the latter the ability to have a substantial say on the internal politics, procedures and the juridical 
policy-making processes of the Third World nation. It would not simply lead to the erosion of national 
sovereignty – ‘questioning the sovereignty of states’ – or act as a means to render the policy-making 
processes of the Third World nation contingent on compliance with Western corporations and the 
economic models that best suit them, but was a continuation of colonialism, ‘neo-colonialism’ as many 
Group of 77 delegates termed it (as stated in Article 16), by other means. And as the Brazilian 
representative put it, the implication of all this would be to give these companies ‘power over 
development projects’140 and so consolidate the linearity of an economic international law that provides 
for only one pathway to development. This was most acutely felt within the context of economic crises, 
international inflation, trade imbalances and shortage of resources such as oil due to regional conflicts 
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where there was a growing exploitation of petroleum. The reorganising of international relations through 
the Charter was meant to be a partial remedy for these ills. However, as was stated, the push back of a 
DIL reinstating the preference for seeking ‘hegemony and spheres of influence’ occurred in earnest with 
international arbitration upholding the privileges of Western capital over developing nation-states and 
pre-existing global power relations continuing to be of the utmost relevance.  
In addition to all that has been stated, it is also worth pointing to the pioneering nature of 
Articles 29 and 30. In regards to the former, the Group of 77 fought for the principle of the common 
heritage of mankind to be incorporated in the Charter so as to carry forward and embed a previous 1970 
resolution, and in order to act as an embryo from which would emerge the landmark Resolution on the 
Law of the Sea, adopted in 1982. Article 29 sets out in a preliminary manner the case that the utilisation 
of the ocean bed and sea soil is for the benefit of all the nations of the world, including landlocked 
nations, although this would be further expatiated upon in the standalone resolution. The intimation of 
common sovereignty is also hinted at in Article 30, which invokes the principle of the ‘protection, 
preservation and enhancement of the environment for the present and future generations’. Placing these 
environmental concerns in the context of economic international law was significant, not least because it 
addressed the need for the resources of the earth beyond national jurisdictions to be considered as a sort 
of commons, over which humanity as a whole held responsibility. This, in turn, could benefit virtual 
future generations as genuine subjects of international law. We could even conceive of these future 
generations as social relations still lying in latency or potentiality and which could perhaps have a stake 
in shaping legality in the present.  
As a final word, we can see embedded in the Charter both dissident and disciplinary elements. In 
terms of its radical dissident components, the Charter held the potential to provide the impetus for the 
evolution of international norms. In the arena of economic international law, for example, this was a 
potential to move away from orthodoxy and the pre-existing international relations between the Global 
North and South. While our contention may be that many of the UN resolutions in the 1969–74 period of 
international law-making were constrained by aspects of the UN development framework, and many of 
the presumptions of this approach were left unchallenged, the Charter was still a genuine attempt to 
enshrine a more equal and just world through the protection of Third World nations’ economic self-
determination and sovereignty. At least to some extent, these legal concepts could be utilised to contest 
the linearity of a conventional development macroeconomics propagated by the West. During the same 
period, however, the key facets of DIL were also being instilled, legitimated and solidified within 
economic international law in a manner that acted to rebuff the realisation of the latter’s more radical 
potentialities. This was achieved primarily through the hegemonic status that orthodox methodological 
assumptions secured within the conjoined spheres of the theory and practice of development economics, 
in which Western interests held the power to define and enforce the ‘correct’ economic organisation of 
nations. This therefore subverted Third World efforts to use the idea of economic self-determination and 
the rights of sovereignty to offer an alternative economic order, in which the particular interests of the 
First World were no longer internationalised through its hold on the law, but rather, one where the 
particular interests of all would act as the foundation to international order. Through the use of 
international economic law and its epistemological and methodological power, the West was thus able to 
secure the retrenchment of existing power relations. Even in a new geo-political context, the ideological 
(and coercive/military) power of the West was such that it was able to manage and maintain the 
international order in the form of a hierarchy of nations (coloniality), even as it did so through the use of 
new but in many regards conventional disciplines to achieve this. In this case, pushing the principle of 
compensation for nationalisation; subtly placing transnational corporations on a par with developing 
nation states; framing themselves as the prudent guardians or managers of the world economy; and 
prioritising the flows of private capital from the First World over the sovereignty of Third World and 
postcolonial nations, allowed the West to reinscribe a DIL that the Third World sought to challenge on a 
global scale following the embrace of the nation-state form. In this way, then, the field of economic 
international law, far from becoming part of a new discipline reordering international relations on a more 
equal footing, became a new means to express the decadence of a DIL.  
 
In his concluding speech at the UNGA plenary session on the Charter, the Mexican representative warned 
that ‘Peace cannot survive long in the midst of injustice, but in human affairs it frequently occurs that 
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crisis must attend the birth of a new order.’141 Unfortunately, notwithstanding the positive contributions 
of postcolonial dissident law-making to international law142, Third World attempts to claim justice 
resulted in a reinforcement of development rationality, as Third World critiques were based more and 
more on accepting the premises of the Western legal concepts underlying DIL. This was coupled with the 
fact that development, along with economic growth, had become a transcendent notion lying outside 
political contestation.143 What is most significant for us to understand here is that economic development 
had erased claims to justice as reparative for the ills of colonialism. The national liberation movements, 
which had championed a view of justice as struggle against unequal power relations on a global basis, 
had been extinguished with the acceptance of development as both replacement and answer to 
colonialism.  
Chapter Three: The ‘Spatial Cut’ and Spatiality of 
International Law in the Context of Development 
The above-described discourse of development helps to maintain the specific spatiality of DIL and its 
related institutions. The first moment of this spatiality is the ‘spatial cut’ that underpins DIL. This cut is 
productive of what Doreen Massey calls the ‘geographical imaginary’144 of international law, namely, 
how spatiality is both represented and constructed by the global judicial institutions; to put it another 
way, it is ‘the political production of space and place designed to maintain structural injustices and even 
modes of justification’.145 In this case the spatial cut of DIL produces both the Global North and South; it 
is productive of the ‘geographies of injustice’146 that divide the centre of international law from its 
periphery. What is significant about this global space is that it is ‘not so much a description of how the 
world is, as an image in which the world is being made’.147 
Pahuja identifies the cut as the real foundation of DIL. The cut is ‘the boundary line of law’s 
own definitional truths – who is the “self” or legal subject, who is the other or legal object’.148 DIL 
therefore ‘produces its own subjects, as well as its objects of rule’.149 As previously mentioned, it is the 
Third World that is constructed as a legal object and so has its subjectivity denied. At the same time, 
however, the First World needs the Third World in order to guarantee the universal legitimacy of DIL as 
well as to secure and consolidate its own identity and subjecthood by ensuring that the Third World 
recognises the First as the supreme subject. This is substantiated by Pahuja, who states that the modern 
world, characterised by the rule of developed law, was seen to be produced by the West before the Third 
World’s integration; in her words, the West ‘posited a world – complete with coeval legality – as already 
in existence before the Third World’s entry into it.’150 The subjecthood of the First World, or what some 
postcolonial theorists call ‘absolute Being’,151 is somewhat based on its supposed construction of legality. 
The cut is therefore representative of a line dividing those who are fully subject due to the presence of 
law, characteristic of civilisation, and those who exist outside law and so are not capable of subjecthood, 
as they are only capable of existing as a newfound object of a DIL that recognises them as such. The 
‘other’, originally outside the scope of law and so incapable of exercising its agency, comes to depend on 
the institutions of DIL to partly facilitate its involvement. It is therefore very much like the Hobbesian 
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142 Seen with, for example, the growing strength of postcolonial countries in the UNGA, where they were able to start 
shifting the balance of power since 1955; the subsequent establishment of the principle of decolonisation and self-
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143 Pahuja, p. 19 
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147 Massey (2005), p. 84 (emphasis added); Kostas Axelos, Introduction to a Future Way of Thought: On Marx and 
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brute, living ‘constantly in a state of nature’.152 The horizon-line can therefore be rearticulated as the line 
of exclusion – those who are excluded are paradoxically needed for the construction of the 
included/subject’s identity and for the latter to successfully posit their values within a universal 
framework.  
The line of the cut also issues the division between what Baxi calls the ‘two broad global 
classes: the developers and the developees’153 in the language of development. The economic lines and 
hierarchy that have been drawn here are roughly parallel to the juridical line which separates Global 
North from South. While contemporary social movements, like national liberation movements in 
postcolonial states, continually attempt to redefine the Global South in their own terms – as terrains of 
struggle and resistance which deny the limitation of its agency – the Global North, through DIL, produces 
a mirror image to show the South what it could look like if it followed the singular narrative of salvation 
– of development and rule of law.  
Chapter Four: Diametric and Concentric, Smooth and 
Striated 
The relationship between the Global South and North really defines how the centre–periphery axis works 
at a time of globalisation. DIL functions as an anchoring orientation in this paradigm, which holds the 
line of division between North and South154 steady through its fracturing discourses, as well as ensuring 
the hegemonic identity of the centre.  
 Eduardo Viveiros de Castro’s study of dual organisations is useful here in elaborating how the 
spatial paradigm of DIL has become increasingly intricate in the event of the inclusion of the Third 
World. Viveiros de Castro draws heavily on the structural anthropology of Lévi-Strauss as informed by 
Amerindian (hereafter in this chapter contracted to ‘Indian’) cosmopolitics, particularly when looking 
into the spatial representations of the village morphology of many indigenous peoples.155 It is exactly this 
spatial representation of the village that has so much to tell us about the spatial structure of DIL.  
 The first spatial representation Viveiros de Castro introduces us to is the ‘diametric dualism’. 
The diametric dualism takes on the structure of a circular village divided into two halves (West and East); 
this is the ‘dual organisation’. The line or ‘cut’ separating the two halves of the circular village acts as a 
diagrammatical representation of the symmetrical and reciprocal relationship between parts. The two 
opposed halves or terms are static and reversible oppositions. The Indian used such oppositional dualities 
to mark distinctions between classes and castes and as a basis from which to articulate the ritual and 
reciprocal duties (matrimonial, funerary, economic) between them within the village environs. Within the 
diametric dualism the Indian cosmological and mythological spatiality meets the geographical spatiality 
of the village. Nascent DIL, prior to the integration of postcolonial countries from the Third World, took 
on a similar form to that described above. A classical or overly imperial element is embedded in this 
form. This is because while reciprocal relations and treaties were drawn up between imperial powers and 
Western power blocs, the colonised Third World was completely shut out (these countries’ legal status 
was one confined merely to an extension of dominion or colonial trusteeship).    
 To expand on this point, it is possible to look closely at the vertical line or separating diameter 
within the village-organisation representation, and its relation to the outside boundary or circumference – 
the limit of the village. Viveiros de Castro relates that if an observer is placed on the diameter, they will 
see the circumference as a barrier or an invisible horizon; essentially, they will be unable to see beyond 
the invisible line of the circumferential boundary. This is because the diametric dualism is constructed as 
a self-sufficient system or self-contained whole enclosed by an ‘impassable frontier’. The outside is kept 
completely out of sight, as well as outside the realm of conceptualisation. Any idea of internal 
indeterminacy is non-existent, and this fulfils an existential need to keep the system firmly together as a 
bounded whole. The diametric dualism is thus a type of reductive system. Its modus operandi is to keep 
oppositional terms or socially defined groups integrated together within a totality. Its key characteristic is 
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to entirely preclude the occurrence of an event – a happening which could only appear from an 
unimagined outside in order to disrupt the dualism of a fully circumscribed village structure.  
 The paradigm of the diametric dualism that characterises international law before the advent of 
the 1960s national liberation movements has this crucial feature of precluding any idea of event. Rather 
than being the strength of the system, this constitutes its Achilles heel and leads to its partial downfall. 
The static purity of binary oppositions within the diametric dualism leaves it with an inability to contain 
its ‘outside’ when an event eventually does occur on the horizon. This leads us to our second spatial 
paradigm, which is the outcome of the morphing of our first paradigm in reaction to an event. This is the 
‘concentric dualism’. 
 The concentric dualism, rather than a completely separate structure to the diametric dualism, can 
be seen as its logical progression. In addition to the purely formal and reciprocal/symmetrical relations 
between social classes within the village structure, asymmetrical relations between centre and periphery 
are included. The dualism specific to the concentric model is therefore between an inner circle, 
representative of the ‘sacred’ and public centre, and an outer circle, suggestive of a ‘domestic and 
feminine periphery’.156 The relationship between the inner and outer circles is clearly a hierarchical one.  
 In contrast to the diametric dualism, the concentric dualism is not subject to positing itself as a 
complete system or totality. The outer circle, the supposed boundary-line, invites a central observer to 
look outside to the prospect of more encompassing circles beyond the visual horizon.157 This somewhat 
partial embrace of the ‘outside’ prevents the concentric dualism from presenting itself as a universality, in 
strict contrast to the diametric structure. The outside, or ‘external zone’, acts as a reference point, which 
the internal circle or centre is always subject to. Within the Indian’s village spatiality, the ‘third zone’ 
outside the village is represented by nature or the world. The earth or environment is symbolic within this 
cosmology of an encircling contingency, in which the centre must always respect and regulate its own 
structures in relation to.       
 As we have stated, the encircling contingency facing international law in the 1960s and 70s took 
the shape of national liberation and independence movements within the periphery. These social 
movements mirrored the growing confidence of the colonised Third World in the face of a crumbling 
imperialism. With the retraction of empire and its borders, and the growing strength of national liberation 
movements having the force of an event, DIL’s diametric spatiality was severely inadequate in 
encompassing the periphery. What ensued in post-1960s international law was a mix of diametric and 
concentric forms of spatiality, which ensured its survival. The inclusion of the postcolonial nations in the 
1960s into a new universal judicial framework, representing the reciprocal sovereignty of nations beneath 
the law, also included integration into the asymmetrical relations of an economic hierarchy. The 
economic gradient defining nation-states, or the introduction of economic comparativeness, would 
maintain the centre, while continually regulating the periphery. The morphology between spatial 
paradigms and the integration of one within the other allowed imperium to continue within the confines 
of DIL. Events coming out of the Third World could be more easily contained within a spatial system 
that pre-empted and sought to contain them. To better understand how DIL was able to regulate and 
confine the events that proliferated within the Third World, we will need to delve more deeply into Gilles 
Deleuze’s comprehension of the event.   
 The most salient aspect of Deleuze’s, and Félix Guattari’s, notion of the event is that it is most 
concerned with becoming. The question that the event seeks to address is: how do we reactivate 
becoming, considering the fact that we are commonly completely unable to perceive becoming in 
everyday life?158 As Deleuze concluded via his engagement with Scottish Enlightenment notions159 of 
legality, regularity and causality (themselves heavily dependent on the sixteenth-century recovery of 
speculative geography and imperial legality among Salamanca School jurist-theologians), within the 
chain of cause and effect that so defines history, the qualities that make up the event – creation of the 
new, experimentation, constant and perpetual change160 – are covered up. The event itself is what makes 
the process of change overt, i.e. discloses it – change within beings and subjectivity on the one hand, and 
the place and space the subject is situated in, on the other. The event is thus not merely another part of the 
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linear temporality of history; it is what escapes history.161 In his interview with Antonio Negri, Deleuze 
makes this point explicit – the event is the Untimely, in the sense that it leaves behind the preconditions 
of history in order to create anew.162 Hence, the present time of beings is not that which is enmeshed 
within the causal chain of history, but that which is ceasing to be or leaving behind to take off on a new 
trajectory.  
 The new trajectory, or in Deleuzian parlance ‘line of flight’, is therefore an escape or severance 
from the dominant space-time of a system. The system, with recourse to the paradigms we mentioned 
above, is a representation which seeks to divide up reality ‘into definable things which stand in an 
ordered relation to one another’.163 The ‘situatedness’ of the subject within this spatial system dictates 
what that subject can perceive; for example, in the case of the diametric dualism, the subject situated on 
the diameter is prohibited from seeing beyond the boundary-horizon. As has already been noted, with the 
concentric dualism, a subject located within the inner circle is able to imagine enclosing circles beyond 
the visible. In a sense, it is possible to say ‘where something is situated has everything to do with how it 
is structured.’164   
 An event can thus be seen as an escape not only from an imposed situatedness within a structure, 
but also from the type of subjectivity that the structure confines the subject to. Because the experience of 
the subject is influenced by the structure itself, what is created here is the normative subject.165 The 
normative subject is defined as acting as a type of centre which experiences are organised around.166 The 
organising centre of the subject experiences the flows of life as a unified, coherent whole. The holistic 
grasp in which the subject organises its experience can be called ‘sense’167 – the meaning the subject 
derives from ordering and ranking experiences into a conceptual structure or whole. These flows, 
impressions or singularities of affect (i.e. the individual affects or impressions the world imparts to the 
subject before their integration into a structure of meaning) are regulated by the normative 
conceptualisation of time and space held by the subject.  
As has been stated, this normative/conventional space-time is influenced by the organisation or 
structure that encloses the subject. This allows us to bring the horizon back into consideration. The 
homogenous continuum of the horizon can be thought of as the territory of the self-regulating subject.168 
The behavioural habits or ‘refrains’ of the experiencing subject enable him/her to associate the territory 
with a type of causal/inductive reasoning and laws, producing the sense of the familiar and predictable. 
This causal reasoning links together sensations, feelings and habitual activities into one ‘continuous 
stable space’169 of a regulated reality. What could otherwise be seen as separate activities, potentially 
contributing to the subject’s sense of becoming, is integrated into this territorial-whole.  
While we may look at the village spatialities as circumscribing what the subject can experience, 
it also needs to be noted that the subject regulates itself with regard to the perception of its surrounding 
territory. The outcome of this process is one in which the normative subject ‘staves off forms of 
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repetition that entail continual becoming-other’.170 Becoming is arrested as the subject of organising 
experience posits its own stable identity (a combination of narrative linear time and regulated space, i.e. 
an interiority), which is duly regulated and positioned in respect to its surrounding territory. This fits in 
with the representative or categorising function of spatial organisations, which situate stable and self-
regulating identities within a territory.   
 Within this context, the process of the event can be seen, as Claire Colebrook states, as a 
deterritorialisation that occurs ‘when an event of becoming escapes or detaches from an original 
territory’.171 It is the nomadic subject that can be said to partake in such an event. In contrast to the 
normative subject, the nomadic subject conceives of reality as separate ‘blocks’ of space-time, de-linked 
or de-severed from a holistic territory or structure.172 The nomadic subject is able to comprehend the idea 
that reality, far from being composed of a space-time continuum, is made up of heterogeneous blocks 
which relate to the subject’s encounter with differing milieus. These different blocks are usually 
combined into an ordered, uniform and seamless unity in respect to the experiencing normative subject. 
However, the nomadic subject experiences them as combinations that can be reconfigured and connected 
in various different ways, each reconfiguration completely transforming the blocks brought together.  
The deterritorialisation process occurs when unified, overarching space-times entrenched within 
boundaries disintegrate to reveal a multiplicity of blocks. It is precisely the escape, or line of flight from a 
structure, which creates new connections with the world by bringing together blocks of space-time in 
novel combinations outside the normatively defined.173 The connecting together of blocks does not, on 
this account, act in a representational fashion. This is not simply a connection of entities, denoted by 
metrics, integrated into a socially quantifiable whole; every connection of one block to another in this 
instance creates a qualitative change to the whole, as well as a quantifiable one.174 The connection, in this 
way, can be seen to maintain a certain form of dynamism that cannot be reduced to representational 
forms. The blocks brought together are never constitutive of a definitively new whole, as the potentiality 
exists of further connections and production.175 
In Kafka: Towards a minor literature Deleuze and Guattari explain that ‘terms are distributed 
throughout the ordinary series, at the end of one series or the beginning of another, and so mark the 
manner in which they link, transform, or proliferate’176 (this can be summed up in the phrase ‘every 
beginning is an end, every end a beginning’). What Deleuze and Guattari denote as the beginning or end 
of one series can rightly be called a ‘threshold’. The threshold is essentially a boundary-line, which 
ensures the identity and being of what is on the inside. When the boundary-line is crossed, when the 
terminus is expanded so to speak, the being whose existence is reliant on the demarcation is transformed. 
To reinforce the point, in Capitalism and Schizophrenia Deleuze and Guattari state that ‘the limit 
designates the penultimate marking an inevitable change…the limit beyond which the enterprise would 
have to change its structure.’177 Moreover, their argument in Kafka is an elaboration of the idea that 
connectors – those terms at the beginning or end of a series – once they bind themselves onto another 
series, result in the production of a completely novel composition or the outcome of the complete 
transformation of the original parts. The same process is evident with the nomadic subject in relation to 
the event. Within the intensity of the event, the subject’s becoming and fluid identity are reactivated; the 
normative subject is completely subverted. In this instance, the static, circumscribed being of the 
normative subject passes a threshold which reactivates the fluidity of its identity and being. It is no longer 
pure interiority, but subject to continuous becoming. Furthermore, we can assert that the nomadic subject 
is less subject than subject-becoming.  
The subject-becoming is further clarified in the notion of the ‘fold’. Rather than simply passing 
a threshold drawn up by a normative subject’s experience of a space-time structure, the nomadic subject 
appropriates the threshold itself. This threshold can also be seen as a fold – that is to say, a nominal 
boundary that renders conspicuous a continuous movement between an outside and an inside.178 
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Deleuze’s favoured exemplar of the fold is between being and thinking: as it is difficult to delineate 
between where being ends and thinking begins, the fold can be considered to be the perpetual enmeshed 
interaction between the two (although they cannot be formally distinguished). In which case, the subject 
itself constitutes such a fold. While it is worth noting here, for the sake of clarity, that a fold may be 
considered a boundary of sorts, more often than not it erases any clear-cut distinctions manifested in the 
boundary-line, as it is a process of continual, restless movement. Any distinct and ‘crisp’ boundary-line 
is, for the most part, drawn up by a spatial system of representation and control in the process of 
annulling becoming.  
The nomadic subject can thus be said to epitomise how the fold operates within subject-
becoming (or ‘becoming-other’). In appropriating the threshold, the state of becoming of the nomadic 
subject enables it to act as a connector between the different disparate milieus (or blocks of space-time) it 
experiences. Hence, the milieus themselves are perceived by the subject-becoming, rather than as another 
unified space-time, as holding themselves in a perpetual state of transformation. The subject, becoming 
de-centred, no longer acts as an organising centre of experience. That is to say, it can no longer organise 
its experiences around a static identity, located within a homogeneous space-time.  
The fold, which is conspicuous as well as inherent to the nomadic subject, permits the latter to 
embrace the contingency of the outside. Conversely, the inside is stopped from positing itself as totalised 
identity and being. This is not only apparent due to the connecting role the nomadic subject plays in 
bringing together disparate milieus; it is also due to the fact that the nomadic subject is a type of conduit 
through which the virtual can realise itself at the moment of the event. The virtual can be thought of as 
the ‘fullness of reality’.179 This fullness incorporates the entirety of actuality, including all potential 
possibilities that are yet to materialise. These potentialities are, for Deleuze, no less real or part of reality 
despite not, at least ostensibly, existing within the confines of the present. The potentialities of the virtual 
are then those of becoming and transformation through differentiation. 
In relation to the virtual, the event (as discussed above) can be considered as a significant actor. 
According to Thanem and Linstead, the ‘event taking place with the actualisation of the virtual never 
terminates its connection to the extended and indeterminate world of the undivided virtual Whole.’180 The 
event provides a link that tethers potentialities – which are undergoing actualisation within its space – to 
the further unactualised potentialities of the virtual. In this scenario, actualised potentialities are not fixed 
and determined simply by becoming actualised in the present; this is because they continue to maintain a 
link, through the event, with further virtually unrealised possibilities.        
 The nomadic subject’s181 sense of perception in the event is skewed, as it is de-severed from the 
dominant or over-arching spatial structure. It is this innovative perspective and angle on experience that 
for Deleuze opens up a new world. It is made possible by the nomadic subject’s continual passage 
through thresholds, as well as the subject’s openness to the outside, which allows it to participate in the 
event so as to retain a link with the virtual. This new sense of perspective is aided by the event’s concept-
creating nature;182 after all, the alternative possibilities generated by the virtual include a manifold of 
concepts and ways of thinking.  
Suffice to say, with the national liberation movements of the 1960s various legal concepts and 
contestations were thrown up. Deleuze hints at this when he points to the event as creative of new law: 
‘Jurisprudence…is a matter of a situation, and a situation that evolves.’183 The event invents the right of 
new ways of being and perceiving: it generates a new legality. It interacts with novel ways of becoming 
by aiding the subject’s passage through, and indeed past, the threshold of normativity governing positive 
law, and thereby creating a certain immanent law. This is the fluid law of interaction that operates as a 
fold – it takes up the position between that which makes up the inner being of positive law and its 
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outside. It is the law proper to justice,184 which is prodigious in its creativity and innovative in the 
production of the new, and perpetually attempts to detach itself from the horizontal plane of 
transcendental law.    
In order to further articulate the nature of this immanent law and jurisprudence in terms of 
postcolonial social movements, let us now turn to the spatiality proper to the event. The space that is 
opened up by events is what is called ‘smooth space’. Smooth space draws ‘a deterritorialisation that cuts 
across both the lineal territorialities and territory or deterritoriality of the state’.185 To elaborate within the 
postcolonial context we have thus far been examining, the allegorical nomads of Guattari and Deleuze’s 
philosophy can be seen in the light of some of the social movements today that exist on a level both local 
and global; they exist outside the confines of the nation-state in order to disrupt its striated space 
(discussed below) and claim to territorialisation. Moreover, we can say that the event of national 
liberation, in which the subject-becoming of the people-nation emerges, is productive of this proliferating 
smooth space.  
The postcolonial subjectivity proper to this space is created through empirical processes of 
resistance against the spatial structures of colonialism. The debris of scattered, enslaved subjects under 
colonialism, in re-gathering itself into a people-nation, reactivates its sense of becoming. The people-
nation, however, is kept in a state of becoming purely because its empirical self-creation (i.e. in political 
resistance) is tethered to the virtual/idea that is the beyond of its experience. Any grouping or assemblage 
of this kind is kept in a state of dynamic becoming and qualitative change due to its continued adherence 
to the contingency (or virtual potentialities) of its outside. The people-nation, in the event of national 
liberation, constitutes itself not only as a political subjective-becoming, but also as a sort of fold. This 
fold equates to the appropriation of the ‘cut’ or, as Deleuze would have it, the ‘anticipation–presentation’ 
mechanism186 from those who would otherwise use it against the Third World. In this case, embracing the 
contingency of the outside helps to both anticipate and ward off the nation-state form and its 
corresponding mode of thinking; any interiority of the people-nation is stopped from positing itself as a 
stable being and identity opposed to continuous becoming.  
What is right and proper to this people/nation/fold and its deterritorialising effects is a relation to 
the earth. National liberation movements, and the social movements that sprang from them, can be said to 
have a leaning towards the absolute deterritorialising effect of the earth. If we are to bring up the 
concentric dualism representation once again, it will be recalled that Indians proclaimed the outside of 
this village spatiality to be inhabited by a ‘third zone’ – by the natural contingency of the earth. The earth 
acts as the ultimate outside or (absent) ground of contingency, which definitively resists the 
territorialisation of any one spatial system of representation. As Gregg Lambert relates, philosophy or 
politics from the point of view of the earth187 assumes a perspective from which all human societies are 
seen as transitory, and therefore in a state of becoming, no matter how much they attempt to withstand it 
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by positing a stable essence or interiority. From the position of the nation-state, it is partially due to the 
subject’s incarceration in spatial systems of representation as an organising subject of experience that the 
perspective of the earth is precluded. In which case, when one thinks from the viewpoint of the earth, the 
subject–object duality of spatial representation gives way to the continuous movement between territories 
and the absolute deterritorialisation of the earth.188 This perspective is only possible when the nomadic 
subjectivity and the smooth spaces it inhabits decentre the normative subject of organising experience. 
This is simply as to understand the perspective of the earth is to move towards a position of absolute 
deterritorialisation.  
While relative deterritorialisation concerns the historical transience of territories and human 
societies upon the earth, absolute deterritorialisation is the process in which territories are completely 
swallowed up by the totality of the earth as a whole.189 The earth as Whole is reality in its entirety – all 
virtual/latent possibilities as existing simultaneously in the present.190 Absolute deterritorialisation is thus 
the complete actualisation of the virtual whole in reality – Deleuze and Guattari use the term ‘utopia’ and 
other writers ‘non-place’191 to describe this. This non-place is the ahistorical aspect of the event, which is 
fundamental in reanimating being within the conditions of history. Geography, in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
philosophy, is crucial to becoming and the event as it ‘wrests history from the cult of origins in order to 
affirm the power of milieu’.192 The symbolic character of origins is that of the Greek ‘autochthon’ – a 
being that literally ‘springs from the soil’. The autochthon is thus a creature of territory and marked 
origins. To deterritorialise the Autochthon is to see it in its proper relation to the entirety of the earth – in 
doing so, we recreate it as a new being.   
In relation to the national liberation movements we have had cause to mention, the threshold 
between relative and absolute deterritorialisation is of especial importance. The threshold is the tipping 
point in which the relative state passes into the absolute state,193 that which was momentarily occupied 
and appropriated by national liberation movements during the collapse of colonialism. Here, we are able 
to conceive of the overlapping folds and thresholds, which constitute the particular types of smooth 
spaces occupied by the kind of movements we have considered. It is the process of connection between 
and proliferation of the folds and smooth spaces that encompass the earth which haunts the nation-state, 
as ‘movements of relative deterritorialisation…always [threaten] to be absolute.’194 In addition, this 
involves a process of delinking, which can be explained as the cutting away of some of the links that 
weld hierarchical or asymmetrical social relations to those of the nation-state form. In terms of the earth 
itself, it can only be ‘defined by this degree of imbalance, or disequilibrium [between absolute and 
relative states]’.195 It is this disequilibrium that lends to the earth the power to create new territories 
(relative deterritorialisation), as well as providing the impetuous in its perpetual leaning towards the 
absolute state. 
While the nomadic subjectivity’s relations to the event, deterritorialisation and the earth mark 
the principal qualities of smooth space, it is also appropriate to note how smooth space resists the type of 
metricisation that typifies increasingly homogeneous striated space. To this end, the smooth space of the 
nomads defies the geometric matrix of the horizon as it encompasses an ‘open space, one that is 
indefinite and noncommunicating’.196 It is ‘without division into shares…a space without borders or 
enclosure’197 and is therefore delimited and vast, or infinite/absolute, in its resistance to both 
territorialisation and reduction to measurable distances. Smooth space, rather than being characterised by 
borders, is formed of folds in which distinctly separating boundaries are erased (like the sand dunes 
continuously shifted by the ceaseless motion of the desert winds). While most demarcated spaces have 
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clear boundaries, the ‘spatialising traces’198 that a structure leaves behind in the creation of boundaries are 
suppressed. In other words, while the boundaries themselves (those that have been laid down) are 
considered clear-cut, the actual act of ‘cutting’ (that which produces the boundary), whereby the structure 
is divided between its inside and outside, is concealed. It is the process of appropriating this threshold, 
outside the central control of a structure, which is unique to smooth spaces. The events that open up or 
disclose smooth space also ensure that they are freed from causal modes of reasoning, and therefore 
metricisation and control.  
What takes place in this scenario is that the majoritarian model, which ‘people [are forced to] 
conform to’,199 has been rejected or put off in favour of a minority becoming. Minoritarian becoming, 
consistent with the nomadic subject, has no models. The negation of the model equates to an all-
encompassing embrace of uncertainty and unpredictability – in a word, contingency. When minorities do 
construct a model, it is under the assumption that they are in no way beholden to it, as it is created solely 
out of the resources of the people-nation. These minority models can thus be easily changed and/or 
discarded by the people themselves. In contrast, the majoritarian model can be considered to be the 
normative framework of DIL. This model breaks down in the cauldron of the event, in which 
jurisprudence and the situational creation of right throw off the conventional threshold of positive law.  
This minority model of jurisprudential formation in situ is consistent with the workings of 
smooth spaces, in which lines and points are replaced by wanderings ‘along a trajectory’,200 where points 
along a path are oriented by ‘local operations’ or varying points of note such as are characteristic of a 
local place. The points here are ‘invisible’ because they are forgotten as soon as they have served their 
purpose in providing orientation; they are not mapped or made static through the power of geometry. In 
other words, smooth space is a ‘local absolute one occupies – without counting’.201 The absoluteness of 
local place here is fundamentally characterised by the intensity of the being that travels and lives through 
place/regions – ‘Intense Spatium instead of Extensio.’202 
 The trajectories that are indicative of smooth spaces can be properly considered to be lines of 
flight, which differ from the geometric lines that enclose and define subjects. The geometric line is 
reduced to points: it moves between one point and the next.203 In contrast, the line of flight escapes from 
representational structures in order to move unimpeded and multiply unabated, changing qualitatively as 
it proliferates. So, it simply cannot be reduced to points as the orientation here is unanchored and in 
constant variation204 so as to avert capture. It corresponds to the expression of a new becoming that 
unfolds in a different way depending on the unique features of the (smooth) space. This accords with the 
experience of the nomadic subject who encounters events, intensities or singularities of affect, and helps 
to remove her/him from the coherent organising experience of sense. The intensity of experience and 
expression, such as also identifiable in situational jurisprudence, occurs as a detachment from sense qua 
whole. In fact, what occurs is a deterritorialisation of sense. Sense, in its normative mode, is a fixed 
image produced in the mind from an encounter with the other. These images and associations, remaining 
in a state of fixity unconducive to becoming, are amalgamated and linked through causal-chain reasoning. 
But in the newly deterritorialised sense attributable to the nomadic subject, sense, in terms of affects, not 
only emerges from encounters, but also takes part in a process of releasing itself, along with the subject, 
‘from [the] world of effected relations, from territories’ to form the ‘potential for [perceiving and 
experiencing] other relations and new worlds’.205 
 It is these new worlds that hint at a new sense of experiencing and perceiving. The perception is 
local in that it has detached itself from the territorialised form of sense and experience. These new 
worlds, or blocks, contain their own spatiality and temporality, separated from normative conventions 
(and majoritarian ordering). From each of these blocks – Deleuze also equates these with monads – 
perceptions unfold with new forms of being, stimulating new expressions.206 Each monad, or ‘atom’, 
while holding onto its local place from which it perceives, absorbs the outside through the intensities of 
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its affects i.e. of individual experiences, which come out of the encounter with the world, and in so doing 
shakes off territorialised experience and sense. Orientation through intensities of experience, via the 
event, sustains a link with the outside, which holds off any normative spatial structure of 
experience/sense and its corresponding subjectivity (the interior space of scientific man).207 The outside 
or ‘absolute’, which worlds and monads are tethered to, is the virtual – this is the monad’s grasp of the 
infinite, that which transcends it.  
It should be clear that this is a fundamental challenge, emerging from a ‘local absolute’, to the 
orientating anchor of a DIL. In this way, the subjective being of social movements can simultaneously 
evade capture by the state and international law. What is characteristic of some of the social movements 
emerging from the Third World, according to Rajagopal, is that despite being locally embedded and non-
statist, they are still able to challenge DIL on a global level (as has been explained above).208 However, 
the main quality of these heterogeneous groups, and what they share with the smooth space inhabited by 
the nomad, is that they ‘resist exact centration or reproduction, and all the more so universalization’.209 
The intensities inherent to smooth spaces suggest the irreducible nature of the experiences and 
perceptions they stimulate. The situational nature of justice and creation of right can be seen here, 
produced as they are within the intensities of events.  
The multiplicity of social movements fits in aptly with a manifold of trajectories that is intrinsic 
to smooth space – a multiplicity that challenges the homogeneous, all-encompassing quality of the 
geometric grid. On this basis, the putative universality of DIL is contradicted by the ‘peripheral or semi-
peripheral sites which function adroitly within the political spaces created by globalisation’.210 These 
social movements, which make up many of the enclaves within the periphery, are at the forefront of a 
critique of development discourse as supremely limited in its blindness in acknowledging the organising 
principle of justice as struggle. The struggle here is intricately intertwined with the preservation of the 
local ‘absolute’ of place, which is characterised more by Neocosmos’ articulation of the nation as an 
inclusive political subjectivity than by a crude, militant particularism based upon a bounded idea of place 
(something which the institutions of international law are quick to admonish). The ‘vastness’ of the 
nomad’s deterritorialised sense of place (usually conceived of in terms of picturesque panoramas such as 
the desert or steppe) rings true with the social movements of the Third World, which threaten the 
accentuated borders of the nation-state.  
 
The smooth spaces proper to events are recaptured within the paradigm of concentric dualism, as we have 
already outlined. In contrast to the diametric dualism alone, the concentric dualism is able to contain and 
adapt to the possibility of events, such as those embodied by national liberation movements. However, it 
is the concentric and diametric dualism together, in partnership, which epitomises the dominance of DIL 
from the 1960s onwards.  
 While the concentric dualism can be used to explain how DIL proved to be far more open to the 
event in comparison to previous paradigms of colonialism and imperialism, a further comprehension of 
‘striated spaces’ can demonstrate how nomadic subjectivity was re-captured and contained.  
Striated spaces primarily involve the process of sorting and ‘sedimentation’ occurring on the 
surface of the earth. Strata, which form striated spaces, are layers that are built on one another upon the 
earth. They can be considered to be ‘acts of capture’211 that seize what is near, in order to force and bind 
together. In this manner, singularities and intensities, which are productive of smooth spaces, are 
‘imprisoned’ or ‘locked’ into systems that are codified and enclosed as territories. Both the diametric and 
the concentric dualism provide good examples of this method of codification, as social groups and castes 
are given demarcated positions in a system which define their characteristics (centre: male, public; 
periphery: feminine, weakness, etc.). The outcome of this process is the socius – the stratification that 
occurs from the territorial machine of the (nation-)state form.212 The stratifications built upon the earth 
make it ‘heavy’, ‘bloated’ and ‘overburdened’213 with forms of sovereignty attached to centralised 
structures. The act of overburdening through sedimentation and the accumulation of layers acts as a way 
                                                            
207 Colebrook (2005), p. 201 
208 Rajagopal, p. 268 
209 Casey, p. 303 
210 Rajagopal, p. 270 
211 Deleuze and Guattari (2012), p. 45; Lambert, p. 225 
212 Lambert, p. 223 
213 Ibid., p. 225 
 
 
47 
to blunt the natural contingency of the earth. This is signified starkly by the imagery of the earth’s surface 
weighed down by territorial layers. The sedimentation process is conspicuous with the ascension of 
political parties: national liberation movements gave way to parties in former colonial states as the 
institutions of DIL exclusively acknowledged the nation-state form through the UN.  
The manner in which the political party operated to subdue national liberation movements 
demonstrates well how the sedimentation/codification process of striated space takes place. Vital to 
sedimentation is the collapse of the societus214 or state of alliance that characterises the smooth spaces of 
the people-nation. These ‘alliance relationships’215 stop social roles from accumulating into the distinct 
strata that make up striated spaces. When sedimentation takes hold, however, a ‘sorting and ranking’216 
process occurs. This operation takes a variety of loosely configured roles and constructs a distinguishable 
structure out of them, arranged into social classes. The result of this is emergence of a new elite, which 
carves out a space and establishes itself as ‘legitimators of change and delineators of the limits of 
innovation’.217 These elites essentially capture the threshold that the former alliance/societus held; the 
former deterritorialisation of the people-nation collapses back into territorialisation of the nation-state and 
the party apparatus.   
 The distinct social roles that are created within the party structure correspond to different 
positions within varying strata. The elites, who now govern the nation through the party and the state, 
monopolise and mark off the leading social roles from the great multitude of people. While the former 
societus of the people-nation corresponded to a line of flight, connection between different events, 
nomadic subjectivities and blocks of time-space, the political party organisation heralds the return of 
distinct boundary-lines. The ‘line’ within political parties is constituted through its subordination to 
ordered points (recall the linear perspective).218 Each demarcated point is a social role fixed within one of 
the multiple levels or layers of strata. Points on different strata are securely connected to one another 
through a line. The line does not simply denote a discernible hierarchy but delineates between social 
classes, as in the diametric dualism, and their qualities, as in the concentric dualism. The organisation of 
the party in this sense can be seen as a ‘pluralism of order’ based on ‘positions, interests and 
governmentality’.219 This chimes with the way in which Deleuze and Guattari describe striated space as 
‘both limited and limiting…it is limited in its parts, which are assigned constant directions, are oriented 
in relation to one another, divisible by boundaries, and can interlink.’220 The territorialisation of the social 
movement through the political party, and the people-nation by the nation-state, corresponds to striated 
space’s championing of divisible, metrically located boundaries which divide people, but also ensure 
their centralised control and ‘capture’ (in the state-form). The political party, and its method of control 
over the organs of the nation-state, represents the ordering excesses of the formal organisation.221 
 These ordering excesses are indicative of the triumph of what Deleuze calls the molar, over the 
molecular. The molecular can be seen as the hidden dynamism of points that interact with each other, in a 
mode alongside one another (as opposed to hierarchically), in a similar way to the series, which we noted 
above. The encounter between molecules is transformative, and their continued becoming ensures they 
evades capture and integration into an enclosed whole. The molar, however, is a form of 
reterritorialisation that joins points together into an ordered unity within a static identity.222 The points 
within a molar segment or the social roles of the nation-state are fixed within a whole and are therefore 
conducive to ‘stable behaviour patterns’.223 The people who embody these social roles are ordered 
through subjectification224 – they are brought into a normative understanding of the world through 
restriction to a single way of being or behaving, corresponding to that role they occupy. Their behaviour 
thus becomes predictable as seen from the perspective of the structure (the God’s eye view, see above). 
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This is precisely why Deleuze and Guattari associate striated space with what they call ‘Royal 
Science’,225 or the centralised science of the state. Royal Science is founded upon a ‘fixed model of form, 
mathematical figures, and measurement’, all of which inclines it towards the ‘static’226 as opposed to 
becoming. It has a ‘metric power’227 that categorises as it ‘aspires to universality’.228 The majoritarian 
‘model’ is crucial for strata and striated spaces to hold a structure in place via socially definable metrics. 
The model is predictive of human behaviour and ways of being which are imputed to the defined social 
roles of a stratum. Human behaviour, in these models, is reducible to constants or universal laws. This 
compounds ‘a conception of society as being composed of inert subjects susceptible and bound to the 
application of universal laws of the state’.229 The social division of labour and the codified social classes 
that this brings about converts the subject into a unit230 of productivity, completely at odds with the 
nomadic subject as the dynamic centre of forces.231 The nomadic subject’s line of flight is defined by 
irregularities, as opposed to constants, and the unpredictable and uncontrolled transformations of 
becoming. Universal metrics, the language of the structuralising forces of the concentric and diametric 
dualism, becomes a new threshold, which defines and binds together interiority (this model is best 
exemplified by such terms such as ‘world order’, as utilised by Donald Rumsfeld and Henry Kissinger).     
The hold that Royal Science has over legal practice and concepts is evinced by the emergence of 
managerial theories such as law-as-plan. The latter, in the same manner as the majoritarian models we 
have thus far discussed, provides a cognitive frame that allows for the reduction or minimisation of 
disruption caused to a normative (or moral) orientation by events. In many ways, it provides a method in 
which to block or at least obscure openings that may appear to the virtual. For the model/plan events 
appear solely as unplanned occurrences, the so-called ‘conditions of legality’232 that necessitate a demand 
for as well as give rise to the rule of law. To elaborate, they are the ambiguous, complex or arbitrary 
moral contexts (or situations) that can only be circumvented or ordered by resorting to the ‘master plan’ 
(ground) of legality.233 The irrationality that breaks forth in unplanned occurrences must submit to those 
officeholders234 (those in the higher-end social roles of the stratum) who are in place to carry out the 
planning process. Cost-efficiency is deemed to be the major benefit of this approach, in complete contrast 
to prohibitively costly modes of ‘spontaneous self-ordering’ and experimentation.235 This is because once 
plans or models are adopted by a group of officeholders there is explicit reason to adhere to them; plans 
which are persistently discarded or tinkered with (i.e. minoritarian plans/models) are detrimental to a 
durable legality.236 Any attempts to re-open the master plan or majoritarian model is strongly resisted as 
the manner of ordering society must be settled beyond any costly contestation. Legal institutions (or 
systems) become the means through which plans can be carried out as they configure the normative 
orientation that will guide the collective-subject impelled to follow. The implementation and construction 
of plans on behalf of the collective-subject, which is de-politicised and de-subjectified, effectively 
produce an obligation to conform to the officeholders’ interpretation of the instructions that are derived 
from the master plan. To put it another way, the highly rational organisational abilities of the 
officeholders make up for the costly errors of the people-nation at large. 
On the planetary scale, the modus operandi of Royal Science parallels that of DIL as it is built 
upon categories that are the grounds for its claim to universal principles. This is comparable to the 
universality of DIL, with its foundation in the categorical cuts it effects and the new hierarchy of power it 
seeks to define with the pseudo-scientific basis of measurable macroeconomics – the metric power of 
GDP, development and so on. The geometric divisions of nation-states are all too complicit with the 
power of metric measurability to capture and locate people in a system of control. To come back to the 
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cut/line of striated space, the manoeuvre is ‘from point to point, hence from one countable simple 
location to another’ so that ‘any qualitative properties… properly neutralised…can be assigned definite 
values, mathematical or otherwise.’237 The division of postcolonial states into nation-states through the 
drawing of spatial lines would be a necessary precursor to a territoriality inseparable from quantitatively 
defined development statistics.  
Nowhere is the power of the majoritarian model more pronounced than in a discursive and 
policy context that has arisen post decolonisation, one that has allowed for the convergence of 
developmental economics with global security concerns. This development-cum-security model, as Mark 
Duffield notes, harbours planetary-wide ambitions.238 For the model to be firmly secured on a global 
basis the instability of minoritarian models must be re-accentuated, this time explicitly associated not just 
with economic primitiveness but also with social conflict. The ‘arbitrary’ and complex moral scenarios of 
unplanned events may lead directly to social dissolution, criminality and internecine civil strife.239 
Moreover, wars that arise from the social circumstances of squalor and poverty result in the destruction of 
valuable socio-economic assets – it would seem that the risk involved in the pursuit of such marginal 
models is, by and large, extensive. More significantly, a lack of planning through the conventional and 
accepted model of development spreads instability globally and the circulation of destabilising flows 
(refugees, economic crises, terrorism, etc.) sends ripples through the entire world-system. Hence, the 
reality of international interconnection means that underdevelopment becomes a major security concern: 
it is an enormous breach in global security waiting to happen.  
 Around the development-security mode a proliferating array or ‘strategic complex’ of 
institutional actors have arranged themselves (for the start of this process from 1973–82, see the previous 
chapter240). They make up a radically new assemblage,241 equipped with an augmented capacity to 
intervene in order to provide a robust defence of the model. These institutions (NGOs, civil society and 
aid organisations, private companies and so on) assemble themselves into formations that enhance their 
ability to penetrate into the developmental nation-state. The operation of these institutional actors unfolds 
through direct access to, and co-option of, ‘the people’, by providing the latter with the methods and 
means necessary to follow the development-security model, regardless of the pre-existing machinery of 
the state. Furthermore, the concept of ‘the people’ itself is replaced by ‘the population’, a term and 
concept well suited to biopolitical management, measurability, control and containment.242 It is, after all, 
manageable populations that fit comfortably into the presiding model or master plan, as they are easily 
controlled and bounded through economic indicators and welfare statistics. While, as we have stated, 
national liberation movements momentarily managed to decouple the ‘nation’ from the ‘state’, the ability 
of the people or popular masses to connect with the nation and vice versa is prevented and indeed 
anticipated by the emerging development-security model that folds back the people into the population 
and reinforces the link between the nation and the centralised state. This thoroughly controlled population 
(control-group), enmeshed within the developmental nation-state, is the outcome of a policy that seeks to 
provide Third World nations with the canny ability to ‘contain’ and manage destabilising effects, which 
threaten to circulate outwards and go global, within their own borders.   
 The development-security policy model advocated by a variety of non-governmental 
institutional actors equips Third World nations with a trajectory that aims at no less than the complete 
social transformation of society.243 This entails the wholescale reordering of the nation-state along lines 
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more conducive to the aforementioned model.244 It is the goal of the model to inculcate nations with the 
capacities to socially ‘progress’ and become ‘self-reliant’, ostensibly to help place ‘ineffective’ states on 
the same level as the ‘effective’ ones.245 This then returns us to the paradox at the heart of DIL. In terms 
of the leading paradigm of development and security, the strategy from institutional actors is to 
emphasise the ‘contingent sovereignty’246 of undeveloped nation-states in an international context in 
which the emission of destabilising flows has global consequences. The actors therefore have a rationale 
to intervene, as sovereignty cannot exist in an absolute state amongst those ineffectual nations, 
particularly when the world-system is at stake. And yet, the aim of intervention is precisely to enable the 
self-reliance of the developmental nation-state in its own economic affairs in that very same, 
interconnected global context. The nations of the Global South are deterritorialised only in order for them 
to be then re-territorialised. The palpable result of this subordinating rationality is that the development-
security model is secured on a planetary scale through undermining the sovereignty of the nation-state, 
yet only seemingly in order to reassert this same sovereignty by helping establish powers of containment 
over populations.  
In notable contrast to the ideal Third World state that has realised its self-reliance (a nominally 
authorised form of reterritorialisation), the spectre of the fragile and fragmenting state conjures up the 
pernicious prospect of the ‘ungoverned space’,247 constituting an unauthorised, as well as dangerous, 
form of deterritorialisation. This disconcerting image serves to strengthen the argument that spontaneous 
and destabilising circulatory flows248 require the developmental nation-state, which can contain the 
harmful effects that threaten to scatter themselves indefinitely across the surface of the globe. The 
escalation of these flows, if left unabated, even threatens to redound upon the Global North to such a 
grave extent as to collapse the very distinction between developed and underdeveloped.249  
Overall, it seems that the legalistic power of Royal Science is all too suggestive of the 
concentrated power of the state over its national boundaries. And, indeed, as Third World governments 
accepted the nation-state form, the resulting structuralisation of the people-nation aided in the 
extinguishing of national liberation energies, as well as the capture of Third World peoples into the 
institutions of a DIL. So, it would seem that while the nation-state can be said to striate space on a local 
level, DIL achieves this operation on a global level.  
 
During the era of traditional imperialism, the centre depended on its privileged First World status as it 
exploited the colonies via a one-way relationship between itself and the periphery. Globalisation seems to 
continue this state of affairs while additionally generating the global resistance directed against it. To put 
it in other words, ‘even as capitalism is increasingly organised on a global basis, resistance to it is also 
emerging on an extra-territorial basis through social movements.’250 The relationship between the centre-
periphery is as much defined by the centre’s occupying the margins as by the margins’ inward movement 
to the centre. This has partly to do with the Global South’s use of the promise of DIL, albeit generally 
resulting in failure. It also has to do with the mobility of social movements, which are based locally in 
place yet can act globally through the subversion of DIL – by redirecting it to their own ends. 
 To look at things from another perspective, we can surmise that what most defines the power 
centres of DIL, or of the concentric dualism, is ‘what escapes them or by their impotence [more so] than 
by their zone of power.’251 We must remember that the concentric-dualist mode of DIL (with its origins 
in the analysis of Indian cosmology) was the answer to the problems posed by the postcolonial Third 
World, from which lines of flight or decoded flows seemed to be escaping at a rapid rate. Yet even as the 
concentric–diametric paradigm of DIL has been partially successful in stymying Third World claims to 
justice, the key problem still persists – can institutions and organisations, both of disciplinary and 
dissident international law, effectively conspire with or against the absolute deterritorialising effects of 
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the earth? How open can these international movements or institutions be to the eternal movements of the 
earth? 
Matters are complicated, however, when we note that for Deleuze and Guattari, striated and 
smooth spaces are interdependent. They are in constant interaction: ‘smooth space is constantly being 
translated, transversed into a striated space; striated space is constantly being reversed into a smooth 
space.’252 The smooth space of the nomad is continually in the process of being captured by state 
mechanisms which map, measure and place or locate it in a geometric grid or matrix. Yet striated space is 
continually transformed into smooth space – places which escape state control and are either reconfigured 
by nomads/local groups and/or are subject to the earth – which ‘asserts its own powers of 
deterritorialization’253 predominately through the power of covering up and concealing, something 
idiosyncratic of the naturally changing world. This constantly changing world resists the ultimate triumph 
of striated space. Thus, smooth space relies on the striated, as it provides it with an opportunity to renew 
itself and re-emerge with a new dynamism without which it would wither and die of its own accord.254 
Likewise, striated space requires the resurfacing of the smooth in order to renew and re-energise its 
geometric capture of the world.       
If one looks at smooth/striated spaces at the level of organisations, institutions or even social 
movements, just as in societies, one can see they consist of ‘changing mixtures of meshworks and 
strata’.255 The ambiguity at the basis of UN institutions, for example, is that despite the stratifying 
influences they impart on the global level, they are in themselves a mixture of the striated and the 
smooth. Just as with the concentric dualism, UN institutions are somewhat open to events. This allows 
them the scope to properly react to and contain them. The old institutions/formal organisations of the 
nation-state and political parties, on the other hand, seem to lack, at least, the same degree of openness to 
contingency and events.  
This is the fundamentally equivocal nature that exists at the heart of the institutions of DIL. The 
smooth space of these institutions guards against their own complete capture by social movements, which 
in turn occupy and inhabit their own very different type of deterritorialising spaces, as well as their 
nation-states within the Third World. This is generally because there is an operative dynamism in these 
institutions which refigures cuts and thresholds – such as between the economic and political, between 
the international and national, between institutions, and so on – to suit themselves.256 This dynamism 
ensures the dominance of Western paradigms through the institutions of DIL (see above) and underlies 
the hegemony of development economics and associated discourses. While these cuts, which play out 
within the terrain of institutions, have the effect of maintaining a globalised striated space, the spaces of 
these institutions themselves have proven to be dynamic enough to avoid Third World capture. As 
structuralising discourses like development help contain the spread of social movements across the globe 
and the renewal of the cause of justice, these discourses extend themselves institutionally through an 
unmatched flexibility which sidesteps categorisation, assuring its own continuity and survival. The place 
of international institutions can be thought of as deterritorialising in a similar way to nomadic space, as it 
is less the single nation-state as the discourses which cut through them all that are of significance. This 
could be seen in the initial attempts of the Third World to harness DIL for its own ends: demands for 
economic justice by the postcolonial states were reduced to the notion of development as a cure-for-all, 
something which openly defies the particular borders of the sovereign nation-state. International 
institutions of law invoke a transformative dynamic in which they are at once a promising type of local 
meeting place for nations and yet also one from which the resulting global effects are all too evident. In 
other words, a multiplicity of nations may be involved, but they are all too often subject to a singular, 
unifying narrative of salvation. These international institutions thus function, paradoxically, through 
smooth space, in the same manner Deleuze and Guattari impute to transnational actors in general terms, 
while promoting a global striated space.257 However, the smooth spaces of DIL’s institutions and 
nomad/social movements are not to be confused; while they may share a lot of the characteristics of 
smooth space in general, they operate in diverging ways due to the difference in social actors and 
subjectivities involved. 
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It is thus possible to say that there exists an inner (relative) threshold within institutions of DIS 
between meshworks/smooth spaces and those more striated/prone to sedimentation. This inner fold is 
always in flux, and is susceptible to changes depending on the relation of the institution to a dissident 
international law. The same can be said of the multitude of social movements which make up dissident 
international law – while there may be a leaning towards the meshwork of smooth space, sedimentation 
always exists within as a lurking and latent possibility. Institutions, characterised as they are by the type 
of connections that proliferate within them, vary in their relation to the outside. Moreover, it was only by 
becoming more open to the outside that DIL was able to reduce the influence of a dissident international 
law’s claims to justice (through a process of recapture).  
Ultimately, this inner fold is subject to the greater fold between DIL/dissident international law 
and its relation to the earth. It is, after all, the attempt to keep the absolute contingency of the earth at bay 
that defines the concentric dualism from the viewpoint of the rooted European (and Eurocentric) 
observer. The struggle really hinges, as Gregg Lambert insightfully points out, upon DIL’s continual 
attempt to stop dissident international law from conspiring with the earth and its absolutely 
deterritorialising effects.258 
 
Viveiros de Castro is cognisant of a different spatial paradigm besides that of the concentric and 
diametric types. This is the ‘triadic schema’, which notes the latent presence of ‘triadic classifications 
(social, ceremonial, or cosmological)’.259 As we are already aware, the diametric dualism denotes 
symmetrically static and reciprocal relations, while the concentric dualism is representative of 
contrasting, asymmetrical relations. However, it is the triadic schema that can be seen as the true 
foundation of this representational duality. What the triadic schema really reveals is the undisclosed 
frame that the dualisms conceal. In this sense ‘all binary opposition, in short, is the degeneration…of a 
ternary structure.’260 The ternary structure is the root of the dualisms and as such acts as the foundational 
figure of geometry and mapping. It reveals the unseen schematic between what would otherwise be 
immobile dualisms – a far cry from the static representation that is epitomised by diametric dualism.   
We should observe that there is an element of movement between representations – particularly 
with the concentric dualism, which mediates between the stationary diametric dualism and the hidden, 
foundational triadic schema. The triadic structure, as the concealed root of the dualisms, is radically open 
to movement and becoming. This is because when, and if, the diametric dualism is transformed or 
converted back into the original triadic structure, the terms of the triangularity are incommensurable.261 
To explain, the diameter of the diametric dualism can be resolved into legs (terms) of equal length that 
can be transformed or assembled into the triadic schema, but the hypotenuse of this triangle (the relation 
between terms) cannot equate with these sides of equal length (see the pictorial representation above, on 
page 8, for clarification). In fact, the hypotenuse is the square root of the sum of the other two sides, 
which is an irrational number.262 This would mean the relation between the terms of the dualism, now 
transformed into a triangle, is ‘a continuous and involute entity, inward growing and properly 
interminable’.263 The irrational number is in a state of becoming as its fractions continue to proliferate in 
an uncontrollable manner. The properly geometric triadic schema, the root of the dualistic spatial 
representation, contains its own internal dynamism. It is, literally speaking, radical. 
The horizon, with which the triadic schema is synonymous, may act as a foundation but it is 
continually threatened by its own internal contingency, which it may not be able to control. We have 
discussed the horizon-foundation of DIL post the event of national liberation – the horizon reconstitutes 
itself as foundation, yet it still contains traces of contingency that remain clearly evident. We can liken 
this to the movement of the concentric dualism – it may well be more receptive to events, and hence, 
overall, preserve its spatial organisation (or arrangement) by embracing openness to some extent (in order 
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to exercise some control over it), and yet it cannot keep the triadic schema completely hidden from sight 
(mirroring the inability of the diametric dualism to ultimately keep veiled the horizon that lies beyond). 
Another way in which to view the triadic schema is through the normative structure of the 
nuclear family. The normative family structure (father–mother–son) or the ‘family-conjugal-triangle’,264 
for Deleuze and Guattari, is the result of the ‘oedipalisation’ of desire.265 The original prohibition that is 
constructive of the oedipal triadic-family is that which condemns incestuous relations between the mother 
and the son outright.266 In this prohibition, the son looks away from the mother and so turns towards the 
father. The father is the representation of the political authority figure, and the son waits his turn to carry 
on in his footsteps, biding his time in order to become the new ‘sanctioning authority’.267 In this process, 
the son continues to maintain the triadic spatial-structural representation through an acceptance of defined 
social roles/strata and the associated normative subjectivity.  
Accordingly, Deleuze and Guattari’s critique of both Freud and Lacan centres on the idea that 
the creation of the normative subject, through the unconscious, is a supremely political act. The 
production of the superego, through the internalisation of spatial structures of authority, is not simply to 
be accepted as a process of psychological development.268 
The normative social subjectivity of the son, constructed within the triadic schema, distinguishes 
between the contrasting qualities of the father and the mother. It is then possible to say that the paranoiac 
transcendental law’s prohibition269 on incest creates, on the one hand, the father as the normative subject 
of authority, and on the other the mother as the repressed, prohibited object of desire.270 It is this original 
prohibition that creates the law and its reliance on the object–subject duality. The prohibition between the 
mother (object) and son (subject) generates the repressed desire to return back to origins, and in the case 
of DIL, absolute territorialisation. This return to origins also takes on the form in Freud and Lacan of the 
engrained desire to return back to the wholeness and interiority of the womb – something that safeguards 
and marks the final expulsion of the outside. This form of oedipal desire is only possible with the 
stratified triadic schema.  
 The compulsive (i.e. paranoiac) obsession with origins is one that is also characteristic of DIL. 
The original prohibition that marks the creation of a modern, post-1950s DIL is the exclusion of the 
postcolonial Third World, embodied in its national liberation movements, from the centres of power. In 
addition, we can say that ‘paranoiac transcendental law…never stops agitating a finite segment and 
making it into a complete object’.271 The fanatical obsession with returning to origins manifests itself in a 
sedimentation process, in which those on the top layer (such as those with economic superiority) are 
determined to ground DIL on an absolute territorialisation which admits of no outside. Any 
differentiation becomes purely internal to the structure (Deleuze calls this ‘unity of composition’). 
We will recall that the periphery of the concentric dualism is described as being inscribed with 
‘feminine characteristics’ (weakness, etc.). Within the triadic family, it is possible to say that the mother 
constitutes the Third World, excluded by the political and economic authority of the First World/father 
that predominates over DIL. The mother still retains a salient role in the maintenance of the triadic 
family, just as the Third World remains fundamental to the construction of a judicial universality, 
granting legitimacy to DIL. Despite this, the mother is consigned to the periphery, mirroring the 
exclusion of the Third World due to what is commonly perceived as a lack of economic strength through 
development.  
 However, it is also possible to say that the Third World resembles the son, patiently waiting for 
the time when he can become the sanctioning power, controlling the reigns of international law through 
economic might. It may be best to suggest here that the Third World in actuality embodies the 
hypotenuse of the triadic schema – namely the relation between the two terms of the dualism, or between 
the mother and the son. While the hypotenuse is held in a unity within the triadic schema, its length 
equates to an irrational number and so can be considered to be in a perpetual state of internal (fractal) 
becoming. The contingency radiating from the hypotenuse is kept in check through the power of the 
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authority of law qua original prohibition. Overcoming this prohibition and stimulating a line of flight 
between the mother and son is the proscribed role which immanent justice plays.  
In order for ‘immanent’ justice-as-struggle to be renewed, it requires re-engaging with the idea 
of justice. Pahuja espouses this as its ‘utopian, aspirational face’.272 She goes on to explore the gap 
between positive law as the descriptive, constitutional body of law, and the idea of justice, which is ‘the 
excess created by law’s invincible promise’.273 What makes international law so productive, despite its 
hegemonic discourses, is that it creates an excess over and above ‘the body of its own doctrine’, and this 
is when it ‘operates as a screen onto which people project a variety of struggles’.274 The immanence of 
justice relies upon a (re-)connection with justice’s virtual possibilities, a connection that will ultimately 
continue to disrupt and so reactivate the triadic schema by adding to its instability. Justice will create the 
conditions conducive for the lines of flight of social movements in the Third World, and so allow for an 
escape from the territorialisation of enclosed spaces within the triadic schema. 
Justice itself acts both as a legal creation thrown up in the intensity of the situation or event and 
as a reactivation of the unactualised possibilities which make up the virtual. It is the shifting borderline 
between dissident and DIL, the borderline that both paradigms fight over and their existence is 
intrinsically bound up with.  
Conclusion  
The re-emergence of justice as struggle in Third World social movements, existing outside nation-state 
control, is an effective challenge to the hegemonising influences of DIL. A spatialised justice emphasises 
the temporary nature of structured social relations, be they relations inherent to the state or between states 
through the institutions of international law.  
Justice as struggle can be said to reanimate the idea of justice, associated as it is with an 
emancipatory politics that harnesses the future promise of justice as having been served and which is 
woven together with the situational struggle of the present in anticipation of righting the injustices of 
organised and ordered social relationships. The utopian energies of a political cause, which humanitarian 
ethics does so much to stamp out, re-surfaces within the space-time enclaves or smooth spaces of these 
global social movements. Alternatives to the mainstream narrative of development and its singular 
temporality, as well as its closely allied discourse on human rights, are contained within these 
movements. They represent an effective rejection of the striated spatiality of DIL, a refusal to accept the 
fixed spatial image (of the one world or ‘orb’) that the Global North presents to the Global South as its 
likeness.  
These social movements, although based upon the ‘local absolute’ of a place characterised by 
the intensity of the struggle for justice, are also able to effectively and strategically utilise the institutions 
of DIL when it suits them to do so, as noted by Rajagopal. The outcome of these movements is a re-
politicisation of the people, based on Neocosmos’ idea of ‘the nation’ as a politicised subjectivity in 
excess, which is deterritorialising in so much as it desists from accepting a particular, fixed (Western) 
socio-political organisational form. The uncontainable dimension of DIL, that is to say the idea of justice, 
alongside the ‘excess’ of political subjectivity outside the structural relations of the nation-state, provides 
the opportunities for Third World social movements to project an alternative way, namely, a dissident 
international law. 
 
The sprawling people-nations (the deterritorialising nationalism of the damnés, or wretched) of the 
postcolonial Third World had the effect of re-introducing equivocality into the institutions of DIL 
(resulting, notably, in their reformulation post-imperialism, so as to absorb the new decolonising 
energies), most notably bringing these institutions into proximity with the deterritorialising force of the 
earth. Without question, the immanent justice (the ‘membrane’ notion of justice) embodied in the people-
nation came face to face with conjunctive possibilities275 and immanent expression of earth/nature. Even 
if only momentarily, national liberation and movements of decolonisation made use of institutional 
assemblages as a means of passage – a process in which the affects of transformation and re-invention for 
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the collective-subject became ‘ultimately inseparable’ from the openings which bring into purview the 
‘outside’ of the institution.276 
 In the accord between the collective-agent and the outside, or ‘intensive other’ (nature, earth, 
animals; the un-orderable beyond of positivist law) of the institution, the unactualised possibilities of DIS 
could come to be enacted. This runs contrary to the Lacanian conviction that nature constitutes the realm 
of the ‘impossible-real’, i.e. that which may only be perceived through representations, whose very 
functionality relies on the submission of reality (of objects) to the cognitive ground of the subject. For 
Guattari, the real (or, nature) is the artificial (the ‘abstract machine’ of experimental, inter-transformable 
parts) and not the impossible that Lacan would proclaim it to be.277 And as such, the ‘natural as real’ is as 
much a practical assemblage that people may connect to as, say, the machines of the nation-state, the 
capitalist world-economy, the world-system, and so on. As Guattari would make us understand, 
communication between the creative side (the ‘instituting’ or constitutive power) of institutions and 
nature requires the becoming of group subjectivities who are, in addition, able to critique themselves 
through self-analysis (or immanent analysis/critique). In this fashion, the ‘segregative split’ between 
nature and people is overcome; one assemblage (space-time block) docks with another. 
 We would be wise to suggest, however, that Lacan’s belief in the representational perception of 
nature has a strong current of thought behind it within the historical and conceptual ‘sequences’ (which 
does not imply strict continuity or determinism)278 of DIL. The modes of thought that have been 
influential in shaping international law have continually sought to ‘block’ a connectivity between 
colonised/subjugated people and an intensive other that would preclude the onset of a predominating 
positivist law. Indeed, it is the link with a ‘radical’ (even ‘irrational’, in the terms of the hypotenuse of the 
triadic schema) alterity that would, and can, beckon alternative socio-political forms. As opposed to a 
viewpoint that would simply define the social movements of subjugated peoples’ negativity (as solely 
disrupting the order and existent way of things), we can state that they have been, and continue to be, 
positive assertions of the type of practical experimentation that stimulates concept-production and thus 
points beyond the dispossessive, geospatial ordering of a DIL. In contradistinction to this, previous 
sequences have also been defined by the conception and setting up of anticipatory spatial structures and 
socio-political formations (the place-state, machina mundi, ius gentium, Anthropos–Humanitas, the great 
chain of being, Spanish imperium, etc.) for the expressed purpose of pre-empting and ambushing an 
emergent immanent justice/law. Put differently, holding in place the dis-connection between justice/law 
and earth/nature has been the major project of Neo-Aristotelian natural law (to which we shall now turn) 
of which the main proponents of interest to us include the jurist-theologians who so decisively influenced 
the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment as well as the emergence of international law: Albertus 
Magnus, St Thomas Aquinas and Francisco de Vitoria. 
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Part Two: The Dialectic of Nomos and Topos: Self-
Ordering, Nature and Power in Aristotle and 
Albertus Magnus 
Chapter One: Aristotelian Cosmology and Albertus’ 
Speculative Geography 
The immanent justice exercised by a people-nation, as was explained in the previous section, takes up its 
position between a positivist law and its outside. It assumes the form of a ‘membrane’ suspended 
between a majoritarian, established constitutional body of law, and its beyond – the radical reinvention 
and multiplicity of institutions. This equates to an in-between position that connects a people existing in 
excess of the law by which they find themselves bound to that which appears to throw off any attempts to 
trammel it – namely, the earth. The place of justice seems to lie on a threshold, one which looks forward 
to ushering the ‘uncounted’ into positivist law, adding to the flux of institutions which have seemingly 
closed in on themselves. Immanent justice invariably invokes the absolutely ‘un-orderable’ earth and its 
capacity for self-organisation as that ‘minoritarian model’ which guards against sedimentation.  
 With this membrane justice, the molecular-becoming of a people-nation connects itself to the 
enormous ‘abstract machine’ of nature, that is to say, to the power of matter. In other words, the 
molecular energy of the deterritorialising nation comes to embrace the molecular-matter of nature; it re-
makes the relations to the earth once turned asunder by processes of dispossession and accumulation, re-
making itself in the process.  
 One recent example of a process like this is the re-emergence of the community among the 
indigenous peoples of Bolivia in the wake of the water wars in 2000.1 Prompted by an attempt to 
dispossess and further commodify water consumption, urban and rural peoples gathered themselves 
around the water-earth (understood precisely as that which cannot be fully reduced to the legal-economic, 
low-intensity schemes of the state/market and its posited laws), in the process gaining enough momentum 
to attempt Miltonian-like flight. Crossing the border between nature and culture they re-made themselves 
as a people-nation (the self-recognition as indigenous people among Bolivians shot up during and after 
the water wars),2 paving the way towards the re-articulation of the relation between the state and the 
people and the earth at its basis via the introduction within the Bolivian constitution of such strange 
concepts as Buen Vivir. The ethnos3 of a people-nation (or the common, to be distinguished from and 
opposed to the reduction of a demos to the ethnos of the myth of autochtony) emerges in the ceaseless 
movement between a specific geography (the mountains, the Altiplano, the sources of water, and the 
fertile Santa Cruz crescent all the way to the Amazon basin) and the deployment of equipment (law being 
one form of such equipment), solving political questions. Ethnos, the community as a technical state, is a 
relation of technical rather than ‘cultural’ forces, in the limited or even ‘necessitarian’ sense often given 
to moral, religious, psychological, artistic or scientific attributes.      
 In order to understand the conditions that make up such a technical state, the behaviour of 
human groups should be analysed under the double conditions of their interior and exterior milieus. The 
point of these concepts – exterior milieu, apprehending everything materially surrounding the human, 
from the geographical and the animal to signs and ideas characterised by their plasticity or ‘originary’ 
virtuality; and interior milieu, or social memory from oral storytelling to meta-data storage, supported by 
the non-zoological organisation of objects and yet quasi-biological in its functioning and evolution – 
taken from the field of biology is to understand the human at the level of the group in its functioning as 
an organism. In our Bolivian exemplar, the point is made concrete in the fact that the struggle for water 
evoked the becoming-human of nature as well as the becoming-nature of the human. It is from this 
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double movement that the ethnos emerges as a political force to be reckoned with (a people-nation, the 
indigenous movement and the MAS coalition4). In this respect, the ethnographic present is not some 
immobile or immemorial time, i.e. backward, the past, pre-modernity, under-development, etc. Rather, as 
Viveiros de Castro says, ‘slow societies know infinite speeds, extra-historical accelerations…that make 
the indigenous concept Buen Vivir (“good life”) something metaphysically closer to extreme sports than 
a relaxed retirement in the countryside.’5 
 Following from this enticing invocation of politics and law as ‘extreme sports’ in relation to the 
case of the recent legal and political developments of the Americas in the twenty-first century, it can be 
said that it is in the combination of the two – nature and people, external milieu and internal milieu, or 
‘world’ as a multiplicity of intricately connected multiplicities – that the capacity for a boundary defying 
self-assembly is realised; the power of the people comes to enact the force of ‘matter-movement’ itself. 
Matter, in ‘engendering its own formations’, carries within itself the productivity to (re-)create itself 
through its technical differentiations. It can be said to ‘bear events’, and in so doing, disallows any 
external influences or forces (any ‘outside agency’) from exercising control over it.6  
 The people-nation, in mirroring the potentiality of matter, creates itself through continually 
gathering itself together, a process that reactivates its sense of collective becoming. This molecular-
becoming signifies a re-injection of equivocality into topos (place) – an outcome of the immanent 
relations between a people (demos) and its milieu, within the wider context of the earth. As such, the 
other’s political agency is maintained through the people-nation’s alliance with the unbounded nature of 
the place it inhabits. 
 It therefore becomes a major project within the lineage of the positivist, natural law tradition (as 
a significant, constitutive precursor to a DIL) and the prospect for global trade and rule, to disconnect the 
people-nation from the earth by enforcing an ongoing segregative split between the two, to insure against 
the onset of an immanent justice as practised by the other. This project was played out via the 
modifications made to Aristotelian ontology by Neo-Aristotelian natural law theorists such as Albertus 
Magnus. For Aristotelian ontology, topos takes on the function of a modulating ‘membrane’ (a 
‘connector’) between the self-gathering capacity of phusis (nature) and the spatial ordering of nomos 
(human convention or law). Topos therefore becomes an integral concept, as well as a key target, for 
Neo-Aristotelians. In the Aristotelian tradition, topos/place acts as a medium linking beings to the 
immanent flows of the cosmos. It prevents the onset of a perception of the world mediated, largely, 
through a quantitative mathematical model that reduces the qualitative characteristics of nature to an 
assessment of ‘surfaces, lengths, and solids of natural bodies by abstraction’.7 Phenomenological 
concepts such as topos convey Aristotle’s scepticism of mathematical accounts of nature8 (such as those 
celebrated by Proclus the Successor, who was famously critical of the Aristotelian approach), which 
promote a purely technical understanding of the world. Instead, an immanent structure of the cosmos is 
advanced, so as to guard against nature’s absorption by a mathematical model privileging the abstraction 
of form over ‘sensible beings, and experience’.9      
Aristotle can be considered to be a ‘pre-critical’ philosopher (as some theorists designate him) in 
so much as he does not present cognition as a stable ground from which a subject can gain knowledge of 
an object. In other words, the object is not required to order itself in relation to, or orbit around, the 
organising subject in any way (a condition of so-called ‘modern subjectivity’). The absence of this type 
of subject–object relationship has much to do with the capacity of Aristotle’s cosmos to act as a self-
ordering interiority lacking an outside – a type of organisational dynamic compatible with Christopher 
Kerslake’s reading of immanence.10 However, this standpoint misses something quite significant in 
respect to Aristotelian ontology, namely that latent sedimentary processes still lurk within it, as well as 
without, in the form of an embryonic nomos thinking (exemplified in the Politics in the form of the 
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tripartite distinction of people) – something which Albertus and his successors in the natural law tradition 
would exploit, and utilise against the more unpalatable (i.e. paganistic) elements of Aristotelian 
cosmology.    
For Christian theologians like Albertus, a cosmos of ‘immanent spatiality’ collapses back into a 
system of the natural world/order by means of a radical decoupling of topos from phusis. A topos 
disconnected from phusis, enabling the former to be framed as ‘social location’, is crucial here; it will 
come to define the overriding aims of the Neo-Aristotelian project, that is, constructing a framework 
within which to understand the other’s relation to place, elaborating upon a method of ‘placing’ the other 
in a wider spatial system, and manoeuvring to co-opt place as an instrument of power and imposition (as 
a capturing apparatus). The modification and appropriation of topos by Neo-Aristotelians went hand in 
hand with the whittling away of the concept’s equivocality – in the sense in which it was previously 
conceived of as a zone of intermingling or meeting point between nature’s immanent forces. Moreover, 
topos completes its transformation into social location, considered to be the reduction of beings by an 
external agent (eventually embodied by man; this is given its theoretical finalisation by Aquinas and 
Vitoria) to a geopolitical location within the world-machine. Place (as topos), in effect, becomes 
territorialised as a bounded entity.  
Continuing this line of thought, it would seem that the Neo-Aristotelian tradition operates 
through reversing the relation between nomos and topos – with the former gaining the upper hand over 
the latter by colonising phusis from without as well as from within Aristotelian thought. This leads to the 
puncturing and draining of immanence from nature, although not its complete erasure. Immanence as the 
mode of relationship between matter and its virtual beyond (for Aristotle, the cosmos as the ‘Whole’), 
returns, but at the behest of the ethical citizen, that is to say, as contained within the ethical life of the 
polis or the city-states of European nations.    
In summary, a natural law consolidated through its spatial arrangement and ordering expresses 
its positivist leaning by revoking the self-gathering capacities of nature, as well as through the 
construction of apparatuses of capture in anticipation of the people-nation. Place, within the natural law 
tradition, becomes influential in explaining ‘otherness’ – in the sense of the ‘lack’ of agency of those in 
thrall to the immanent workings of earth and nature, as well as its perfection for those who are able to 
force the world to submit to their whims. This Part seeks to continue from the previous one in 
demonstrating how the spatiality of a positivist (natural) law, articulated by Albertus, sets up the 
conceptual apparatus and structures that will stifle and anticipate the immanent justice intermittently 
practised by the other.  
 
In Russell Winslow’s formulation, Aristotle’s phusis (nature) represents a unique ‘self-gathering’.11 It is a 
multiplicity brought together into a unity – a gathering-into-continuity.12 The gathered-togetherness of 
nature corresponds to an array of potentialities and actualised activity (‘being-at-work’) that make up, 
individually, its manifold beings. Thus, each being can be considered a unity of potential and actualised 
activity, the unity of which secures an autonomous identity.  
The self-gathering capacity of nature can thus be discerned within the very workings of 
individual beings. Beings, in themselves, constitute a multiplicity of parts (of traits, qualities and so on), 
but the division between these is dissolved through the continuous movement and activity proper to the 
being in question. Continuity of movement ensures continuity of identity, on this reading of Aristotle. In 
other words, the work or activity of each being furnishes it with its independent and continuous identity.13 
During the cycle of a being’s existence, its ‘potency array’ or potentiality is transformed into realised 
activity or work. Conversely, actualised activity may withdraw back into latency, back into the potency 
array, while still constituting the gathered-togetherness of a being.   
Phusis, as a whole, manifests itself throughout the entire cosmos. The identity of phusis, and by 
implication the cosmos, is possible only through this gathered-togetherness of a manifold of beings. To 
put it differently, on the cosmic scale, continuity between all beings allows for the distinct, unfolding 
identity of phusis. The latter consists of a multiplicity brought together through its being-at-work 
(actualised activity) and potentiality. The being-at-work or movement of each contributes to the eternal 
movement of the cosmos – the cosmos, after all, can be thought of as ‘eternity in movement’. It is the 
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continuity between beings – the being-at-work or continuous activity of all – which guarantees the 
eternity of this movement, and so the self-identity of the cosmos. The cosmos, moreover, is not simply 
the sum of all potentialities actualised in any given moment, but the full array of latent, as well as 
realised, potentiality (i.e. activity held back for future occurrence). It is this that – just as it keeps 
individual beings in movement – keeps the cosmos in perpetual movement.14  
The foremost movement that occurs within the cosmos is the perfect, self-contained, circular 
motion of the heavenly bodies, the fountainhead from which all beings derive their unique trajectories. 
Furthermore, what is noteworthy in Aristotle’s cosmos is that it retains the power to order itself, that is to 
say, it governs itself autonomously through a process of self-ordering. Self-ordering is the outcome of the 
mutual dependence between beings, as the dynamic and unique trajectories of each relies on the 
galvanising proximity of the other. Thence, beings can be said to orientate and order themselves through 
their constitutive relation to others – to gather together’. In its eternity the cosmos is the endless shifting 
of the position, as well as the relation, between beings that are ‘at-work’. In this equation, place/topos 
plays an important role as the immediate environs that attach beings-at-work with each other. More 
profoundly, place links beings not just with other beings, but also with the cosmos as a whole (i.e. to all 
other beings). In being gathered together in this way, beings assume an immanent relation with each 
other; they are free from interference from any agent external to or outside of the cosmos.      
In his commentary on Aristotle, the medieval Dominican theologian and bishop of Regensburg 
Albertus Magnus (the Great)15 articulates a major subversion of the former’s cosmology in order to fit a 
Christian, and therefore Neo-Aristotelian framework. His alterations have far-reaching implications for 
the self-ordering processes that keep the Aristotelian cosmos in movement. Albertus was, indeed, deeply 
interested in the manifest order of nature and earth. However, this order had to reveal itself within the 
limitations of Christian theology, which could not permit of the ‘pagan elements’ of Aristotle’s 
cosmology. In which case, Albertus was impelled to jettison the idea of the eternity of the cosmos,16 a 
notion underpinning the self-ordering capacity or gathered-togetherness of beings. Hence, Albertus was 
drawn into seeking another foundation on which to base his ordering of nature – he found his theoretical 
range in drafting-in not just theology, but astrology, speculative geography and geopolitics to support his 
cause.17 
Albertus’ interest in the study of nature was perfectly sincere; he genuinely wished to 
understand the relationship between people and their environment.18 His intellectual project centred on 
how the earth was considered to resemble a domain of ‘natural order’, an established legality with the 
likeness of ‘a mosaic where everything was in its place and the design of the creator was clear’.19 While 
he expounded on the beauty of the earth, he was mostly interested in it as a fundamental design: in its 
production and its establishment or order, in addition to how it could be altered by human hands. Given 
his aim of effecting a compromise between Christian theology and a (Neo-)Aristotelian framework, the 
principal issue was how to contain the immanence of Aristotle’s cosmos. The latter needed to be replaced 
with a far more determinate system that left a place for an external divinity yet did not completely 
sideline human agency.   
Albertus was therefore forced to take another tack. His method involved tampering with the 
delicate hylomorphic model, assembled by Aristotle to reflect his observations of nature. This manoeuvre 
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was in line with his Neo-Aristotelianism, in the sense that form became the recipient of a vast amount of 
ontological and explanatory power to the detriment of matter. The self-propelling movement of 
matter/dynamis to ‘run after’ form/energeia was revoked in favour of the latter’s power to move matter 
and bodies at will. The immanent relation between dynamis and energeia was replaced in Albertus’ 
model by the control of energeia over dynamis. Consequently, the ordering of nature was no longer a 
self-gathering based upon the parity natural beings realised in assembling themselves. Order was now 
realised as something that must be imposed from above. The question now became: ‘what is this above? 
Where exactly is order imposed from?’ To answer this line of enquiry, Albertus shifted to the discipline 
of speculative geography, so as to conceptualise the order appropriate to the earth. He combined this 
analysis with the more ancient theories of astrology20, so as to explain how imposition emanated from 
‘above’ – or more precisely, from the firmament. Furthermore, he split the ‘above’ – the sky – from the 
‘below’ – the earth. The ‘biospheric’ imagery of the sky/earth relation suggested a thoroughly 
hierarchical relationship to parallel that between form and matter.  
The foregoing division is evocative of the Greek mythological story of the titan of Navigation 
and Astrology, Atlas Telemon (‘The Endurer’). Atlas’ defeat at the hands of Zeus led to his punishment 
of holding up the sky, or ‘heavenly vault’, thus severing the primordial interrelatedness between earth 
(Gaia) and sky (Uranus).21 Likewise, the primordial virtuality of the ecology of nature, intimated also by 
various indigenous cosmologies (for example in the North American Iroquois creation myth), is severed 
in Albertus’ theorisation with the aid of the emerging sciences of optics and the precursor of geopolitics. 
This was, in essence, a view that utilised the mechanisms of science to privilege the ‘fragmentation’22 of 
natural habitats to the detriment of boundary-trespassing ecologies and political cosmologies.  
With the division posited between the earth and the sky, Albertus was then able to draw upon 
the contingency or flux of the firmament or constellations, i.e. the radiation of light, assuming the role of 
a medium imposing a determinate order on earth. For all his Neo-Aristotelianism, it was in fact the Neo-
Platonic element of light that subdues, as well as transmits form to matter. In Albertus’ use of astrology 
and the Neo-Platonism23 of Arabic optics – which casts light as the master element capable of 
transmitting order by imposing a form on matter – he managed to find a method of re-introducing order 
through a means more conducive to fixity and a view from above. Indeterminacy was now something 
relegated to the outer heavens so that determinate and established order could be realised on earth. 
However, this raised the issue of how determinate order could be compatible with the agency of human 
beings on earth. At this point, Albertus makes use of the nascent legal order or the inner realm of the 
polis by positioning ethical life as the key condition for exercising political agency. Coupled with this, he 
invokes the Aristotle-inspired medieval image of the tripartite world-machine. In making use of the 
tripartite system, the nations of the planet could be differentiated and hierarchically arranged into blocs 
along the lines of the political and ethical agency they were supposedly capable of realising and 
according to where they were placed in the moral order of the world. 
Albertus’ use of the elements, in this case light, to shape and fix the form of beings on earth can 
be seen as an initial ordering process. The outcome of this process was to distinguish between 
geographical zones corresponding to the above-mentioned tripartite system, in which the world is split 
between three separate blocs of people. The differentiation is established through the varying strength of 
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form-inducing light radiation that shines upon the inhabitants in various regions of the earth. Of these 
blocs, one group (the perfect ‘middle nations’) is understood to have obtained the psychological 
‘harmony’ required to exercise political agency over the others. This way Albertus did not completely 
erase contingency from his ordering process, but gifted it to those he saw as well positioned to receive it, 
leaving room for free will and agency.  
In the secondary ordering process, Albertus made use of the seminal position of the polis as the 
centre of ethical life for Aristotle. Accordingly, it is only within its enclosure that ethical potency can be 
actualised and agency upheld. The polis is the realm of the ethical situation – of the encounter between 
ethical beings. It is therefore the only place where the rational faculties (logos) can be practised and self-
transcendence from the determinism of geographical location can occur. Those who live in the polis as 
ethical beings are bequeathed the agency to govern the world-machine; there is an ethical imperative 
bestowed upon these polis-dwellers to bring others to a moral life, realised solely through the state-form. 
In seeing to these imperatives, they uphold a territorialised ordering over the earth. This was certainly 
one way, in Albertus’ mind, that the self-gathering capacities of phusis (in Aristotelian ontology) and the 
Ecosphere (in the realm of speculative geography) could be tamed or controlled by bringing order to the 
earth.  
  Overall, Albertus’ argumentation can be seen to unfold over what can be identified as a range of 
three levels, or ‘spatial scales’.24 Every scale represents a domain of interaction between forces and 
elements, whether (1) natural/atmospheric (hemispheres of earth/sky), (2) ethical (the polis) or (3) 
political (world-machine). Within each scale, political battles occur over whether place/topos opens up to 
a greater beyond (such as the cosmos) or is closed off and regulated (to delimit an enclosed ethical and 
legal order).   
Chapter Two: Harmony and the Nature of Place  
For Aristotle, nature (phusis) can initially be comprehended when one contrasts it with nomos. While 
nature is said to be ‘the same everywhere’, nomos – usually translated as convention, human law or 
custom – is seen to vary from place to place.25 Hence, what holds by nature is seen as eternally the same 
and is therefore applicable to all. In contradistinction, what holds by nomos only holds true for a 
particular community.  
Following on from this, it should be possible to consider the universal and eternal constitution of 
nature. These are qualities that make it unique and spectacular in the eyes of Aristotle, and constitute its 
cosmic quality. Nature cannot be thought outside of or external to the wider cosmos of which it forms a 
fundamental part. It might be tempting to conclude from this that, due to the eternal qualities attributed to 
it, nature constitutes a static entity. This would, however, be a truly mistaken perception. On the contrary, 
Aristotle’s cosmos is ‘eternity in movement’.26 It is something with ‘no beginning and end in time’.27 By 
being forever in movement, nature can instead be grasped as that in which things continuously ‘generate 
and grow’.28 A static account of nature is inconceivable for Aristotle as it would suppress its vital 
component – that of its eternal movement – and so limit it to a lower level, that of human affairs and its 
constrained perspective (i.e. that which is proper to human community). If this nomos-perception indeed 
provided a valid method in which to understand nature, the distinction between human existence and the 
cosmos would thus cease to hold (the latter would be subsumed by the former).29  
In our continued analysis of the law of phusis, it is necessary to defer to the foremost conceptual 
tool in Aristotle’s armoury – that of place. Place cannot be said to have any life as a concept absent the 
movement and circulation of natural bodies and entities. The law of nomos, on the other hand, linked as it 
is with convention and culture, derives its force from the spatial order30 over that which is proper to 
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place. This is so in the sense that the connotative meaning of nomos can be traced back to the primordial 
act of drawing a line in the soil in order to demarcate territory, which brings the land together with law.31 
Its denotative meaning is that of an act of enclosure or ‘hedging’. The demarcation of territory – the 
‘order of the soil’32 through hedging and enclosure – is primarily concerned with the occupation of a 
particular spatial order through the unique conventions and laws that rule over it. In thus constituting 
itself, nomos proceeds to differentiate itself via the moral authority of place (autochtony) and bureaucratic 
administration. These are the qualities that also serve to distinguish the people on ‘this’ side of the 
enclosure (as autochtonous) from the other people on its far side. Nomos, on this reading, is suggestive of 
a particular type of spatial unity – that which defines a community or collective which, through spatial 
closure, marks itself off from another as a distinct legal order over and against an exterior that is in 
principle un-orderable. This denotes what Hans Lindahl terms ‘a-legality’ (discussed at length in Part 
Three), the strange and ulterior normativity (‘xenonomy’) that defines legal orders distinct from that in 
which one is situated.33 
Contra nomos, which can be said to rule over the narrower and more particular realms of the 
bounded spatial order, phusis consists of those qualities inherent to the wider cosmos. Intrinsic to this 
cosmos is a unique type of order – more commonly understood as harmony. From the ‘shortened’ (solely 
human) perspective of an established nomos, the self-ordering of phusis as considered from the cosmic 
perspective appears as ostensibly un-orderable. This is due to the fact that, unlike the (closed) spatial 
fixity of nomos, the cosmos is the harmony that perpetually moves.34 Put otherwise, it is the proper 
ordering of things that ensures all things are in constant movement in relation to one another. The 
defining feature of the wider cosmos is a ‘belonging togetherness’35 of entities and things, or in Russell 
Winslow’s terms a ‘self-gathering’.36 This mutual movement between bodies and things is at the forefront 
of Aristotle’s understanding of nature. Movement is thus significant for both thinking about and 
perceiving nature. We can add that the cosmos is suffused with an immanence of rationality and order, 
rendering it coherent (although not from the solely partial perspective of nomos).37 For Aristotle, it would 
logically follow that the ‘divine nature of the cosmos is immanence’.38 Divinity and rationality are 
therefore evenly interspersed throughout the cosmos alongside the moving harmony of nature.  
Thinking within a framework of change and movement, Aristotle develops what is commonly 
known as the ‘hylomorphic model’.39 Therein lies Aristotle’s conception of nature in greater detail, as 
well as its connection to the wider and more general observations we have made on the cosmos. The 
more specific concepts of ‘matter’, ‘form’ and ‘place’ are a part of what can be described as Aristotle’s 
‘phenomenological view’.40 Essentially, these concepts allow him to build a model around which he can 
closely examine the data of experience or phenomenon,41 which act as a basis for his wider cosmological 
views or his ‘preunderstanding’.42   
The hylomorphic model is illustrative of one of the major infusions or interactions that furnish 
nature with its necessary motion. The interaction in this model takes place between matter (hyle) and 
form (morphe),43 said to have a close working relationship with each other. Matter, within this paradigm, 
can be defined as the ‘innate and active potential’ to seek form. Indeed, it is the nature of matter to ‘run 
after’ form, as it were.44 As long as matter reserves the right to move of its own accord towards it final 
form it holds an inherent potentiality that pushes it onwards. The end result of matter’s motion is its 
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infusion with form. Form is the final, formal shape in which matter is moulded once it has carried out its 
activity through movement. This final shape is closely associated with the surface of the body of matter; a 
boundary is created between matter and its limiting outer surface – it is this shaping boundary that 
constitutes form.45 
Within the sphere of its immediate environment or place (topos), matter in its formative 
movements can be re-described as body.46 Thus, a body can be seen to run after form; once it has reached 
it, it has come to rest. In alighting at its final form it has also arrived at its ‘proper’ place within the order 
of the cosmos. As within the hylomorphic model matter runs after form, so, in the immediate environs of 
nature, body runs after its proper place where things are ‘innately inclined to rest’.47 The point at which a 
body reaches its form is inherently linked with where this occurs. This is its proper place. When a body 
rests, it has, if only momentarily, concluded its movement in activity and its shape is delineated.  
The proper place in which a body comes to rest needs to be disentangled from place in general. 
For Aristotle, everything both has its place and is in place. Where something is situated or placed 
constitutes a basic metaphysical category.48 When something is in its proper place it can be said to be a 
full participant within the ordered harmony of the wider cosmos; to be in the proper place is thus to be 
properly ordered. This can be illustrated with reference to the self-referential power of bodies to be 
moved, mirroring their capacity to seek their full potentiality and purpose or form – their telos. We can, 
again, see the end or purpose (telos) of a body as residing in form. This is in line with Aristotle’s belief in 
the intrinsic generative power of nature as phusis, something not imposed from without but residing 
within.49 In other words, each natural thing contains the principle of its own production. That is, it 
contains the ability to change its shape and encounter stability in its actuality.50 But most significantly, in 
nature, ‘anything that maintains itself in wholeness has its end in being itself.’51 So, when something 
arrives at its proper place, it has realised itself in being ordered, and thus in belonging to the wholeness of 
nature’s being. Wholeness corresponds to both the completed form of the entity – the perfect being, 
which is complete within itself – and the linking of the entity to the wider unity. While entities may 
complete themselves by finding their end in form, they cannot truly realise themselves when divorced 
from their proper place. They are linked as if by an umbilical cord to the incubating wholeness of nature’s 
being, and thus transformative processes.    
To put it in other terms, the movement and activity of a body as it arrives at its proper place 
ensure that the stability of that being comes to the fore. The completeness, or continuity, of a body as a 
stable identity is dependent upon its movement to place. The continuity of a body’s identity involves the 
dissolution of its ‘internal differences’ or the many parts from which it is made up.52 Movement therefore 
preserves the autonomous identity of a body, by holding it together in a unity or gathered-togetherness (a 
whole). A body’s link to the entirety of the cosmos is crucial as its unique movement derives in part from 
the perfect ‘everlasting motion of the [celestial] spheres’.53 The perfectly complete, circular orbit of the 
celestial spheres keeps in train the unique movement of each body in the cosmos and therefore upholds 
the unity of individual beings, as well as the Whole. Hence, each body depends on the unity of the 
Whole, as the Whole depends on its constitutive unity.     
A body can also be thought to be simply in place depending solely on its continued locomotion 
or movement.54 This does not necessarily imply a qualitative change in the body, but merely a change 
from place to place.55 We can understand this as a phenomenological categorisation premised on the 
observation that a being is always in something; a being is always in place.56 
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Aristotle sees place in its most basic form as a container or vessel57 that surrounds physical 
bodies, or ‘the innermost motionless boundary which contains a thing’.58 Place is theorised as the 
boundary between the surface/form and its outside. This boundary is the container, which cannot be 
considered part of the object per se.59 This attests to the salience imputed to boundaries, limits and 
surfaces within Aristotle’s ontology. For being in place is inextricably linked with ‘being bounded by a 
surface, of being limited’.60 The limit is found in place, and in fact ‘is part of place itself’.61 As we can 
see, we have two boundary-limits worthy of note which make up Aristotle’s account of nature: firstly, the 
limiting boundary between matter and its surface, known as form; and secondly, the boundary-limit 
between a body’s surface and its immediate outside, known as place.  
It is a testament to the subtlety of Aristotle’s thought that the boundary-limits of form and place 
are far more than a mere fencing off marking the distinction between being and non-being. But if this is 
the case, then it becomes pertinent to ask: what is the actual nature of this ‘limit’ (peras)? In order to 
answer this question effectively, we need to locate this discussion of limits in the wider context of 
potentiality (dynamis) and actuality (energeia). The interaction between potentiality and actuality, as we 
have already seen, is closely interwoven with that between matter and form, motion and change.  
As has already been noted, bodies have their own in-built dynamism or potentiality, fully 
actualised when they are fully formed. It is the motion of a body that can be thought of as the 
‘actualization of some potential’.62 This raises the contention of whether it is safe to assume that 
actualisation (energeia) as the completion of an entity’s being involves foreclosure of further movement 
or activity. Todd Mei argues against any such notion, for if this were the case, we would be deceiving 
ourselves in thinking energeia a ‘static mode of being’. Instead, he observes, it is more a ‘manner of 
performance, or being-at-work’.63 The dispute hinges around the multiple meanings of energeia. In its 
most general form, energeia is the ‘power to actualise capacities’.64 While energeia could designate the 
end of an activity that realises form, or the end point of matter that has arrived at its final form,65 the real 
stress in Mei’s definition is on the force involved in actualisation as a transformative process. It is to this 
end that we can interpret energeia in a hermeneutic manner as being-at-work. What being-at-work 
denotes is the condition whereby all things partake of their being only by virtue of being in constant 
activity.66 Nature is ‘not explainable by material but only the formative activities always-at-work in 
material’.67 The formative activities of nature suggest a pertinaciously persistent motion at the heart of 
things that resists any type of foreclosure.  
When working with definitions of energeia which lay a pronounced emphasis on the end of an 
activity – i.e. as its final form – the temptation is to equate genuine actuality as ‘one in which its state of 
being is in its completeness’.68 Actuality in this understanding becomes a mere mode of formal being 
which resides not in continued activity but in the stasis of stability, placing undue significance on an ideal 
end point. It is important to consider here that when matter reaches its rest in form, and thereby completes 
a cycle of activity, it is not precluded from reinitiating its movement and/or once again changing its form 
(this is most notable in locomotion). The completion of matter in form can be thought to designate a 
temporary marker (Winslow considers form to be a ‘incomplete completeness’69), implying the fleeting 
nature of any one completed action. Being-at-work continuously transcends these markers indicative of 
the transient completion of any given action.70 It is, after all, the quality of perpetual becoming that 
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characterises nature. To put it in another way, phusis ‘is the substantial nature of things and their 
becoming’.71  
 Energeia as an actualisation of activity is an enactment of performance, which has its end in 
itself, or, to put it another way, ‘its performance is its actuality.’72 In this sense it can be said to be 
perfect, particularly in contrast to kinesis, which Aristotle claims is ‘a temporary mode of being 
incomplete’ due to its inherent relation with temporality.73 It is the case here that energeia and kinesis 
realise their ends differently. While energeia has its end within itself (as matter and bodies have the 
productive principles of change and movement within themselves), kinesis realises its end over time or 
duration;74 its movement is the culmination of an entire process, which has its end in a perfection that lies 
outside of its very being.  
 What can be ascertained here is that while energeia can be thought of as the movement that 
attains to the end of activity, dynamis or potentiality is the force75 that induces change within matter or 
bodies. The interplay between potentiality and actuality is fundamental to the flowering and flourishing 
of entities within the wider framework of earth.76 The unlimited potentiality/force of the earth – its 
definitive feature – can only reveal itself within the continuous being-at-work of nature, something only 
perceivable through the phenomenological and dialectical traits of movement and change, flowering and 
flourishing.   
 We are now able to return to the discussion regarding limits (peras) with a far more acute 
comprehension of what this entails in its substantiality. Firstly, let us reconsider the first boundary – that 
between matter and its surface, which is wholly constitutive of form. It has been stated that when matter 
reaches its final form it has been perfected as an entity that has reached actuality. This actuality, which 
coincides with the boundary-limit of matter, does not close off being as a completed artefact. It is not 
simply a boundary designating the fencing off of being from non-being. What it amounts to is an end to 
one cycle of movement, which concludes with an infusion between matter (hyle) and form (morphe). As 
being-at-work (energeia) is a continuous phenomenon, the limit can only divide one cycle of movement 
from another cycle that is yet to be induced, and so acts as a contingent exteriority. As nature is part of 
the unlimited potentiality of earth and cosmos, there is no end to the transformations that could take place 
for matter/body. The primordial act that gives form to matter77 is that which opens up the world to further 
potentiality rather than closing it off. This is the eternity of the cosmos in motion, one that is always in 
the process of opening itself up to further change and transformation.  
 Following on from this, it is necessary for us re-examine our second boundary-limit – that 
between the form as surface and its outside as the surrounding container of place. As remarked above, 
place itself is seen as a limit, as well as limiting. Elaborating on this theme, Ed Casey explains that place 
‘contains-and-surrounds the body by furnishing to it an environment that, if not always stable…is 
nevertheless a defining locatory presence.’78 What is depicted here is the power of place to attach a body 
to its wider, yet most immediate environment. In this sense it is ‘circumambient rather than merely 
receptive’.79 In other words, it can be seen as an active interface between the body and its surrounding 
world as opposed to a mere container which separates the body from its outside.  
The link that attaches a body to its exteriority is made possible by the harmonious ordering of 
nature. We have already seen the harmonious dialectical relationship between potentiality and actuality, 
and the same relation can be said to characterise the connection between place and body. This interwoven 
quality points to the ‘belonging togetherness’ of the two. This type of relation between body and place 
can be defined by ‘cooperative action’, since things are always in the process of being placed, and 
conversely place is always in the process of being filled.80 Casey further considers this relation a ‘double 
immanence’ that reveals the ‘reciprocal belongingness’ of place and body.81 The immanence invoked 
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here is suggestive of the horizontal exchange or mutual diffusion of body in place, and place around 
body. Each actively influences the other and so shapes a space of mutual co-existence.82 This relation is 
demonstrative of what Aristotle sees as the intrinsic order that permeates the cosmos. Certainly, it is a 
matter of some interest that relations within the cosmos, or at least those which are aligned with and do 
not transgress phusis,83 are characterised by a mutual belonging togetherness in which entities cannot but 
exist in the process of being-with-others.  
While there is no hierarchy in the relationship between the place and the body, hierarchy within 
the cosmos, where ‘lower elements exist for the sake of the higher’,84 does not seem to entail a 
relationship of dominance and subordination. This is no less true than in the relationship between the first 
unmoved mover and the rest of the cosmos. The first unmoved mover, despite setting the cosmos in 
motion, exists outside of it (in the sense of playing no active, reciprocal role; it can still be considered to 
be part of the cosmos) and therefore cannot interfere or intervene within it, even seeming ‘unconcerned 
with it’.85 The cosmos remains a timeless entity with no beginning or end, but celestial bodies within it 
remain finite and dependent on the movement of other bodies to help them realise their innate capacity. 
This chain of movement is traced all the way back to the first unmoved mover which initiates the 
movement.86 The key aspect of this immanence is the lack of imposition from above, and a capacity to 
exist in movement alongside others. Hence, Aristotle theorises order in nature through immanent 
harmony and not imposition.87  
Place, considered as a container, does not simply contain, but opens up a body to the 
possibilities of the wider world. Just as the form-limit can be said to open up to the possibilities of further 
transformative activity which can result in shape-shifting, so the place-limit can be reinterpreted as an 
opening up to the change and movement of other placed entities. To understand the ambiguity that 
surrounds place as something that acts in an en-closing and closing-off88 manner on the one hand, and 
links, attaches and opens up on the other, we can better think place as a ‘horizon’ (horismos).89  
Place, as horizon, is where something can begin its presentation or ‘presencing’ (discussed 
below); it is ‘an active source of presencing: within its close embrace things get located and begin to 
happen.’90 Place is where things are revealed and make their appearance as part of nature. While we have 
considered already the mechanisms of containment which can be attributable to the horizon,91 it should 
be stated that the potential for the horizon to open up to a beyond need not be dismissed. Peter Fitzpatrick 
articulates this exact point when he accurately observes that the horizon need not simply be ‘a closed 
finality but the opening to all possibility that is beyond an affirmed order’.92 Returning to the idea that 
place is a basic metaphysical category in Aristotle’s thought, we can quite clearly see that a being which 
reveals itself through its activity and movement can only do so in and through place. Hence, place is 
‘requisite even to grasping change itself’.93 
Things being open to each other – when they are open to each other’s ways of being (and hence 
of being formed and reaching potential) – is itself a demonstration of the true harmony and order 
immanent to the cosmos. As has been stated above, the order that is envisaged is not imposed from above 
(as it is in the legal imposition of order alluded to in the previous quotation) but can be seen as a 
horizontal exchange or flow of forces between the ontological entities of nature. Harmony here relies 
upon the openness of entities to others beyond themselves in order for things to properly enact and 
participate in ‘belonging-togetherness’. What harmony fully entails is the capacity of beings to answer 
the call to continually go beyond the restrictive boundaries of their final form, through continuous being-
at-work. Additionally, the boundary-lines that separate different ontological forces of dynamis and 
energeia, change and movement, are continually being erased or at least breaking down in mutual 
exchange and infusion (and, therefore, can at times seem indistinguishable). It is this mutual exchange 
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that is characteristic of nature. While bodies and matter in nature cannot be thought to have any agency as 
such, they do have an internal dynamism, which is attributable to a primordial belonging or gathered-
togetherness. So it would seem that Aristotle’s universe always appears full.94 
Harmony is no more implicit than in the relationship between the two limits we have been 
discussing – the form-limit and the container-limit. These two limits not only work harmoniously 
together, but are also in some senses intermingled. Their related processes shape a common space in 
which the limits of form and container are perpetually being transgressed. The interaction between limits 
ensures that they both remain open to change, which remains inevitable, and are kept in constant contact 
with their beyond. Place remains open to being filled by another body which it links to its outside, and 
form remains open to the further activity and change which emanates from within. Fitzpatrick’s 
observation concerning nomos is also apt for our developing understanding of place. He states that it 
‘cannot be positioned only in the bounded but must somehow extend intrinsically to an “outside”’.95 
Certainly, the reaching-outwards quality of place is destructive of a model which sees place solely as a 
bounded whole. But equally, the notion that a body is wholly at the mercy of its beyond cannot hold as 
the inner motion and dynamism of matter wards off any ultimate determination from outside. The balance 
of the two does not simply equate to a stalemate or static equilibrium but is constitutive of a harmony in 
which the counteraction of forces (one from within, one from without) leads to the eternal movement of 
nature, and more widely, the cosmos.  
In concluding this section, it may be possible to hypothesise that the limits that book-end 
Aristotle’s moving bodies are better read as types of membranes or skins which are reactive and adaptive 
to their exteriority or beyond. Notions such as place can be seen in the light of the vital interfacing role 
they play in mediating between a local environment, manifested in its actuality, and the vast potentiality 
of the earth in its ontological guise as its beyond. Mei makes the point that ‘[being-at-]work moves the 
earth itself into the Open of a world and keeps it there. The work lets the earth be an earth.’96 In 
perceiving the fluidity, dynamism and constant openings which constitute particular emanations of 
nature, we may hope to grasp the unlimited potentiality and enormous power to shift our world from 
beneath our feet which encapsulate the earth/cosmos in its eternity. 
Chapter Three: Genesis Lost: The Dismantling of the 
Hylomorphic Model  
Aristotle’s hylomorphic model, explains Tim Ingold, became more and more embedded in the history of 
Western thought, but also,‘increasingly unbalanced. Form came to be seen as imposed, by an agent with a 
particular end or goal in mind, while matter – thus rendered passive and inert – was that which was 
imposed upon.’97 The hylomorphic model is, as we have argued, like the greater part of Aristotle’s 
cosmology, held together by the finely intertwining threads of immanence which run through the cosmos. 
As explained earlier, immanence is a key component of Aristotle’s ontology of harmony and productive 
ordering. The harmony of the matter-form model is a progressively and continuously realised 
equilibrium, giving rise to change and movement in nature. Body and form in Aristotle’s account of 
nature are held in balance, with form in its final state less an absolute end point than the boundary 
between the end of one cycle of movement and change and the beginning of another. It is thus the 
emphasis upon the ‘final products’ of the processes of formation98 that marks the genealogy of Christian 
Aristotelianism.  
 At this point, we are able to discern the figure of Albertus Magnus. Like Aristotle, Albertus was 
interested in explaining the formative processes within nature. While the latter retains the hylomorphic 
model as an effective basis of analysis, the relationship between form and matter/body becomes 
increasingly unbalanced, leading to the expulsion of the immanence that plays such a significant 
ontological role within Aristotle’s framework.  
 We will recall that for Casey there can be perceived within Aristotle’s place–form model a 
‘double immanence’. The implication of this is a double transgression that parries the final victory of 
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form over body/matter and resists the reduction of place to a final enclosure fencing off the outside. Thus 
the boundary-limits within Aristotle’s notion of place are neither fixed nor determinate, but dynamic and 
always in the process of being erased. It is here that we can really understand Albertus’ manoeuvre in all 
of its salience, which is an outcome of the need to render Aristotle’s phusis fit for a Christian ontology. 
This involves the inversion of Aristotle’s hylomorphic model, whereby the boundary-limits that act as 
temporary separations between ontological forces are displaced. Let us then elaborate on how the two 
boundary-limits of Aristotle’s conception of place are altered by Albertus, significantly changing how 
they function.   
 The first manoeuvre – articulated in Albertus’ De Natura Locorum99 – concerns the collapse of 
the immanence inherent to the hylomorphic model. The hylomorphic model is effectively dismantled and 
reconfigured, and with it the generative capacity of phusis is lost. This generative power can be thought 
of as generic and termed ‘genesis’, and it lies at the very centre of Aristotle’s idea of place. To grasp the 
fallout from Albertus’ unbalancing of the model, we are obliged to reveal the operative nature of 
generic/genesis for Aristotle.  
The very vitality and versatility of phusis is maintained through the ability of the model to 
endure solely through constant change. Here the words of Alain Badiou, who is thought of more as a 
Platonist, on the subject of love are both relevant and apt: ‘the point of creation is also the point of 
resistance.’100 Genesis is a prevailing force of creation that gives rise to something new101 through self-
generative motion. The primordial movement of matter and bodies attests to the empowering ability of 
charting and forging a unique trajectory. The temporary end of a trajectory may result in form, but the 
particularity of a direction corresponds to the specificity of an equally temporary form. The shaping of 
matter in place, which, as we shall detail, is a complex process, embodies creating anew as much as 
resistance against attempts to annul (or contain) motion. In re-engaging with these thoughts let us 
introduce new concepts – perspective and orientation – which will yield us rich dividends. This new 
approach will provide us with the discernment we require to fill in the theoretical space linking Aristotle 
and Albertus.            
 Perspective can be considered the unique trajectory that matter and bodies take in movement – it 
is the mode of being’s expression.102 The irreducibility of this perspective stands at the heart of what self-
generation is all about. Matter holds the power to move itself, and hence the power of self-ordering 
within the cosmos. Order, as has been noted, is the motion of matter to its proper place. The arrangement 
of matter may be partly subject to form, but harmony only manifests itself when matter deploys the force 
to advance by guiding itself forth. Thus entities of matter assume partial perspectives brought about by 
the singular direction they take through place. This struggle of matter through its trails involves the 
exhibition of dynamis – the intensive force of forging a new direction which (re-)animates existence. 
 In reconsidering matter’s arrival at form, let us envisage telos as a mode of orientation. When 
matter reaches form it accomplishes telos, which is the end point of any one cycle of motion. This end 
point, in its fragility and effulgence, only acts as a sort of spur to further motion and generation. 
Orientation is only ever partially fulfilled, and is unable to be accomplished in its completeness due to the 
cessation of motion and the annulling of the cosmos’ eternity this would entail. Hence, orientation is 
concerned here with the eternal motion of the cosmos. Entities of matter have their own unique 
perspective, which interacts and contributes to the eternal cosmos but is not subsumed by it. The partial 
perspective of matter thus comes face to face through orientation (telos) with the eternal Whole – that 
which is only comprehensible through its absence of beginning or ultimate end. The relationship between 
perspective and orientation acts as a catalyst to a productivity seemingly incapable of being exhausted. 
The relationship is a chief contributor to the genesis inherent to Aristotle’s hylomorphic model.      
 Here it is felicitous to re-introduce place in the slightly altered terrain between Aristotle and 
Albertus. Place is effectively where particular perspectives and orientations meet or intersect. It is where 
body and form intermingle, the domain in which the irreducible is caressed by the eternal. It is where the 
double immanence discloses itself. The ingenuity of such a versatile concept is that it operates as a sort of 
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passage or corridor between domains while containing the co-habiting forces of energeia and dynamis – 
the forces of movement and change.  
 Let us start by reaffirming place as a zone of co-existence and co-habitation between varying 
forces. The self-generating movement of matter, its dynamis, in its encounter with form or energeia, 
results in the generation of the new, and fundamentally the creation of novel shapes. Thus, it is the 
counteraction between forces that creates anew. In spite of the fact that it is no matter of chance that these 
specific forces come together, we are still able to proclaim with Sarah Ahmed that ‘in the nearness of 
objects to each other what happens in the “now” of this newness remains open, in the sense that we don’t 
always know how things affect each other, or how we will be affected by things’.103 It is precisely 
because place is a cauldron of interacting forces that it can act as an impetus to the creation of the new. 
With the proximity of matter and form within the confines of place, a reciprocal subversion occurs.104 
Within the container of place, both forces remain open to each other. When the relation is between fluid 
intensive forces, boundaries between co-habitants do not hold.105 In the binding of energeia and dynamis, 
a mutual shaping occurs in the ‘co-incidence’106 of these forces; we can observe change and movement 
intersecting through place. In this case, when matter arrives at its proper place, form is empowered to 
shape its contents. On the other hand, the self-generated movement of bodies effectively means that 
matter can shape the place it passes in its trajectory. Places are haunted by bodies, as matter co-habits 
with form while form continually greets and embraces matter in place. Certainly, bodies are submerged in 
place, but significantly, in return, their self-motion attests to their power to shape place.107 We can then 
be so bold as to assert that the identity of place is regularly subverted by dynamis’ trajectory and 
particular perspective, thus denying place the safe anchoring of fixity.  
 We can then consider difference to be the outcome of the perpetual encounter between forces. In 
this manner, the new is continually generated within the place of encounter. It is a genesis that, in its 
spontaneity, interminably recreates itself in novel forms. There is, however, an added layer to place that 
maintains genesis. Place is a domain of co-habitation, but is also a hidden passageway between domains. 
It may seem counterintuitive to consider place as a type of passage as well as container, but this is not as 
contradictory as it may initially sound. What deserves our attention, here, are the consequences of 
dynamis denying place fixity in identity. The shaping of space through criss-crossing trajectories and 
perspectives precludes place closing in on itself – into the demarcated surface of a territory (nomos). In 
circumventing the emergence of a surface closed in on itself, place discloses something far more 
profound. Indeed, place is at liberty to provide a passageway to the Whole. This Whole, as has already 
been mentioned, is the entire cosmos – the perpetual movement of all. And this eternal movement also 
implies eternal genesis. 
Place, in its capacity as a container, is a sanctum in which ‘presencing’ is sustained. In order to 
elaborate on this, we must first expatiate on what we mean when we assert that place is a sort of 
container. Place is a container not because it tenaciously holds matter and form in any fixity, but because 
it acts as a microcosm that is able to encompass the entire scope of the cosmos. Inversely, it is a 
macrocosm that subsists in even the tiniest place. To reiterate, place is a corridor between the very 
particular event of encountering forces and the Whole. Alternatively, place is a passageway between the 
particular and universal. These openings to the Whole that reside in place are tentative and delicate – 
liable to close and vanish as quickly as they open.108 It is these openings which place affords to matter 
that can truly be described as disclosure or presencing. 
When the Whole is rendered present to matter, it is through the unique passageway that place 
affords. The partial perspective of matter is not absorbed and therefore effaced by orientation (telos). The 
singular trajectory of matter is the point of penetration at which it confronts the eternal. The particularity 
of a perspective is allied to that particularity which is definitive of place. In this joint venture a unique 
tunnelling passageway109 is momentarily held open. This is the point where genesis resists; the 
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presencing within place anticipates and resists the onset of a ‘re-presencing’. Re-presencing would not be 
possible, as every moment of presencing is its first and last. Not only are passageways to the Whole 
completely dependent on the unique circumstances of place, the passageways or openings collapse in on 
themselves, never to reappear in the same form. 
In the process of rethinking place, Albertus is hugely successful in breaking down the points of resistance 
that provide the hylomorphic model with its resilience. The double immanence (although there is of 
course a further one we have identified) that is such an engrained feature of the hylomorphic model is 
dismantled. The immanent or dialectical relation between form and body, place and body, and 
furthermore between place and cosmos, collapses as Albertus separates them through his theoretical 
incisions. The separating of these respected forces and entities from each other has its corollary in the 
disqualification of a previous proximity. With Albertus’ incisions we see that the heart of the 
hylomorphic model – genesis – is ripped out in a major operative manoeuvre.     
Albertus’ opening gambit is to revoke the self-generative capacity of matter. He therefore 
evinces matter to be ‘lifeless and motionless’ as ‘material’ cannot be ‘the cause of…power’.110 In his 
remodelled conception of nature, the inner dynamism of bodies to move and change of their own accord, 
which is the fundamental generative quality of phusis, is lost, as a body is ‘not moved either by itself or 
through an accident…’.111 Nicholas Wey Gomez states that in Albertus’ notion of nature there is ‘no 
longer an intrinsic cause of being moved and being at rest in natural things’.112 In other words, matter is 
disempowered through the removal of its self-generated trajectories. We are immediately able to deduce 
how immense the consequences of this theoretical move may be.  
The power of matter to order itself – it’s self-ordering – cannot hold under these new 
circumstances. Through the power of self-ordering, matter is able to assume its own particular 
perspective and therefore its unique trajectory. Self-ordering ensures that matter is free from being 
completely determined by orientation. It is only through the initial separation of the perspective of matter 
from the guiding orientation of the cosmos that harmony is possible. This is, after all, the condition of 
possibility that allows for the tunnels and passageways (through place) to link matter to the Whole.  
In the redaction of matter’s control over its own trajectories, not only is self-ordering no longer a 
possibility, but the unique passageways that penetrate into the Whole crumble away. The singular nature 
of matter’s trajectories through place bursts into the Whole in a unique way. The particularity that defines 
matter’s journey can no longer combine with the particularism of place like a key that unlocks the door to 
the domain of the Whole. On the contrary, matter becomes submerged in an overriding orientation.113 
What this means is that matter’s generation through movement is wholly dependent on an orientation that 
absorbs its particularisms. Matter is essentially blinded and is no longer able to navigate its own way 
through the world.  It is now induced to move by movers existing outside itself. For Albertus, potentiality 
exists for all bodies – inanimate or animate – within the confines of nature, only in the desire for a 
soul.114 Nature thus comes to be defined by the potentiality of all bodies to desire a soul, and it is this 
which induces movement to form and actuality. Matter is now at the behest of soul, and no longer 
communicates with a Whole capable of acting as a reminder that motion is always an ongoing mission.   
 In Albertus’ theorisation, it is energeia that becomes the prevailing force, and advances on 
dynamis through cannibalising it. Energeia’s relation to the Whole is through its combination with 
matter, but as this correspondence is obviated, energeia comes to steal a march over dynamis. Albertus’ 
manoeuvre is significant in adding rigidity to the first boundary-limit, represented by form.115 With the 
annulling of the intrinsic quality of matter to move itself, body has lost its ability to transgress its final 
form or, to put it in other words, to shift its shape and in doing so to resist the surface-limit of form. It is 
effectively the first containment of being we encounter, made possible by the offsetting and rendering out 
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of joint of the finely tuned equilibrium of the hylomorphic model. With the loss of equilibrium, the 
mutual subversion that staves off the descent into fixity for either matter or form is disabled. What 
becomes pronounced and rather explicit is an internal hierarchy in the hylomorphic model between form 
and body. Hence, Albertus expresses the opinion that higher things must always be considered in relation 
to lower things, such as that of ‘form to its own material substance’.116 It would seem, though, that with 
the loss of a mutual shaping, form loses as much of its potency as matter.  
 In the case of inanimate natural entities, Albertus considers their form induced by movers 
existing outside of them.117 As inanimate natural entities are not considered to be in possession of soul, 
they must be commandeered by a soul existing beyond them. Hence, with the lifeless and inert matter of 
inanimate things, movement into form is transmitted from beyond.118 The imposition of movement and 
change on naturally inanimate things effectively covers up or hides the formative, and as such, symbiotic 
and generative processes that give rise to them.119 In such an ontology of imposition, natural entities 
become objects which ‘are locked into their final forms, closed in upon themselves’.120  
Rather than opening up, in Albertus’ place-determinate model – a type of what David Harvey 
dubs environmental determinism121 – place becomes a mechanism that functions through closing down 
and containing (enclosure, hedging, and further, dispossession). For the most part, Albertus retains 
aspects of Aristotle’s conceptualisation of place as a mediating influence between the environment and 
the body. It is a power mediating between the natural habitat, the climate of an immediate environment of 
the earth below, and the potent life-forming influence of the heavens above, in the shape of the first 
mover.122 In this guise, place becomes an ‘active medium informing body’123 because it acts as ‘an active 
principle of generation.’124 As natural bodies are given form by the first mover which resides above, it is 
incumbent upon place to act as an apparatus of capture in order to hold and maintain bodies in their 
location. This means that they are impelled to remain open to and at the mercy of the beyond. Place is 
now augmented with a certain power: it acts as a tool125 used by nature to induce bodies to move to their 
proper place and is thereby invested with the power to bring ‘forth forms in matter of simple bodies.’126 It 
is therefore a container for a controlling form, and in taking up this employment it becomes something 
akin to territory127 (or what the critical geographer Stuart Elden has previously referred to as a ‘bordered 
power container’128). Specifically, it becomes a boundary that objectifies natural entities as final product, 
and a habitat or place that is converted into a territory through powers that are beyond it.  
Chapter Four: A Seepage that Would be Sutured: The Sky–
Earth Fold 
The native North American Iroquois tribes,129 very much in awe of the sky, dared to imagine that its 
irresistible force derived from its ‘unfathomable height’.130 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, in a perceptive 
remark, dreamily observed: ‘Deep Sky is of all visual impressions the nearest akin to a feeling. It is more 
of a feeling than a sight, or rather, it is the melting away and entire union of feeling and sight.’131 
 The enigmatic and formidable powers of the sky are just what Albertus has in mind as he shifts 
the terrain of conceptual battle to the geographical circumambience of the earth, as well as the sky. 
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Albertus’ intention is to tackle the problem of the interaction of the two hemispheres in his own way.132 
In spite of the disabling of Aristotle’s double immanence, there is still a place for contingency in 
Albertus’ model and hence a promising node from which to base the relationship between hemispheres. 
Contingency manifests itself in his thought through the notion of ‘flux’.133 With its very specific 
meaning, this is introduced partly due to Albertus’ reduction of matter – and by implication earth – to a 
cul-de-sac for thought. It is no surprise that he turns to Neo-Platonism134 at this point since it provides 
him with a theoretical rescue in furnishing him with the transmitting elements that will connect earth and 
place with the beyond of the heavens or sky. Albertus finds these transmitting elements in the light 
radiation that flows down from the sun and the celestial bodies which make up the constellations.135  
Herein it is noticeable that Albertus has constructed another model that easily complements the 
hierarchy implicit in his rendering of the hylomorphic model. This model is built on what can be seen as 
the first fold that underlies Albertus’ study. The hierarchical model, in which the beyond, the heavens or 
sky comes to dominate the earth, is constructed through the erection of an overt boundary, separating one 
from the other, with only the interface of place as a go-between. The earth and sky come to inhabit 
‘mutually exclusive hemispheres’.136 The inspiration for this hierarchical sky/earth division can be traced 
to the Neo-Platonists: Wey Gomez elaborates that those such as Macrobius and others were of the 
opinion that ‘earth ought to occupy the lowest, farthest place from the first cause on the periphery of the 
cosmos because earth was the most ignoble among all creatures in the ladder of being flowing down from 
the divine.’137 Albertus is one with Macrobius on this issue, and he states that: ‘the earth is denser and 
lower according to nature, and by reason of that property, ought to have a place…further away from the 
location of fire [or the light of the stars].’138 While he is primarily addressing the science behind this 
cosmic positioning, the moral dimension here is implied and we shall consider this in turn in the next 
chapter. While the divine operates through the transmission of light radiation, which has its source in the 
heavenly bodies, the earth is reduced to acquiescence in accepting its hegemonic configuration from 
above. And here we return to Albertus’ notion of flux, or, the means by which things are formed anew. 
Light, or ‘the complex of different powers that flowed down from above’,139 is the source of the diversity 
of places140 or ‘compositions’.141 The shape that these powers take is dependent on the hugely 
complicated, interrelated and ever-changing configuration of the celestial constellations.142 The events of 
rupture and change in the world are subject to the changing patterns of the rich, interweaving tapestry of 
the firmament.143 The flux of the heavens and their eternally changing configurations is suggestive of the 
idea that while what is beyond or above may be immersed in utter contingency, that which is contained 
below is reduced to carrying out the summons of what is above. Thus, form is transmitted via the 
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in what initially appear to be unknowable ways. See Hans Blumenburg, p. 462 
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slipstream of light rays emanating from the stars in the heavens.144 Within this system, it is the sky that is 
always on top, and yet the earth exists as firm ground145 on which structures of necessity are realised. So, 
it seems that it is solely that power from above – a ‘heavenly’ power – that can bind ‘matter to a specific 
thing…’ 146  
 In Albertus’ formulation we do not see only the co-option of Aristotle’s notion of place and the 
positing of a fundamentally unbalanced hylomorphic model, but also the corroboration of these 
representations against a primordial ecology that constructs the earth through the process of genesis. The 
elements of the sky are set against the earth, with which it was originally in an immanent relationship. 
With Albertus the primordial pact is broken. It is only in the breaking down of this pact – the Ecosphere – 
that the sky can be re-conceived not just as a beyond, but as the firmament that acts to territorialise the 
earth, driving away the previous ecology that maintained the earth in a fragile genesis.     
 
According to the anthropologist Tim Ingold’s reading of his sources on matters concerning the earth, sky, 
wind and weather, there is a perceptible realm in between the hemispheres of the earth and sky, 
seemingly hidden away in the horizon where they appear to meet.147 This discreet realm, screened from 
theorisation, is the ‘weather-world’. It is the domain of the ‘medium’, a place where all the action is said 
to happen yet which is given little conceptual exposure. It is also the realm of place, which in mediating 
between earth and sky resides in a critical position in Albertus’ world-machine.148 Without the co-option 
of the medium, Albertus’ final unveiling of the tripartite geopolitical model does not carry the same 
potent theoretical, hegemonic force with which he invests it. The incipient frontier between the earth and 
the sky is the ambient scene of struggle between those who would keep it open, and those who would 
shut it down. 
 To understand Albertus’ battle for the medium, it is first wise to elaborate upon what the 
medium actually consists of. The medium existing within the weather-world relates to the naturally 
occurring elements that dwell within it; the weather-world is defined by the ‘restless life of these 
elements’.149 The medium can be thought of as the affirmative flux and flows of the elements – including 
light, but also air, wind and the currents of the weather in general150 – which afford perception and 
movement.151 In other words, they can be considered the intensive forces that come to co-habit that 
generative ambience between hemispheres as ‘vectors’152 of interaction.  
 To follow on from this, we should say that the special role designated to the medium is, in fact, 
to prevent the hemispheres from shutting themselves off in sutured or closed-off totalities. The fluxes and 
flows of the medium are as much a part of the earth as they are part of the sky. If we take the example of 
light – which is most appropriate to Albertus’ commentary – it is possible to reveal that elements of the 
medium exist in a form of immanence which is experienced not as independent of the observer, but as an 
unfolding ‘within [a] field of relations established by way of their presence within a certain 
environment’.153 Sense and perception cannot exist without immersion in change, movement and flux. It 
is the very flows of the medium that underwrite perception in the first instance. In this sense, matter (or 
substances) exist immersed ‘in the currents of the medium’.154 The elements of the medium – such as 
light – do not exist outside bodies/matter but alongside them as part of the world, part of the ‘soil of the 
sensible’.155 Beings are bathed and suffused in currents of luminosity as they feel the light, as it flows, 
change the surroundings they interact with and inhabit. The observer comes to feel, perceive and engage 
with the permutations induced in their ambience by the radiation of light. As light ‘invades us’ we come 
to meet it, and this meeting constitutes the union between the vicissitudes of feeling and sensation that is 
the core of an entity’s being. Light, in its capacity as medium, is therefore an ‘interpenetration’ between 
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things and their surroundings.156 Thus, elements are not unidirectional in their movement but flow in and 
out, disrupting the boundary-line between interiority and exteriority, earth and sky, and consequently 
resisting the emergence of any frontier that might transform hemispheres into separated totalities.   
When sky and earth are considered as a fold we come to understand that they are inextricably 
linked within an indivisible field.157 Thus, the elements of the weather-world or medium come to 
maintain the symbiotic sky–earth relationship. The medium opens up the land and earth, ensuring their 
reactivity and contingency in response to the sky. The land as a surface is not a boundary or interface 
between earth and sky but a ‘vaguely defined zone of admixture and intermingling’.158  
The interactions inherent in the sky–earth fold through the weather-world can thus be considered 
to play a substantial part in upholding the Ecosphere that perpetually unfolds itself. The sky–earth fold is 
the point of interception between hemispheres where elements such as light assemble. This point of 
interception is the open wound, so to speak, from which the multiplicity of co-inhabiting life-forms seep 
out. It is a zone of intensity where intermingling takes place between the elements and a proliferation of 
life-forms – the ‘infinite sum of the diverse’.159 This multiplicity of life forms, drawn out by intercepting 
elements, act as the binders, or ‘border beings’, which defend against the erection of any frontier 
boundaries between sky and earth. In this open world, living entities withstand objectification by being 
conduits for life. In its comings and goings and productive movements the open world ‘may generate 
formations, swellings, growths, protuberances and occurrences, but not objects.’ 160 
In contrast to the open world of the sky–earth fold, Albertus is led to subscribe to a two-
dimensional surface ontology161 through his utilisation of ‘spatialised optics’ (elaborated upon below). In 
this surface ontology, the land that separates earth from sky becomes an interface. Land becomes a 
properly disciplinary concept – a regulated boundary between the earth and the sky that ensures order. 
The sky–earth fold – where the earth requires interaction with its beyond in the sky – wards off the 
temptation to enclose the land.162 But with land as a regulated interface, the earth can no longer respond 
to the call of the sky and the sky is no longer open to the cries of the earth. The forces of light and the 
firmament are free to shape the land as a barrier or iron-cast division between hemispheres – a 
prerequisite for the creation of territory. In this manoeuvre, Albertus ensures that the ‘generative 
movements of life [are] turned into the boundaries of exclusion’.163  
 In this positing of a militarised frontier between sky and earth, the life-generative space in 
between them is sutured up. The middle realm of the weather-world (the place where the limits of earth 
and sky meet in a creative entanglement) is transformed into a frontier. The interface of land is no longer 
the zone of admixture. The land, as structured patterns generated by light, is now a centre between earth 
and sky. In becoming this interfacial centre, it ‘subordinates and organises all spaces’ and so completes 
the transformation into an ‘organising principle’ which reduces other spaces to ‘differential moments 
internal to itself’.164 Land organises the spaces of the earth through regulating the movement and flows of 
the elements. It allows the one-way traffic of light radiation to flow down from above to structure the 
earth. The land, as interface, disallows the earth any reciprocal approach towards the sky. Thus, the 
separating boundary between earth and sky also acts to separate the pure contingency above from the 
necessity realised below. Above this boundary, the sky is able to impart order on earth, and below it, the 
earth-as-contained cannot similarly affect the heavens – the autonomy of the latter is duly revoked.165   
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  The land as intermediary is the domain of place. Place, along with land, makes up the structure 
of order that contains entities and life-forms. What is in the process of beginning to emerge here is the 
colonised territoriality model166 (which will only really fully appear with Aquinas and Vitoria), although 
at this point we can only assert that suturing and fixity emerge hand-in-hand with the establishment of a 
discernible and institutionalised order.167 Land is not a place that realises the co-habitation of inhabitants, 
but presents itself as a place to be occupied, as the ‘grounded fixities of landscape’.168 The ‘exhabitants’, 
or entities that occupy this place, exist segregated from one other as objects adorning the land. The 
ground of this potential territory to be occupied is built upon the erasure of the dynamic Ecosphere.      
 
In his study of light, Albertus turns towards a philosophy in which it is a centrifugal element: Neo-
Platonism. In giving light considerable metaphysical weight,169 Albertus finds something of grave 
significance to his own thinking in the Neo-Platonic tradition. For this strand of thought he had not only 
to thank the Ancients, but also the Arab philosophers170 who had preserved and conveyed it. 
We have already stated that light is an element that belongs to the medium. Neo-Platonists, 
however, envisaged light as not just any element amongst others.171 Light is the principle or supreme 
element of the medium, the first amongst equals, as it uniquely stores away hidden formative powers. 
Naturally, Albertus is drawn towards Neo-Platonism since light makes up one of the key elements of the 
medium which it is vital for him to co-opt.172 In strategically embarking upon the conscription of light, 
Albertus correctly identifies it as the potential kingmaker between the earth and sky. It is thus important 
for him to separate light from other elements of the weather-world in order to promote it in his system 
and set it against its co-inhabitants.173      
For Neo-Platonists, light is an immense power that carries forth the vibrant energy of the sun’s 
rays.174 It is perfect in its immateriality, an immateriality that holds quite an allure for Neo-Platonists, 
closely associated, as it is, with the weightless purity of the soul.175 The point of origin for light is the 
firmament, and specifically the all-powerful sun, which is the eye (from above) with the ability to bring 
things about.176 The heavenly vault, from which light emanates outward, is the site of an alternative 
multiplicity and flux (to the sky–earth fold) – that of the ‘pure contingency’ of the configuring stars.177 
The ever-shifting celestial constellations fixed beyond and above the sky–earth fold are positioned in a 
location from which Albertus can contest the Ecosphere.  
Albertus must maintain an element of flux within his paradigm so that he can explain how 
generation takes place and the new comes about on earth. In this, the limitless beyond of the skies proves 
useful as it retains a potentiality for constant variation. For Albertus, the horizon alludes to the 
constellations and contingency of the celestial bodies with their perpetual permutations and particularity. 
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Correspondingly, the position of the perceiver on earth as they glance up to the heavens can be said to 
attest to the uniqueness of place.178 The specificity of constellations is commensurate with the 
particularity it affords to place. It is only from the initial point of pure contingency or flux – displaced to 
the firmament above the earth – that an external force can be realised with the power to order the earth.  
Albertus’ aim is then to separate light from the other elements of the weather-world, so as to 
appropriate it on behalf of the pure contingency of the firmament. In order to do this, he must harness the 
Neo-Platonic properties of light. This involves splitting it away from the immanence of which it is a part. 
The pivotal attribute of light in the Neo-Platonic tradition is that it acts both as transmitter and unifier. 
Light is invested with the ability to order and rank the other elements and bodies of the earth. Indeed, it is 
the ‘master’ element that arranges others around it by disclosing a pattern of structural positions. It can 
thus transmit an order, and, through this, forcibly unify the bodies of the earth from above. The process of 
unifying implies the power of forcibly bringing and holding together bodies against their will.179 Thence, 
the transmission of the immaterial, pure contingency of the firmament generates a unified material order 
on earth. Light is then turned into an extensive force, as opposed to the intensive forces of the medium.  
In order to co-opt light and realise its Neo-Platonic properties, Albertus makes use of the optics 
and physics of light.180 The Neo-Platonic view of light can be said to underpin the proto-scientific 
mechanism of ‘spatialized optics’.181 It is this proto-scientific mechanism (or technique/‘technology’) that 
provides Albertus with the tools to separate and capture light from the immanence of the medium, and to 
activate its compelling, Neo-Platonic side. Optical laws provide the framework in which light can 
externalise a discernible order by translating the contingency of the firmament into a contained spatial 
structure upon earth.182 
Albertus understands optical principles and laws as principally determining the extent of which 
form is conveyed. The angle at which light rays hit a place and the distance they have to travel will have 
a determining impact on the type of form that is generated.183 So, both angle and distance greatly affect 
the power of light radiation in shaping place. As the transmission of light rays comes from a unique 
horizon and astrology,184 every place will have an ‘unrepeatable form’.185 As Ingold states, the science of 
optics depends on light becoming a medium isolated from the observer.186 In other words, light exists as 
something separated from the viewer – something existing outside of the observer’s body – and, at least 
for human beings, is only taken in by the interiority of the eye and mind.187 Light is said to flow to the 
perceiver unidirectionally.188 The direct, linear transmission of radiation is all the more interesting in the 
Neo-platonic tradition, contrasting sharply as it does with the more indirect influences of the circular 
motion of heavenly bodies.189 The master element is no longer at liberty to suffuse the viewer, whom it 
immerses, but exists on the outside as separated by an unbridgeable chasm. On the outside it is ordered 
into uniform lines, and on the inside it is translated into the faculties of sight or perception for animate 
entities. Light then sets itself upon animate entities and other elements, as opposed to communing with 
them.        
Albertus subscribes to the view that light which falls perpendicularly in straight lines results in 
the undistorted conveyance of form, whereas light that arrives at an angle results in the distorted 
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transmission of form.190 This chimes with the contemporary view of optics at the time, which held that 
light falling perpendicularly projected perfect images onto surfaces, and distorted images when at an 
angle.191  
The consequences of such a theory can be demonstrated on so-called ‘inanimate’ bodies such as 
plants.192 They are moved to actuality by light radiation, which acts as an outside mover communicating 
the power of form.193 This is achieved by imparting the generative capacities of nutrition and 
reproduction.194 Light no longer suffuses the plant on a par with the other elements – which invariably 
brings together the earth and sky. The other elements are now at the behest of the master element of light, 
which takes on the primary role in the formative process. While light may be said to impose form, 
inanimate entities are no longer in a reciprocal relation with light and thus open to influencing it. The 
process of mutual subversion breaks down on either side of the boundary erected by optical laws to keep 
light and recipient from intermixing. The plant no longer has the ability to combine elements – most 
significantly light – with matter.195 It is trapped on one side of the optical boundary, imprisoned in its 
imposed form, and so is unable to bind elements in (re-)constructing the world. The creative force of the 
plant is thus retracted and controlled from without; its ability to resist objectification quite simply 
dissolves away. Ingold sums up the situation best: ‘[the] dynamic potential of life-world and animate 
manifold [is] represented as interior property…[and] is carved up and distributed among forms 
themselves.’196  
 The co-option of light through optical laws means the generative and formative processes that 
were previously secured and entrenched by the sky–earth fold are now proffered by light in its connection 
with the pure contingency of the firmament. The immanent relations between the elements of the 
weather-world are broken down and displaced (in terms of generative capacities) by a multitude of stars 
and constellations – by an alien astrology, which asserts an evocative power and pull. Here, Albertus 
paves the way for his spatialised optics, which allows for the replacement of the sky–earth fold with a 
hierarchical sky/earth relationship.  
The final stage of the mechanism of optics concerns the surfaces of matter which light rays help 
to illuminate.197 Matter is here associated closely with the surfaces of earth in contrast to the translucent 
and radiant quality of light emanating from the heavens. Evidently, Albertus theorises the earth and 
matter entirely through the surface-form. This approach effectively conceals the dynamism and depth 
inherent to matter and materials themselves. 
A surface is rendered visible in optics when a ‘characteristic scatter pattern in light is reflected’ 
off of it.198 Surfaces are distinct and persistent patterns or textures, only made visible to the eye when 
light is reflected off them and subsequently taken in by the perceiver as visual perception.199 Light acts 
out its function as transmitter by translating the unique patterns of the celestial orbs onto the bodies of the 
earth.200 The patterns that form surfaces constitute the limit-form of matter; bodies come to take on the 
image of stratified layers or distinct structures on the earth. What light reveals to our perception is the 
formulated structures and (geographical) systems that are constructed when matter is mastered through 
the unifying qualities of light. It seizes and holds together bodies and matter, in their varying degrees of 
perfected form, in order to produce and compile through them a coherent structure. 
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  Upon this purified land constructed via optics the way has been cleared for structures erected by 
humanity to now appear ‘out of the woodwork’. In contrast to the prior depth of the earth, the pure 
contingency of the sky (its ‘unfathomable height’) remains high above, seemingly out of the reach of all 
human control. Nevertheless, and despite the suturing of the sky–earth fold, a new opening (to a 
generative realm) reveals itself elsewhere for Albertus – one within the control of a chosen people.   
Chapter Five: That Which Remains Open: Establishing the 
Polis as Perfectible Community 
The sky, in acting as a beyond, is precisely that: it is the pure contingency which may structure the earth 
below, but itself fades away far above the horizon, shrinking all human interaction. Despite acting as the 
displaced absolute contingency in Albertus’ geopolitical system, the sky does not offer an accessible 
opening to a virtual realm (such as the earth, eternal cosmos) of formative possibilities within the grasp of 
human beings. Hence, from the perspective of the human ensconced on earth, the system is still 
tantamount to an inert, lifeless totality.201 But where the sky–earth fold has been shut down, an alternative 
opening to a generative, agency-bestowing Whole (realm of the virtual) does present itself. 
It initially takes the shape of a get-out clause in Albertus’ commentary. He hints at a way in 
which the structuralising forces of the beyond or the heavens could be counteracted. The feat can be 
achieved ‘artificially by experts cognizant of powers communicated by the stars’ (or those ‘who have 
known the location and the powers of the stars’). These experts or scientists possess the insight needed to 
come up with an ‘antidote’ to, or can at least impede the effect of, nature.202  
The expert or scientist – Aristotle would categorise them as the ‘wise men’ or masters – can 
effectively construct an enclosure that repels the forces of the beyond. This enclosure converts the 
beyond of the sky into a more manageable exteriority existing outside of, but constitutive to, the 
construction of an interiority. Put differently, what in fact the (technical) expert is able to achieve is to 
convert the pure contingency of the beyond to a more ‘affordable’ and ‘economically viable’ 
exteriority.203 This involves a procedure for ‘hedging’ (the creation of containing boundaries which filters 
out uncertainty and regulates risk) or making technically manageable the uncertainty of the world’s 
exteriority. It can be considered an early forerunner to a sort of managerialism-cum-technical rationality 
(a precursor to the entrepreneurial spirit of Christian Calvinism, articulated famously by Weber and Du 
Bois, and latterly in terms of control by Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari). To flesh this out, the 
problematic concerns the ability of man to regulate the interactions with an exteriority (i.e. between an 
entity and its environment) in such way that he can ‘afford’ to be open to it – he can ‘survive’ a 
connection with it via the reduction of its uncertainty (or ‘unfathomability’) so as to best accommodate it. 
In order to maintain a reciprocal relationship between man and the world’s exteriority, and so preserve 
the dynamic place of the polis-dweller in the geopolitical system as a whole, the former must repulse 
and/or filter exteriority.204 As the normative ground for action and agency, the city-state or polis is able to 
repulse the more ‘enchanting’ or ‘mysterious’ aspects of exteriority, as well as filter its generative or 
corrupting effects (through normative structures that enclose the land) as the case may be. The radical 
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exteriority or ‘Impossibility’205 of the heavens is levelled down through a process of mutual affordability 
(the part played by the heavens is discussed in the next chapter) that brings the sky within the grasp of 
human capacity, containment and closure on a strictly regulated basis. Once the impossible-sky is drawn 
within the reach of man, the latter can release the former’s possibilities, which become ‘possessable’ for 
man. In this process, it is the polis that assumes a technical role for man in making the sky affordable and 
rendering its impossibility or unfathomability transitory. In this new contract between man and nature, 
implicitly depicted by Albertus, the earth is managed by human hands on behalf of nature (with the 
retraction of its self-ordering capacities, nature harbours less uncertainty and no longer needs to order 
itself), as the elements from above (light radiation) are filtered and regulated to ensure a ‘groundwork’ for 
human survival. The certainty of the earth is secured just as the uncertainty of the beyond is regulated.  
Here, it is apposite to consider the role of the city-dweller. His task is to maintain a dynamic yet 
stable position within Albertus’ geopolitical model, which confers the ethical obligation to govern, while 
surviving exposure to a harsh beyond – that which is liable to unpredictable and uncontrollable shifts. 
The interiority of the polis or city-state emerges out of its own possibility for dynamic change, albeit 
ethical and political, as a counterpoint that is able to meet the sky-exteriority on equal terms. However, to 
complement this, ethical and political agency or capacity is directed towards the technical control over 
nature, involving the imposition of definitions on natural beings (rendering them less mysterious), 
enabling them to be instrumentally and practically utilised for human ends. The emerging technical and 
regulating rationality will act as an engine and impetus for a future imperialism, as well as the global 
economic system. In terms of the domain of ethical life, it can be said to act as the platform or ground 
from which the wise man206 can realise his political agency over an exteriority which he is able to meet 
on his own terms.  
 
Within the polis, motion is very much an organising principle of society. The human capacity for 
movement and change develops in line with the actualised potential of rationality and reasoning (logos). 
Accordingly, what Aristotle calls ‘perfect beings’ can be thought of as fully autonomous and self-
contained people who have been fully formed in actuality.207 These perfect beings, in Albertus’ 
interpretation of Aristotle, cannot reach their actuality outside of the enclosure of the polis.208 The polis is 
required as ethical and social beings can only realise themselves in a moral community in which 
continuous activity or being-at-work (energeia) is possible.209  
Since the self-propelling powers of physical beings have been contained, for Albertus the only 
beings that still have the capacity for autonomous movement are the well-ordered citizens of the polis, 
who strive for perfection.210 The polis is fertile territory for the being-at-work of the citizen, due to the 
fact it is pervaded with a ‘governing awareness’ – the prouparchousa gnosis.211 This governing 
awareness can be thought of as a kind of interior milieu or atmosphere – the cultural norms, habits, laws 
and language which surround, inform and preserve a person’s perceptions. Perceptions are shaped by a 
culture that is already at-work212 and so pre-exists any one person. As public culture is already at-work, it 
can be thought of as the potency or potentiality that is coterminous with the boundaries of the polis. The 
potency that exists out there in the cultural domain is absorbed by, and so assimilates, the members of the 
polis as they develop the capacity for rationality.213 The perception for which the governing awareness 
acts as a precondition for possibility is one that is exercised in advance of immediate experience. Hence, 
it furnishes citizens with an understanding of universals and the rational principles needed prior to 
becoming familiar and at ease with the world. It thus provides the ability to ‘see’ particulars at the 
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moment they are encountered. Winslow identifies this as the first stage of the logos-structure (structure of 
discursive rationality) that is activated via the polis.214              
The first stage of the logos-structure seems to necessarily involve the sociality of the polis. 
Within it, moral and ethical behaviour constitutes a continual performance in which a being is 
constitutively held open through the encounter with others. This manner of reasoning leads Aristotle to 
state that neither the life of philosophy nor that of politics should be associated with the idea that thought 
is an activity divorced from the sociality of the polis215 or ethical community216; thinking constitutes a 
form of being-at-work or continuous activity217 and is dependent on being-with-others.218  
The good life on this account is not simply the following of inert, intrinsic principles (arche)219 
or the enjoyment of external material goods.220 Rather, it is an immersion in particular circumstances with 
others – circumstances that always renew the motion of being-at-work. Hence, encountering the 
particulars of a situation compels one to return to the first principles221 (such as phronesis or Sophia222) 
that guide action. Significantly, guiding principles shape and hone praxis, which in turn links those 
principles to the potential becoming inherent to the changing particulars of the situation.223 Hence, a 
hermeneutic interpretation of one’s own being or identity is always possible; life is kept open by praxis 
and so any final conceptualisation of what constitutes the self is deferred indefinitely. Within the ethical 
community of being-with-others, the other has a substantive role for the perfected ethical being. The 
presence of the other within the community prevents one from being ‘totally’ oneself. In other words, the 
ethical encounter with the other renders the full constitution of the subject or Being (i.e. modern 
subjectivity) an impossibility224; it is this distance between fullness and emptiness which is the true 
ground of ethics as praxis.  
Praxis here links the wider principles of practical judgement (phronesis) to the particulars of any 
given situation. The tension between principle and practice is what results in a continual becoming.225 
Thus, the manner in which engagement occurs in an activity always has the capability of transforming the 
subject as it relates to ethical-political decisions.226 Any given situation is made up of an ethical multitude 
– the plentiful particulars which both construct a situation and vie for and demand deliberation. In 
navigating the ethical multitude implicit in a situation, and investing radically in a norm or injunction that 
becomes the symbol of something heterogeneous to itself, distinct from the given set of rules, options and 
choices, this immersion in ethical life serves to destratify fixed and stable identities in the given order of 
things.227 At least three considerations are important for the development of a legal theory attuned to the 
fact that the links between fullness of being or subjectivity and particulars are precarious and contingent 
(which, by the way, may be the best way to describe justice): first, the ethical can only exist invested in 
the normative and the relation between the two is one of structural mutation; second, the question 
concerning the extent to which socio-juridical normativity is left unhinged when one emphasises the 
contingent relation between fullness and the particulars of a situation is, strictly speaking, a question 
having to do with the presence or absence of ground (so, there is no logical transition between the ethical 
and a certain normative order); third, it is the absence of ground that makes praxis worthwhile, 
understood as the distance between the sedimented social practices or undecidable structures within 
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which we live (our ‘interior milieu’) and a decision. A corollary of this is that there is no absolute subject 
or omnipotent chooser, which is why the proper sense of a praxis is that of a radical encounter between a 
(less than) subject and a heterogeneous element (an other) which calls for normative (and factual) 
displacement. This may be the very opposite of asking for an absolute grounding of a system of norms, or 
full (perfected) subjectivity.  
In the encounter with this heterogeneous something, call it the other or the stranger as Lindahl 
does, through the use of rationality we can come to gauge the other’s potentiality. Put otherwise, the 
encounter with the other ensures that full autonomy and self-regulation are not what happens or ought to 
happen in practical life. This does not mean that categories of autonomy and self-determination or 
freedom become obsolete, but rather that the relation between autonomy and heteronomy is always at 
work in society and cannot be foreclosed. Thus, it makes sense to speak of a heteronomous dimension to 
law in social life. For with the encounter we come to understand the other’s subjectivity as a self-
gathering (not to be confused with modern subjectivity-as-full-autonomy or pure self-regulation) – that 
which is being-at-work and therefore present, but more significantly the other’s array of potentialities, 
which lies latent within them. Logos, as discursive rationality, is the unique manner in which we come to 
comprehend the potentiality of others – something which demands respect and openness towards them. 
This is not because we are irrational or because traces of irrationality remain with us, but rather because 
the heteronomous dimension that we have referred to before (gaps, faults in social life) is inherent to 
rationality itself. This opacity of self-regulation and the law may be the genesis of another type of 
freedom, one that would be more akin to tunnelling through boundaries, walls and hedges than to the 
verticality of sight and power that inheres to the act of drawing lines on a flat surface. The subjectivity 
that is detected by logos is the other’s potentiality (to detect and move beyond boundaries, gaps and fault-
line), absent the ‘material’ as constitutive exterior.228 Through discursive rationality one can visualise the 
potencies of the other, even when they are not materially present. The process of coming to detect the 
potency array of the other, which is a unique trait of human rationality, but would be no especial attribute 
in a more human world (this is the strange hypothesis of an ‘us before the world’ entertained by various 
Indian cosmologies, for instance) still requires praxis (the physical encounter with particulars), without 
which logos remains inactive. In addition, praxis allows us to re-evaluate the potentiality of the other on 
an ongoing basis. 
With the impossibility of the full constitution of the ethical subject, the next best thing occurs – 
transcendence as the outcome of encounter or political alliance.229 In Neo-Aristotelianism the name for 
this transcendence is perfectibility. This is the form which becoming takes when the integration of praxis 
(the particulars encountered) with phronesis (as universalisation procedure) resists the closure of being – 
the closure of being stuck either in a practical present or in the abstraction of rational principles. We have 
stated that the ethical citizen acquires his rationality from the surrounding cultural environment of the 
polis. This is the first stage of the logos-structure. In the second stage, the citizen in his encounter with 
the ethical situation can exercise his agency in making a decision, notwithstanding the undecidable nature 
of sedimented social practices, which involves unhinging himself from his cultural world, the governing 
order and awareness that conceives of itself as the ultimate ordering.230 A rationality that is first derived 
from technics/culture (and from which the ethnos/human is derived) empowers the citizen to make 
informed decisions that may include breaking from that order and awareness which is already given. The 
condition for this to happen is the appreciation of the fact that the gap between an order and ordering can 
never be closed completely, and so no order is the ultimate ordering. At bottom, this entails a constant 
renegotiation of the relation between the ethical and the normative, which may constitute the very fabric 
of social life or what us moderns tend to call ‘critical distance’.231 In ordinary language, the process 
requires generating a critical distance from the prevailing perception, through laying bare all the 
arguments (practical and intellectual knowledge) conveyed on an issue. For Albertus, though, it is the 
wise men or philosophers who have the task of laying out all the arguments on an issue. He seems close 
to giving wise men or philosophers (who at this point may be at the point of becoming technical experts) 
the role of legislators or at least helpers of what we now call public opinion, which would fit the Neo-
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Platonic tendencies of his reading of Aristotle. The citizen would then be in a position to make a decision 
on whether to affirm the already existing way of things, or to challenge and critique them. The agency the 
latter course of action exerts indicates the citizen has ‘stepped out’ of the given awareness in order to 
practise the intensive capacities proper to rationality. What the cultural world bequeaths to the ethical 
citizen is the additional ability to break away from pre-constituted perceptions. In breaking away in order 
to move against the governing awareness, a citizen ‘makes a stand’ and undergoes the ‘self-differing 
rational work that leads to choice’.232      
In the moment of the ethical situation, making a stand to disregard the prevailing forethought of 
culture entails a circular motion, albeit a virtuous one. If the ethical citizen decides to unhinge himself 
from the governing perspective in order to make a decision, the choice that is made contributes to the 
constitution of the polis. The decision effectively completes a perfect circular motion by returning to 
shape the prevailing awareness (through the incorporation of new particulars).233 Since this awareness 
induces rationality in members of the polis, making a decision can be thought of as shaping the souls of 
the polis’ inhabitants.234 Making a choice implies the use of original or first principles in a 
universalisation procedure (not to be confused with a given universality) with which all subjects of the 
polis are interlinked.235 The original principles are persistently renewed through ethical investment of the 
normative or activity with others. And because the life of the polis is social, social life is essentially 
practical – the practice ‘by which social relations are made by human production’.236 Praxis incorporates 
the unlimited potential for human relationships within the polis, and this helps to some extent in 
thwarting the onset of the final form of the human. This is all only possible within the polis, which acts as 
an enclosure that allows being-at-work to ‘shine forth’ through its ‘transformative display’.237 
Within the polis, the boundary between thought and deed can be said to blur.238 The perfected 
beings of the polis are those wrapped up in the internal motion239 of thought and the external movement 
of practical deliberation, which are both in action in any given ethical situation. Hence, thought as 
movement links together contemplative activities (Sophia) and practical activities (praxis) within the 
confines of the polis.240  
The linking of Sophia and praxis is additionally a primary condition for hitting the mean, and 
thereby actualising the right ethical conduct in any given situation. Hitting the mean in virtuous activity 
involves a ‘maximum condition in which all human powers of thinking and desire are present and free to 
work together’.241 Additionally, the mean is a judgement made on the basis of sense perception (drawing 
upon the governing order and awareness), on a truly qualitative rather than quantitative understanding of 
reality.242 Thus, the mean can only be realised in a sui generis way of life,243 where the boundaries of 
being are continually transcended through the mutual receptivity between action and thought. Within a 
different context, this manner of reasoning is invoked by Brenna Bhandar, who considers a sui generis 
model for a legal order that fuses two separate modes of thought, and in so doing resists the hypostatising 
positing of difference through the creation of clear-cut boundaries.244 Moreover, the relation of 
contemplative life and practical life (praxis), and the use of the faculties of both Sophia and phronesis 
(original principles) in hitting the mean, is a delineation of the fold between deed and thought which 
establishes the basis of the polis.  
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The enclosure of the city-state245 thus becomes associated with a type of homeland for thought 
as activity striving towards perfection.246 It is the polis which opens up, which ‘opens the world and 
declares a manner of belonging within and to being’ based on human thinking and deliberative ethical 
action.247 It is solely within the enclosure of the polis that a world can be opened up for human beings.  
In this opening, the general laws and principles that guide ethical activity are said to play a 
primary part.248 They carry, in the intensity of their activation, the ability to integrate individual ethical 
acts with the moral community of the polis as a whole. In the intensive process of the ethical situation 
human faculties are integrated into a singularity of combined activity and thought, and, on top of this, the 
perfect being or ethical subject is constituted via its integration with an ethical totality.249 Ethical 
principles or general laws act as an intermediary between the human faculties and intensive ethical 
activity, as well as between the subject and the ethical totality of the polis.250 Finally, the polis, as the 
grounds for the two-stage process of rationality, allows man to generate his own conditions of possibility 
– the enveloping, ethical atmosphere. This mirrors (and threatens to supplant) the heavens, which initially 
sets the conditions for man and his changeability.251        
 
With the confiscation of the self-moving powers of non-human natural bodies and phenomena, the master 
or wise man in his privileged ethical motion is ideally situated to hoist definitions and identities on the 
former. It is important to relate that for Aristotle, the second stage of the logos structure enables the 
citizen to discover the nature of a physical being by discerning the unique way it moves through the 
world, its unique trajectory or perspective. In divorcing oneself from the governing awareness, one can 
come to an understanding of a being based on terms of its own nature, as opposed to the point of view of 
exclusive or human-human nature (for instance, Socrates listening to the gods or his daemon in his 
dreams).252 This self-differing capacity of rationality allows for a genuine discovery of the nature of 
another physical being. Albertus has already obstructed this possibility for rationality, as in his model of 
nature non-human physical beings are incapable of that self-ordering or self-gathering that enables the 
being-at-work so worthy of rational discovery.  
Another way to consider this issue is from the standpoint of temporality. For Aristotle, the time 
of human ethical life has its origin in the outermost heavens – it is the cosmos and the motion of the stars 
that generates time for the polis-dweller, which is the view conveyed and adopted by Averroës. However, 
this time is radically cyclical in having no beginning and end (the ‘cosmic circle’ here is not a boundary 
between inside and outside but a rotational motion that dissolves any internal markers as it goes along), 
aligned as it is with the eternal movement of the cosmos. While Albertus and Thomas Aquinas are said to 
have granted that time did indeed emanate from the heavens, with Christian eschatology a linear 
temporality is layered on top of Aristotelian cyclical time patterns, breaking it up into sequences that ends 
with its completion in the eventual salvation of the adherent. Uniform linear temporality and the 
revolutionary cosmic cycle were interrelated for the ancients, but medieval Christian theology’s clear 
focus on the former clears the way for the evolution of the rational subject’s ‘internal time 
consciousness’, as outer experience is safeguarded and consolidated within. For Blumenburg, this 
epitomises the transition from cosmology to anthropology that defines Christianity’s development from 
the medieval world to the renaissance.253 
 The ultimate result is that the nature of other physical beings remains inaccessible, and so it is 
left to the master to impose a nature and order upon them. The only place where a fully dynamic 
openness to the other can be said to exist is in the domain of the polis, and that is between human beings 
considered to be of the same level of potency.    
The polis, being the realm of human potentiality and perfectibility, disqualifies those who, like 
the barbarian, subsist outside the city walls. The barbarian’s lack of political agency is in contrast to the 
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master’s abundant powers. The latter’s agency and subjectivity are equated with the creation of legal 
boundaries. According to Neocosmos, subjectivity fluctuates depending on historical context, as the 
normative boundaries political agents create for themselves are always in the process of being 
transcended.254 The master’s self-differing rationality grants him effective control over the setting of 
these legal boundaries. In possessing the opportunity to divorce himself from the governing awareness of 
culture, through the exercise of making decisions that result in its alteration, his subjectivity can be said 
to exist in excess of an objective social location.255 Hence, the result of the empowerment of politically 
activated agents is the ability to define their own subjectivities, and correspondingly to aid in the 
construction of their society’s normative boundaries. The boundaries that political subjects create for 
themselves are always in the process of being transcended and elude reduction to an objective social 
location or the particularity of a structural context.256 This delineates the ‘social contract’ in which the 
ethical citizens of the polis take on the responsibility from nature for the work of drawing boundaries, 
regulating the ‘traffic’ across them, and thence exercising agency so as to maintain and preside over the 
world and the barbarians that subsist upon it. 
 
Chapter Six: The Tripartite System: The Middle Nations and 
the Visibility–Invisibility Fold 
The ethical citizen’s ability to draw or shape the normative boundaries of the polis is an outcome of the 
mutual affordability between the heavens and man. We have already stated that from man’s end of the 
bargain, the polis as (en)closure effectively filters and inhibits unwanted emissions from the sky. This 
closure can be considered more accurately to be a ‘modulated/economic openness’257 (a qualified or 
conditional openness) that secures the continued survival of man in light of the unpredictable flux of the 
stars (as exemplars of generative power), as well as, importantly, maintaining lines of communication 
with the heavens. However, what completes this mutuality is, correspondingly, the heavens’ role of 
affording man. This involves the sky surpassing its ‘ontological isolation’258 by securing a position or 
location in the world where the transmission of radiation is relayed in an optimal optic manner, so as to 
result in the perfect transfer of form. Through this means, the sky reciprocates by affording man so as to 
retain, at least initially, connection and communication with him. What this communication implies, in 
addition to the overcoming of distance, is a shared capacity that unites the two. It is the capacity for 
formative change (ethical becoming in man; generative from the heavens), transmitted via light radiation, 
which is now realised in the space interior to man’s existence; in other words, the shared container of the 
polis is where man and star’s joint capacity meet.259 Consequently, the sky and its powers are folded back 
(‘pleated’) into the polis; the cosmic is folded back into man’s normative ground. The heavens now 
appear ‘in-the-house’, or domesticated, through partial annexation by an interiority: the sky is within the 
horizon of man’s possibilities.260 One can almost see in this speculative geography and law the 
beginnings of today’s vertical politics and the legality of broadcast images and affordable signals. 
 In this schema, we can locate the polis as the verticality that enables man and the sky to meet, 
and furthermore to be mutually affordable and compatible (‘compossible’). Verticality, as a mode of 
geopolitical power,261 is volumetric in its dimensions – that is to say, the polis is not to be defined merely 
by normative boundaries (inside/outside), but also by its height and depth.262 Hence, the polis enables 
man to set his normative boundaries as if from above (from the altitude of the sky) while simultaneously 
being grounded from below. The polis owes its height and extension outwards – its abstraction from a 
merely objective social location – to the transcendence activated by man’s ethical becoming (the ethical 
immanence residing within the polis). Most significantly, the verticality of the polis – gathering together 
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man and the heavens – allows man to bring the entire world(-machine) into sight, and indeed, into his 
possession. 
At this point Albertus is able to unveil his tripartite system, which is inspired by Aristotle’s 
consideration of the three peoples or nations in the Politics. Through the tripartite system, Albertus is 
able to position his notion of place within a wider spatial order – that which becomes the world-machine, 
or machina mundi.263 This is the same prevailing geopolitical model that would ‘assert itself…into the era 
of European colonialism in the Americas’.264 Prior to Albertus, the tripartite system constituted a model 
that had existed in Europe for centuries, but it would now be re-established and re-imagined with some 
crucial embellishments (considered to be newly gleaned empirical observations) drawn particularly from 
the emerging science of optics. Light, as we have already seen, is accountable for the diversity of places 
in the world, due to the variations in intensity of the light rays that hit any given place. Thence, in the 
place-as-container model,265 the physical properties of place are communicated by light.266 In this view, 
light radiation structures matter and bodies in such a way as to create the spatial patterns of the model. 
This was famously the basis of Albertus’ conviction – one that would later influence Columbus in his sea 
voyages and the jurist-theologians who laid the foundations of international law in the sixteenth century – 
that the so-called inhabitable ‘torrid zones’ were fertile exactly because of the intensity of the light 
radiation upon them.267 The model of the geopolitical world-machine sets the basis for what will be a 
type of ‘social contract’ for Albertus – in which those in the privileged middle nations are called upon, 
and ethically obliged, to exercise governance over the world.  
 
For Albertus, what distinguishes Aristotle’s original three peoples – the ‘peoples of the colder regions of 
Europe; the people of Asia; and the Greek people’268 – is the nature of the place they inhabit and its 
relation to the varying intensity of light radiation. Those who, for Aristotle, inhabit the colder 
geographical regions such as Northern Europe are characterised by a ‘greater slowness and viscosity of 
blood, caused by the constriction of their bodies’.269 Aristotle considers these people as ‘full of spirit, but 
deficient in skill and intelligence’.270 Albertus attributes the quantity of spirit to the vital heat retained by 
the body’s major organs in order to compensate for and counteract the cold climes. Despite the Northern 
Europeans’ ‘spirit’, their constricted bodies interfere with their use of reason, rendering them ‘stupid and 
dull’.271   
Likewise, Aristotle claims that the people of Asia ‘are endowed with skill and intelligence, but 
are deficient in spirit’.272 Here, Albertus equates these qualities with the people of Ethiopia and India, 
who are subject to an intensity of heat which causes ‘them to excel in ingenuity’273 as constant 
evaporation through the pores purifies the blood and internal organs. In spite of this, the intensity of heat 
results in a loss of bodily vitality and hence a depletion of spirit.274 
Aristotle concludes his thoughts on these two sets of people by dismissing them as capable of 
being no more than slaves, unable to reach any advanced level of political development.275 In Albertus’ 
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estimation, both these sets of people, inhabiting the extreme climes of the globe, are subject to the 
corrupting nature of their place with its stratifying and constricting effect on the soul.276  
In these instances, place locks in the structuring forces of the beyond and in so doing throws off 
the delicate synchronisation (or ‘balanced make-up’) between the body and the soul of a people.277 The 
corruption of bodies and matter in the container of place means that the soul cannot, in movement, 
command the body, since the proper boundary between soul and body has been disrupted.278 On the 
contrary, the body, enclosed in its surface-form, holds back the soul and thus can be said to command 
it.279 The body, in resisting the soul, finds itself outside the boundary that defines nature,280 ‘as generated 
things are changed from their own boundaries…’.281 The functionality of the soul depends upon acting 
within nature’s confines. The surface-form of the body, in its physiology, negatively affects the 
psychology of a people by limiting their ability to tap into the reasoning powers that result from perfect 
form. Rationality can only come about when body and soul are in synchronisation and realised in the 
proper hierarchy, and appropriate boundaries are maintained to stop the body from impeding the soul’s 
progress.282 It would seem that the physiology of a people is able to act as an indicator of some internal 
disharmony – a direct result of the ontological priority given to surfaces.    
Interestingly enough, the people inhabiting the geographical extremes exist on the wrong side of 
a boundary-line; they exist outside of their nature, as the corrupted quality of their place determines the 
body’s rule over the soul. One can only exist within nature/being if the proper principle of the soul ruling 
over the body is observed.283 This mirrors the distinction Aristotle makes between master and slave, in 
which epistemic insight is only accessible to the few who have the correct or perfected manner of being. 
It therefore comes as no surprise that Aristotle thinks of the Greeks as being a middling people 
existing between the two extremes, and so, as Albertus adds, existing within their nature (‘their functions 
are natural’).284 Aristotle himself claims that: 
The Greek stock, intermediate in geographical position, unites the qualities of both sets of people. It possesses both 
spirit and intelligence, for which reason it continues to be free, to have the highest political development, and to be 
capable of governing every other people…285  
Only those people in the middling places possess the luxury of a body and soul in harmonious 
relationship; their character traits and customs286 are not at all excessive, and they are in fact ‘laudable in 
their activities’ for being moderate, as their ethical life enables them to reach the mean.287 In Albertus’ 
opinion, this is due to the fact that those nations such as the Greeks live in temperate climes.288 
As we can anticipate, Aristotle’s notion of the middle or mean in morality is at once applied by 
Albertus to place, with global normative consequences. The middle place is in the privileged position of 
being occupied by the ‘right sort’ of people, bestowed as they are with the ability to govern the unruly 
people of the world. Albertus rationalises this by stating that the ‘inhabitants of the fourth and fifth 
climate displayed the virtues that pertained to those who live in the middle’.289 The ‘middle nations’, with 
their cultivation of moderation in all things, embody the requisite virtues and ability to exercise 
governance over the world. They consist of the citizens of the Greek polis and the rulers of the Roman 
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Empire,290 with the baton passing to the Spaniard in the sixteenth century. The outcome of this line of 
reasoning can be surmised by the following: ‘We come to witness the transition in Albertus’ argument 
from the idea that creatures had a place in the cosmos according to their rank in the scale of perfection to 
the idea that peoples also were hierarchically distributed across the globe – indeed, that place implied 
position in a moral order.’291 A gradient of being is spatialised and ‘distributed across the globe’.292 The 
effect of this is to project a vast moral order onto the world in line with the conception of the machina 
mundi293 or the world-machine as a vast system of capture, with its adjoining and interconnecting parts. 
And, indeed, it comes to take the place of that other vast machine – phusis itself. 
We can assert that these middling nations, able to realise the mean, are most like those citizens 
who actualise the virtues of the polis. It would seem to follow that the special privilege of the middling 
nations is the capacity for governance even beyond their own lands. Evidently, the benefit of being able 
to resist the stratifying boundary between thought and action includes the power to posit it and impose it 
on others. Hence, Northern Europeans are people of spirit – of action and deed – but not intelligence, and 
Asians and Africans are people of intelligence – but not of spirit and deed. These people of the periphery 
are said by Aristotle to be unable to live in cities, and are hence unable to enclose themselves within city-
states that allow for being-at-work.294 It is only within the confines of the polis that rationality in both of 
its major modes – practical (phronesis) and intellectual (Sophia) – is made possible, and so entirety 
enabled.295 The mechanism that enables the boundary between thought and deed to be set is one that has 
well and truly been appropriated by the middling nations. The middle nations, in actualising the mean in 
moral and ethical praxis, lay claim to a fold they deny to others, who inevitably fall foul of the 
boundaries imposed upon them. The ability of the middle nations to govern is, in addition, the power of 
the political manoeuvre to set clear-cut boundaries that detrimentally come to define others yet are erased 
or transgressed in their own societies.  
To simply think that those middle nations which attain being-at-work are ‘perfected beings’ in 
the sense of reaching final form is to miss the subtlety at play here. In being able to practise being-at-
work, the middle people find themselves at liberty to define who constitutes the lower rungs, or the 
exteriority, of a moral order of personhood. In contrast, they are able to withstand categorisation 
themselves: they cannot be defined against their will, as they are the ones who are empowered to set the 
boundaries of what defines personhood in the first instance. While it may be assumed that the middling 
people are the highest categorisation of personhood on the moral scale of being, any definition of what 
constitutes a ‘person’ – in this case, he or she who realises rationality – is surely liable to change or 
modification, so as to maintain the exclusion of some people from the system/order, or to at the very least 
ensure that they are numbered among the lower ranks.  
 These middle nations with their state-forms (although at this stage not yet equivalent to the 
modern state) constitute outposts ‘of reason and order’ in an otherwise ‘hostile world’.296 The place of 
those nations in the middle affords not only the emergence of a highly developed state, but the epistemic 
insight that could even counteract the power of the world. The two are combined, as the highly developed 
moral order can construct an enclosure that maintains agency over and within the boundaries of nature (as 
soul), as well as securing a separation from, and managing, a threatening outside.  
Here, we can return to the place-as-container model in order to understand its effect, as well as 
its consequences, on all the nations of the tripartite system. For, as Neocosmos suggests, it is only 
through the politics of the contestation of place that conditions conducive to critical thought are 
generated.297 With the place-as-container model we have the reduction of those nations that inhabit the 
periphery of the geopolitical system to a social location;298 consequently, their subjectivities are limited to 
being homogenised expressions of places.299  
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 To elaborate, scientific analysis frames place as objective social location. For example, the 
objectivity of place is disclosed by Albertus through analysis of how the sun, the heavens and 
constellations, and other natural phenomena, come to produce the structures of the earth. Those people or 
nations we could consider as subjects – with the possession of their own agency and politics – become 
thought of as the products of an objective place that determines how they function. On the contrary, for 
Neocosmos, the nation consists of ‘subjective affirmations’ that can be considered as distinct from, or at 
least irreducible to, social location. This is because politics consists of political subjectivities collectively 
creating themselves as a nation, whereby a people come to define themselves and therefore resist 
confinement within objective boundaries.  
 With regard to the middling nations, place is reduced to the developed moral order as the state-
form, inherent as it is to the polis or city-state enclosure. In Albertus’ reading of Aristotle, it is only this 
state-form that actualises the political agency that Neocosmos associates with the nation. The state really 
becomes, in this instance, the ‘manager and regulator of place’.300 It regulates and maintains what exists, 
and so precludes the possibility of the new. In effect, the contingency and flux induced from above can be 
regulated by the state-form in its management and ordering of place.  
Within the middle nations, the structure of the state regulates the relation between place and its 
beyond. By acting in subservience to the beyond, the place-as-container model – with its confining 
boundaries holding bodies in their fixity – is now enslaved to the state-form and its power to create 
boundaries anew. What, in effect, is happening is that the state-form is emerging as a ‘spatially defined 
unit’.301 As a spatially demarcated enclosure, it can ‘disavow the event’302 that emanates from the 
exteriority of the world – the unforeseen event being a necessary outcome of a flux beyond human 
control (precisely why exteriority must be rendered affordable). Contingency thus becomes displaced: 
rather than emanating from above, it becomes constitutive of being-at-work’s very real powers to adapt 
so as to preserve itself from determination. While the middle nations may initially occupy the temperate 
regions, the threatening flux of the constellations and celestial bodies means that nothing is definitively 
beyond change. This is made clear by Albertus when he points out that ‘mutations in elements appear 
immediately from even a moderate variation or change of the stars…’.303 However, the state-form as 
developed moral order, in co-opting place as an enclosure, takes control over the boundaries that shield it 
from not just the earth but also the sky, and so events are precluded from breaching the walls of the polis.  
The developed state of the middle nations concerns itself with ‘constancy and preservation in the 
face of the future and stranger’.304 There is an associated danger here that the state-form, with its 
defensive positivism, in closing itself off could stifle being by reducing it to lifeless inertia. However, 
being-at-work (in its techno-ethical capacity), realised exclusively within the polis-enclosure, grounds the 
organisational structure of the state in terms of a reactivity and adaptability to the beyond. This will 
furnish the structures of imperialism with its geopolitical dynamic, with its enduring quality. The agency 
intrinsic to the being-at-work of the middle nations acts as a shared capacity, a shared contingency with 
the beyond, and comes to be enclosed within the very structures that govern the machina mundi.  
 
Within the tripartite model, politics and governance become linked with the formal and public power 
structures of the state-form as the developed moral order. Politics as a form of agency that exists in 
excess of state structures is comprehensively denied.305 The notion of political agency as embedded in the 
idea of the sprawling people-nation is expelled from the state-form; agency becomes that which is 
realised only through a process of enclosing and hedging.  
The emergent condition of the periphery nations, existing as they do as an exteriority vis-à-vis 
the middle nations, is contained within the geopolitical system. The nation finds its becoming annulled by 
the centralised states that inhabit the privileged middle. Cast as a centre, these middle states are brought 
together through the manifestation of certain unifying organisational principles (such as that between soul 
and body). They comprise a centre that exerts power through ordering all that orbits around them; thus, 
they are given the licence to integrate the peripheral nations into the geopolitical organisation. The states 
that occupy the centre are now in a position to manage the entire geopolitical axis.  
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 Those nations on the periphery, in being unable to transcend their place, cannot satisfy a 
requirement that is a condition not only for political agency but also for moral personhood. They are 
confined to a ‘contained particularity’306 without being able to project vertically outwards towards the 
heavens in an affordable manner. A key failing attributed to them in this regard is an inability to properly 
enclose themselves from the surface of the earth – they are ‘too attached to the earth, a creature of blood 
and soil’.307 In this corrosive attachment to the earth, the barbarians of the periphery nations cannot be 
said to actually inhabit the earth as such, as the ‘terrestrial environment becomes habitable to the extent 
the world is no longer open but enclosed’.308 It is the occupation and enclosure of the land that becomes 
the sole acceptable criterion for inhabitation. The barbarian, in dwelling within the earth, subsists as an 
exile from the moral centre. He happens to be engrained within the perilous exteriority of the bare, open 
frontier of the earth. At this point, left to carry out this mode of living, the barbarian must acknowledge 
the consequences of being exposed to the unaffordable, transformative and imposing power of the 
heavens.  
Thus, we encounter a fundamental aspect of the tripartite model: the invisibility–visibility fold. 
It is in the make-up of this fold to operate as a continually shifting division in the interminable process of 
erasing itself. Hence, it cannot be reduced to an inflexible dualism or even dialectic, as the operation of 
the fold involved allows for great fluidity.   
We have stated that the geopolitical system, as Albertus considers it, ensures the visibility of 
those who inhabit the periphery by shedding light on the objective social location of those people. It is 
only by making visible the social location of those on the exteriority that we can grasp the geopolitical 
system as whole. On the other hand, we are also able to maintain, in addition, that those very same 
nations – consisting of the exteriority – have been rendered invisible. As Cheliotis 
explains,‘invisibilisation pursue[s] the anterior (because superior) aim of disinheriting the invisible of 
membership of human kind…[H]and in hand with the invisibilisation of victims and their natural 
humanity goes the invisibilisation of their otherwise shocking lot.’309 While visibility and light ‘capture’ 
in order to bring inside, and hence, in effect, disclose the geopolitical system as a whole, invisibility 
continues to uphold exclusion from the personhood and political agency of those in the far reaches of the 
system. ‘Invisibilisation’ involves the ‘subhumanisation of others’ through exclusion ‘from the moral 
order of belonging to the human species’.310 The issue in question here is the ‘never-fully realised process 
of inclusion in the category of human personhood’.311 To put it in other words, sight and blindness seem 
to go hand in hand. Sight is the ability to locate and confine things; it is the power of the oculus mundi, 
the eye of the world,312 which renders visible, captures and manages the objects within its geopolitical 
orbit. Blindness, on the other hand, is a type of ‘dominating principle’ that allows for the juxtaposition of 
objects ‘which would be impossible if they could see each other’.313   
 If the periphery nations are subject to both visibility and invisibility, this also appertains to the 
middle nations. To take up visibility first, we should note that with regard to the middle nations, visibility 
(or ‘visibilisation’) goes hand in hand with perception (‘the eye which sees’). The special powers of the 
middle nations correspond to the ability to realise the mean, which affords ethical perception. The basis 
of this perception, we will remember, is the intensive contingency of the ethical situation that activates 
the mean as a supreme moral force or capability. Perception can be said to make visible to the subject 
immersed in the hidden contingency (depth) of an ethical situation the structures of normativity which 
properly stimulate being-at-work or ethical subjectivity. It is the moral situation that continually 
constructs or contributes to a renewed acquaintance with ethical perception – the unassailable mean.  
These capabilities of perception or sight bear out the view that those in the middle nations have, 
exclusively, full membership of moral personhood. The exclusion of those on the periphery from the 
moral order only shores up the desirability of being ‘inside’ and hence the legitimacy of the middle 
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nations. The moral legitimacy bestowed upon the middle nations brings us back to the ability of these 
nations to exercise political control and agency via the means of the closure of the state-form. On the 
level of ethical life the polis directs its perception outwards, towards the world-machine; the perception 
of the middle nations is perfectly aligned with the orientation of the whole. While the consequence of 
visibility for peripheral nations is the reduction to objective social location, for the middle nations it 
means the ability to connect with the entire world-machine through the powers of a privileged perception 
or (in)sight.      
The process which links the middle nations to the orientating whole of the spatial system is 
something cloaked from the sight of the periphery nations. The barbarians are blind to that which they 
cannot perceive, and thus the middle nations conspire to make themselves invisible. The perception – 
which connects situations to structures of realisation – uniquely envisages and opens up the world 
beyond. Only subjects of the polis can grasp the world in its entirety, due to their ethically induced ability 
to transcend their location and mode of being. A similar power of movement is exercised by birds, which 
‘routinely move from one domain to another’.314 This is the power exercised by the polis-dweller, who, 
due to his transcendent capabilities, can travel through the opening made by the polis to the world-
machine beyond. The form or structure of the geopolitical system can be considered as a politically 
empowering totality. Thus, the polis-dweller can smoothly move between the agency-bestowing political 
structures of the polis and the world.  
The highest form of political agency that these middle nations exercise is the ability to render 
themselves invisible by erasing their particularities and proclaiming their qualities universal315 or, in 
Albertus’ terms, moderate.316 The erasure of particularities is an ‘invisibilisation’ that can be traced to the 
citizen’s immersion in ethical life – within the depths of the polis. Within these depths – generated by the 
interacting complexities of a constellation of ethical situations – the polis-dweller remains hidden from 
sight.317 The citizen is able to perceive outwards while remaining safely hidden within the enclosure. The 
constellation or multitude of the ethical is an obvious counterpoint to the mysterious and discreet 
movement and capacity of the stars. In contrast, we can only think that the barbarian remains stranded on 
the outer surface of the earth,318 unable to move beyond their place through to any other domains (in 
lacking all depth and verticality, they cannot grasp the world as totality, in thought). They are left subject 
to the elements and unable to conceive of or participate in the common good of civil community.319  
The political agency of the middle nations rests upon a curious form of verticality320 which 
accords with the ethical and political developments of the state-form. The construction of this verticality 
has its roots in the citizen who is linked to the moral community of the polis, which, in turn, acts as the 
ultimate portal to the entire geopolitical system. In moving through the levels, the ethical subject comes 
to almost float above the world-machine, in order to take in the prospect of the earth and barbarians on 
the surface below, both conveniently ruled out of ethical agency. In this view, ethical transcendence of 
the citizen – a necessary condition to exercising agency – becomes associated with a privileged 
comprehension of the orientation of the whole world-machine. In short, transcendence becomes attached 
to the governance and administration of the geopolitical system.         
In rendering particularity invisible, the ‘moderate’ customs and morality posited by the middle 
nations are transformed into the supreme form of values of the tripartite system. The polis-as-enclosure 
conceals the ethical contingency at the core of political agency and governance. However, the moderate 
customs of the middle nations can only be realised on a global scale when they are rendered visible 
within the geopolitical system as a totality. Hence, middle nations will have moral legitimacy in any 
future practices of colonialism,321 entailing the occupation of periphery nations – trapped as they are 
within their limited particularity outside the legal and moral order of the polis.322  
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 The middle nations, which will extend themselves through the movement of colonialism, will 
not only affirm the state-form and polis as the only way to actualise political agency, but will also affirm 
themselves in their nationhood, with the moral superiority this involves. After all, the nation in this 
morally exclusive sense can only be shored up in its orientation towards the universal323 and its vertical 
movement and transcendence out of a contained place (verticality towards the heavens). Alongside this, 
the state seems to reinforce itself as the manager of place through its movement inwards – into a 
centralised enclosure that affords an exteriority, which, likewise, affords it back. From this perspective, it 
is only within this state-form that being is safely secured from an unaffordable beyond, and is thus able to 
transcend itself and lay claim to dominium.324 Dominium becomes the principle ethical act in which the 
moral beings of the polis take on the political legitimacy of ordering other nations in order to align them 
with the orientation of the world-machine.   
The fold inherent to the middle nations, between thought and action, is co-emergent, and 
interdependent on that fold employed by the geopolitical system as a whole, that between visibility and 
invisibility. In the final analysis, it seems that Albertus’ thought lends itself to the interpretation that the 
moral order or state-form enthrones itself as the ultimate creator of boundaries, surpassing the ability of 
the earth and, eventually, even the heavens.325 
Conclusion 
Albertus Magnus’ modifications to Aristotelian ontology, that is to say his containment and curbing of 
the self-generated movement of bodies (dynamis), will have lasting consequences for Neo-Aristotelian 
thought as well as the conceptions of legality and trade bequeathed to us by the Scottish Enlightenment. 
This is because, for Aristotle, the self-movement (being-at-work) of matter (hyle) is fundamental for a 
being’s independent identity. After all, it is only through its own action that a being can secure its 
continuity as a gathered-togetherness. Through a being’s autonomous activity, the internal differences or 
myriad qualities constituting it are dissolved. In this dissolution of internal difference, a being is 
preserved as a whole – as a unity that can posit itself as an independent identity. Without the ability to 
move itself in activity, a being is reduced to rubble – to a ‘heap’.326 In this reduction to the heap, a being 
lacks the ability to order itself (self-ordering) into a continuous whole; it remains scattered into its 
independent parts. Hence, as the being is unable to define itself in its independent nature as an 
autonomous identity demanding respect for its otherness,327 it is left to the forces beyond it to hoist a 
definition and identity upon it. 
In the reduction of phusis’ self-gathering powers to the heap, Albertus’ variant of Neo-
Aristotelianism can claim no direct access to a being’s nature (in Aristotelian terms). Instead, potentiality 
is forced onto beings; they are ordered by an external agent or power (a process of in-formation over 
trans-formation328), firstly through the light of the heavens, and then by the legitimacy that man as polis-
dweller derives from being located at the moral centre of the world. Beings are defined no longer by what 
they are but, implicitly, by their relation to man placed at the commanding heights of the moral order. 
Hence, natural phenomena are considered quantitatively or extensively, not intensively through their 
unique movement and trajectory (at-work) in and through the cosmos.329 The external ordering of beings 
that results from this theoretical manoeuvre announces the onset of a territoriality, an outcome of the 
clearing of phusis of its self-ordering powers.  
This sets the scene for Albertus’ exposition on the tripartite world-machine, which entails the 
ascendency of a ‘nomos-thinking’ over phusis, and thus the prevalence of the paradigm of a nascent 
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spatial legal and territorial moral order over a place (topos) which formerly acted as a constitutive link to 
the wider eternity of the cosmos. Place finds itself ensconced, as it is recruited as a territorial interface 
between, in Albertus’ speculative geography, the hemispheres of the earth and sky, effectively subduing 
the former and regulating the latter. Figuratively speaking, we could say that Atlas is firmly held in place, 
as a spanner wrenching asunder the primordial immanence of the Ecosphere. With the emergence of the 
polis as an enclosure, the privileged place of ethical life comes to replace and contain a contingency 
displaced from the sky–earth fold. Man emerges as the ethical and legal being best equipped with the 
political agency to impose order on all things that surround him.  
To revert back to the terminology employed in Part One, what Albertus attempts to deal with 
here is the uncontained ‘triadic-cosmological schema’, which emerges not just from within Aristotelian 
cosmology, but also from Christian theology’s attempt to retain for man an openness to the heavens (of 
which mutual affordability acts as a partial solution). In re-concealing the foundational contingency 
inherent to the triadic model (i.e. the eternal cosmos), Albertus’ thought led him to structure and contain 
an un-orderable cosmic multiplicity (immanence) at the level of geopolitics (nomos), so as to re-introduce 
a process of ordering through the thesis of the moral authority of place.330 The idea would continue, many 
years later, to shape the theoretical justifications for colonialism over the Americas, and particularly 
influenced Albertus’ fellow Neo-Aristotelian Francisco de Vitoria (via Aquinas, who tried to ‘fix’ the 
cosmic manifold331) by providing a method of ‘folding back’ triadic elements into seemingly universal, 
planetary-wide legal structures (and thus rendering the confined triadic disciplinary). And, indeed, 
Albertus’ theories regarding the other’s relation to nature/earth and its ecology would find their historical 
realisation at the point of the Spaniard’s encounter with the Indian.  
 
 
                                                            
330 In many ways, to prevent man from being ‘opened up to the inside’, or to control the flux of the heavens inherent 
to Albertus’ system (the ‘outside within’) so it is not swallowed up or transformed from within by its own 
foundational contingency. See Viveiros de Castro (2012c), p. 11 
331 Albertus and Thomas Aquinas are considered to be the Dominicans’ two most influential thinkers. The former is 
cited as having directly contributed to the ‘Age of Exploration’. See Wey Gomez, pp. 231–2  
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Part Three: Vitoria’s Jurisprudence and Indian A-
Legality 
Chapter One: Vitoria’s Historical and Legal Context 
Albertus’ operation of folding back seemingly un-orderable cosmic elements into the polis, and indeed 
his geopolitics, had already provided the method for Francisco de Vitoria’s jurisprudence. The latter can 
be said to have done for Amerindian societies what the former achieved in the previous Part in respect to 
Aristotelian cosmology. For Vitoria, the folding back of Indian cosmologies and institutions into the 
positive law of Spanish imperialism was an attempt to contain, as well as anticipate, the force of a latent 
triadism lurking behind the ‘binary machine’ of Amerindian thought.1 Vitoria’s work was significant at 
the time of Spanish colonialism over the Americas, as the foundational contingency inherent to the 
triadic-cosmological schema threatened to return with the encounter of the Indian; the undisclosed frame 
of the deterritorialising earth seemed to make its appearance felt once again. Vitoria had spent his early 
years studying and lecturing at Paris; more specifically he was attached to the Dominican college of S. 
Jacques, which counted the figures of Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas amongst its most 
prestigious luminaries (the latter having been the former’s student).2 It was these two Dominican 
theologians that were to influence Vitoria most when he came to consider the ‘affair of the Indies’ from a 
legal standpoint.  
Let us start by noting that the historical and legal context of sixteenth-century Spain required a 
theory which would properly legitimise Spanish claims over the Americas, in the wake of the (mis-
)conduct of the Spanish conquistadors. The conquistadors’ actions would result in the re-examination of 
the justice of titles in the Americas and, indeed, Spanish claims to territory became a matter of public 
interest as they fell under intense scrutiny from the Dominican Orders.3 With the resurgence of Natural 
Law Theory, alongside the Spanish colonists’ ‘butchery’ and ‘pillage’4 in the Americas, the conditions 
were apt for Francisco de Vitoria’s major contribution to international law. Legal theorists such as Peter 
Fitzpatrick dub Vitoria the ‘reluctant father’5 of international law, while others such as the anthropologist 
Anthony Pagden are more hesitant in their approach.6 However, there is little doubt that Vitoria’s 
construction of jurisprudence in the face of the affairs of the Indies7 and his subsequent juridical 
justification of Spanish colonialism can be seen as a serious theoretical precursor to a system of 
international law and international relations.8  
 What captures Vitoria’s erudition and underpins claims that he is the father of international law 
is his response to the foundational violence of colonialism in the Americas. By 1513 the Spaniards 
occupied only a handful of islands in the Caribbean (Hispaniola, Cuba, Jamaica and Puerto Rico),9 but 
this all changed during the 1520s and 1530s – a time in which the ‘great American Empires of Mexico 
and Peru [were] discovered’.10 With the defeat of the Mexica and the Incas, a huge amount of territory 
now lay in the hands of the Spanish Crown, making a by no means insignificant number of Indians 
officially its vassals. While the Spanish colonialists saw the remote islands hitherto colonised as 
inhabited by tribes of the Indies barely considered fit to be part of humanity, the vaster regions of central 
and southern America revealed ‘more civilised’ empires, which seemed to contain some semblance of 
political organisation and self-governance. This was met with growing abuses and outrages by the 
                                                            
1 In this sense, according to Schmitt, empire, based on the Christian republica christiana, was seen as the great 
restrainer – the katéchon – of the Anti-Christ, which kept the world safe from rogue elements such as the Islamic 
nations prior to the ‘discovery’ of the Americas. See Schmitt (2006), p. 87 
2 Bernice Hamilton, Political Thought in Sixteenth-Century Spain: A study of the political ideas of Vitoria, De Soto, 
Suárez, and Molina, Oxford: Clarendon Press (pp. 171–6, 1963); Wey Gomez, pp. 238–9 
3 Pagden (1982), p. 57 
4 Francisco De Vitoria, ‘Letters on Political Matters: Letter to Miguel de Arcos, OP, Salamanca, 8th November 1534’ 
in Vitoria: Political writings, eds. Anthony Pagden, Jeremy Lawrence, Cambridge University Press (1991), p. 331  
5 Fitzpatrick (2001), p. 152, and (2008), p. 279; Guardiola-Rivera (2011), p. 32 
6 Vitoria, Introduction xxviii (Pagden): ‘…although it is clearly false to speak of Vitoria as the father of anything so 
generalised and modern as ‘International Law’, it is the case that his writings became an integral part of later 
attempts to introduce some regulative principle into international relations.’ Also see Hamilton, p. 98  
7 Vitoria, p. 331 
8 Ibid., xxviii 
9 Amongst others, see Pagden (1982), p. 58 
10 Ibid., p. 59 
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colonists, which brought into sharper focus the possible illegality of Spanish conquests.11 The question of 
the legality or justice of the Spanish title to the Americas was one that Vitoria sought to place at the heart 
of his scholarly studies. Importantly for Vitoria, an examination of the Spanish claim was overdue as 
‘most…[Spaniards] no longer thought about’ it.12 In light of events in the Americas, the issue would need 
to be exhumed and thoroughly scrutinised in the crucible of the public realm. The events in question, 
confided Vitoria in private letters to colleagues, were in no uncertain terms ‘vile’, and constituted 
‘impiety’, ‘tyranny’ and ‘blood massacres’.13 In themselves they provided ample grounds for doubting 
just title.  
 In considering just title, Vitoria was reawakening European anxieties over justifications for 
colonialism. Anxieties easily resurfaced as ‘European powers became increasingly preoccupied with 
questions of legitimacy.’14 Questions of legitimacy abounded due to the inability of any European state to 
make an ‘unassailable claim to sovereignty’ over overseas possessions.15 Hitherto, appeals to Roman 
modes of rationalising the judicious nature of acquisition had proved tenuous since the Roman model 
consisted of a ‘series of devices’ which allowed conquests to be represented as wars against aggressors.16 
European nations found it increasingly difficult to appropriate Roman laws and justifications for war for 
their own purposes; indeed, it would take an incredibly devious sleight of hand to represent conquests – 
at least initially – as anything other than enslaving ‘peoples living peacefully on their own lands’.17  
 Through his deliberations upon the unabashed violence that took place in Central America and 
Peru, Vitoria was able to construct the foundations of his disciplinary legal system. Despite the evident 
difficulties in appealing to Roman legality, Vitoria laid the groundwork for his jurisprudence through an 
adaptation of the old Roman Law of Nations, as well as through an adherence to medieval canon law’s 
doctrine on the rights of infidels (first developed by Pope Innocent IV).18 In the face of what some legal 
theorists term genocide,19 the unique circumstances of the Spaniard’s encounter with the ‘vanishing’ 
Indian20 would prove to be the firm basis for his legality.21  
The pressing juridical questions thrown up by the encounter with Amerindian nations primarily 
concerned the legal rights attributable to the Indian, such as whether the natives had the proper rights of 
dominion over the territory they occupied. Furthermore, and more generally speaking, what was it that 
actually constituted sovereignty within the commonwealth; what were the rights and duties extant 
between different states and nations? Albertus, as a figure much studied and cited in Iberia at the time, 
provided an intellectual backdrop for theologians and jurists contemplating these questions. As we will 
recall from the previous Part, he had already asserted the claim that the ‘clearing’ away of the self-
ordering capacities of nature, through the management of the medium of the land, was a necessary 
prerequisite for a perfect sovereign community.22 It would prove difficult for any nations abandoned to 
the un-orderable nature of the earth to obtain sovereignty (in the sense of dominion) over territory unless 
they could demonstrate a prior ability to manage and order the land. For Iberian jurist-theologians 
working within the confines of Albertus’ schema, ‘periphery’ nations, such as the Amerindian’s, could 
only be subject to planetary law once their pre-existing traditional ties and social bonds with the earth 
were dissolved, to make way for the external imposition of order. The dispossession (or ‘dispossessive 
ordering’) this implied would require the separation between native cosmology and the earth to which it 
held a prior proximity. As we have already argued, the productive particularities and specificities inherent 
to earth and land (as an outcome of contingent ‘worldly circumstances’ or the experimental equivocations 
of nature)23 can be considered a medium creative of unique social relationships and geospatial 
                                                            
11 Pagden (1982), p. 59 
12 Ibid., p. 66 
13 Vitoria, p. 238, pp. 332–3  
14 Anthony Pagden, ‘Stoicism, Cosmopolitanism, and the Legacy of European Imperialism’, Constellations (vol. 7, 
issue 1 2000), p. 6 
15 Ibid., p. 6 
16 Ibid., p. 6 
17 Ibid., p. 6 
18 James Muldoon, Popes, Lawyers and Infidels, University of Pennsylvania (1979), p. 149 
19 Fitzpatrick (2008), p. 324 
20 In this instance meant sensu lato, as in Madrueira’s ‘vanished Tupin’ cited in Neil L. Whitehead’s Introduction to 
Staden, lxxiii  
21 Elaborated in two lectures: ‘On the Indians Lately Discovered’ and ‘On the War Made by the Spaniards Against 
the Barbarian’, see Anghie, p. 321 
22 Nichols, p. 19 
23 Ibid., pp. 23, 26 
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orientations. Opposed to this is nature as disenchanted and manageable surface, displaying itself to a 
power beyond it (i.e. man as polis-dweller), which rearranges and reorients its geospatiality.24 The 
outcome of Albertus’ speculative geography was the preparation for the land to be rendered homogenous 
and universal, and therefore a resource or commodity the colonist could place a value upon. Moreover, it 
is possible for us to link Albertus’ geopolitical analysis with the growth of a planetary economy flooded 
with resources from the Americas (the exemplar being gold), seemingly ripe for expropriation. This 
would be crucial in the establishment of the world-system in its colonial/modern form as land and earth 
previously left un-orderable (from the European perspective) by Amerindian societies were fully 
integrated into the global economy.25 Further, it is worth suggesting here that the Spanish appropriation 
of vast swathes of the New World invokes the connection Carl Schmitt draws between nomos and the key 
processes of any legal order: namely, appropriation/production/distribution. The original violence that led 
to land-appropriation can be considered part and parcel of a nomos26 in which the primordial action of 
‘taking’ and cultivating for the purposes of production comes together with the distribution of what has 
been taken. The first act of appropriation can therefore be considered as the basis for the distributive 
justice that follows; it is law and economy that together ground the legal order, as demonstrated by 
Spanish colonisation. Once the original appropriation or founding violence has taken place, it is quickly 
forgotten, as the focus of the legal order becomes distribution or economic and technical considerations 
over and above the validity of the original act. Schmitt’s take on the original appropriation as that which 
generates the ground for law and economy despite ostensibly being completely beyond it is echoed in 
Lindahl’s concept of a-legality, which I make use of below.27    
Thus, in terms of Albertus’ geopolitical paradigm, Vitoria attempted to juridically justify the 
need to re-order Amerindian societies geospatially, so that Indian cultures were ‘freed’ from the 
stranglehold of an un-orderable earth (the given). To this end, the principal issue seemed to be the lack of 
a common framework in which to address universally binding questions of legality.28 In the absence of 
the aforementioned, there was no way to bind people to universally regulating principles within a system 
of normativity that included all.29 Vitoria’s response to these questions would also provide an answer – 
which would become somewhat of an orthodoxy in Spain – to the debates surrounding the extent of the 
self-governing capacities of the Amerindians, one which would sit comfortably within Albertus’ 
speculative geography.  
Indeed, with the help of Albertus, geography re-merged as a significant technology of control 
with the very empirical ‘discovery’ of the Americas. As Carl Schmitt states, the European struggle of 
conquest over the New World led to ‘a new spatial order with new divisions.’30 It was these divisions on 
the face of the globe that facilitated the political struggle, not just for land-appropriation between 
Christian states, but also between native and settler, indigenous and coloniser. Geography as a ‘new 
global concept’ now had at its disposal a new ‘planetary image of world’ that it could effectively adapt 
itself to.31 This new spatial consciousness, termed ‘global linear thinking’ by Schmitt, could divide, after 
the fashion of Albertus, the ordered relations of the medieval respublica Christiana – the sovereign 
Christian states – from the un-ordered ‘open spaces’ of the New World.32 In respect to the relations 
between the Christian and non-Christian territories and princes, Vitoria worked within the spatial order 
and institutions of the respublica Christiana, which remained a fundamental point of reference during the 
Age of Discovery despite the declining power of the Church as an adjudicating body over issues of law.33  
                                                            
24 Nichols, pp. 23–4 
25 The ‘discovery’ of the New World should be understood as marking the beginning of the creation of the modern/ 
colonial world-system, and the emergence of the world economy. See Aníbal Quijano and Immanuel Wallerstein, 
‘Americanity as a Concept, or the Americas in the Modern World-System’, International Journal of Social Sciences 
(no. 134, pp. 549–57, 1992), pp. 549–50, 553. Also see Quijano, ‘Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin 
America’, Nepantla (no. 1, vol. 3, pp. 533–80, Fall, 1998) 
26 See Schmitt’s various interpretations of nomos, p. 327. 
27 Schmitt, pp. 324–335. Hans Lindahl’s ‘a-legality’ can be seen as an updated version of many of Schmitt’s 
theoretical positions.  
28 Anghie, p. 322 
29 Ibid., p. 324 
30 Schmitt, p. 87 
31 Ibid., p. 88 
32 Ibid., p. 101.  
33 Ibid., p. 113. The jus publicum Europaeum is linked to increasing secularisation and the strengthening power of 
European states as spatial orders that could determine their own normativity. 
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It was also during the time of Vitoria that Schmitt charts the rise of the jus publicum 
Europaeum: the law among sovereign European states – the ‘European core that determined the nomos of 
the rest of the Earth.’34 It was Spain as ‘the first great land appropriator’ that expedited the move away 
from the authority of the Church35 (see below) and that is identified by Schmitt as precipitating the major 
event prefiguring a European interstate system. Crucial to this process were the internal dividing lines 
between sovereign Christian states themselves. For for example, the dividing lines demarcating Spanish 
from Portuguese territory, such as the friendly Rayas lines emerging from, and encapsulated in, the 
Treaty of Tordesillas, which recognised each empire’s claim to land on the basis of reciprocity between 
Christian nations under the notional authority of the Catholic Church36; and the amity lines of conflict, 
derived from the conflict between Protestant England and Catholic France, that is, between those nations 
which were involved in an ongoing dispute over claims to land-appropriation, partly due to the lack of an 
overarching adjudicating authority.37 
 
We have already intimated that the event of the encounter took on the form of a legal question that 
demanded a response. The event-as-question solicited two very different answers, at least ostensibly: one 
embodied in the exclusionary violence of the colonist, and the other in the relational ethics of Vitoria. In 
many ways, the former’s response to the encounter pre-empted the ontological significance of the Indian 
for the latter’s jurisprudence. A further background to this dispute is provided by the direct influence of 
Albertus’ pioneering psycho-geography, already explained above, on Jesuit and Dominican missionaries 
in the New World.38 In fact, many sixteenth-century chroniclers (lay travellers) who journeyed through 
the Americas supported the analogy drawn by those very missionaries at the time – that the Amerindian 
was part of a nation constructed out of ‘myrtle’, meaning, the Amerindian’s psychology revealed an 
ability to comprehend belief yet lacked the ‘solidity’ of will and memory to consistently adhere to it. This 
was said to contrast with those nations of ‘marble’, whose strength of will, as well as intelligence, 
provided for the ability to steadfastly commit to belief (and faith).39 The basis of the distinction invoked 
Albertus’ tripartite geopolitics, grounded as it is upon the (Neo-Aristotelian) tripartite division of the 
soul. Thus, the Indian soul displayed an obvious disharmony, suggesting a tropical ‘myrtle’ ‘mineral 
resistance’ or molecular-becoming. This jarred with the molar ‘marble’ harmony and solidity40 of the 
more promising ‘middle’ nations. 
The response of the conquistador was to regard the ‘molecular-myrtle’ Indian nations with 
considerable suspicion. The supposedly inconstant nature of the Indian drove the colonist’s discourse, 
which was framed through the expectation of meeting the ‘diabolical’, that which is monstrous by virtue 
of its ‘double’ quality. To this purpose, a common tale in circulation at the time held that the Indians 
were enchanters who merely conjured up the outward guise of humanity. Underneath appearances, the 
Indian forbore any categorical designation. He was man mingled with beast; his outward aspect belied the 
animal nature within. Moreover, the colonist’s exclusionary deportment led him to subscribe to a specific 
mode of defining mankind: this was the classical Anthropo-centric mode of mankind, propelled by the 
declining force of Greek antiquity, which struggled in fully explaining the mysteries of the New World.  
The duality of man and animal through which the colonist perceived the Indian upheld a reductive 
metaphysical schema, overtly disrupted by the Indian’s own radical dualism, in which what lay behind 
the image of ‘man mixed with beast’ was the creative ability of beings to transform themselves. The 
Indian’s belief in the potential for inter-transformability between species41 perplexed the colonists’ 
narrow frame of Anthropo-centric thinking, which drew a strict (if illusory) division between animality 
                                                            
34 Schmitt, pp. 126–7, 138. The jus publicum Europaeum is a spatial form, fitting the European inter-state structure, 
which could support a specifically new international law. 
35 Ibid., p. 130 
36 In this example, territory was divided on the basis of whether it fell to the West or the East of the line between the 
Spanish and Portuguese empires.  
37 Ibid., pp. 89–99 
38 See Wey Gomez, pp. 232, 235, 237, 238 
39 Viveiros de Castro (2011), pp. 2–6 
40 Viveiros de Castro (2012a), p. 96 
41 Transformability is a constant theme in Amerindian cosmologies, particularly, for example, in terms of the 
creation-myth, and as regards the trans-specific nature of the shaman (see Part Four: sections 4.6, 4.7). See Viveiros 
de Castro (2012a), pp. 57–9 and Immanence and Fear: Stranger-events and subjects in Amazonia, trans. David 
Rogers, Iracema Dulley, Hau: Journal of Ethnography Theory 2, (vol. 1, pp. 27–48, 2012b), pp. 32, 36 
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and humanity.42 In the Amerindian schema a person (whether man or non-human) could connect with the 
latent yet formative (uncontained) triadism of the (immanent) cosmos. In other words, we can say that 
Amerindian cosmo-sociological dualities were in a state of ‘perpetual disequilibrium’, in 
contradistinction to the more stationary and classical (diametric) dualities of the coloniser. Trans-specific 
beings,43 that is to say, creatures that occupied some ‘in-between’ zone between animal and man, could 
only be represented indirectly in the classical colonisers’ paradigm as ‘mythical beings’ such as the 
Cyclops or Sphinx of ancient Greek legend. They were essentially thrust into a zone of ‘non-being’ – a 
non-place, containing beings perpetually in the process of transformation but existing safely beyond the 
diametric dualism’s boundary-edge. This un-orderable place of non-being is precisely where the ‘cosmic 
schematism’44 of the Indian’s radical dualism connected with a triadic root, the multiplicity or sensuous 
flux of the earth.  
 In opposition to this capacity for transformability, a pronounced aspect of Indian cosmology, the 
categorical Anthropos definition of mankind delineated a type of enclosed and strictly demarcated 
rationality that did not extend beyond a select few who were able to properly realise the form of man (an 
‘in-formation’). The force of this rationality derived from its being fully exercised against those deemed 
to be lacking in it. According to this view, beyond the immediate world of the Spaniard there existed an 
‘outside’ in which there resided enchanted creatures beyond the scope of rationality, i.e. considered to be 
utterly irrational. These beings, exiled from the Spanish world, were, due to their lack of proximity to 
familiar forms or ways of being, not to be admitted. Rationality was thus a quality exclusively in the 
possession of those who resided within the confines of a very narrow cultural world. What this in fact 
meant was that the Indian’s inconstancy, his inability to commit to a fixed judgement and settle on a plan 
or course of action, completely precluded him from establishing or conforming to the (molar) institutions 
of ‘king, law and faith’. This hard-line position chimed with some of the Jesuit missionaries, who put 
forward the opinion that ‘order, constancy, exactitude’45 would perhaps remain unattainable for the 
Indian.  
 The colonist’s mentality and spirit of conquest were indubitably excited by the expulsion of the 
Moors in Spain in the same year as the ‘discovery’ of the Americas (1492). The Reconquista signified the 
purification of the Spanish world of the other, exiled due to their infidel status. Thus, the normativity of 
the Spanish world could only be bolstered and secured through the exclusion of the other and the world 
they inhabited. Furthermore, it would not have seemed a huge leap for the colonist to export his 
exclusionary manner of thinking to the Americas. To this end, the conquistadors looked ‘upon the newly 
found lands principally as a boundless field for the spirit of conquest engendered during the medieval 
Reconquista’.46 The colonist’s exclusionary approach effectively meant the Indian would meet the same 
fate as the Moor within Spain, or an even worse one; once the interiority was purified, it would be left for 
the colonist to probe the exteriority of empire. Both through war and enslavement, it was this Anthropo-
centric thinking that drove the colonist’s approach towards the Indian.  
 At least in his initial account of the Indian, the colonist hit upon the ontological nature of the 
answer to the question arising from the uncertainty and contingency unleashed by the event of the 
encounter. It is this that takes us to the very heart of the Indian Question: do the Indians have a soul? 
How do we understand the personality or psychology of the Indian? A common answer necessarily 
involved a reference to Aristotle’s natural slavery theory. This was, in essence, a ready-to-hand theory 
which was propagated most ardently by the theologian Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda and proved popular as 
an explanation amongst the colonists of the Indian’s strange hybrid nature. In response, it elicited a 
scathing critique from Vitoria and the Dominican Bishop of Chiapas, Bartholomé Las Casas. However, in 
setting out his own account of the Indian’s personality, Vitoria found it imperative to first dismiss the 
credibility of the Pope’s jurisdiction over Indian lands (the Spanish Crown had depended on the Papal 
                                                            
42 See Tim Ingold, ‘Humanity and Animality’, in Companion Encyclopedia of Anthropology: Humanity, culture and 
social life, ed. Tim Ingold, Routledge (pp. 14–32, 1994), p. 14  
43 Viveiros de Castro (2012a), p. 48 
44 Ibid., p. 48 
45 Viveiros de Castro (2011), p. 6 
46 Lewis Hanke, All Mankind is One: A study of the disputation between Bartolomé de Las Casas and Juan Ginés de 
Sepúlveda on the religious and intellectual capacities of the American Indians, Northern Illinois University Press 
(1994), p. 5. Schmitt draws upon Hanke in his overview of Vitoria’s contribution to a European International Law or 
the Respublica Christiana, p. 101, 1.ff. Also see Quijano and Wallerstein, p. 553 
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bulls issued by Pope Alexander VI); he could then, in turn, dismantle Aristotle-inspired theories of 
natural slavery.47 
Drawing on medieval canon law, Vitoria was of the view that the Pope had no ‘spiritual or 
temporal power’ (or authority) over unbelievers/barbarians in any circumstances.48 No overseas territory 
could thus be legitimately given to the Spanish Crown on the basis of the Pope’s jurisdiction over infidel 
territories,49 as religion could not act as a basis for a common framework of jurisprudence (this was 
acknowledged by medieval canon lawyers such as Innocent IV). Despite the Papacy’s diminishing 
influence, its mediating power revived in the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries; with overseas 
European expansion Christian rulers sought moral cover from the Pope for conquests they justified as 
part of a programme to extend the boundaries of the Church. As long as conquests were justified as such, 
the Papacy was in a position to sway the manner in which conquered people were treated.50  
The Pope’s power was significant at a time in which European nations vied with each other for 
the spoils of overseas territories.51 In such circumstances, concerns were raised over the plausible threat 
that the Pope might transfer his allegiance from one Christian nation to another, on the basis of conquered 
people being treated harshly, with little care for their souls. Within this context, we can fully appreciate 
Vitoria’s approval of the comparatively little blood spilled by the Portuguese in Brazil as a thinly veiled 
critique of the management of Spanish colonial operations. Indeed, the colonists’ indiscretions were a 
topic on which the Spanish monarchy felt particularly vulnerable, having partially justified colonisation 
on the salvation of souls.52 This was undoubtedly a contention in which Vitoria could find some favour in 
the advancement of his own considered opinions. This view was strengthened by his feeling that Spanish 
lawyers were simply hiding behind Papal patronage and the narrow letter of the law.  
At times where the dispute hinged upon the more scholarly grounds of the validity of natural 
slavery in assessing the Indian, Vitoria was effectively able to dismiss the argument by reverting to the 
legal doctrine of canon law and the rights of infidels. For the most part, he was able to show that the 
empirical particulars in the Indies indicated in the most definitive manner that the Indians were ‘masters 
over their own affairs and had order in their lives’.53 This reinforced the universal basis of a 
jurisprudence that could include nations hitherto unknown to the Spanish world, as ethnographic 
information gathered by observers in the Americas yielded ample evidence of shared or, at least, 
recognisable practices. In repudiating natural slavery theory, Vitoria’s intention was to reveal not only 
that reason proved to be the basis of all law (i.e. a universal law), but that it also remained adaptable in 
the face of normative challenges such as those implicit to the encounter.54 However, as a staunch Thomist 
and Neo-Aristotelian, he still found it necessary to retain much of Aristotle’s psychological and 
ontological framework, despite the jettisoning of natural slavery theory.55  
Vitoria held a similar line in denying Papal jurisdiction over Indian territories. He affirmed that 
it could only be reason, ‘the defining quality of law’, which could provide for the universality of 
jurisprudence. At this point Vitoria found it opportune to draw upon the Roman doctrine of ius gentium, 
or the law of nations; it was on this basis of universal reason that he asserted the territorial and self-
governing rights of the Indians. In respect to this, the main issue of note was ‘the nature of the Indian qua 
man and his proper place in the world’.56 Hence, we see that the matter was as much an ontological issue 
as it was a matter of human law.57 Here, Vitoria arrives at the mode of mankind that could effectively 
counter the Anthropos of the colonists: the proper place of the Indian was in the inclusive category of 
Humanitas. The Christian-inspired Humanitas encompassed all people, even unbelievers, who remained 
within the sphere of possible salvation, or certainly not irrevocably beyond its reach. This was due to the 
                                                            
47 Guardiola-Rivera (2011), p. 32 
48 Vitoria, p. 263 
49 Anghie, p. 322; Pagden (1982), p. 30 
50 Muldoon, pp. 138–9 
51 The question of legal title over the Americas becomes a struggle between individual European Powers competing 
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Church. See Schmitt, p. 130 
52 Ibid, p. 140 
53 Vitoria, p. 250 (emphasis added) 
54 Fitzpatrick (2008), p. 43 
55 Pagden (1982), p. 37 
56 Ibid., p. 67 
57 Ibid., pp. 28, 48 
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power of divine law to grant all the intrinsic potentiality for reasoning, a constitutive openness to 
persuasion through strength of argument.  
Within Albertus’ tripartite structure of rationality,58 Vitoria stressed the importance of reason 
(which the Indian seemed to possess due to rationality’s intrinsic nature) in the creation and 
comprehension of law, while other elements – such as will (vital for a commitment to faith) and appetite 
(or desire/ instinct) – were open to modification with the development of the right normative 
institutions.59 If Amerindian nations could be persuaded to convert through the power of rational 
argumentation, they could just as easily be convinced of the need to remove the impediments to their 
‘perfectibility’ or (constructivist) recognition as perfect communities.60 What, in effect, amounted to the 
lack of perfection in Amerindian nations did not necessarily prevent the future onset of developed legal 
institutions, which could help in ameliorating the Indian’s psychology and moral condition. The theory 
harked back to Albertus and Aristotle’s ethical motion within the community; there lay an obligation 
upon perfect communities in granting assistance to those nations wherein ‘blockages’ or impediments 
arrested the ‘perfect’ autonomy bestowing61 motion of ethical subjects (i.e. citizens). It was within the 
power of the legislator and his skill in formulating the law to actualise the community’s perfection 
through directing the conduct of citizens, in order to make them good and just.62 For the Indian, 
perfection was still a possibility if they were able to accept their position within Humanitas.  
Through the potential to be saved, if holding to proper Christian belief, the Indian enters into the 
universal category of Humanitas, qualifying him for legal status and natural rights. The portrayal of the 
Indian as pure victim was in no small part due to the foundational violence of Spanish colonialism; 
Vitoria considered the Indian as needing to be saved not only from his imperfect ways, but also from the 
destructive logic of the perpetrators of violence – the Spanish colonisers. And so the Indian as ‘victim’ 
was able to take the place of the other which acts as foundational for ethics and politics.63 The logical 
conclusion of the ‘genocidal’ excess of the conquistadors was an exclusionary violence resulting in the 
extinction of the other: there was simply no place for the Indian within the Spanish world. However, 
within Vitoria’s legal system, relational violence becomes less exclusion, more ‘integration into the self-
same world’.64 In gaining admittance to the Spanish world, the Indian-as-victim could be a future 
beneficiary of the Spaniard’s tutelage and guardianship (derived from the Roman civil law, or ius civile). 
This went hand in hand with the suppression of the Indian-as-victim’s political agency, as his society and 
governance structures were made to conform to a universal jurisprudence in which normative standards 
were set by the Spanish. Moreover, the overt violence of the conquistadors would become internalised 
and meaningful within a system in which the disciplinary and ‘ontological violence’ of the other’s 
inclusion took the place of the exclusionary violence of total annihilation.65 
To put it in terms that continue and extend Albertus’ geographical imaginary, Vitoria theorised a way 
in which Amerindian societies could be folded back into the molar legal institutions of Spanish 
imperialism. The latter now had a claim (in jurisprudential terms) to exercise control over the earth, in the 
sense of dominion extended outwards over the hitherto un-ordered and fertile lands of the Americas. 
Through the admission of the Indian into a mutual affordability with the heavens, cosmic-cum-molecular 
transformability based upon the finitude or transitory nature of form could be replaced with ‘the promise 
of a narcissistic fusion with the absolute’.66 In a sense, the potential perfectibility of Amerindian nations 
contained the hope of re-channelling the Indian’s personality, so as to direct it towards a cosmic absolute 
(in the form of the Godhead). In which case, to abandon the Indian to the un-ordered earth (in its fertile 
depths hidden below, in opposition to the managed and ordered earth-as-surface seen from an elevated 
position above) would essentially be to accept his damnation and inevitable fall from Humanitas. On the 
                                                            
58 From the previous Part, the model consists of ‘intelligence, spirit and skill’ (Albertus’ interpretation, directly from 
Aristotle). The structure is preserved, but re-interpreted by Vitoria via Aquinas as reason, will and intelligence. The 
‘appetite’ is a sub-category modulated by the relationship between three principal elements.   
59 Vitoria, p. 218, 222 
60 Ibid., pp. 222, 225 
61 Ibid., p. 158 
62 Ibid., p. 222 
63 Jan Nayar, ‘The Politics of Hope and the Other-in-the-World: Thinking exteriority’, Law and Critique (vol. 24, 
2013), p. 65 
64 Ibid., p. 66 
65 Ben Golder, Victoria Ridler, Illan Rua Wall, ‘Editors’ Introduction: 'The Politics of the Border/The Borders of the 
Political’, Law and Critique (vol. 20, pp. 105–111, 2009), p. 110  
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100 
other hand, in choosing to accept his position as part of a planetary jurisprudential system, the Indian 
could still transcend his victimhood as a subject-willing-to-be-ordered.   
To speak in more general terms, through the construction of his legal system Vitoria posited a 
foundation for law that could adapt to the event so as to contain and manage it. Through his 
jurisprudence, he was able to reset the normative boundaries of the Spanish world (or legal order) so as to 
re-posit it as a completed totality in imperium (in juridical terms, the ‘commonwealth’). Thus, it was for 
the Spanish state to initially acknowledge an exteriority that was outside its control in order to, through a 
process of constructivist recognition, ultimately include, contain and assimilate. To put it another way, it 
was only through responsiveness to the initial contingency of the encounter, in the inclusion of the 
excluded other, that a concentric-diametric system of legality could ultimately act for its own self-
preservation.67  
Chapter Two: The Indian’s ‘Unrecognisable Shape’ 
In encountering the Indian, the conquistadors and early colonists found themselves somewhat perplexed. 
A curious observation at the time centres on remarks concerning the ‘form’ or ‘shape’ taken by the 
Indian. Intriguingly, the Indian was seen to have possessed an ‘unrecognisable shape’68 (a ‘xenomorph’). 
This is very much supported by the evidence recorded by Dominican friars, such as Zonta,69 who 
confirmed the widespread circulation of myths in vogue amongst the colonists. A popular myth, which 
gained traction, held that the Indians were human merely in appearance. The Indian, it was supposed, 
only took on the guise of being human. Certainly, the Spanish captains setting forth to the Americas seem 
to have been predisposed to seeing any number of ‘mythical’ and invented beings during and after their 
conquests.70 Despite the seemingly fantastical fixations of the colonists, they had nevertheless managed 
to give utterance to the opening salvoes of much wider philosophical inquiries.71  
 The issue regarding the Indian’s form, once raised, caused much disagreement even amongst the 
colonists themselves. One controversial viewpoint, given prominence by the theologian Sepúlveda 
(although he offered later a partial retraction based on semantics) during the Valladolid debates with Las 
Casas, categorised the Indian as more ‘animal’ or ‘beast’ than ‘man’.72 Maintaining an allegiance to this 
position proved to be challenging, as it flew in the face of the theological orthodoxy adhered to by 
religious interests such as the Dominicans. Certainly, the prevailing view was aptly represented by the 
bishop Antonio de Montesino in his acclaimed sermon on Hispaniola in 1511. Against the colonists, he 
gave vent with the cry: “Are these Indians not men? Do they not have rational souls?”73 The exclamation 
proved to be a galvanising starting point to the Dominican project of fighting the colonists theoretically 
on the Indian Question. Alternatively, colonists fell back on the position that the Indians were men, but of 
a lower species – an anthropological type of ‘Homo monstrosus’.74 This only served to emphasise the 
ambiguity at the heart of the Indian’s form. Moreover, this lent further credence to the thought that the 
Indian occupied some murky ontological realm falling between more distinct categories – between 
animal and man. This ostensible resistance to a coherent classification induced in the colonists a 
distinctive Proustian anxiety. The Indian constantly – and alarmingly – revealed hidden selves, while 
suggesting yet others, unknown and unknowable.75 His primary manifestation appeared to be that of an 
eerie stranger, of being incognito.  
In addition to some of the epistemic questions raised by the colonists, another prominent issue 
concerned the Indian’s fragile psychology. This was seen to be borne out by the Indian’s erratic 
                                                            
67 One could say the ability of Vitoria’s spatially organised jurisprudence to contain or absorb events echoes that of 
the concentric dualism (combined with the diametric). Hans Blumenburg (p.80) describes this post-Copernican 
paradigm as ‘the construction of a topographic-schematic center’ with ‘concentric relations to it.’ 
68 Pagden (1982), p. 25 
69 Hanke (1994); p. 132; Staden, lxi  
70 Lewis Hanke, Aristotle and the American Indian: A study in race prejudice in the modern world, Indiana 
University Press (1975), pp. 2–3  
71 Staden, xxx–xxi 
72 Hanke (1994), p. 85, and (1975), p. 48; Bracken, p. 35 
73 Hanke (1994), p. 4 
74 William Arens, The Man-Eating Myth: Anthropology and anthropophagy, Oxford University Press (1980), p. 33; 
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75 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, trans. Carol Clarke and Peter Collier, Penguin Books (vols. 5 and 6, 2003), 
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behaviour, primarily recorded in various ethnographic literature drawn up by Jesuits as well as the 
Dominicans.76 Attitudes were exemplified through a constant refrain of the colonists themselves, 
espoused by Diego le Cruz in this instance, that the ‘Indians are not stable persons’.77 It alluded to the 
worry that the ‘disharmonious’ psychology of the natives (following Albertus) was beyond being 
‘perfected’ to the degree required to accord with the set normative standards of the Spanish 
establishment. Indeed, the supposed inadequacies of the Indian’s will (as a constitutive part of the 
tripartite rationality) to commit to a judgement or belief, or to convey consistent behavioural patterns, 
suggested the failure of indigenous institutions to reach the standards of developed rationality conducive 
to the harmony of perfect ethical beings. On this interpretation, a disharmonious personality was 
symptomatic of an imperfect ontological form.        
 The colonists’ hypothesis that the Indian’s psychology was beyond the scope of the established 
institutions of the Spanish state to remedy (or ‘perfect’) was anathema to the Dominican mainstream. The 
Dominican friars, as gatekeepers to the Indian soul, needed a stable subject capable of salvation. They 
simply had no truck with the notion that the native’s personality could never be made, and rather failed to 
conform to the molar institutions of the Spanish establishment. The very real anxieties lying just 
underneath the theoretical conflict between leading Dominicans and the colonists (and a minority of 
allied missionaries) intimated the weighty significance of the philosophical disputes that arose out of the 
context of encounter.78 The colonists’ appraisal of the Indian threw up questions of normativity, potential 
perfectibility and the nature of humanity, which demanded a response. Let us now turn, in greater detail, 
to the colonists’ thoughts on the matter of the Indian Question, as it requires due consideration, and will 
provide us with a better understanding of exactly what Vitoria tried to circumvent in his own evaluation 
of the Indian psychology. 
 
The conquistadors’ (henceforth I use the general term ‘colonist’) or discoverers’ initial thoughts could 
only reveal the inadequacy of preconceived frameworks to suitably locate the Indian in the Spanish 
world. These Europeans, ‘configurers’ or fixers of worlds, were presented with a stubbornly strange or 
unknown world that confronted them with the ‘power of lived experience’ over the theoretical claims of 
the past.79 In short, they were faced with a ‘discovery’ in all of the empiricism that it entailed. After all, 
the term ‘discovery’ derives from the Latin disco-operio, meaning ‘to uncover or expose to the gaze’.80 In 
many ways, the capturing power of visuality over the New World paralleled the form-imposing powers of 
Arab optics for Albertus.81 In this instance, the gaze of the discoverer denoted a mode of possession over 
the planet, the entire orb as exposed to the powers of the colonist to potentially shape what they saw.82 
Whereas for Albertus the established design or pattern of the world depended on the emanation of light 
from the distant stars of the heavens, the colonialist could more directly see or visualise the potential 
expansion of the Spanish establishment into the New World. However, in perceiving the Indian through 
colonial eyes, an issue now lay with the colonist’s own ‘category error’. This error to satisfactorily place 
what was before them, and the subsequent ambiguity this gave rise to, demonstrated the radically 
incomplete nature of a past83 that could not completely grasp the events of the present. For the early 
                                                            
76 The sixteenth-century ethnographic literature, mostly consisting of state-directed socio-psychological research, 
were records not only deriving from the Jesuits in Brazil, and the Dominicans (for the most part) in the rest of Latin 
America, but from significant compilations of second-hand accounts put together by French colonists in Amazonia. 
Of the latter, the most prominent is Jean de Léry, whom the anthropologist Levi-Strauss considered a forerunner of 
modern ethnography. See Staden, xli–xlvi 
77 Hanke (1994), p. 26. Jerome Gordon (1501–1576) shared this view; see Margaret T. Hodgen, Early Anthropology 
in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, University of Pennsylvania Press (1964), pp. 376–7 
78 Staden, xli 
79 Anthony Pagden, European Encounters with the New World: From Renaissance to Romanticism, Yale University 
Press (1993), p. 89. The power of the empirical ‘discovery’ was championed by the humanists, such as Erasmus, and 
ethnographers such as the French missionary André Thevet, as a force that could expand the limits of (and, indeed, 
liberate) knowledge. The ‘incomplete’ or partial nature of the past was revealed by experience of new phenomena, 
which suggested the inability of scholasticism based upon classical thought (i.e. from antiquity) to fully explain the 
world as a ‘completed’ entity. 
80 Ibid., p. 5 
81 According to Albertus, sight also ‘serves for discovery’. See Albertus (2001), p. 58 
82 The colonist’s notion of possession through discovery is dealt with by Vitoria (pp. 244–5), who discredits the terra 
nullius as a stand-alone argument capable of overriding the Indian’s claim to dominion. Also see Sven Lindqvist, 
Terra Nullius: A journey through no one’s land, Granta Books (2012), for a further explication of the terra nullius 
argument in the context of the aborigines of Australia.     
83 Pagden (1993), p. 94 
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colonists to maintain an open mind to or gaze upon the Indian was to accept him as defying existing 
ontological categories. In other words, to analyse the Indian in his own terms would be to defy the stable 
categories underpinning the Spanish world. Thus, the theoretical groping around to designate the Indian 
as ‘animal’ or ‘beast’ was part of an effort to articulate the notion that the Indian lived in another world 
entire and inaccessible to the Spaniard.         
The ‘unrecognisability’ thesis’ central claim lay with the unstable nature of the Indian’s 
personality and its implications for the missionaries’ proselytising project. According to the 
anthropologist Viveiros de Castro, the Portuguese Jesuits faced many difficulties in the process of 
converting the Tupi indigenous societies of Brazil to Christianity. A dominant motif concerns the 
Indian’s resistance to doctrine; while many of the Indians would avidly assimilate new forms of thought, 
they would just as easily relinquish teachings to take flight and look for refuge in nearby forests. The 
Jesuits blamed the Indian’s ‘inconstancy’ for the initial failures of doctrine to take root.84 At the heart of 
the matter was the Indian’s openness to the constant acquisition of ‘new forms’: a type of perpetual 
shape-shifting which revealed the contingency inherent to his very soul. This contingency almost seemed 
to intertwine the Indian with the sinuous and fertile nature of his exotic lands.85 
Many of the Jesuits’ written opinions on the ‘inconstancy’ of the Indian correspond with the 
Spanish colonists’ unrecognisability thesis. The Indian’s nature seemed a challenge to stabilised forms of 
social institutions (such as Crown, conjugal family, Church) based firmly upon habituation. Hence, the 
Jesuits were quick to scrutinise the unruly habits that the native seemed to possess; alongside 
demonstrations of ‘disinterest’ and ‘forgetfulness’ Indian men seemed to pursue wives, wars and 
intoxication with excessive zeal.86 The temptation was to conclude that indigenous society simply did not 
display the firm normative grounding for conversion to Christianity to flourish.    
  The Indian’s inconstancy was closely associated with a long-standing conflation of nomadism 
with disorder. In the Christian tradition, this evokes some of the more outspoken medieval canonists’ 
opinions on Muslim infidels as ‘untamed animals of the field’ whose nomadic sensibilities placed them 
beyond the ambit of normativity.87 In like manner, the colonists identified the Indian’s inconstancy with 
the excessive emigrative movements of nomadism, in contrast to the stabilised forms of order of the 
Spanish state and cities. The Indian’s nomadic nature seemed well suited to the ‘magnificent 
irregularities’ of the earth.88 However, it was precisely these lines of communication that the Indian held 
with his constantly shifting surroundings (the forests that Viveiros de Castro notes the Indians regularly 
fled back to) that hardened him against a definitive acceptance of doctrine. If the Indian could not be 
pinned down, the question arose: was he beyond the pale of salvation? The Dominican bishop and first 
biographer of Columbus, Agostino Guistinuani, noted that some Spanish colonists believed the Indian’s 
capacity for conversion was ‘very slight’.89 Many colonists seemed to have had a great readiness to 
accept that the Indian could not be subsumed within a recognisable normative order. This downbeat 
assessment of the Indian personality, which seemed to evade the capture of categorisation, put the 
viability of conversion in grave doubt. On this account, the Indian was simply too changeable to commit 
himself to Christianity.  
 The argument from the point of view of the colonists can be considered in another way. This 
centres on the Indian’s inability to put forward a recognisable ‘counter-universality’.90 In positing the 
latter, the Indian could well have advanced his own alternative categorisations of, for example, what 
constituted humanity and what did not. In comprehending the lines of exclusion and inclusion that 
defined the Indian’s thinking on the nature of man, he could take on a discernible shape in the eyes of the 
colonist. Once the Indian idea of universality was understood, it would only be a matter of persuading the 
                                                            
84 Viveiros de Castro principally cites the Portuguese Jesuit missionaries (see footnote below). However, their claims 
were also corroborated by the Spanish Dominicans and colonists; for example Governor Nicolás Oviedo put forward 
the standard formulation: ‘the faith had been preached to them before; they had accepted it, and then fell back into 
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Indian of the falsity of his beliefs. This would make him more accessible to the missionary, and more 
susceptible to the arguments of the gospel. However, as we have seen, both the Portuguese Jesuits and 
Spanish colonists hinted that the chief problem concerned the Indian’s lack of belief in the idea of 
universality itself.91  
A common hypothesis in this regard was the idea that the Indian’s language could not make use 
of universals since he could not conceive of them. Thus, the Indian-savage’s unmediated relationship 
with the given nature of the world shaped the development of his capability for speech and language. The 
‘natural man’ was able to describe unmediated the instantaneous sensations emanating from the given 
flux of the natural world; the vital mediation of ideas simply did not factor into his processes of speech 
making. In Locke’s account, the natural man has no access to ‘abstractions or universals’ and so their 
language cannot reflect the logic inherent to the speech of European man.92 
The Indian’s speech-act was merely a way to capture the immediacy of the image of the 
surrounding world.93 It was an attempt to grasp the totality of a perception, without the prerequisite 
‘decomposition’ (see below) which characterised the cognitive processes of the European man. The 
Indian’s discourse, in representing the totality of perception or the immediacy of the image, seemed 
almost completely indeterminate.  
On the other hand, European languages were mediated through ideas not immediately accessible 
via the senses. This mediation allowed for structured, reflective thought. The process was initiated 
through decomposition – the breaking up of the immediate wholeness or fusion of sensation into an 
organised linearity. In ordering perception or received sensation into a linearity, images were gathered 
into a continuous but distinguishable sequence.94 The sequence was a result of the taking apart and 
reconstructing of reality through the use of abstract concepts – abstracted common qualities and natures 
(i.e. universals). The de-composing process thus sealed sensation into the self-same, closed totality of the 
linear sequence. The result was the conformity of the surrounding world with the cognitive faculties.  
By contrast, the Indian’s perception in its totality had an open-ended relationship with the 
shifting environs. It seemed to follow that his perception could only be a radically incomplete one. In 
other words, the Indian’s speech was reflective of the incompleteness of the world he perceived. In being 
immersed in the immediate, perception cannot be contained within a determinate or en-closed totality. 
The Indian’s language was therefore reflective of his psychology. The indeterminacy in his speech 
corresponded to the indeterminacy of the (unmediated) given or his constantly shifting world. Proof of 
this could be seen in the Indian’s fusion of ‘pronoun, verb, substantive, adjective, noun’ into an 
indistinguishable continuum.95 The natural man was therefore reduced to a dependence on an over-
indulgent use of particulars to describe his world, something which seemed to intimate a limited 
knowledge of any stable, complete(-d or perfect) reality. From a theological standpoint, this could only 
be a considerable challenge for Dominicans considering the reliance of Christianity upon universal 
categories.96  
 
From the previous argument, it is clear that the Indian’s acceptance of the given in all its immediacy and 
flux is the chief problem which destabilises or de-harmonises his personality. This rendered it 
unrecognisable to a European ontology, which fundamentally had universality and perfectibility at its 
heart. The Indian was thought to be unable to think universality, let alone posit an opposing or counter-
universality through the articulation of alternatives capable of contesting European categories. We can 
then re-term the issue as that of the radical ontological incompleteness of the Indian.97       
                                                            
91 In the metaphysics of Christianity the soul is the properly constructed element and the basis of difference (i.e. 
between man and animal-other). The universality of Christian concepts is thus based on excluding that which is 
man’s nature from that which is not (the soul as spiritual and universal power or essence contra animal corporeality). 
From the Indian perspective universality exists, although it is mediated through the body which is the site of a 
constructed particularity and hence the source of difference, and as such can dictate qualification to a virtually 
universal personhood. This type of immanent Amerindian concept could not be the basis of institutions consistent 
with the transcendent universality of the Spanish Dominicans. See Viveiros de Castro (2012a), pp. 114–5 
92 Pagden (1993), p. 128. Note too that Rousseau and Montaigne were influenced in their ‘philosophical musings’ by 
ethnography on the Amerindians; see Staden, xli–xlii 
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94 Ibid., p. 132 
95 Ibid., p. 131 
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 From the viewpoint of the colonist, as we have seen, a rejection of totality could only take on 
pejorative connotations. However, in Viveiros de Castro’s estimation, we can read the Indian’s 
inconstancy or unrecognisability as an affirmative acceptance of incompleteness. By implication, it is a 
rejection of the ‘perfect being’ or perfectibility as the basis of the institutions of society or culture. The 
Tupinambá, and in our case more generally the Indian’s, ‘philosophy affirmed an essential ontological 
incompleteness: the incompleteness of sociality, and, in general, of humanity.’98     
 The Indian’s initial openness to the missionary doctrine, as Viveiros de Castro understands it, 
suggests the fundamental place of the other in Indian society.99 The Dominican Las Casas confirmed a 
similar reception from the Indians in Spanish-controlled territories.100 For the Tupinambá, the other was 
welcomed as the basis of the molecular-becoming constitutive of Indian society; stabilised social forms 
were jettisoned in favour of an operative openness to the other. The Indian did not subscribe to a closed 
definition of his own being against that of the other, but accepted the other as a way to re-introduce 
contingency into his own being. Here, the other does not reaffirm the universal scope of one’s own 
humanity, but on the contrary reaffirms the falsity of pre-determined definitions that aspire to fixity (or 
transcendence). Thus, it is only through the incorporation of the other that one can properly ‘exit’ oneself, 
and so nullify the temptation to posit oneself as a stabilised, self-contained being.101  
We can then interpret the Indian’s initial openness to Dominican or Jesuit missionaries as 
embodying the harnessing of the contingency emanating forth from the encounter. The accommodation 
of the European ‘other’ (re-)stimulated the molecular-movement inherent to Indian communities. To put 
it in other words, Indian society can be conceptualised as the constant movement towards the 
outside/exteriority of the other. In moving towards the outside, the inside/interiority is continuously 
redefined. The indeterminacy involved in defining oneself, as one continuously seeks the encounter with 
the other, is the foundation for repeatedly thwarting the inception of the belief in a universal nature, in the 
sense of abstraction or transcendence (i.e. the nature or essence of man as humanity).102  
Conversely, we have seen that the process of de-composition breaks down the capacity of 
leaving or ‘exiting’ oneself which the encounter with the other engenders. For the Indian, the other is 
inexhaustible in its potentiality to destabilise reality and perception. It is the capacity to destabilise or 
rupture that prevents perception from closing in on itself, from being ‘completed’ or perfected, and thus 
becoming a self-referential loop. The other preserves the given as a given or the flux of sensation which 
renews being. In engaging with the given, one must move out of oneself to leave a previous form behind. 
In the paradigm of de-composition, perception, in becoming a closed totality, merely assimilates the other 
in a bid to preserve its own stability. De-composing, in ordering the sensations of the immediate 
wholeness of reality (into abstract categories), negates the capacity of the other to renew the self. 
Experience becomes a unity in which abstracted concepts and common qualities define the nature of 
reality. Perception is no longer about leaving or shedding a former mode of being, but about the 
movement inwards which stabilises the singular subject (‘personality’ with its constituent elements).         
We can read into the Indian’s open totality of perception the desire to uphold communication 
with the outside. The outside corresponds to that which lies just beyond ordered de-composed experience, 
and that which is significant for the perception of any new, unregulated sensations. In light of this, we 
can consider the outside as the realm of the un-ordered.103 The un-ordered is a ‘residual domain’ that 
consists of ‘a superabundance of possibilities that have been levelled down to the status of the irrelevant 
or unimportant’.104 It was the Indian’s wish to maintain contact with the other that invited in and even 
accommodated the un-ordered within his world. Here, we start to unravel the ‘strangeness’ of the Indian’s 
hidden nature – his incognito.  
The order of experience, through the process of de-composition, ensures that what is exposed to 
the gaze is more or less recognisable as something due to its perfect or at the very least perfectible mode 
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99 Ibid., p. 46 
100 Hanke (1994), p. 73, pp. 102–3 
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102 Viveiros de Castro (2012b), p. 32 
103 Lindahl, p. 157. Lindahl adopts for the notation ‘unorderable’; however, I shall continue to use my own notation 
of ‘un-orderable’ through the entirety of this manuscript, although referring to one and the same concept. 
104 Ibid., p. 157 
 
 
105 
of being.105 What is perceived, in residing in an ordered reality, is what is relevant and important to us. 
That which is irrelevant and unimportant remains unperceived, i.e. is subject to the domain of the un-
ordered beyond the confines of determinate reality. For the Indian, on the other hand, the realms of order 
and the un-ordered feed into each other in the immediacy of the given. The Indian sensitivity to the given 
ensures that determinate order cannot take hold of a reality in which the un-ordered remains perpetually 
open (as opposed to open only some of the time, which is commensurate with a determinate, stable order 
that only changes over long periods of time).106   
The Indian’s incognito or hidden form, as well as his disharmonious personality, is therefore a 
result of his relationship with the un-ordered. What is rendered relevant and important for him is as 
quickly made irrelevant and unimportant. To put it another way, the Indian is unknowable precisely 
because he sheds his form as quickly as he obtains new ones. The native’s incognito, his mode of 
appearing,107 has a constitutive relationship with the un-ordered. In terms of the Indian’s behaviour, this 
can be recognised in the accounts we have noted. As the colonists and supporting missionaries considered 
the matter, the native’s ‘disinterestedness’ in behaving in line with doctrine demonstrated a disregard for 
belief. This is also Viveiros de Castro’s view, in that he sees the Indian as having a suspicious regard for 
belief itself.108 Conversely, what is now readily apparent is the Jesuits’ intuition that the Indian could 
only be converted once and for all when he conformed to habits that could induce a stable personality. 
This way, he could finally be forced to reveal himself; he would be uncovered and rendered knowable.  
The inconstancy of the indigenous personality can then partly be explained by his ‘a-legal’ 
behaviour. The early colonist’s initial inability to explain the Indian’s behaviour and the concern over his 
repudiation of doctrine attest to this. Hence, it is possible to see the ‘normative challenge’109 issued by the 
native to his captors. This is the defining trait of a-legal behaviour: it is the questioning of normativity 
itself from a domain of experience beyond it. What is fundamentally placed into question is the 
‘disjunction’ between legal and illegal that characterises the normativity of legal orders – in this instance 
the Spanish state based on dominion and the Church as the ‘establishment’ from the point of view of 
creative institutionality. The Indian’s behaviour cannot properly be described as falling into this 
disjunction. To elaborate, the Indian’s experience of the other/the un-ordered realised a gushing array of 
possibilities beyond the recognition of those that make up the determinate reality of the Spanish world 
(one could say it is beyond Albertus’ mutual affordability and the management of risk this implied). The 
colonists’ critique of the native’s behaviour and associated psychology was an admittance of his ‘other-
worldly’ order of experience. Because of the absence of a common standard of perception and 
experience, the Indian had no way of admittance to the Spanish world. In the latter, only certain 
possibilities were admissible – those that conformed to the framework of state institutions and its 
associated normativity. Man, after all, in order to be considered such, had to exercise his powers as a 
creator of artificial worlds.110 In contradistinction, Indian society seemed to reject this artificial scarcity in 
favour of a surfeit of possibilities – those that, seemingly, could not possibly be ordered into a coherent 
normative legality.111  
We can go further here and suggest another qualification, namely that the Indian’s behaviour 
equates to a ‘strong’ form of a-legality. The strong variety of a-legality denotes behaviour that is un-
ordered and un-orderable.112 In other words, the native’s very different order of experience disqualified 
him, in absolute terms, from being integrated into the Spanish normative framework. Here, we can 
invoke the colonists’ pessimism once again in restating the view that the Indian could not be converted, 
nor his unruly habits corrected. The native’s behaviour was not simply a claim to perfectibility, in this 
view, but an outright rejection of (normative) inclusion.113 To put it another way, he refused to be 
contained and to seek his possibilities within the Spanish realm of experience. His behaviour marked an 
affirmative decision to remain separated or excluded from Spanish normativity. The so-called ‘natural 
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man’ was just too inconstant, too changeable (one could say a psychotic, cut off from a determinate 
reality) to ever wish to accept the rules of a stabilised legal order. To paraphrase Diego de la Cruz, the 
inclusion of the natives would require an authority over them that the missionaries simply did not have.114      
The Indian’s a-legality is indeed what determines his ‘strange’ mode of appearance, as he 
seemed to emerge from the ‘fringes of space and time’115 on the Spaniard’s horizon. In this, he took on 
the manifestation of ‘otherness-as-strangeness’116 for the colonist. His destabilised psychology, and hence 
a-legality, was very much an attribute of his continued link to the un-ordered, beyond the colonist’s range 
of perception. It is therefore not a surprise that the native’s realisation of a never-ending stream of 
possibilities could only defy the comprehension of the colonist. For the Dominican theologians who 
undertook the responsibilities for conversion, the colonists’ claim that the native would remain 
unknowable was to throw down the gauntlet. Moreover, if the Indian experienced the other as a 
destination117 that needed to be continually traversed, in the colonists’ eyes the other could only appear as 
a strange figure openly defying the cogito. 
Chapter Three: The Indian’s Now-Orientation  
An argument closely related to the ‘unrecognisability’ thesis concerns the assumed deficiency of the 
Indian’s memory and will.118 We can identify this as a type of derivative argument, in the sense that it is a 
continuation of the scrutiny on his personality – the analysis of which was a major consideration of the 
Indian Question. We can subsequently trace the discussion as it shifts from the ‘inconstancy’ of 
personality to the corollary issue of the incapacity of the Indian to project himself in time.119  
 To pick up the thread of the argument from the previous chapter, of considerable concern to the 
colonists was the native’s resistance to doctrine. This was documented in the written testimonies of 
colonists such as the Franciscan Bernandino de Sahagún, who expounded on their conspiratorial 
treachery. Accordingly, they did ‘not give up their gods…and…continue[d] to pay them service through 
clandestine offerings and celebrations’.120 This touched upon another worry of the colonists and 
missionaries, namely, the intensive and unbounded zeal of the Indian in living only for the present. This 
necessarily entailed forgetting the habits sanctified by doctrine and showed a lack of prudence in thinking 
through the future consequences of debauchery. Hence, to complement Sahagún, the missionary 
Francisco López de Gómora noted that the Indian was ‘prone to “novelties”, drunkenness, vice, and 
fickleness’.121 The natives’ lack of foresight in reflecting upon their actions was seen to result in their dire 
situation, as they appeared to be ‘content with very little; they do not store up things for their children’.122 
It seemed that the Indian’s unbridled appetite was responsible for the diminution of the other elements of 
the tripartite rationality (namely, will and intelligence). 
 The Indian’s disposition seemed to be wholly guided by the novelties of the ‘here and now’, and 
yet his actions also suggested a strange repetitiveness. To expand on the latter point, he seemed to be 
caught in a cycle of ‘eternal recurrence’ through which the passionate excesses of drinking, dancing and 
vengeance held sway. Presumably from the Indian’s perspective many of his intensive activities would 
have taken on the aspect of the ‘novel’, in the sense of being subject to the pre-de-composed sensual flux 
(the given) of the present. From the colonists’ perspective, the native was very much stuck, or rather 
enslaved by his immediate orientation, moored in the present. The savage seemed to possess neither an 
‘obvious past’ (or history, personal or societal) nor an ‘imaginable future’.123 His actions were completely 
submerged in ‘now-time’,124 the time of the eternal present. Behaviour directed solely by the perception 
of the present could only be ruled by impulsive passions, since ‘there is no tomorrow’.125 The creative 
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energies of today existed merely to be exhausted in consequence of the non-existence of tomorrow. In 
light of this, the colonist Antonia de Villiante summed up many of his colleagues’ feelings when he 
claimed that if the Indian was left to his own devices, he would revert to the idleness of his present-
orientation.126 
 
The point of view of the colonist on the question of the Indian’s memory can be recast as an argument 
conforming to what the anthropologist Christopher Bracken terms ‘the tale of two sorts’.127 The theory 
has its best-known modern source in the writings of Adam Smith, a representative of the Scottish 
Enlightenment whose modelling is in part an attempt to describe what divides savage man from civilised 
man. It theorises the disjunction that distinguishes two types of people, primarily interpreted as economic 
actors equipped with foresight capacities. People of the first type are able to project themselves into the 
future, an ability which enables them to successfully calculate the outcomes of their economic 
productivity. As they are future-orientated, they can attune their behaviour so it is in line with their 
projection. They therefore lean towards frugality, and choose to make reasonable decisions to invest in 
the future through the accumulation of resources. The second type of actor is stuck in the moment, in the 
hopeless eternity of the present. They are wasteful, consuming an excess of ‘value’ in a scarcity of 
time.128 In this second, unsuccessful type of actor, we are able to recognise the colonists’ depiction of the 
native as present-orientated.  
 For the successful economic actor, to project oneself in time is to realise a future orientation that 
can properly be described as ‘anticipatory’.129 To anticipate is to reduce the future to a manageable set of 
possibilities, so that one can proceed to choose between them. The exercise of finalising a decision 
between the possibilities the mind has presented one with is to logically work at negating and containing 
possibilities that are not chosen. Conversely, the present-orientated sort, such as the savage, can have no 
relation to the future, as every day is the same for them. They are today what they have always been.130 
The Indian could not, therefore, project himself into the ‘horizon’ of his possibilities as he could not 
perceive a determinate, manageable number of possibilities to choose between. In the reign of 
indeterminate possibilities, projection has no way of taking place; its condition is the prior constriction of 
possibilities. To be a ‘savage’ is then to expand the horizon of possibilities to near infinity; and to be 
civilised is to restrict these possibilities through continuous negation of those that are not relevant or 
important.  
 For the Indian, despite every day being the same, the day can still lay claim to the ‘novelty’ 
derived from the context of an eventful present. Hence, he can be said to be an extra-temporal being 
confined to a present of unmediated sensations and impressions. So it seems that he is passionate, yet 
disinterested. He is disinterested due to the fact that determinable possibilities can exert no influence over 
him. Yet he is governed by passions that entice him to indulge in unproductive labour, such as, for 
example, dancing. This attests to a continued commitment to experiencing a surfeit (or excess) of 
sensations. The excessive nature of activities such as dancing can be considered a marker denoting 
‘recourse to savagery’ which ‘bars access to futurity’.131 The wasteful use of energy that accompanies 
immersion in a context drains away the cognitive energy that is required for the process of projecting 
oneself in time. As the Indian lives through a time of constant events without duration or temporality, 
futurity remains inaccessible.132  
The act of projection is important in ensuring that the future displays continuity with the past. In 
other words, to fix the possibilities realisable in the future is to make certain that the future resembles the 
past in a predictable way. Futurity (the ‘will’ in the parlance of the Jesuits) and memory are therefore 
closely aligned; to shape a determinate future is to reduce reality to how one always remembers it. In the 
case of the ‘prodigal’133 Indian, his appetites could not be contained within this temporality, the realm 
proper to determinate, relevant possibilities. He thus relived the present in its perpetual novelty of 
impressions, and acted as if the world were created anew every day. Naturally, if the world is continually 
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created afresh, one can only forget the excesses of an equally non-existent yesterday. We can impute 
from this that now-time appears to be the realm in which a continuous variation of possibilities is 
disclosed. This seems to chime with the view that the ‘savage’ had no perception of a stabilised, 
continuous reality. The only stability he perceived was the stability of a world of discontinuity, of a 
reality prone to continual ruptures.  
 To be civilised is to positively erase the ‘eternity’ harboured (by the savage) in the present. To 
be a public benefactor is to be mindful of the exhaustible nature of reality. Correspondingly, to act in a 
frugal manner is to be of benefit to others: he who acts frugally does not drain away the possibilities of 
others (through his poverty and dependence on others) but adds to it through his industry and wealth. On 
the other hand, the excess of the Indian, or his prodigality, intimates a movement towards savagery; it is 
the ‘becoming-savage of savagery’.134 The surfeit of appetite of the savage can be seen to restrict the 
capability to settle on financial or economic plans (i.e. investing in the future). Overall, the basis of 
savagery is to conceive of a reality that is overly generous in the sensations it bequeaths.  
Savages, in Bracken’s articulation, are thought to be those men who have ‘too much animal’ in 
them, or at least have not managed to master their own ‘animality’.135 Once again, we can discern echoes 
of the colonists’ commentary on the Indian’s personality. The native shares in the animal’s malaise of 
subsisting in now-time. Like the savage, animals cannot distinguish between possibilities that seem to 
mesh into one, as they are immersed in their impressions (hence arises the instinctive nature of the 
animal). This would seem to echo the colonist’s position that the Indian occupied some penumbral realm 
between animal and man he assumes the outer guise of humanity but is still more animal then man 
beneath the surface.  
 
Many of the colonists were quick to point out that the ‘prodigal’ Indian was loathe to do any hard work 
whatsoever. Doubtless, work had been long associated in monastic orders (such as the Benedictine) with 
structured daily activity, in contrast to the disorder of miscellaneous tasks done randomly. Moreover, 
work was imbued with the profundity of re-enacting Creation itself136 through its conquest of nature and 
rendering it orderly: in creating and transforming the surroundings around him, man works within and 
extends the tradition of genesis. On the other hand, idleness was seen as the ‘enemy of the soul’ as it 
violated the injunction to save and build for tomorrow.137  
 The Indian, as has been stated, was guilty of the sin of wasting his life through lack of 
dedication to productive labour.138 His unproductive, energy-consuming labour fixed itself nowhere and 
therefore disappeared ‘the “instant” it is performed.’139 Productive labour, on the other hand, such as that 
lovingly pursued by the aforementioned monastic orders, fixed itself in the land. In other words, 
industrious labour directly resulted in the fixity of the land, in its cultivation, the directing of its fertility 
towards productive ends. As we have already stated in the case of Albertus, the clearing of the land and 
earth of their mysteries was the fundamental basis of a perfect, well-ordered community. 
The inconstant Indian, however, simply could not exercise fixity over the land. The re-
enactment of Creation could only be achieved through productive work which re-established fixity and 
order over land on an unending basis. To nullify the native’s perception, which granted him vision of the 
world’s continual birth, the inverse perspective that envisaged continual fixity of the land had to be 
planted within him. This attempt to ‘cure’ the Indian of his idleness had initially manifested itself in the 
colonial policy of adopting the encomienda system. However, this was later shelved due to the pressure 
exerted by the Dominicans; they decried its brutality in accentuating the death toll of the indigenous 
population.  
 By way of replacement, a number of Dominican priests pressed for colonial policy to be 
redirected towards educating the natives, over and above their enslavement. Both work and education, 
after all, could pursue the same goal, although through different means. This would be to introduce order 
into the Indian’s perception of reality. Education would impress upon his psyche an orientation that 
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would make the Spanish world familiar to him. His ways could then be improved by introducing to them 
a sense of realism. Hence, those Dominicans who held a more Augustinian position were generally more 
optimistic about the Indians’ capacities if they could just be encouraged to learn.140 Reputable theologians 
such as Alfonso de Castro and Las Casas instructed the Crown to go down the path of education against 
the colonist arguments that the inconstant Indian was beyond salvation.141 Las Casas took the lead in 
pushing for the native to be inducted in literacy prior to baptism, so that he would know something of 
Spanish and Christian norms before he chose to commit himself.142 The Spanish Crown’s response was to 
direct Las Casas’ pleas to Francisco de Vitoria, who was empowered to preside in judgement. Vitoria and 
Las Casas’ views on the education of the Indian were one and the same, and thus colonial policy was 
recalibrated accordingly. The former’s judgement sat comfortably with the Crown, which wished to 
distance itself from the colonists’ misdeeds. Above all, the Spanish monarchy wanted to convey that the 
official policy was the salvation of souls, in order to maintain the Pope’s consent for the conquest (for if 
the moral justification of conquest was lost, the Pope could always transfer his allegiance to the other 
Christian kingdoms in contention, such as Portugal).143   
The mainstream perspective thus shifted away from the colonists’ positions, to the opinion that 
the Indian could be liberated from his foibles, and his capacities optimised through schooling. This would 
give him a surer footing in his admittance to Christendom and the Spanish world. If he could be cured of 
his savagery, he would merely be a representative of a world that had been lost,144 of impressions 
rendered inaccessible. Inevitably, paradise is always a paradise lost.  
Chapter Four: Ius Gentium, Ius Civile and Anthropos–
Humanitas  
The legality of the Spanish conquests proved to be of a supremely contentious nature, and drew within its 
net an array of vested interests including lawyers, bureaucrats, theologians and scholastic philosophers.145 
Francisco de Vitoria, a leading representative of the latter at Salamanca, was one of the most outspoken 
in condemning the manner in which the conquests were conducted.146 Many of the administrators of the 
Spanish state ruminated over the conquests within the narrow, legalistic sphere of jurisdiction; this ran 
counter to the more wide-ranging arguments advanced by scholastic theologians such as Vitoria.147 The 
Crown lawyers seemed to be missing a critical point, as purely legalistic arguments were blind to the 
ethical dimension of the affair of the Indies. The conquests threw up spiritual and moral issues that 
deserved to be confronted theoretically; they could not be seen to be of solely legalistic concern. In short, 
the Spanish administrators’ adherence to a technical understanding of positive law failed to acknowledge 
any of the crucial normative/ethical components of legality.148 Consistent with his ethical spirit, Vitoria’s 
critique of the colonists’ massacres was meant as a reassertion of the Crown’s ostensible policy to save 
souls, as opposed to that of laying waste to Indian communities. If the Crown’s intentions were in 
earnest, it would surely champion the view of ‘bringing eternal life, not temporal death’.149 After all, the 
salvation and ‘joyful tidings’150 that the missionaries saw as their duty to bring to indigenous societies 
had nothing to do with the colonists’ actions.  
Vitoria’s anger at the colonists’ activities was for the most part an expression of profound 
disagreement over the place occupied by the Indian in mankind. In his exploration of the Indian Question, 
the issue of understanding the native’s personality was as much a theorisation of what constituted 
humanity’s common qualities. The Crown lawyers’ justifications failed to engage on an intellectual level 
with this problem. In the absence of history and antiquity to properly explain the Indian, Vitoria agreed 
that the onus was on law to describe the framework within which the native could be placed. However, 
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the task of law was not simply to justify conquests on technical grounds, but to consider judiciously the 
rights attributable to the Indian, such as his right of dominium or self-governance.151  
With this abiding concern over the rights properly held by the Indian in mind, Vitoria worked 
through the legal traditions of the Roman ius gentium and ius civile, as well as medieval canon law. In 
these traditions, the pagan or infidel’s rights were upheld as part of the universal and affirmative category 
of Humanitas. The basis of this jurisprudence was the ontological notion of ‘others-as-ourselves’.152 Man 
was posited as a unity very much in line with theological orthodoxy, expressed by the maxim ‘all 
mankind is one’. All men were therefore worthy of ethical consideration and legal rights, derived from a 
common point of origin or provenance, descent or genesis from the primary cause. All men had souls, 
which were capable of being saved, as some notion of their common creator lay latent within them. To 
paraphrase Las Casas, no nation existed which did not at the very least have an obscured understanding 
of God, and no capacity was so limited as to render the worship of Him an impossibility.153  
Mankind could not but be reaffirmed as a unified category on the basis of a shared capacity or 
potential to act ethically. The Indian became the mirror image of the Spaniard in this regard. Here, the 
ethical view of inclusion of the other in a common jurisprudence is juxtaposed with the exclusionary 
violence of the colonist and the legal obstructionism of the Crown lawyers. For Vitoria, to re-emphasise 
the solidity of mankind as a universal ontological category would be a partial antidote to the blind 
slaughter meted out by the colonists. The colonists’ failings were therefore chiefly attributed to the 
inability to recognise the native as sharing in the same ontological character. Therefore, any cynical 
attitude towards the potential of the Indian to be saved needed to be challenged. After all, Vitoria was of 
the opinion that the native’s place was firmly within Humanitas. 
 
Antony Anghie in ‘Francesco De Vitoria and The Colonial Origins of International Law’ provides a 
seminal outline of how the eponymous theologian-jurist constructed his legal system.154 It is this outline 
we shall follow and elaborate upon in the course of the next three sections. By way of a quick sketch to 
commence, it is possible to consider Vitoria’s legal system as made up of the following moments:  
 
(1) Vitoria posits his legal system as a ‘completed’ totality – this is achieved through the adoption of the 
doctrine of jus or ius gentium155 (the law of nations or peoples). Ius gentium incorporates both the 
Spaniard and the Indian within a common framework. The Indian is now recognised within a global 
legality. (2) The projection of a difference between the Indian and the Spanish is imputed to contrasting 
cultures. The Indian’s cultural practices are now conceived of as being at variance with the universal 
norms or standards the Spaniard realises. (3) The difference, or as Anghie puts it, ‘the gap internalised’, is 
internal to the self-same system of ius gentium. (4) The Indian is judged to be of potential perfection, 
which can only be attained through the adoption of Spanish practices. Ius gentium thus also incorporates 
ius inter gentium – the law between people or nations, or a set of proto-international rules and 
relations.156 In addition, and quite significantly, Vitoria also draws upon ius civile (Roman civil law) 
when justifying the asymmetrical nature of the relationship between the Spanish and Amerindian nations. 
The guardianship of minors and its associated mandate (mandata) is of especial relevance here. This, in 
essence, acts as a final justification for colonialism and will survive (as the institution of the mandate) in 
the reconstruction of the legal system after World War II.  
 
Let us turn to the doctrine of ius gentium. Vitoria adopts and adapts the doctrine from old Roman law.157 
It can be interpreted as that law which ‘natural reason has established among all nations.’158 The 
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proposition that ‘natural reason’, as defined by the Romans, was necessary for the establishment of law in 
all nations arose from the outcome of a pragmatic process, constituted by two stages.  
Firstly, since the Romans found themselves governing diverse nations, a body of law had to be 
constructed in order to fit them all. Ius gentium was an answer to the practical problem of how to contain 
and unify a multiplicity of people under one rule.159 The doctrine was driven by the need to bind the 
imperium, in its entirety, to a legalistic totality. The first stage required administrators of imperium to 
index all the possible laws, customs and practices existent in those nations under Roman dominion. In 
reality, this meant sorting and sifting through the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ laws, so as to judge which would befit 
the whole. Sorting through the laws of nations would eventually result in the compilation of a single, 
unified corpus of common law. The aggregated matrix of law would have the integrative power to bind 
societies together to a common order, submitting them to the set standards of the whole – of imperium.160 
The power of ius gentium would emanate from its universal validity; Roman judges and administrators 
would be able to draw upon it in the adjudication of difficult cases.161 This first stage therefore results in 
an enclosed legal totality, founded upon a common and familiar point of reference.   
 Secondly, the Romans’ pragmatic interest in governing imperium through a common law begat 
an ontological foundation. The practice of compiling laws led administrators to the view that common 
law was rooted in a common experience. Ius gentium is thus the outcome of the reduction and distillation 
of diverse experiences into common law; there can be no ‘beyond’ of this common experience. Put 
otherwise, the bounded legal totality of ius gentium invalidates any mode of experience outside of its 
scope. The constitution of ius gentium, itself, was said to be a process that engaged the ‘active exercise’ 
of man’s ‘reasoning faculty’.162 The construction of the doctrine as a totality took place via inductive 
reasoning, which manufactured the general from the multiplicity of cases. Hence, the resulting 
composited law could be recognised and acknowledged by diverse nations as they perceived it to be 
acceptable, buttressed, as it was, in their very own experiences. Ius gentium contained, in a sense, the 
quintessence of their laws. Evidently, the doctrine derived its validity and force through the universality 
that it bequeathed,163 sought by Vitoria as the basis for his jurisprudence. The universality of ius gentium, 
alongside its bounded totality, meant the effective dissolution of normative boundaries between nations 
within the imperium. This was the ‘interiority’ of imperium, built through the grounding of contained, 
self-same experience.  
The universality inherent to ius gentium had a further implication – one that was able to exercise 
an influence over medieval canon law. Despite the fact that the doctrine was developed within the 
confines of imperium, its validity could be projected and applied to those beyond its frontiers. It thus 
became a method by which to regulate relations between those within the imperium, and those without; it 
came to include all nations within its purview. In fact, it became the baseline rationality or minimum 
threshold of reason that nations or people needed to attain in order to qualify them for inclusion within 
the system of universal law. Meeting the baseline of ius gentium indicated that a nation lacked the 
ignorance to misunderstand the explicit rationality of common law, and was, thence, perforce subject to 
it. Under old Roman law, all nations met the minimum requirements needed to be subject to the laws of 
empire. This meant that ius gentium applied to, and bound, (captured) barbarians or non-Romans 
(Germanic or otherwise) to the universally valid laws of the Roman imperium.164 The barbarian or 
‘stranger’ was subjected to these laws, despite no immediate eligibility for Roman citizenship (prior to it 
being granted to all within the imperium in 212 AD). Citizenship was an honour limited to Romans and 
the privileged few who demonstrated, over many years, the requisite loyalty and devotion to the Empire. 
For non-Romans or barbarians, Roman citizenship acted as a disciplinary/ control mechanism; a way to 
pacify nations and compel them to conform to the normativity of the imperium, in return for a possible 
uprating in status and standing. After all, Romans conceived of Empire as an exchange (mandatum), in 
which the Roman lifestyle or civitas was extended to the orbis terranum. That is to say, citizenship would 
be granted to barbarians in exchange for the obligations incurred to observe the laws of imperium.165 In 
                                                            
159 Adams, p. 128 
160 Ibid., p. 128 
161 Ibid., p. 128 
162 Ibid., p. 136 
163 Ibid., p. 137 
164 Itself derived from Koinos nomos, the common law of humanity as conceptualised by the ancient Greeks, see 
Pagden (2000), p. 4 
165 Pagden (1982), p. 8 
 
 
112 
this respect, it can be said that ‘Imperial Rome offered a model and a means to conceptualise imperial 
relations’166 – a model that acted as the foundation from which Vitoria articulated his own jurisprudence.  
In addition to ius gentium, the Roman imperial model leaned heavily upon ius civile (civil law) 
in legally establishing relations with the non-Roman, something Vitoria overtly refers to in the context of 
natural law.167 ‘Private law’, specifically family law, is particularly to the purpose here, as it illustrates 
the type of structural dynamic the barbarian was dragged into. Within the terms of the Roman family, the 
Emperor can be said to have taken on the social role of the paterfamilias168 (head of the household) in 
relation to his non-Roman subjects. As such, he holds a potestas169 (legally sanctioned power) over these 
subjects in the same way as a pater over his son in the Roman familia. Most appropriately, here, Vitoria’s 
interpretation of potestas directly links it, within his own context, to the Royal power of the Spanish 
Crown.170 Through an analysis of the Roman familia, we can discern that its structural dynamic mirrors 
that of ius gentium, in the sense that its force and power is derived from it being a unified, and therefore 
legally bound entity. So, for instance, a mother171 with illegitimate children, i.e. born outside of the 
marriage relation, was not acknowledged to be a part of the legal sanctity of the familia, the stable 
nuclear family, and could therefore exercise no potestas.172 Likewise, illegitimate children were 
themselves deemed outside the power of potestas. However, one method in which these children, and 
more generally ‘minors’,173 could be brought under potestas was to assign them a legal guardian. So, in 
terms of imperial relations, the Emperor could be said to ‘adopt’ the minoritarian barbarian in order to 
integrate him within the proper legal structure and relationships of the familia (i.e. imperium or 
commonwealth). Through his method, the minor or barbarian could benefit from the legal protection the 
familia afforded.174 Furthermore, the guardian/emperor acted in an administrative capacity in managing 
the minor’s inheritance and financial transactions, (as the child or minor could not be said to ‘utter’175 so 
as to conduct them himself) up until such a point in time at which the latter was acknowledged to have 
reached maturity. The minor or son’s ‘promise’ of inheritance was held for him within the familia – the 
only institution that could legally authorise such rights.176 The guardian can be said to have taken on the 
role of a virtual, or model, paterfamilias. His relationship to the minor principally consisted of tutelage in 
the management of property, and can be more widely conceived of as an exchange (mandatum) in which 
the minor benefited from legal protection (or welfare) in return for ceding temporary control over his 
‘estate’. Thus, inheritance becomes a future ‘promise’ subject to appraisal.177  
 Vitoria saw the Indian in a similar vein to how the Romans perceived the non-Roman – through 
the lens of the legal doctrines of ius civile and ius gentium. Firstly, the minoritarian Indian was bound, 
and bounded, by ius gentium. He was deemed to possess sufficient reason to ascertain the rules that were 
the product of a common framework of law.178 This position was further reinforced by ius civile: the son 
or minor was deemed capable of possessing dominion (future control of the estate) due to his potentiality 
for reason. In this way, Spaniard and Indian could be said to share the same ontological character.179 In 
sharing the same manner of being, they could be folded back into the same enclosed world, or totality – 
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familia, imperium or commonwealth.180 In the pater’s ability, embodied in potestas, to capture minors 
and bind them to the familia, a structural legal relation was generated, in the same way in which Vitoria’s 
jurisprudence irrevocably linked the Spaniard with the Indian within the same legal order. This legal 
order was a ‘notional international community’, or what Vitoria named the ‘commonwealth’.181 Ius civile 
formed the base of the relations within the commonwealth, as Vitoria conceded that indigenous lands 
could be held in tutelage, and moreover Castile could assume temporary control of property and goods 
until the Indian personality reached maturity.182 In the encounter with the Indian, the Roman model of the 
protectorate and mandate came to the fore, as colonial institutions and relations, sourced from ius civile, 
proliferated.  
 
As Vitoria would have been well aware, any legal doctrine grounded upon, in effect, the ontological 
equivalence between Indian and Spaniard could only be a direct assault on the colonist’s ideology. The 
colonist judged the Indian to be a part of the un-ordered and un-orderable, and hence irremediably foreign 
to the Spanish world or order. In this sense, the colonist subscribed to the exclusionary Anthropo-centric 
definition of mankind.183 The colonist prejudices outlined in previous sections neatly conform to this 
definition. In light of this, let us then turn our attention towards analysing the various aspects of the 
colonist’s perception of the Indian.  
The Greek term ‘Anthropos’ ‘literally means ‘looking upwards’.184 It signifies a category of 
mankind that boldly looks up to the ‘ethereal heights’.185 The imagery of fixing one’s gaze on what lies 
beyond symbolises mankind’s unique orientation towards a destination of ‘some preordained future’.186 
Man can be thought of as a particularly uncommon being in his ability to hold back his perception of the 
present so as to enable himself to envisage what is yet to come. This future-orientation implies an ability 
to take hold of a unique destiny, which is inseparable from the exercise of rationality and moral 
judgement.187 Furthermore, these capacities are closely associated with perception – the perception of 
‘what is in sight in the surrounding world’.188 This conceptual proximity of perception and rationality can 
be, here, imputed to the possessive power of discourse. The linking of the ability to perceive the world 
with the ability to articulate what is seen attests to the salience of discursive rationality. The hallmark of 
discursive rationality, the ability to withhold the present in order to conjure up images of a potential 
future, properly distinguishes Anthropos.   
As such, Anthropos not only delineates what it means to be part of mankind, but also 
distinctions within the species.189 It therefore defines what it means to be ‘other’. The other, rather than 
an ontological entity, exists solely as a discursive invention.190 Walter Mignolo explains it in this fashion:  
Who invented the other if not in the process of constructing the same? Such invention is the outcome of enunciation. 
The enunciation doesn’t name an existing entity but invents it. The enunciation needs an enunciator (agent), an 
institution, for not everyone can invent the anthropos but to impose the anthropos as the other in the collective 
imaginary it is necessary to be in a position to manage the discourse (verbal, visual, sound) by which you name and 
describe an entity (anthropos or other) and succeed in making believe that it exists.191   
The invented other, for the Ancient Greeks, was embodied in the figure of the barbarian. The term 
‘barbarian’, itself, denoted a mere ‘babbler, someone who could not speak Greek’.192 The ability to speak 
Greek, a veritable master discourse, was closely associated with the psychological or intellectual 
capacities. The ability to see, to comprehend the mysteries of the cosmos, and to name it through 
language, invents a privileged psychology that seems to take on ontological dimensions. By implication, 
the other is disclosed through language’s power to name and by extension possess what is sighted. This is 
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a political manoeuvre par excellence. What is re-affirmed, seemingly beyond contestation, is that the 
ability to speak and to reason can only be realised within the institutions of civil society, the polis, 
precluding the barbarian beyond its frontiers from membership of the Anthropos.  
 Anthropos is essential for the demarcation of the oikumene193; it reinforces the exclusivity of a 
thoroughly closed world (or totality) where it is solely ‘possible to be truly human’.194 The exclusion of 
the other, in addition, reinforces ‘self-inclusion’; it consolidates the closure of a world through re-
asserting the validity of the joint/collective normative actions therein.195 This emphasises Anthropos as a 
purely exceptional category of mankind, which makes distinctions within the species only through this 
method of discursive invention. Invention, here, connotes both self-possession (i.e. defining oneself 
through language and rationality) and the potential to possess others (as man’s invention) as well as the 
natural world.  
Let us now return, in order to apply this analysis, to the colonist’s commentary on the Indian. 
For the colonist, the Indian-other was invented discursively as a stranger to order, as a sort of ‘monster’. 
We should recall that the colonist expected to meet with all manner of ‘mythical beings’ in the strange 
lands of the Americas – ‘dog-faced’ men and such like. In the encounter, the colonist came across a being 
defying definitive classification; the native seemed to fall between stools. He seemed to signify the free 
reign of the animal within man, and yet his outward manifestation was pure man. In many ways then, he 
lived up to expectations by giving corporeal form to mythical figures that were terrifying precisely 
because they were at heart unknowable and un-orderable; they fundamentally resisted any common point 
of reference. This mode of thought can be considered a result of the colonist, in an attempt to take hold of 
the Indian via the faculty of the understanding, conceptually abstracting the Indian from the organic 
whole of his world or environment. To attempt to comprehend the Indian by divorcing him from the 
given, the realm of the un-ordered, would be tantamount to re-conceptualising him as a partial object in 
the colonist’s method of understanding.196   
Due to the other’s resistance to appearing in a directly representable form, whether through not 
actually existing at all or existing in such a way as to forestall description, Anthropos reacts through 
functioning as a sort of self-defence or anticipatory mechanism. We can discern this in the solely negative 
terms used to describe those who can only be indirectly represented. As the Indian chose not to reveal 
himself, the Spaniard was thus forced into the management of this otherness through discourse. The 
native’s relation with the realm of the un-ordered, the source of his obscurity, needed to be regulated at 
all costs. Thus the attempt to possess him discursively can be understood as a method of trying to 
suppress his mode of being and sensing, in the absence of any recognisable, directly representable 
subject. At this point, we should be reminded of the Indian’s sensuous excess, the impressions through 
which he experienced his indeterminate world. To put it simply, he stood in excess of the Spanish world 
(stranger-as-otherness). If his link to the un-ordered could not be cut off in actuality, all that was left to 
do was to disqualify him from Spanish order altogether. The native would have to invariably constitute 
the outside or exteriority of the ordered world. Thence, to invent the Indian as other was to place him 
beyond the confines of both a conceptual and a legal/normative order. 
With Anthropos, as we have noted, there is an over-developed ‘self-inclusionary’ aspect. Notice, 
for example, that the colonist (through a discursive function) depicts the Indian personality as incomplete 
or partial. In contrast, the invention of the other allows the colonist to posit himself as in receipt of a 
complete personality. Through this means, the colonist can obfuscate his own ‘constitutive finitude’197 by 
projecting it onto the native. To put it another way, to externalise the Indian as the stranger is to conceal 
and delimit the force of the ‘stranger within’ – that which is incubated within the very being of the 
colonist himself. To possess the other discursively is also to possess oneself, to determine oneself in such 
a way as to displace one’s own finitude. To invent the other as partial is to invent the self as total – as a 
form that will endure. However, any subject that finds it necessary to reassure itself of its own perfection 
by excluding the other cannot be enunciating this position from the viewpoint of totality. It is, of course, 
the very fact of the colonist’s partial nature that drives him to attempt to en-close the Spanish world, so as 
to disqualify the incomplete Indian. It would seem that the finitude which haunts the colonist’s Anthropo-
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centric approach, bereft of the cosmological refuge in the eternity of the universe proclaimed by the 
pagans of antiquity, thus requires another category of mankind to salvage it.  
 
The Humanitas definition or category of mankind was favoured by theological orthodoxy in Spain, 
including by the Dominicans Vitoria and Las Casas. In the Roman ius gentium Vitoria found the 
intimation of an ontological point of origin (the shared experience underlying common law) for 
humankind. This underpinned his major contribution to Humanitas as a developing mode of 
categorisation concerned primarily with the legal rights of others. However, it was in the medieval period 
that the most significant development of the largely Christian concept of Humanitas took place. The 
universal Church’s doctrine of canon law, adopted in the thirteenth century by Pope Innocent IV, the 
former canon lawyer, can be considered a watershed moment for legalistic thinking on the rights of the 
non-Christian or infidel. In this period, Christian–infidel relations were recast, with the emphasis placed 
upon the inalienable rights proper to the infidel and pagan over dominion and property. Vitoria 
extensively drew upon this legal tradition in his critique of a popular strain of Anthropo-centric thinking 
based upon natural slavery. 
 Canon law’s exposition on the rights of the non-Christian was essentially an extension of moral 
concern to the other. It reinforced the ontological parity of all men, with the view that this meant the 
additional parity of legal rights. Pope Innocent IV’s thoughts on the universality of the Church led him to 
the position that the Christian and non-Christian enjoyed this ontological equivalence. From his 
viewpoint, it was the destiny of all men to give a fair hearing to the gospel and to eventually become full 
members of the Church. There were in actuality two groups of men – those who were Christian and those 
who were yet to be. It must, however, be borne in mind that all men constituted one group – that of the 
Lord’s ‘flock’, since Christianity sought to bring into the fold the entirety of mankind. In this sense, non-
Christians were members of the Church in potentiality if not in actuality. The infidel can be seen as 
marking the ‘outside’ of the Church’s membership, not existing within its bounds, but nonetheless still 
falling within the universal Church’s legal jurisdiction.198 The Church’s main concern, after all, was for 
the souls common to all of Humanitas.  
 The infidel or non-Christian can be said to fall into the Church’s jurisdiction by proxy of the 
ontological equivalence grounding Humanitas. So, what in actual fact qualifies the infidel for 
membership of Humanitas and the rights this entails? Innocent IV established the foundation of 
Humanitas in mankind’s common point of origin as the ‘descendants of Adam’. The genesis of man can 
be traced back to a beginning in which the ‘earth and its fullness’ are the sole dominion of the Lord. At 
this primordial point of legality, property and land are held in common as the earth in its undivided 
wholeness is bequeathed to mankind (comparable to the ‘sunshine which warms all men’).199 Property 
only comes into being through secular struggles between Adam’s descendants. It is the subsequent 
conflicts within mankind that make the necessity of property wholly apparent, as well as its associated 
demarcations of the land. The particularities of the distribution of property and land arise out of purely 
practical, secular considerations.200 Canon law, however, concerns itself principally with God’s love, 
which resonates with all men.201  
In the early, halcyon days of human development, men are distinguished by their liberty; slavery 
is thus non-existent. The freedom implicit in the rights of dominion and self-governance are derived from 
the common law based upon mankind’s common descent and consequently equal claim over the 
‘fullness’ of the earth (the argument is in essence a Christianised version of the Romans’ ius gentium). 
Logically, rights over land and self-determination can apply as much to the infidel as the adherent. As an 
inherent right of the infidel, it cannot lie within the Pope’s authority to intervene and deprive the non-
Christian of his dominion through the waging of war, simply due to the fact of his non-Christian status.202                     
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The argument of ‘all right and Lordship and property deriving from the Creator’203 attests to the 
constituting power of God. It is this constituting power which propels Humanitas as a category of 
mankind. Conversely, the natural slavery argument expounded by Sepúlveda inadvertently questions the 
power exercised by God. It is this line of attack that provides the thrust of Vitoria’s rebuttal of the 
argument. His reasoning leads him to point out that  
the incapacity we attribute to the Indians contradicts the bounty of the Creator, for it is certain that when a cause 
produces its effect so that it is unable to achieve its end, then there is some fault in the cause; and thus there must be 
some fault with God for having made men without sufficient capacity to receive the faith and save themselves.204  
The ‘bounty’ alluded to by Vitoria can be read as the extensive diversity or range (‘fullness’ of the earth) 
of creatures/beings that make up the de-limited world. The question posed to those advocates of natural 
slavery is: why would God will such creatures into existence in spite of the already existing diversity of 
non-human creatures available for mankind to exploit? Why should such a creature as the natural slave 
exist at all? If the Indian (which realised a properly human form) were to be this allegedly indeterminate 
entity, he would certainly constitute an anomalous case in an otherwise determinate world filled with 
creatures of a determinate nature. As Las Casas articulates it, the consequence of this proposition is that 
human nature, fully determined and provided for, has ‘gone astray in the most infinitesimal part of the 
human lineage’.205 Here Vitoria and Las Casas, who were one on the issue, echo the thirteenth- and 
fourteenth-century canon lawyers in their parallel arguments that the infidel could by no means be 
thought of as irrational.206   
 To reiterate, to give succour to the notion that the Indian had an anomalous nature, equivalent to 
that of the natural slave, would be to admit a completely unnecessary indeterminacy into the otherwise 
ordered world. To accept the Indian as a sort of ‘irrational barbarian’ could only threaten the perfection 
and overall rational plan of the universe.207 To concede this indeterminacy would allow an evasive 
creature, with no proper place in the universe, to subsist in its own hidden realm beyond or within the 
earth’s ‘fullness’ or bounty. No doubt, the answer to this quandary for those who subscribed to the 
Anthropos world-view would be to exclude the Indian to some ‘outside’ of the Spanish world. This 
would be to express the sentiment, ‘If the Indian is not a man, it should be of no concern to us.’ Those not 
like-minded would immediately discern that within the world of Humanitas, to accept the existence of the 
natural slave would be to permit a disavowed indeterminacy to exist within the very framework of man.    
Crucially, for Vitoria, the existence of the natural slave traces the indeterminacy of the Indian 
back to the Creator. To adopt Vitoria’s parlance here, the inadequacy of the effect (the Indian) runs 
backwards to snare the primal cause (God). The constituting power could only be much diminished in 
light of the Indian’s incompleteness. It would be to ascribe a disordered element, a ‘remainder’, to God; 
any disorder in the universe could only attest to the disorder of His plans in constituting the world – it 
would, so to speak, be a ‘frustration of his plan’.208 The natural slavery argument could be rationalised 
within a Greek or Aristotelian cosmology, where the harmony of all beings contributes to the self-
sustaining, eternal whole. However, within Christian theology the existence of the natural slave could 
only be to the detriment of the Creator. This was because the argument propounding the commonality of 
mankind’s nature derived its validity from the greatness of ‘God’s love’ for humanity.209 Evidently, the 
preservation of natural slavery within Christian theology would imply that God in creating man gave 
preferential affection to some over others. For Vitoria, since God’s love is not limited or randomly 
manifested in such a fashion, all of mankind could share in the common property of rationality that is His 
gift. Commonality of experience emanates from God’s power to provide the same constitutional nature to 
all men. Put differently, upholding the constituting capacity of God is to give credence to man as an 
ontologically unified species.   
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In rejecting natural slavery (and by implication the Anthropo-centric mode of mankind) Vitoria 
positions the ability to seek salvation as the main quality unifying mankind. This is a key plank of canon 
law. For Innocent IV, the salvaging of souls through the prospect of conversion justified the preaching of 
missionaries in infidel territories.210 While conversion could not by any means be accomplished through 
coercion, rational argument would suffice to persuade the infidel to seek the Lord. Canon law dictated 
that peaceful methods of preaching should be privileged, over and above military coercion (for example, 
by crusaders), on first entering infidel societies.211 A corollary of this is that no Christian nation could 
morally justify conquest solely on the basis of earthly reasons, whether financial, material or for the sake 
of raw power.212 The canonist Anchorano explains the absurdity of the view: if infidels could not possess 
dominion due to their lack of Christianity (or their lack of grace derived from this status), all manner of 
sinful acts became justified in order to convert them.213 The precepts of canon law stressed man’s 
constitutional openness to rational arguments; it was this that should be appealed to above all else. The 
construction of, and receptiveness to, rational argument is a hopeful affirmation of mankind’s capacities. 
Hence, conversion could only be a matter of a positive exercise of choice through will, not an imposition 
enforced through sheer terror. No man could be said to be beyond the pale of salvation, even if 
conversion was likely to be unsuccessful in the first instance.214 On the Indian’s part, his responsibility 
lay with being obliged to listen, followed by acquiescence with what he found reasonable.215 Thus, the 
common quality unifying mankind is the positive message that all men can potentially be saved due to 
the ‘persuasive probability’216 of reason. Salvation, as Vitoria elaborated, depends heavily upon a 
universal rationality.    
 The tenet to privilege the appeal to the other’s rationality over the use of brute force was utilised 
by Vitoria in assailing the colonists’ exclusionary violence against the Indian.217 What the native really 
wished for, in his ontological parity with the Spaniard, was entry into the Spanish world. Only within the 
normative framework of the Spanish world could he seek salvation and claim the place proper to him 
within Humanitas. It was within this normativity that the Indian as victim could be empowered and his 
rights fully respected. His path into this world would need to be smoothed out, so that he could be saved. 
Salvation itself can be considered as a modified form of Anthropos – the audacious gaze upwards is now 
re-directed to a future time, or a beyond in which space and time is finally annihilated. It is a form of 
future orientation that promises to annul the present suffering of the Indian in his victimhood, to help 
transcend his being. In such a manner Humanitas acts as a movement of inclusion – the empowerment 
and salvation of the other, in contradistinction to Anthropos’ movement of expelling or exiling. It marks 
the rejection of simply excluding or annihilating other worlds, in favour of a process of absorbing or 
assimilating them.  
In his initial analysis, Vitoria admits the Indian into his jurisprudence.218 In his use of ius 
gentium, he is able to capture the native, in his exteriority, and to bring him into the sphere of 
jurisprudence and legality. Ius gentium was ideally suited to play this capturing role, in its projection 
outwards of the legality compiled together within the imperium. Canon law can be seen as having been 
an extension of this, in its very own projection of the initial rights granted to the infidels within Europe 
outwards to include the entire non-Christian world.219 Both these elements of natural law emphasised the 
need to admit the other as simply an extension of the self (others-as-oneself). All peoples and nations are 
recognisable, being subject to the same legality and rights based upon a common experience and nature. 
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The suggestion is that indeterminacy can be expelled from the world, and order reinstated in a unified 
mankind. This is, of course, what salvation sought to do.  
In the absorption of the Indian’s exteriority, or the bringing in of the outside, the universal 
category of Humanitas is shored up over the partial Anthropos of antiquity. The Indian, in parity with the 
Spaniard, moves from the domain of the discursively constructed other, into the realm of ontology, and 
the legal recognition this entails. By being bound by ius gentium and the tenets of canon law (both 
contributing sources for natural law, here examined separately), he thus becomes a fundamental part in 
constructing Vitoria’s totality in which all men are bound by the rules of reason. Here it is possible to 
contrast the historically particular Indian of the encounter, with the universal Indian posited by Vitoria.220 
 
In spite of the fact that Vitoria dismissed natural slavery theory and seemingly invalidated the category of 
Anthropos, Humanitas cannot be seen as a category that completely supplants Anthropos. In actual fact, 
Humanitas is that which preserves Anthropos by providing it with an extra dimension of adaptability. If 
we think both categories together, it is possible to see Anthropos–Humanitas as two parts of Jan Nayar’s 
colonial ontology of totality–exteriority.221  
Anthropos can be considered the first moment of this system, in which the movement of 
exclusion constructs the other as well as the self. In the opposite direction, the movement of Humanitas 
includes the other within a legal and ontological totality. The inclusion of the other effectively constructs 
the totality, while consolidating the universal position of the (European) self.222 In other words, it is the 
inclusion of the excluded into a newly posited totality that completes, as opposed to denies, the colonial 
ontology and its ethics.223 Inclusion can be considered a ‘refinement for repairing partial totalities’.224 In 
other terms, the partial totality of Anthropos is repaired so it may reclaim its lost wholeness. Yet, this can 
only occur when it is superseded by the relational ethics of Humanitas. Relational ethics puts the 
emphasis emphatically on a responsibility to the suffering other, the innocent victim subject to the 
detrimental nature of their social location. In terms of the Indian, this is his relation to the given, which 
threatens to subsume him. Thus, the issue was seen to lie not with the native’s nature, his latent human 
capacities (as has been discussed), but with his continuing relation with the given, of which he was a 
victim. Vitoria himself stated that inclusion had its basis in the Spaniard’s ethical, brotherly duty to help 
correct the barbarian’s behaviour, so that he could be rendered fit for salvation and conform to the 
normativity of the Spanish world. With the Spaniard’s aid, the native could move from potential to actual 
salvation. If the Spaniard did not fulfil his duties to the Indian effectively, then it was foreseeable he 
would continue to exist in a state beyond salvation.225  
The salvation of the Indian was a pivotal method by which totality could be repaired. Totality, or 
the view of the world as one universe from a particular position or location226 of the dominus mundi,227 
can only be thought when the discursive other (the barbarian or ‘Cyclops’ of Greek legend) is rendered 
ontological, i.e. when he becomes an ethical being carrying the potential to shore up universal 
normativity. The non-Christian as a Christian in potentiality takes on this role for Humanitas. Anthropos 
is still relevant here, in that its primary operation is the discursive creation of the self and the other via a 
political manoeuvre. This is rekindled in Humanitas with the positing of a pre-political (ontological) 
origin for mankind as a whole or unified species.228 In effect, the exposed political moment of Anthropos 
is projected back to a supposedly incontestable time of constitution, dated back to mankind’s common 
genesis or descent.  
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Despite Humanitas’ effectiveness in concealing the partiality of the other through gifting it a 
new ontological fullness, the whole method of operation can still be considered a response (similar to 
Anthropos in this regard) to the contingency emanating from the event of the encounter. Humanitas 
manages and utilises the event for its own purposes, in order to re-construct the firm grounding which 
Anthropos leaves exposed in its failure to completely conceal the traces of contingency. Thus, the event 
is more fully hidden through the promise of not just the re-assertion of an already existing universal 
rationality, but the positing of potential salvation as the unifying quality between worlds – or at least the 
promise to bridge worlds by filling in any fissures (or fault-lines) that may lie in between. What we see 
here is that the empirical indeterminacy that marked the encounter is subject to the universalising 
language of Humanitas, which ‘hegemonizes and totalises, erases eventness, denies rupture and surpasses 
the world’.229  
As the colonist was to find out, the event which marked the discovery of the Amerindian world, 
or the ‘New World’, could only attest to the contingent nature of the Spanish/European world. Initially, 
this could be countered by reaching out beyond the divide, but only through discursive invention and 
possession. This supremely political manoeuvre, borne out of the need to manage the event, and still 
retaining its traces, is only concealed afresh and more comprehensively through Humanitas’ promise to 
‘reawaken’ being. This involves the inclusion of the other into a seemingly depoliticised category, devoid 
of any grounding in the indeterminacy of experience.230 The major operation of Humanitas is to 
effectively displace Anthropos’ conceptual commitment to an exclusive rationality and normativity. 
Humanitas reconstructs itself through the event (or moment) by the extension of normative boundaries 
and the displacement of exteriority. The historical contingency that defined the Age of Discovery, a time 
of rupture in classical, antiquated thought, required the positing of this new universality of Humanitas.  
The colonial ontology of totality–exteriority is thus built around the divisions and movements 
between inclusion/exclusion (Anthropos/Humanitas, expulsion/inclusion; suffering/hope) and being and 
non-being (subject to totality).231 To render explicable the term ‘non-being’ we can point to those things 
which lack ontological parity with the self in Anthropos – namely, the discursively constructed other. 
Non-being is that which is unrecognisable as it is still in the process of seeking a definable form, which 
will allow it access to the realm of being (and recognition). It can be said to subsist on the level of 
‘hauntology’,232 as a spectral form, which nevertheless exists though its mission to (re-)discover its truly 
human manifestation. Humanitas’ solution to non-being is to capture it through a philosophy of hope that 
‘in the name of the Other’s becoming out of exteriority, affirms the sovereignty of the Self’s Being in 
Totality.’233 Rather than enforcing a rigid fencing off between being and non-being, non-being (existing 
in the imagination and through discourse) is promised the chance to enter the realm of being (the Spanish 
world), affirming the totalising nature of being within Humanitas. The ability of being to determine itself, 
paradoxically, is only available to those who have already accepted the terms of the Humanitas definition 
of mankind.  
With respect to the above, the Indian’s status seems to be that which lies upon the boundary, 
between the realms of being and non-being. On this threshold, there is the possibility and hope of finding 
being (again), of finding redemption in being subsumed within its abstract universality, or the anxiety of 
falling back into the frightful, inhuman domain of non-being, represented by Anthropos in its singularity 
(i.e. shorn of the reconstituted totality of Anthropos–Humanitas). To be on this threshold is to properly be 
within the confines of Humanitas and being, yet with the really existing threat of falling back into non-
being. With this in mind, we can understand Vitoria’s view that the Indians existed in an in-between 
state; they were not yet Christians, but neither were they unbelievers, as they had not had the chance to 
hear the Word.234 The Indian’s nominal rationality could be engaged through the Word, yet it was still a 
concrete possibility that he could reject his ‘true self’. In which case, despite the Indian’s universality, 
Vitoria never seems to quite dispel the Anthropo-centric paradigm from his thinking. This is partly due to 
the important disciplinary role that it plays in his jurisprudence. The Indian, after all, could be part of 
Humanitas yet refuse to uphold the standards that it implies. He could still fail to live up to the normative 
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standards of the Spanish world by choosing to wallow in the immersion of the given. Here, we reach 
another sort of threshold, this time within Vitoria’s thought. Up till now, it is only the containment of the 
initial upheavals of indeterminacy released by the encounter that has been theorised. As to that, the 
construction of Anthropos–Humanitas meant that ‘totality…is little affected’ and could in fact be secured 
despite the event.235  
Chapter Five: The Standard of Civilisation: Recognition and 
Cultural Difference  
 
In bringing the Indian into Humanitas and his system of law, Vitoria ends up squeezing him through the 
prism of recognition and difference. We have stated that the Indian is ‘re-cognised’; he is ‘re-presented’ 
within a system that nominally accepts his cognitive abilities. Vitoria is then able to confirm the 
recognition of the ontological, abstracted Indian as part and parcel of Humanitas. However, recognising 
the concrete Indian as an inhabitant of a society and culture (in actuality) was far more problematic. This 
was an outcome of the prescriptive nature of ius gentium, which bound the native to a universal 
framework of normativity. His legal recognition within this regulatory system required his conformity to 
the normative standards that act as a condition of membership. Hence, the Indian’s ontological 
equivalence is the basis on which he is subjected to this standard. And, indeed, while there was no 
doubting his capacity for rationality, the issue lay with the practice of such capacity. The latter would 
depend on the conditions of indigenous society, and whether they in fact aided or hindered his social 
practices.    
In part due to this implicit normative standard, it became imperative to explain the vast cultural 
difference between the Spaniard and the Indian. Here, there seemed to be a perceived variance between 
the ‘ontologically universal Indian’ of Humanitas and the ‘socially, historically particular’ Indian of 
culture and society.236 The Indian seemed to be ‘schizophrenic’ in that he was both ‘like and unlike 
himself’.237 In his standing as a universal being, he was bound by universal values. These values seem to 
have been the externalisation of the Spaniard’s cultural identity, in the same way in which the ius 
gentium of the imperium acted as a method to externalise the Roman identity. Correspondingly, the 
Indian is said to internalise the identity of the Spaniard, as it supposedly represents his ‘authentic’ or 
‘ideal identity’.238 In other words, the Spaniard represented the Indian’s maximum potential – his ‘ideal’. 
In order to achieve this, the implication was that the native would have to reach the standard of 
normativity set by the Spaniard’s culture, in the concrete context and social praxis of his society. 
Therefore, if the native failed to live up to this standard, to his ideal, he was conceivably a victim of the 
inadequacies or imperfections of his culture and society.239 
 
It is important to put this theoretical turn of events into context. If we recall, Vitoria has just denied the 
veracity of Aristotle’s natural slavery theory, thus precluding the notion that there is anything 
psychologically or inherently the matter with the Indian. However, in casting off natural slavery, Vitoria 
did not sever links with Aristotle’s wider psychological framework.240 As a matter of fact, he took the 
opportunity to re-establish the importance of place for theories justifying Spanish imperialism. So then, if 
the Indian was not a slave due to his nature,241 he must certainly be a victim of his place or geographical 
and social location. Pagden sees this as an introduction of the Aristotelian ethismos into Vitoria’s 
thinking. Ethismos concerns the ‘training by the community of the individual mind to perceive things as 
right and natural, and reject others as wrong and unnatural’.242 The issue now shifts from the Indian’s 
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mind to his environment.243 The fault seemed to lie with the Indian’s education and upbringing – with 
those fundamental social institutions that can be said to underpin society.244  
In coming to this conclusion, Vitoria, inspired by ius civile, made the transition from common 
thinking around natural slavery to a new orthodoxy that saw the natives as more akin to children. It was 
certainly a widespread belief that if they were not irrational, they could conceivably be ‘close to mad’.245 
Vitoria was in actual fact equivocal on the state of the Indian’s wit; although he refrained from making 
any definitive statements on the matter, he was far from a position of ruling out the native’s lunacy.246  
Nonetheless, Vitoria does cite a common analogy of the time likening the Indians to ‘children 
abandoned in a forest’. If, indeed, the native’s condition was tantamount to that of forsaken children, the 
onus and obligation lay on the Spaniard to treat them accordingly, i.e. in a charitable manner.247 So it 
would seem that the native was brought into Humanitas at the lowest possible level psychologically, as a 
mere child.248 It is possible to discern elements of Aristotle’s psychological thoughts in this argument. 
These can be seen, most specifically, in the idea that the child’s ontological state is one of becoming.249 
The child is in a stage of development in which everything is still at stake, one in which potentiality is 
still far from reaching the proper state of actualisation. In this interpretation of becoming, it is understood 
to be a formative stage of being as opposed to a separate ontological category. It is the developmental 
form of being, a preliminary time in which reserves of potentiality are built up or accumulated. At the 
level of the child, the capacities are initially honed, nurtured and forged. Becoming is essentially a 
temporary stage in which the capacities are mutable, receptive enough to be easily shaped, and readily 
primed so as to place the child on the path towards the end point of being. The juvenile condition of the 
Indian – his becoming – required the Spaniard to care for him as an adopted father. In addition, he would 
have to construct the social conditions conducive to the native achieving his full potential – something 
that curiously coincides with the dissolution of the latter’s own unique identity. Here, Vitoria’s tentative 
assessment of the Indian’s condition is consistent with the doctrines of ius gentium and ius civile. The 
former’s force derives from the extension of rationality to all, yet only ever seems to be fully realised in a 
few.250 
In the foregoing argument, Vitoria located the biggest block to the Indian achieving his full 
potential in his culture, his ethismos. It was his imperfect culture that made him ‘unsuited for setting up a 
legitimate polity’.251 Damning judgements on the inadequacies of the native’s culture were deduced from 
its supposed inability to stand up to scrutiny when compared with the developed state and culture of the 
Spaniard. In terms of Vitoria’s system, its regulatory norms can be seen to incorporate what legal theorist 
Brett Bowden calls the ‘Standard of Civilisation’.252 This is ‘the tacit and explicit assumptions that form 
criteria for any given civilisation to identify who belongs to their society and who does not’.253 Nations 
that reach the standard are considered those that are ‘able to show the marks of the state’.254 It was with 
this standard in mind, embedded in the regulatory principle of ius gentium, that Indian societies were 
liable to be judged. For society to show demonstrably the ‘marks’ of the state would also be a 
prerequisite for possessing sovereignty, which was the preserve of the ‘civilised’ nations.  
Conversely, the defining point of Indian culture was that it bore a number of human 
impedimenta255 needing to be overcome in order for it to be granted the same sovereign status as the 
Spaniard’s. Amongst the list of impedimenta were included: the inadequate condition of the magistrates, 
the primitive means of agriculture, and, inter alia, the lack of refined ‘arts, crafts and letters’.256 More 
generally speaking, ‘absence of law’ and ‘enslavement in custom and tradition’ were commonly seen as a 
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‘hallmark of indigenous/“primitive societies”’.257 In contrast to the Indian state of affairs, Vitoria 
considered civilised and ordered societies to be firmly grounded upon the organising principle of the 
common good. Through decision-making processes that appealed to the common good, the majoritarian 
nature of a law and order working for the welfare (economic interests, property, rights, etc.) of all citizens 
was effectively articulated.258 This was the distinctive feature of Vitoria’s organising principle, only to be 
realised where a recognisable legal framework conforming to the standard was in place. It was, after all, 
the civil code that ensured order and distinction of land and property,259 the absence of which foreclosed 
the possibility of recognisable sovereignty. Indeed, this understanding of sovereignty had its foundation 
in the state’s monopoly on the means of force, necessary to enforce the rights of property through 
divisions and demarcations of the land. To put it another way: ‘law and land’, or the control of law over 
land, was a definitive feature of sovereignty.260  
As we have stated, it was only the developed political state that could exercise sovereignty, of 
which the exemplar was the ordered Spanish state. In contradistinction, the level of development of 
Amerindian society did not seem to be particularly far advanced (although Vitoria repudiates the 
suggestion that indigenous society constituted a pure state of nature). As such, descent into the menaces 
of disorder and anarchy were a constant and very real threat. It is an insinuation that runs through the 
dialogue of Spanish and Portuguese colonists in the common motif of the vengeful Indian thirsting 
mightily for blood in inter-tribal warfare.261 With constant, ‘brutish’ civil strife à la Hobbes, the organised 
political or municipal262 life of human civil groups263 was far from being on the cards; the fact that the 
social forms of civil life existed in Indian societies said nothing about their quality.264 In short, Vitoria’s 
evaluation of Indian society seemed to lend itself to the notion that indigenous social structures just did 
not allow for the transgression of savagery.265 
 
The impedimenta could not demonstrate the Indian’s lack of inalienable natural rights. What the 
impedimenta indicated was that the native’s natural rights could not be fully upheld, within his own 
society, as it existed. The sub-standard or under-developed social practices endemic to primitive societies 
seemed to disqualify them from any tangible sovereignty. And if sovereignty could be considered to be 
the ‘metaphysical embodiment of the people’ by the organised state-form, primitive societies badly 
represented their people in failing to enforce their natural rights. This, of course, reflected terribly on 
those said to be ‘governing’ Indian societies.  
While Vitoria was quick to affirm the Indian’s natural rights, there was an admission that these 
rights came with the added responsibility to enforce and uphold normative standards. Again, the 
argument proceeds from the canon law tradition, in which Innocent IV understood that the protection of 
the infidel’s natural rights came together with the right to judge by the laws applicable.266 The Pope had a 
professional interest in the correct ordering of Christian societies, and canon law extended this interest to 
infidel societies.267 This served to reinforce, on a global basis, the belief that only the well-ordered 
society could readily enforce normative standards and uphold rights, and was therefore worthy of 
sovereignty. For the most part, infidel societies, despite possessing the potential to exercise the same 
rights as Christian societies, failed in ordering their societies to a properly sufficient degree. Furthermore, 
intervention for corrective purposes could be justified in cases in which societies were considered to have 
modelled themselves on ‘Sodom and Gomorrah’,268 i.e. they were perennial violators of natural rights. 
Taking his cue from this position, Vitoria asserted that the relational ethics of Humanitas legitimised 
intervention for the benefit269 of the Indian-other. 
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The case for intervention was further bolstered by the stark comparison between the ‘perfect’ 
communities or states of Spain and Europe, and those ‘imperfect’ social forms of the Indian. The perfect 
states were those Vitoria considered to be complete in themselves, replete with independent policy, law 
and magistrates like ‘Castile and Aragon’.270 Moreover, only perfect communities were able to recognise 
each other on the terms of reciprocity, based on an equality of structural forms.271 It was then incumbent 
upon those developed polities like Spain to ensure others reached their potential, so as to guarantee an 
equality of socio-political status.272  
 We can see here that incompleteness or indeterminacy returns, erased from the ontology of the 
Indian, to be displaced onto the social structures and practices of indigenous society. The ‘lack’ – a 
definable feature of imperfect social forms – would require filling in by the Spaniard for these societies to 
attain perfection. In other words, the independent identity of indigenous society would have to be 
dissolved and initial difference (between societies) transcended, in order for those ‘primitive’ societies to 
command full sovereignty, as well as potentiality. Here, the difference, internal to the system, 
distinguishes between those who fully assume the actuality associated with their ontological form, and 
those who, due to the imperfection of their societies, are impeded or held back in the realisation of their 
full potentiality. The burden of those who can fully exercise their Humanitas is to practise a responsible 
politics, to mend the rift between the ideal and the actual (repair damaged totalities)273 – between the 
ontological Indian and the historically rooted, contingent Indian. 
The lack of development of indigenous societies, eligible to be judged by the standard of 
Spanish society, could only be seen as a real concern. The source of all the problems could be traced back 
to the bad habits that had crystallised over time through stagnant and ossified traditions. Vitoria puts the 
blame squarely on the shoulders of the native leaders, the ‘early legislators’, whom he saw as responsible 
for the ‘concretisation’ of these bad habits.274 The inadequacy and venal nature of indigenous forms of 
government had played the chief role in obstructing the adoption of rules of normative behaviour 
conducive to a well-ordered society. The governance structures and leadership of native communities had 
hindered the conditions that could ensure a stable order worthy of sovereignty.    
Vitoria’s depiction of ‘primitive’ or ‘savage’ societies lost in tradition is an intriguing one. In his 
jurisprudence, the Indian had gained recognition and rights. However, this recognition also entailed the 
hypostatisation of cultural and ethnic difference. Recognition presupposes the ‘existence of a reified 
essence that is constitutive of one’s being’.275 The essence of the Indian’s identity, pre-Spanish 
colonialism, becomes over-determined by its primitive social forms. In other words, in gaining 
admittance to Vitoria’s jurisprudence, the native’s contingent and partial identity becomes represented in 
‘bounded and complete form’.276 Likewise, primitive social forms and related cultural traits are 
conceptualised as rigid, enclosed social structures admitting of no fluidity and becoming fully decidable. 
To put it another way, the ‘culturating apparatus’277 of indigenous society is hypostatised. Native 
culture(s) could be thought of as a process of supporting traditional ways of accessing and experiencing 
the world, as well as absorbing new methods.278 This is commensurate with the Indian’s mode of 
openness to the other, one in which identity is genuinely transformed by embracing the contingency 
which emanates from the encounter with the other. In this manner of receptivity, a manifold of potential 
ways of perceiving reality is sustained. As we have seen, the Indian had many others in which to engage, 
of which we have accounted so far for the given of the earth, and the confrontation with the colonist. 
However, the process of legal recognition works precisely to oppose, and indeed foreclose, this 
culturating apparatus of indigenous society; the difference between societies can now be explained 
through the tyranny of a stratifying tradition within native communities.  
 Within Vitoria’s jurisprudence, difference is ‘captured’ through the erection of rigid dividing 
lines between Spanish and Indian cultures. It is the ‘lack’ on the native’s side that produces the 
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difference. Furthermore, indigenous society is only rendered intelligible to the Spanish state-form when 
its difference is explained away through differing levels of development of the same socio-political 
forms. Therefore, difference within the self-same system does not afford the native the freedom to be 
‘other-being’. The latter would entail the Indian’s rejection of ius gentium and ius civile in their entirety, 
in preference pursuing and asserting his own irreducible ontological and legal/social forms. Inversely, 
recognition is dependent upon other-being crossing the normative boundary into the European legal 
system/order (the ‘commonwealth’). This process perforce implies the annihilation of other-being and, 
correspondingly, ensures its conversion into a conforming, self-same being. When other-being is reduced 
to being, the ability to move unimpeded, to struggle against and flee the subsuming structures of the 
European legal order, is lost. The notion of legal recognition articulated and based on rights claims is 
unable to acknowledge the movement and continual change of social forms – a phenomenon that Brenna 
Bhandar associates with the ongoing formation of the subject in its relation with the environment.279   
We will recall that for many of the colonists, the Indian’s nomadic qualities initially inhibited 
recognition, due to his ‘excessive’ behaviour and consequent lack of stabilised social forms. The native’s 
partially nomadic life seemed incapable of the discipline commensurate with a fully ordered civic life. 
Instead, he led an existence indistinguishable from the natural processes of the earth, subsumed within 
the given.280 Yet, with Vitoria, the opposite seems true. Indigenous society through the prism of 
recognition assumes the form of a stratifying and highly traditional social order that stymies legal and 
political progress. On the one hand, Indian society is subject to an excessive amount of unregulated 
movement (molecular-becoming) incommensurate with order, while on the other it is at the behest of 
decrepit traditional structures blocking the development of juridical forms.  
These contrasting critiques can be read as two sides of the same coin. The Indian’s nomadic 
being, as other-being, enabled a certain capacity to flee, as well as leaving him free to assume a form un-
orderable within the confines of a bounded, contained Humanitas. Vitoria’s jurisprudence, and the 
hypostatising recognition it implied, could not acknowledge this ability to flee. From the perspective of 
his legal system, any un-orderable aspects of ‘primitive’ society become markers of non-progression or 
under-development. The facets of Indian society that remain un-orderable are only recognised indirectly 
as a lack or imperfection. The Indian becomes a victim of his culpable leaders, who, rather than negating 
the conditions conducive to other-being and hostile to natural rights, only condone the traits of Indian 
societies un-orderable within the European legal order. Hence, the aspects of indigenous society that fled 
recognition in order to resume their relationship with the un-orderable are identified as the remains of an 
ossified tradition.  
The sole means to represent, indirectly, the un-orderable aspects of indigenous society within a 
common jurisprudence was by situating it historically, as temporally behind the advanced states of 
Europe. Such indigenous societies would then be able to exercise their full sovereignty at such a point in 
time when they lost all marks of the un-orderable. Until such a point, difference internal to the self-same 
system was explained through varying levels of development and progression. Indigenous societies, 
much like the Indian himself, were immature social forms that needed the aid of the Spanish state. To put 
it another way, indigenous social forms were presented as in a state of becoming, in need of guidance to 
find the proper being. Conversely, to leave Indian societies ‘abandoned’ to the un-orderable and the given 
would be a deplorable act indeed. Even Las Casas, despite his praise for the lawful nature of many Indian 
societies, conceded that some had not reached ordered government ‘as was the case with all peoples of 
the world in the beginning’.281 
To conclude this section, let us state that the major achievement of Vitoria’s jurisprudence is the 
effect it has of levelling down282 the Indian’s behaviour and practices from embodying characteristics of 
strong a-legality (a position given expression by the colonist) to conformity with traits proper to weak a-
legality (elaborated through his jurisprudence). The issue is no longer related to the separate ontological 
form of the native or his non-being, a perspective that would insinuate an inherent foreignness to order. 
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The problem is relocated to the social institutions and practices of indigenous society, within which can 
be discerned, and acknowledged, a perceivable order in becoming. Upholding the Indian’s rights, in fact 
liberating him and his society, required only the removal of the impedimenta of his primitive social 
forms. This would release, from constraints, the nascent legal order within indigenous society, so as to 
enable it to progress. It was only through the process of inclusion, and the constructivist recognition this 
implies, that the impedimenta or un-orderable aspects of native social forms – those aspects that can have 
no place within the ius gentium, or ius civile for that matter – could be filtered out. The narrative of 
progressivism implicit here posits a future time when a well-ordered indigenous society will celebrate the 
triumph of culture and normativity over the earth.283 It is a triumph that will signal the full use of the 
Indian’s potentiality, that is, of his being.   
Chapter Six: Resistance, Disciplinary Action and the A-
Legality of the Indian 
 
Vitoria’s impetus in producing his scholarly work on the Indian Question arose from the re-examination 
of the natives’ claims to rights; the outrages of the colonists acted as a spur in this regard. Nonetheless, 
the violence that the colonists meted out re-emerges in a legal manifestation, internal to Vitoria’s 
jurisprudence. In the latter, violence is a product of the difference between Indian and Spanish cultures. 
Once the standards of ius gentium are breached, disciplinary action and intervention become necessary in 
order to mend the rift opened up by difference. The deviance of the native’s behaviour demands 
regulation, and so sanctions are merited to this purpose. Put otherwise, to attenuate Indian deviancy 
corrective treatment was required, directed towards the goal of his moral improvement. Through this line 
of argumentation, we are able to see that the violence that was unjustifiable and boundless outside any 
conceivable jurisprudence becomes justified within Vitoria’s jurisprudence.284 In other terms, Anthropos 
seems to have been internalised; it both generates and regulates the difference that exists within 
Humanitas.    
 However, we should note that the violence inherent to Vitoria’s jurisprudence is not solely 
articulated and legitimised through the need to correct the Indian’s deviancy from set standards. Vitoria is 
also led to consider the cases in which intervention can be given a sound legal basis through the doctrine 
of Just War.285 It was within reason that war could be legitimately declared due to the sacrifice and 
oppression of innocents, in which there was a need for action in order to obtain rights.286 Violation of 
natural rights was also a valid enough reason for intervening to re-order indigenous societies, to ensure 
future compliance in upholding them. Moreover, Vitoria indicated that the Indian’s deportment, more 
generally, deserved to come under scrutiny, and could provide a pretext for intervention. What seemed 
most open to censure, in this regard, was the Indian’s exclusionary behaviour, which gave insufficient 
respect, and, in fact, ‘offence to the law of nations’.287 It suffices for us to examine Vitoria’s musings on 
the Indian’s resistance to illustrate this point.288 
The Indian’s stubborn resistance to the Spanish missionaries and colonists proved to be quite a 
bone of contention for Vitoria. The conclusion he drew was at odds with that of Las Casas, who argued 
                                                            
283 Adams, p. 10. In actual historical terms, as Quijano and Wallerstein note (p. 549), ‘the process of 
peripheralization involved less the reconstruction of economic and political institutions than their construction, 
virtually ex nihilo everywhere.’ 
284 Blomley (2003) provides a useful explication here, which bears quoting in full: ‘Law tends to deflect questions of 
its own innate violence to the violence that makes law necessary. Yet when law is forced to confront its violences, it 
authorizes them “as a lesser or necessary evil and as a response to our inability to live a truly free life, a life without 
external discipline and constraint.”’ (Quoting Sarat and Kearns).  
285 According to Schmitt, the respublica christiana bases itself on the varying distinctions between types of enemies 
and hence types of wars, on the grounds of ‘profound distinctions between human beings and on a great disparity of 
their status.’ Moreover, Just War enables a Christian prince to pass judgment over those they subdue. Schmitt, pp. 
105, 122 
286 Vitoria, p. 305; Muldoon, p. 149; Schmitt, p. 109 
287 Vitoria, p. 282  
288 Vitoria furnishes us with other examples that demonstrate the exclusionary deportment of the Indian’s behaviour. 
These include the Indian’s refusal to share his property in common with the Spanish, and his treatment of the 
Spaniard as if he was a ‘stranger’, in violation of the ancient law of hospitality to foreigners. See Vitoria, pp. 279–80. 
Interestingly, Schmitt (p. 124), in his discussion of Just War, cites a Lutheran contemporary of Vitoria, Johann 
Oldendorp (1480-1567), as stating that ‘just war is not war, but justice, and that unjust war is not war, but rebellion.’  
 
 
126 
that the natives’ actions were purely in self-defence in the face of conquistador attacks, and thus that they 
could not be ‘justly warred against’.289 Vitoria chose to uphold the right of the colonists to defend 
themselves, supposedly confronted, as they were, with Indian aggression.290 The adoption of violent 
stratagems by the native held enormous significance for Vitoria, as it served to show that the former was 
intent on excluding the Spaniard from his world.  
In response to the exclusionary resistance of the native, Vitoria opted to re-assert canon law’s 
insistence on the rights of missionaries to preach the Word, and the obligations of infidels or pagans to 
deliberate upon it in a reasonable manner. Any obstruction to the business of proselytising, any block to 
the advancement of conversion, was enough to make just war permissible.291 Evidently, the Indian’s self-
defence, by its very nature, was likely to result in the obstruction of some of the missionaries’ activities. 
Nevertheless, counter-violence was seen to demonstrate the failure of reason to get through to him. It 
furnished further evidence of, and indeed reinforced the notion that the Indian required disciplinary action 
in order to make him conform to rationally sanctioned norms.  
The disciplinary action warranted by the Indian’s behaviour included the temporary forfeiture of 
property, territory and arms used against the Spaniard, and beyond that it justified the overthrow of native 
‘princes’.292 In the precipitation into war, the Indian’s natural rights were suspended till such a time in 
which he was deemed to be in possession of his senses. Not only did this act as a judicious punishment 
for his artifices, it aided in the re-assertion of his rationality through means he was considered to 
comprehend.  
The native’s violence against the colonist was, indeed, a transgressive act, in that it is through 
resistance that the traces of victimhood are erased. In Vitoria’s initial analysis of the Indian, it was stated 
that his victimhood vis-à-vis the colonist perpetrators rendered him worthy of ethical consideration. It 
was the native’s role as hapless victim that led to the reinstatement of his universal being in Humanitas. 
Contrariwise, once Vitoria put to one side the colonist’s excesses and considered the case for just war, he 
looked again at the propriety of the Indian’s actions against the colonists. His innocence seemed clear in 
light of the colonist’s outrages. However, once he took up arms in resistance his guilt and culpability 
became clear. The native, in taking matters into his own hands, and seeking empowerment and redress 
through counter-violence, became a perpetrator every bit as insidious as the colonist. In such 
circumstances, it was for the Spanish, as possessors of the superior society, to punish the native’s actions 
for the betterment of his society. So it seems that Vitoria had no truck with the Indian adopting an 
exclusionary deportment towards the Spanish, echoing as it did the mentality of the colonists.   
 
The resistance of the Indian heralded the loss of his innocence. The more he tried to establish and assert 
his exteriority, the more it seemed to perpetuate and legitimise his coercion into the jurisprudential 
system. We can interpret this manner of resistance as the native’s attempt to re-appropriate ‘anthropos’.293 
In this self-assertive manoeuvre he affirms his other-being. As was stated above, within the colonist’s 
discourse, Anthropos signified the imaginative invention of the other, as well as the complementary 
power to define oneself. The Indian, through the re-appropriation of anthropos, was now able to redefine 
it in his own terms, from the point of view of the ‘invented other’. Thus, an inversion takes place, so that 
anthropos, itself, takes on the perspective of the other. Hence, what is denoted is the other’s discursive 
possession of itself, that is to say, the continued invention of its own identity (in the sense of autonomous 
‘form’). In practical terms, the Indian-other’s anthropos signifies the coincidence of his way of sensing 
the world, through immersion in the given, with the inexhaustible power of self-invention. In taking on 
the ontology of other-being, anthropos bespeaks the native’s resistance to closure – to the category of 
Humanitas and the jurisprudential system, as overlapping and co-dependent totalities. Whereas for the 
colonist Anthropos proved a method (if inadequate) to conceal the lack at the very heart of the self, the 
Indian’s anthropos can be seen to harness this lack. Thence, humanity, for the indigenous, could not be a 
                                                            
289 Hanke (1994), p. 92 
290 Ibid., p. 282; Schmitt, p. 109: ‘ultimately Vitoria’s view of the conquista is altogether positive. Most significant 
for him was the fait accompli of Christianization.’ Furthermore, Schmitt states that Just War in this case acquired its 
legal force from the missionary mandate, and grounded the framework of the respublica Christiana as legal thinking 
moved towards an equal sovereignty of (European) states over and above a spiritual power: pp. 111, 120. 
291 Vitoria, p. 285, Muldoon, p. 148 
292 Vitoria, p. 324 
293 The Indian’s re-appropriated lower case ‘anthropos’ is differentiated from the colonist’s capitalised ‘Anthropos’. 
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completed nature: it was merely a transitory condition.294 The lack is thereby a necessary condition for an 
open identity, and the native’s resistance reasserted this point. It is at this point we ought to remember the 
indelible image (conjured up by Viveiros de Castro) of the Indian fleeing the missionary by returning to 
the forest, no doubt to re-engage with the contingency and flux of his fertile surroundings.  
 The native’s other-being should be thought of as a purely affirmative ontology, unlike non-
being’s search for determinate being, and the progressivism of a becoming-into-being. Naturally, both 
non-being and becoming, in this instance, have their end point in the determinate form of being. 
However, other-being implies a fidelity to a separate type of ontology altogether. In which case, the 
Indian’s assertion of his incomplete self-determination or fidelity to other-being could only be interpreted 
as a rejection of Humanitas. The native could well be accused of denying his own humanity and negating 
his own claim to redemption or salvation. In other words, when appropriated (or defined) by the Indian, 
Anthropos threatens to detach itself from Anthropos–Humanitas, and to reconstitute itself in its 
singularity as anthropos. With the self-exclusion that this implied, Vitoria could only attribute this 
audacious act of defiance to the native’s wish to slide into non-being. This would entail a process of un-
shackling from an ontologically unified mankind. Fidelity to other-being effectively meant cloaking 
himself with an unrecognisable ontology, represented indirectly, for Vitoria, as the wish to revert back to 
non-being.  
 In light of the Indian’s anthropos, Vitoria’s argument that just war was legitimate can be read as 
a commitment to re-positing Anthropos–Humanitas. Let us reiterate that Anthropos acts as a disciplinary 
arm on behalf and as part of the wider Anthropos–Humanitas. It can act, primarily, by threatening to 
exclude the native, despite not actually being able to carry this out. This is due, in terms of the Spanish 
world, to Anthropos’ inability to divorce itself from Humanitas; any separation would undo all the work 
put in to repair the totality ruptured by the event of the encounter.  
 The repair work, as has been noted, relied upon the levelling down of a strong to a weak a-
legality. The Indian’s enforcement of his self-exclusion, and the escalation of his actions in resistance, 
threatened the return of a strong a-legality. By implication, this would mean the resuscitation of the 
Indian’s links with the un-orderable. In spite of this, the native’s resistance would have to be met not so 
much with exclusion but with the greater force of coercion into a jurisprudential totality. Anthropos is no 
longer directed towards the expulsion of the ‘inhuman’, but towards enforcing the inclusion of those 
others in Humanitas who would deny their own humanity if left to their own devices. The discipline 
inherent to the system had to be engaged in order to save the native from himself. No group of people 
could voluntarily renounce their right to live,295 and to repudiate one’s own humanity once it was 
recognised amounted to a rejection of life. It was therefore down to disciplinary action, as a supreme part 
of the ‘grand redeeming project’, to fully include the Indian. The native’s resistance to assimilation, 
alongside his fidelity to other-being, only confirmed the need for Vitoria to shore up his jurisprudential 
totality. In order to preserve the planetary ‘commonwealth of nations’, violence against non-sovereign 
societies was, indeed, acceptable. Likewise, in order to sustain Humanitas, what was required was to stop 
the Indian from entering non-being, which would otherwise enable him to vanish into the realm of 
mythology, or even cosmology, in anthropos.      
Conclusion 
The major success of Vitoria’s jurisprudence was its ability to level down from strong to weak a-legality. 
He managed this process in two distinct cases. Firstly, there is the case of the colonist’s discourse on the 
Indian’s unrecognisable shape. This must have been a particular bugbear for Vitoria, and it proved to be 
the motor spurring him on in his study of the Indian Question. The issue arose with the popular belief that 
the native merely assumed the guise of humanity but was in reality some ‘Homo Monstrosus’. This 
intimated the possibility that he was a member of an altogether separate ontological order. As a 
consequence, the colonists’ Anthropo-centric thinking led them to the opinion that the native was beyond 
the pale of salvation; all that was left to do was to enforce his exclusion from humanity. Exclusion, for 
the colonist, directed itself against the Indian in the outrages of war and the tyranny of the encomienda 
system.  
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 In response, Vitoria moved to quash the colonists’ ideology by pressing the case to the Spanish 
state for adhering to the strictures of theological orthodoxy. Theoretically, this meant the dismantling of 
Anthropos in its singularity, through the positing of the Humanitas definition of mankind. By appealing 
to the universality of Humanitas, the aspersions of the colonist, as well as the potency of Natural Slave 
Theory, could be effectively countered. Humanitas entailed the extension of ontological parity to the 
other – which became the instrument whereby the firm grounding of the legal system could be 
consolidated. To put it another way, Vitoria’s jurisprudence, drawn from old Roman and medieval canon 
law, had its force in being able to reconstitute legal totality through the bolstered universality of 
Humanitas. It was simply the case that the Anthropo-centric paradigm did not possess the same power to 
fortify totality against the effects of rupture imparted by the event-encounter. In contrast, Humanitas was 
able to contain the Indian-other: far from freely communing with the given (signifying the strong a-
legality of the un-orderable) the native is re-conceived as patiently awaiting admission into the Spanish 
world. Thus, the levelling down necessitated by Humanitas was a prerequisite for the repair of totality, 
clearing the way for the supplanting of Anthropos. 
 If it was Humanitas that attenuated the influence of the Anthropos, it required something more 
to set about resolving the challenge posed by the native’s resistance. The latter’s anthropos proved to be a 
method of attack inverse to that of the colonists; his stratagem of re-appropriation through resistance can 
be said, so to speak, to have turned Anthropos on its head. The attempt of the Indian to exclude himself 
from the Spanish world was no less than a redirection of anthropos against the Spaniard. This opening 
allowed Vitoria to re-posit Anthropos as part of the wider Anthropos–Humanitas, as a form of 
disciplinary action against the native. The colonists’ exclusionary violence then shifts to jurisprudence’s 
coercion via the process of inclusion. So, just war was deemed acceptable as a way to keep the Indian 
within Humanitas; once recognised within the legal system, the native was forbidden from denying his 
own ‘true’ nature, and fleeing from Anthropos–Humanitas. His resistance only served to confirm the 
veracity of the claim that he must be saved from himself; after all, it seemed that in practice he was still 
to completely divorce himself from the corrupting nature of his environment. However, with the 
obligation placed upon the Indian to meet the normative standards implicit to a planetary jurisprudence, 
his strong a-legality was perforce levelled down. Both the sanctions incurred in falling below standards, 
and the resulting disciplinary action, were means employed to forcibly erase the marks of the un-ordered 
that remained in the native’s society. 
The outcome of Vitoria’s jurisprudence is as foreseeable as it is fatal: it ultimately ends in the 
affirmation of internalised, disciplinary violence. The grand redeeming project that is disciplinary 
jurisprudence can only fully posit itself as a totality, it seems, when other-being is consigned to oblivion. 
It is no wonder then that the attempts of other-being to avoid capture only served to intensify the violence 
directed against it. The tenacity of the natives in evading capture, which went as far as to involve 
collective suicide in some cases (suicidal line of flight?), is hinted at in a perceptive remark by Las Casas 
in which he insists that they ‘by their nature…are free.’296 
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Part Four: In Search of the Origins of International 
Law: Aquinas’ Chain of Being, Vitoria’s World-
Ground Model of Natural Law, and Amerindian 
Dissidence  
Chapter One: The School of Salamanca and the Thomistic 
Theology 
Arguably, of the Iberian theologians, Vitoria had the biggest impact on the intellectual landscape of 
sixteenth-century Spain. He was a celebrated member of the acclaimed School of Salamanca, where he 
held the post of chair in Theology.1 The School was pivotal in developing natural law and economic 
theory as a major theoretical and practical approach throughout the Age of Discovery, undoubtedly 
accentuating its position as ‘the centre of a new scholasticism, which was to have a lasting effect on 
European philosophy’.2 This was accompanied by a revival of Thomism: Salamanca’s favourite son, 
Vitoria, was influential in helping to transmit the doctrine from its dying embers in Paris to its leading 
light in Spain.3  
 The principal project of Vitoria, and by extension of Salamanca, was the full disclosure of the 
rational principles that lay behind the Christian message. However, crucially, and in contrast with the 
classical view that maintained the activity of reasoning as based on (Euclidian) deduction more 
geometrico and an onto-theology of indivisibles, these rational principles could be discerned through the 
observation of the natural world, by bringing all things within sight through a form of induction veering 
between realism and conceptualism. In fleshing out these rational principles and their relation to the 
natural world, Vitoria deferred to the methodological tools and ontology developed by Thomas Aquinas. 
  Aquinas’ conceptual apparatus was born out of his attempt to reconcile the medieval theological 
theories of the Principle of Plenitude and the rational-world-ground model, while avoiding their pitfalls. 
The former, advocating belief in the effusive ‘God of the Event’, permitted the generative powers of the 
divinity to continually intervene in and transform the universe, thus undermining the perfection of the 
world. The latter deterministic model, however, effectively undermined the will of God through 
impelling Him to transpose all possibilities into a completely foreclosed reality. Aquinas’ move was to 
incorporate the Principle at a selection stage in the creation of the universe, in which the Creator 
generates the world though actively choosing which beings to actualise in an ordered reality. 
Consequently, the universe that results from the selection-event4, in keeping with a God who can at least 
initially exercise His will, can maintain its perfection post-Creation.5   
  From his theological position Aquinas was able to articulate a natural law that became a means 
of comprehending the natural world as an ordered, unified whole. The perfection of the determinate 
universe consists of ‘common objects’ that circulate in the world through their consistent and predictable 
movements and relations with each other, upheld by the physical but also normative law of cause and 
effect. In the Thomistic tradition, the perfected natural order manifests itself as the chain of being, an 
                                                            
1 Pagden (1994), p. 156 
2 Ibid., p. 308–9; Adams, p. 141 
3 Pagden (1994), p. 309. Also see Walter Mignolo, The Darker Side of the Renaissance: Literacy, territoriality and 
colonization, University of Michigan Press (2003), p. 31 
4 This was a crucial difference between the cosmology of antiquity and that of the Middle Ages. Blumenburg (p. 374) 
makes the point that in Antiquity the horizon of human consciousness of the world was defined by the coincidence of 
the ‘horizon of reality and the horizon of visibility’. While the Middle Ages held on to this paradigm, a divergence 
took place between the horizon of the possible and the actual. Hence, reality is the outcome of a selection that while 
preserving the unrestricted potentiality of the Godhead reduces reality to a form of backwardness that lags behind 
potency.  
5 A more detailed study of what is here only given in summary can be found in Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain 
of Being, Harvard University Press (1964), pp. 69–71; John Hick, ed., The Existence of God: From Plato to A.J. Ayer 
on the question ‘Does God exist?’ Collier MacMillan Publishers (1964), p. 84; Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: 
The making of modern identity, Cambridge University Press (2010), p. 141; Blumenburg, pp. 375, 380–1  
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immense architectonic edifice that orders all creatures in a hierarchical verticality6 from God downwards. 
Beings assume their position in this verticality according to the degree of potentiality they are deemed 
able to achieve. Furthermore, the chain is invested with a prescriptive force in so much as it regulates the 
proper relations between creatures, depending on the position they occupy. Natural law then becomes a 
necessary intermediary for man, between the ontological chain and the material (and cultural) reality. 
Through the faculty of perception, man assembles and recognises the objects around him by correctly 
identifying the place they assume in the chain.  
In Aquinas’ formulation of natural law, Vitoria found a method in which he could put the newly 
discovered Amerindian to the test. In indigenous culture Vitoria detected many practices and habits (such 
as cannibalism) that contravened natural law, revealing the native’s inability to correctly order the 
manifold of creatures around him. Most importantly, this could only be seen as a violation of the chain’s 
ontological ordering. In the use of Aquinas’ method, that is to say his approach to natural law, allied as it 
is to the chain of being, Vitoria found he was able to pass judgement on the Indian, who was very much 
in need of corrective action in order put him back in his place firmly tethered to the rest of mankind. 
Chapter Two: Natural Law: Consistency, Normativity and 
the Chain of Being 
In Thomas Aquinas’ schema, the grounding of all things in the world can be seen as the expression of the 
divine light of reason. This is also the focus of his visual and spatial architectonic of the order of the 
natural world and hence of natural law. For in this schema God, the source of light and reason, coincides 
with the Good or the Right,7 and thus confers a sense of things being ordered by residing in the place they 
properly belong to, as if reality were a canvas. Actualised order can be thought of as an emanation (in 
visual terms) of the Right, and the creatures placed in that order incur in exchange an obligation to 
preserve such an order, the just placing of beings in the chain or well-proportioned canvas. That 
obligation is akin to the reciprocated gaze of a spectator looking at a painting that is composed following 
the rules of perspective (i.e. the spectator perceives the painting insomuch as he recognises where the 
objects depicted in it are placed in relation to each other).8 In providing for the given order, the Godhead 
fundamentally acts as a ‘law-giver’ or ‘divine legislator’.9 The giving of law and order is intertwined with 
His form-imparting ability. The Godhead Himself is beyond all law in the sense in which a painter is 
beyond the painting. His self-constitution is an act of pure a-legality, or an action existing prior to 
legality. However, His creation of a closed, determinate world allows for the separate identity of a 
positive law to emerge.  
 To explain, we can perceive in Aquinas’ model a separation of law into two domains. Firstly 
there is the domain of God and His law as infinite possibility or promise (the background of our emerging 
image of the earth).10 Unrestricted (and indeterminate) possibility provides the source of generation, 
which is then retrospectively denoted as the basis of divine law. Once the determinate order is 
constructed, the capacity of a God in excess can no longer trespass into the domain of His creation, or go 
beyond the en-framing of the composed painting of reality. God subsists as the symbolic, sui generis 
head of reality, divorced from the events taking place on earth. Aquinas may well have succeeded in 
preserving the volition of the Creator, but at the expense of depleting His practical significance and 
agency in the direction of His creation. The moment of God’s realised agency is restricted to His initial 
                                                            
6 We can consider the chain as a monumental piece of cosmic architecture. Hence, Henri Lefebvre’s remark that 
‘Verticality and great height have ever been the spatial expression of potentially violent power’ is especially apt here. 
Lefebvre, p. 100  
7 Axel Hägerström, Philosophy and Religion, trans. Robert T. Sandin, George Allen and Unwin Ltd. (1964), p. 254; 
Vitoria, p. 168 
8 Lefebvre is particularly insightful in his own elaboration of the perspective of the spectator in relation to the painter. 
The spectator’s intentions will be swayed to a certain extent by the techniques deployed by the painter, but the looker 
will base his interpretation on factors independent of the artist’s design (pp. 113–4). Such is the relationship between 
man’s interpretation of the material world and the Godhead’s original intention in producing the structure of the 
cosmos. Similar analogies in respect to the artist in relation to his work are deployed by Albertus. See Takahashi, p. 
472 
9 Hägerström, p. 252 
10 Albertus designates this as the realm of the prime principle or the ‘universally active intellect’. Its relation to the 
secondary realm of natural law is defined by the axiom that ‘the house [as an artifact] is produced from a house [in 
the architect’s mind]’. See: Takahashi, p. 477–9  
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process of ordering; He can have no more effect henceforth. The God of the Event is effectively barred 
from interfering in the affairs of His own universe.     
 The second domain – in which the jurisdiction is that of the universe, and more specifically the 
earth – is that of natural law (‘ius naturae’). The natural world, as a closed totality, consists of a 
determined number of things. The rule of cause and effect, inherent to rationality, governs this natural 
world of ‘common objects’. Indeterminacy thus being removed, consistency, regularity and predictability 
serve to characterise the relationship between all things in the universe. This is, of course, only because a 
certain number of demarcated possibilities are admitted into actuality (i.e. the determinate order). The 
principle of cause and effect is one that Aquinas adheres to throughout his theology (in his cosmological 
argument), and which comes to define the physical laws of the natural world. Hence, through the 
consistency of the objects of the natural world, we can come to understand the initial contingency (the 
original cause in excess) which begat order.   
For Vitoria, that faithful adherent of Thomism, this point in the argument would become 
significant for the development of an embryonic, secular, international law. As Fitzpatrick notes, Vitoria 
follows the Thomistic path of unifying the God of the Event and the God of the natural order, and is so 
obliged to take on the consequences derived from this step.11  
To reiterate, divine law is responsible for the creation of the earthly order governed by natural 
law. Natural law covers the consistency of the natural world, the rule of cause and effect that makes up 
the rules of physics.12 The logical implication here is that the latter ends up binding the former, divine 
law, within its own rules. To explain, the God of the Event now becomes a part of the system of natural 
law, and even subject to the consistency of the natural world. He is, indeed, ‘caught by “his” own 
creation’.13 Both divine law and deity are bound by natural law, with the effects of the latter being 
projected back to the divinity in the final analysis.14 
God’s influence over His creation is exhausted as soon as His selection process, which chooses 
the possibilities to be transposed into a determinate reality, is concluded. His indeterminate potentiality, 
as soon as it is separated from determinate order, lacks the generative force of the event to resist the 
rational laws that govern the natural world’s closed totality – of which he becomes a prisoner. Even more 
profoundly and paradoxically, in containing indeterminacy, God has stripped Himself of the power to 
ward off the laws of His creation. God, in continually thinking the infinite, has lost sight of His order. He 
has been condensed into a contained infinity, a dormant singularity. Despite His initial labour, in 
becoming part of the universe, He takes no further part in it; He has no say in its governance. He is a 
mere ‘remainder’ of the creation-event, or the ‘part-of-no-part’.15     
 
To elaborate on the implications of the above for Vitoria, let us examine his interpretation of Aquinas’ 
natural law. Both Vitoria and the School of Salamanca theorised in natural law a supreme method for 
resisting change.16 Natural law was conceived of as a safeguard that upheld the preservation of order on 
earth. In this equation, to uphold natural law was also to maintain the perfection of the chain of being. 
In the Thomistic tradition, the natural order manifests itself as the chain of being. It was invested 
with a great deal of conceptual force and explanatory strength from the Middle Ages up until the early 
modern period. It provided a method of unifying the manifold of beings in the world, via an exposition of 
how these creatures were ordered. Through the ‘comely method and proportion’17 of the chain, beings 
from those that are purely intelligent, such as the Godhead and the angels, all the way down to the ‘rudest 
inanimate object’, were spatially arranged and linked in a rigid, hierarchical edifice. In addition to 
realising a hierarchical ordering in nature, the spatial arrangement acknowledged a reasonable continuity 
between beings. Each being was placed in its position in the chain equivalent to its delimited potentiality 
and power; God retained his infinite potentiality, with all creatures below Him decreasing in it by 
                                                            
11 Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘Law Modernity and the Sacred’, Seattle University Law Review (vol. 32, 2008/9), p. 335 
12 See Gustavo Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation: History, politics and salvation, SCM Press (2001), p. 41 for a 
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degrees. In this manner, the chain managed to withstand the hopeless confusion18 that could threaten to 
arise if the manifold of creatures were not ordered in a clear and distinct way. 
 Natural law could thus become the law of ‘en-chaining’, and the method by which men could 
control and harness the manifold of creatures. It is the maintenance of the ‘linkages’ between creatures, 
and hence the proper place of each on the progressive scale, which is at stake for natural law. Natural law 
can then be considered to be an anticipative mechanism that locates and neutralises in advance any 
changes in the natural order that may adversely affect the chain and the regulated movements it allows 
for.19    
It is these movements with which Vitoria is especially concerned in his adherence to Thomistic 
natural law. It would therefore be wise for us to mention at this point the motions for which the chain 
allows – those of ascending and descending the great ladder of being. This ‘ladder’20 should not be 
conceived of as a two-dimensional plane, as it is more accurate to say that these movements of ascending 
and descending take place upon a sphere. To draw a helpful analogy, when a ship is seen to be leaving 
port it can be perceived to be ascending towards the horizon; and once the horizon is crossed the ship 
descends as it vanishes from sight. In the case of a circumnavigation, we can only deduce that the said 
ship completes its movement in returning to its original place. In respect to the chain of being, this means 
any creature that moves out of its appointed position in the order will eventually return to its rightful 
place. This is an example of induction, and is how the method of natural law works according to Aquinas 
and Vitoria. From the observation of a particular case (say, the ship leaving port) we can surmise a 
general law (all things ascending and descending, the orb should fall back into place). There is only a 
short distance separating this procedure from what common lawyers call to this day the ‘case method’.21 
It all hinges on the play between the emanation of life from a prime source, the Godhead who creates the 
natural order, and the observer who engages in a voluntary act of recognition. There is a gradation of 
conscious, rule-following action that proceeds from interpreting to judging. 
The contrasting directions described above are, of course, both vertical trajectories projected 
upon a sphere or its flattened representation. Access to the ascending movement is the unique privilege of 
man. One of the means of accessing it is through an Augustinian self-transcendence, the ‘radical 
reflexivity’ of withdrawal from corporeal relations.22 The alternative method, favoured by Aquinas, is to 
concern oneself with fellow creatures through participating in governance over them. In other words, it is 
through the first cause’s effects that we come to know Him. It is through natural law, governing the realm 
of ‘effects’ or common objects, that we have access to divine law, the realm of absolute contingency. Due 
to the diminished role of God ex post, man can be said to know all he needs to about the essence of 
things, the effects, through natural law regardless of divinity.23 In other words, natural laws can be re-
constituted as an ‘earthly ius gentium’,24 that is to say a terrestrial law separated from a divinity, or the 
beyond.    
In a sort of reversal of the creation event, it would seem that man has now been liberated from 
the Godhead. Or perhaps the Godhead has merely been liberated from His duties. Nonetheless, the order 
that man participates in can be clearly understood through natural law alone. 
For Vitoria, divine law still has its place as the first precept of law. It is crucial in generating a 
set of circumstances advantageous to man (the manifestation of God’s affection for man). In the process 
of initial ordering, the God of the Event implanted in men self-evident rational principles. This enables 
the perception and correct interpretation of the world,25 or, to put it another way, a comprehension of the 
operating structure of reality.26 Moreover, divine law is strictly demarcated in covering only these first 
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principles, i.e. qualities that are intrinsic to men. Hence, the first precepts are demonstrated, in this case, 
through the universality of the soul in men, which enables the capacity for rationality.  
The ability of man to correctly perceive reality corresponds to his acting in accordance with 
natural law, which is subject to human affairs. Natural law can therefore be thought of as the secondary 
precepts (secunda praecepta); these abide by the laws that govern human normative behaviour, and thus 
culture and habit. Furthermore, it is the source of positive law.27  
Moreover, natural law can be thought of as the mediator between the realm of divine 
intelligence and the rational soul of men.28 Additionally, man himself can also be considered as a sort of 
mediator, and in this respect Aquinas sees him as being expertly placed in the chain of being. In terms of 
law, man is conceptualised as a boundary between the positive law of nature and the divine law of God. 
This is because, within the chain of being, he borders on the highest, most intelligent beings, as well as 
the lower, corporeally imprisoned, creatures. A man’s soul acts as a gateway between the eternality of the 
divine or supernatural world and the externalised rationality of the natural world. To quote Aquinas, man 
is ‘the horizon and the boundary-line of all things corporeal and incorporeal’.29 His unique motion, as 
was stated, is ascension: a vertical movement upwards in self-transcendence. The ‘vertical’ is of course a 
position or direction perpendicular to the plane of the horizon. Man, as this horizon, provides for the 
basic orientation of these vertical movements, and more generally he is situated in such a way so as to 
perceive the movement of all creatures in the chain. He is therefore in such a position as to perceive the 
proscribed movements taking place in the chain – for example, the evil that is explicit in an inability to 
fulfil potential (or work), and the free-fall from one’s position that results.  
Humans, in exercising their rationality, can be said to conform to natural law.30 In doing so, man 
takes on the responsibility that is implicit in his position in the chain. This ‘positionality’ at once makes 
him an ethical and political being. In being thus constituted, he is able to perceive that reality is not just 
subject to the rules of rationality, but exists inherently within a normative framework (all possibilities 
transposed into the natural order are good, derived as they are from God). Following on from this, 
rationality comes with the duty and responsibility to continually ensure the correct ordering of the chain.  
Man thus takes on God’s work in perpetually (re-)constructing or repairing the configuration of 
the determinate order.31 In other words, he is positioned in such a way as to take on the role vacated by 
God. Naturally, man can only come to a discernment of his own cognitive order – rationality in the sense 
of a collection of ideas ordered in the mind – or ‘inner assembly’32 through taking up the task of 
regulating the external order. Aquinas’ argument that you can know divine reason through His effects is 
humanised; man can come to know his own cognitive order only through the natural order that surrounds 
him on all sides.   
 
The theory behind combining rational laws with a normative framework will require some further 
explanation. The natural world, as rendered by natural law, is a uniform system with its own laws 
governing organic matter.33 Within this system, every individual part of the natural world reflects the 
structure of the whole.34 Vitoria here sees a continuum between the physical laws of nature and normative 
nature of morality, as, in his view, they share the same ‘immutable state’.35 The regulae,36 or norms, that 
structure the organic, for example the rule of cause and effect, equally apply to man as he is as much 
corporeal as incorporeal. Since the laws of cause and effect apply to human societies, they must also 
impact upon the rules governing normative behaviour. There is thus a continuum between the organic, 
logically deducible process of nature, and the domain of man and his culture.  
This approach is an outcome of Vitoria reaffirming his allegiance to Aquinas’ nominalism. The 
emphasis on the intrinsic rationality governing nature led Vitoria to deny the realist doctrine that the 
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essence or properties of things were ‘dependent on the will of God’.37 Things or objects possessed their 
own essence, and could quite credibly exist within their own common world without being impinged 
upon by a beyond or outside.38 The quasi-independence of the natural world, encased and enclosed within 
its own normative laws, meant it could act as its own autonomous system or structure.39  
Natural law, as mediation between man and world, involves understanding the correct location 
of man in the system of nature. The ability to locate oneself requires correct cognition, a principle faculty 
of the soul.40 This cognition is enabled by logical deduction, a process that is inseparable from 
categorisation. In order to categorise correctly, one must comprehend the proper place of things in reality 
or in the world, particularly in relation to oneself.  
In order to explain how existing laws are natural, the law of nature works backwards – from the 
specific to the general.41 As concerns the chain, this effectively means deducing from a creature or 
being’s behaviour where in the chain it stands. It requires comprehending the operating structure of 
reality through the correct perception of a particular being within it. Understanding the chain as a natural 
hierarchy is synonymous with the correct use of (re-)cognition, which perceives the distinctions between 
things in the hierarchy. In other words, conforming to the natural world means distinguishing between the 
categories that divide, cut and split it up into a spatial system.42 Perceiving, from the viewpoint of natural 
law, ultimately means thinking within this stable interiority, properly demarcated by the boundaries that 
construct it. 
Chapter Three: Onto-Normative Dissidence: Cannibalism, 
Deviancy and Abnormality Vis-à-Vis Natural Law 
The encounter with Indian cultures provided Vitoria with a concrete context in which to apply his 
Thomistic interpretation of natural law.43 In examining the cultural traits of Indians, Vitoria relied upon 
Dominicans and colonists on the ground to furnish him with the accounts that would prove useful to his 
endeavours. Of the more questionable cultural traits amongst the Indians, the exemplar proved to be the 
practice of anthropophagy. Vitoria’s consideration of the Amerindian practice of exocannibalism, of the 
gastronomic or ritual variety,44 in indigenous societies, provided him with the opportunity to think 
through what implications might result from a violation of natural law. For theologians of Vitoria’s time, 
not only was cannibalism a marker of a type of behaviour that was the ‘ultimate in human nastiness’,45 
but it also signified a profound spiritual impoverishment.  
However, it is important to remember that the consideration of such Amerindian practices 
coincided with and mirrored ongoing European debates concerning the Christian Eucharistic rites, 
specifically whether the sacrificial rite should be seen as literal (bread and wine actually become Christ’s 
flesh and blood) or merely symbolic (the flesh and blood are really but spiritually present).46 Crucially, 
these debates were not purely theoretical. At least since the 1551 Council of Trent47 the possibility of 
wholly or partially abstract an empty signifier which could stand for an entire equivalential chain has 
been crucial for further developments in semiotic practices of exchange, whether war and peace or 
monetary exchanges. From a theological perspective, it is perhaps true to say that the practice in 
European societies of symbolic/literal sacrifice and the consumption of more or less a spiritual flesh-
essence had long since outmoded the necessity of any concrete alternative,48 but it may be more precise 
to observe that it was on its way to being replaced by a concrete money alternative (of which 
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Shakespeare’s plot-setting scene in The Merchant of Venice provides a well-known example). The issue 
is not, therefore, altogether ‘scholastic’ but consequential in the context of the globalisation of practices 
of exchange and reciprocity such as war and trade. It is perhaps here that the seemingly abstract musings 
of the natural law jurist-theologians come to bear upon the origins of international law with the fullest 
impact.  
To return to Vitoria’s concern with Amerindian anthropophagic rite, if remnants of ‘pre-historic’ 
practices could be said to exist in such cultures, then for him the Amerindian could rightly be accused of 
an onto-normative transgression of the natural order. Evidently, if this were the case then the native’s 
misperception of natural law would demand further analysis. 
For Vitoria, cannibalism suggested a false deduction, or a category error, within the Indian’s 
cognition and perception (scientia) of the natural world and its law.49 In this case, it involved a false 
deduction concerning what constituted food and what did not.50 Man, within the scale of being, is 
considered a perfect being. This is because he sits at the top of the chain of being within the natural world 
– he is made in God’s image, and so ‘the closest thing the natural world has as a perfect being’.51 In other 
words, he is attributed the highest potentiality of those creatures of the animal kingdom, and by extension 
the corporeal realm. This qualifies him to lay claim to dominion over his world. In order to exercise the 
capacities of insight enabled through the privilege of being positioned where he is, man is required to 
locate himself in this hierarchy relative to others. Below him, this includes all other animals that can be 
considered, by contrast, ‘imperfect’. The term ‘imperfect’ denotes the more limited potentiality of the 
animals relative to the ‘melting pot’ (as a combination of the corporeal and incorporeal) that is man. 
Consequently, the lower position of animals in the chain authorises their utilisation by perfect men.52 
Likewise, animals are able to exploit the ‘lowest form of organic matter’ in the positions below them, 
such as plants. In turn plants can make use of inanimate matter, and so on.53 
It is noticeable here, from the argument thus far, that the movement that has been described is of 
the descending variety. The descending movement from man to the creatures below him seems to 
indicate an instrumental relationship between the former and the latter. We can discern the normative 
import of the rule of cause and effect in this argument. The position of man in the natural world means 
that he is a cause in excess to all the natural beings below him. It is therefore within the scope of man’s 
action to ensure the correct ordering of those ‘effects’ or animals. The latter, as ‘effects’ (subject to man’s 
power), can be utilised by man for the purposes of maintaining the chain. Most overtly, the consumption 
of animals provides man with the nutrition needed to maintain his power at the head of the natural order. 
In this respect, animals sacrifice their agency for the benefit of those higher up in the chain. As a 
complement to this, man must engage in categorising and defining various species of animals, as well as 
their respected domains – the diversity of which so interested Aquinas. In this way, through the 
understanding of ‘effects’, knowledge of the entire order is obtained. In this instance, man’s 
comprehension of the manifold of creatures entails being cognisant, despite the instrumental nature of the 
relations, of the unique animal contribution to the whole. After all, the reduction of the manifold to the 
monad (a single species or essence) is as much a threat to the natural order as the absurd notion of 
animals exercising power over man.     
Normatively speaking, while engaging in practices of exchange with others and the surrounding 
environment man ought to act in a way that preserves the ‘linkages’ of the natural order. This involves 
preserving the proper arrangement and range of potentialities across the scale. Not to take up the task of 
ordering, allowing for the alternation of such an order, is to risk creatures falling from their position and 
thereby imperilling the operating structure of reality (of which man is the operator). It is only through all 
beings hitting their potential that a stable order worthy of a Creator is maintained. Put simply, the rule of 
a disciplinary normative system would be reciprocity, or exchange, without alterity.  
In man’s relation to man there holds an ontological parity (only the angels and the Godhead 
have a higher ontological status). This ontological equality is manifested through the linkage that binds 
all men together to their unique position in the chain. In other words, all men take up the same position. 
The issue with the Indian’s cannibalism is that it attenuates the robustness of the linkage between men. 
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For perfect beings such as men to consume other perfect beings is to transgress the natural order by doing 
damage to the linkage across a position. Full reciprocity is therefore the rule governing exchange 
relations between men, political or economic. Perfect communities recognise each other and submit their 
relations to the rule of reciprocity, through treaties, as Vitoria was keen to point out. Other communities 
remained perfectible.54  
Ontological parity between those of the same position effectively maintains the equivalence 
between rank and potentiality. To this end, cannibalism can be thought of as a manifestation of dis-
ordering. It decomposes the parity of potentiality or ‘solidarity’ across a position, effectively weakening 
the positionality of man. There can be no linkage between men in a world where ‘everyone is a potential 
meal for someone else’.55 The onto-normatively dissident, anti-social56 side of the Indian is seen to come 
to the fore here. In fact, according to this schema, it is this facet of their imperfection that threatens to 
turn them into hostiles of all mankind.  
Within the chain of being no man can possess another ‘absolutely’.57 All men, possessing the 
rationality gifted by divine law, should not therefore reduce others to tasty morsels. To do so is to behave 
in an un-human way,58 and to perceive others in a purely instrumental manner (as simply corporeal) that 
is a rejection of unique human potentiality. To see other men in this way is to see them as beasts, as 
taking up positions below what is proper to them. By implication, cannibalism also amounts to a refusal 
to take up one’s own position, i.e. that of the human in the chain.   
 
Other aspects of the Indian’s culinary habits are considered by Vitoria in his continued scrutiny of the 
former’s cultural traits. With respect to the chain, the Indian perpetuates a sort of double transgression. 
The first transgression is at the higher end of the scale of being – treating other perfect beings as 
foodstuffs. However, there is in addition a secondary fault. This concerns a violation of the scale at its 
lower end.59 Indians, as was their wont according to the Spanish colonists, nourished themselves on all 
manner of delights including assorted creepy-crawlies, insects, serpents and exotic vegetation (roots, 
berries, etc.). These lower creatures were seen as being almost indistinguishable from the soil of the earth 
– that which the earth produces.60 These pure creatures of the earth, which were thought to spontaneously 
reproduce themselves within the confines of the ground,61 were closely associated to the raw matter of the 
soil.   
 Due to the position of man, Vitoria argued that it was legitimate for him to treat the animals 
below him instrumentally. However, it is, for the most part, only the animals directly below man in the 
chain that are worthy of consumption. The creatures that the Indian is accused of eating fall at the very 
bottom rung of the ladder. The issue here concerns the distance between the position of man and these 
creatures at the very bottom (almost indistinguishable from inanimate matter). These creatures are almost 
ontologically insignificant for man. To even consider them worthy food, or available for instrumental 
use, is to denigrate man as a higher being in the chain. It is to commit man to a descent, and to refuse to 
take seriously his role in keeping in order that which surrounds him.       
   
The perception of man, and the ability to deduce correctly, are enabled by ‘natural institutions’ or 
political structures and posited laws legitimised through natural law. Natural institutions are those that are 
compatible with the natural order; the former intimate the latter or project beyond themselves to the chain 
of being. Natural institutions are therefore a sort of microcosm of the wider natural order. In Vitoria’s 
view, these institutions and political structures are governed by natural law and are principally 
majoritarian. It is primarily consensus that decides what is right and wrong; God could not fail to implant 
rationality in men (commensurate with the first precepts), so consensus could only be the actualisation of 
these proper deductive processes.62 Consensus is then bound up with man’s ability to perceive the natural 
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world correctly.63 It is also linked to socio-political structures, and thus, for example, consensus can only 
emerge in the hominum consortia such as cities.64 The ability to visualise an environment correctly is 
intrinsically linked to the political unit of the city in a way that evokes the role of the urban planner or 
architect as described by Henri Lefebvre. These specialists, utilising reduced models, produce an order 
that is imposed on a place from above. This was the practice adopted by the Spanish for designing 
colonial cities in the Americas in the years after the conquest, and was in line with the code of urban 
space issued at the time: the Orders for Discovery and Settlement – a collection of official instructions 
circulated to the founders of colonial cities from 1513 onwards. These administrative regulations set out a 
plan and detailed how urban space ought to be organised in order to maintain political authority and a 
stranglehold over inhabitants. The plan was geometric in its rigidity, positing a clearly defined centre and 
a grid extending outwards in a hierarchical fashion.65 In transposing a design for the model city over the 
world, what this effectively denotes, in the context of natural law, is that all men are potential ‘planners’. 
Natural law can therefore be seen as the true perception of the dividing and intertwining, enforcing 
boundaries which make up the order of natural institutions or structures. They are outcomes and 
manifestations of the ontological parity holding between all men.  
For Indian societies to be considered as in line with the wider natural order (and to therefore 
fulfil their potentiality), they had to be made up of these identifiable natural institutions. It was difficult 
for this to be the case, however, when a common motif of Spanish colonists and missionaries (one shared 
by Vitoria) established a ‘symbolic equation’ between the practices of cannibalism and carnal deviancy in 
Indian communities.66 It has already been stated that there exists an ontological transgression of the scale 
of being implicit in cannibalism, but just as significant for Vitoria was the perceived deviancy of the 
perverse sexuality and lasciviousness of the Indians, especially the women. Both, generally considered 
together, are markers of those who do not follow conventional morality.67 
So, in Vitoria’s analysis of the family institution – a prime exemplar of the ‘natural institution’ 
governed by natural law – structuring divisions are of paramount importance, even more so than deed and 
function.68 Paternal authority was a given in the family, as was the obligation for the father to educate his 
sons and sustain a monogamous relationship with his wife.69 The deviancy of Indian men and women was 
seen as a supreme threat not only to the family institution, but to indigenous society and subsequently to 
mankind as a whole. The deviancy, in practical terms, consisted of Indian men keeping polygamous 
relationships and practising bestiality, sodomy and incest.70 All these transgressions suggested the 
‘dissolution of the natural relations of the sexes’, and a ‘direct assault on the social fabric as [bad as] 
sedition and political unrest’, the ‘inversions and perversions of the natural order of things’.71  
The Indian was duly painted as an enemy of consistency and stability. Vitoria discerned in 
indigenous societies the subversion, to the point of disintegration, of the structured social relations 
making up natural institutions. The displacement of dividing lines and resistance to the categorisations of 
natural law meant that the native’s cultural life existed against the natural order and its enabling 
structures, in a state of continual transgression and inconsistency.  
Vitoria’s judgement on the inadequacies of the Indian family is, of course, paralleled in his 
criticism of the wider legal, cultural and political structures of indigenous society. At the heart of this was 
the native’s hermeneutic fault in reading and perceiving the distinction between ontological scales 
existing in the natural world. By extension, the fault also implied an inability to comprehend the proper 
ordering of majoritarian/normative political structures.  
The Indian is subject to the first precepts, which dictate that all men have rational souls. 
However, it is the secondary precepts he falls foul of, which focus on the synonymy of normativity with 
culture. The habits composing the native’s world, such as cannibalism, implied that he could not realise 
an adequate political and normative structure. His failure to ‘syllogize correctly’72 meant that any 
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indigenous political and social structures, made up of performative habits, could only exist against the 
order of the natural world.   
Contra the natural order, the Indian world was portrayed as a fundamentally anti-social one.73 
Despite the traces of order that Vitoria located in indigenous societies, he also identified significant 
problems, namely the lurking ‘dis-ordering’ habits which imperilled the chain of being in its entirety. The 
inability of the native to gain a proper understanding of the position of man in the chain, and his role as 
‘en-chainer’, placed him in danger of free-fall from this position. This free-fall was synonymous with the 
transgression of natural law. Moreover, the Indian can be said to have introduced an element of instability 
to reality itself. In such circumstances he could only be met with disciplinary measures. Only through 
sanctions could the positionality of man be reaffirmed and the accepted movements of the chain restored. 
Of course, the native could be left to that hell which is free (as a sort of residual underworld74) from 
order, rank and position, riddled as it is with ‘fugitives’ and ‘deviationists’,75 but this would certainly not 
have been a theological position acceptable to Vitoria.  
Chapter Four: Positionality and Amerindian Spatial Politics 
One of the unresolved tensions of the chain was whether it could successfully facilitate the clear-cut 
distinctions between beings that both Aquinas and Vitoria had hoped for. Natural law could only function 
where the demarcations between creatures in the chain were easily perceivable, as Vitoria’s critique of 
the Indian’s dietary habits effectively demonstrated. Through Aquinas’ theorisation of God’s selection 
process, the chain had acquired an ontological foundation, largely based on numbers.76 In other words, 
the chain was constructed through the reduction of infinity to a limited number of ‘common objects’ or 
things that laid the basis for the ordered world. Measurable metrics allowed for the world to be modelled 
in the stable manner it was for natural law.    
 However, an alternative view persisted, born out of the conflict that made up the very nature of 
Neo-Aristotelianism. The main source of this conflict stemmed from the need on the one hand to 
maintain clear and distinct boundaries between beings, and on the other to articulate the very real 
continuity existing in the natural world. The latter view places the emphasis on the chain merely as a 
representation of the ‘infinitely delicate shadings off of everything into something else’.77 Were this 
representation accurate, any clear division between beings would seem to be erased by the ‘fluency’ and 
‘overlappingness’ of the real world.78 The logical outcome of a theory that advocated a stringent 
continuity between beings was the tearing down of any perceivable and distinct borderline distinguishing 
the very different positions creatures held in the chain; difference almost seems to dissolve into nothing, 
as the medieval Principle of Plenitude79 returns in a new incarnation.  
 According to Alexandre Koyré, the Principle of Plenitude and the infinite universe it proposed 
represented the destruction of the ‘finite, closed, and hierarchically ordered’ world advanced by those 
medieval theologians such as Aquinas, whose restriction of the Principle was designed to ‘limit its 
applicability’. The Principle returned during the renaissance through such theologians as Nicholas de 
Cusa (1401–1464), Giordano Bruno (1548–1600) and the astronomer Thomas Digges (1546–1595). For 
the latter two, Copernicus’ de-centring of the world provided the opportunity to re-establish the Principle 
and reassert its radical conclusions. Prior to Copernicus, de Cusa argued that the ‘interminate’ universe 
lacked precision and was in effect boundless; there could not be any univocal and objective 
representations of the cosmos, as within each being the uniqueness of individuality and the contraction of 
the ‘entire wealth’ of the universe coincides. In general terms, he states that the infinitely great (the 
maximum) and small (the minimum) overlap in being able to foreclose the possibility of representation. 
For Bruno, there was neither centre nor periphery to the universe – instead he favoured an infinite 
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universe, completely lacking in hierarchy, with a plurality of worlds and a superabundance of matter and 
possibilities. Hans Blumenburg depicts Bruno as attempting to build an alliance between German 
Protestantism and Copernican metaphysics, while drafting in astronomical observations from Digges’ 
work (although he went far beyond the latter’s suggestion that man simply practice ‘pious renunciation of 
his share and claim to the world’ in light of the vast amount of the world that remains hidden from him). 
Blumenburg describes Bruno’s universe as a ‘chaos of metabolism’ in which the world metamorphoses 
from one formation to another so as not to ‘congeal in contingent giveness’. The Earth, then, takes on a 
position of immanence in relation to all the stars in the heavens, as the totality of the open universe 
stymies any transcendent notion of man. Interestingly enough, Bruno would re-emerge as a sort of 
bogeyman for German Idealism and as a precursor to the lurking threat of Spinozian ‘pantheism’ which 
Kant attempted to block.80 
 Clearly, the Principle of Plenitude, the infinity of the cosmos and the ‘pure’ continuity between 
creatures was unacceptable to those such as Vitoria, leaving little room as it did for distinctly perceivable 
positions along the chain. However, the Thomistic position still held on to the importance of maintaining 
the manifold in all its glorious diversity.81 After all, the widest range of creatures and potentialities, 
demonstrating the ordered perfection of a natural order that reflects the power of the Godhead, was 
clearly preferable to the reduction of species to the monad. In professing the desire for a weaker, more 
limited form of continuity, the relatively distinct borderlines between beings, as well as a wide array of 
creatures, could still be preserved. Inadvertently, this Thomistic view opened up the prospect of a politics 
that contested the spatial arrangement of the chain itself. There appears a difference between, on the one 
hand, Aquinas’ chain in its delimited ontological form, and on the other the material chain82 in its 
actuality – as really existing in the natural world, consisting of a continuity between an unknown number 
of beings.  
 The Thomistic position is thus indebted to the interminable labour and toils of man to prevent 
intellectual capitulation. Man is mandated to construct and engineer the edifice of the chain along the 
lines of the ‘architectural principle’.83 It dictates that the ongoing construction work on the chain should 
be accomplished by going back to the original ontological ‘blueprint’. It is clear that these terms suggest 
man’s role as an urban planner, compelled to construct ‘to proportion, scale, rhythm’ and to follow 
various orders or instructions.84 This planning work requires social praxis in order for the chain to be held 
together as a unit, as ‘only action can prevent dispersion, like a fist clenched around sand.’85 This is of 
crucial importance, as in the realm of social and material reality the number of beings is open-ended, or, 
at least, evades any definitive closure. There are thus opportunities for ‘new arrivals’ to disrupt and 
interrupt the operational workings of the chain. For example, the discovery of new creatures previously 
unimaginable is enough to push the spatial arrangement of the chain temporarily into disarray. In other 
words, the deviation of the world in its material actuality could mean the appearance of ‘gaps’ in the 
chain – the inconsistencies and disorder provoked by creatures that do not live up to their potentiality. 
The random mutations and loose ends which appear in the DNA of the chain demand negotiation. For 
man to combat this, he is ensnared in an ongoing project to re-build the interior – to ensure through the 
sweat of his brow the ‘positive nature’86 of all the terms of the chain.  
 We can say here that the repair work of man is mediated through the ‘interpretosis’87 of natural 
law. Natural law operated through the correct reading of the ‘book of nature’: the right way to interpret 
and experience nature was to read it back to some original unity. In a sense, as Claire Colebrook relates, 
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‘every experienced affect’ can be ‘read as the signifier of some original scene’.88 Hence, in perceiving 
and sensing the manifold of beings, we could read them as signifiers that intimate a ‘lost’ ontological 
founding act. In this case, our sensations of objects are referred back to the scene of the original event – 
of God’s selection and ordering of the universe, the liberation from an un-ordered eternity. God’s 
selection process was the act that constituted the original ‘unity’ of the manifold, that which is ordered 
into the chain of being. Man’s work here seems to be as endless as that enacted by Sisyphus; it is 
incumbent upon him to continue to retrieve the ‘lost event’ in attempting to reconstruct the perfection of 
Creation. In his toils, he is lead on by his desire to overcome his ‘lack’ – the alienation that divorces him 
from the first act of Creation via the selection-event. God Himself has disavowed his agency post-event, 
and so it is left to man to reconnect to an absent Father through his interminable repair and en-chaining 
work. As God liberates the universe through the founding ontology of rational numbers (orderable 
integers or with a divisible ratio between them), it is for man to ensure that material reality continues to 
conform to Geo-metrics. 
 The force of natural law is felt through its obstruction of the ‘pure continuity’ that seems to 
place the chain in grave danger of dissolution at every moment. Pure continuity depicts a perception of 
reality in which all things have blurred into one – into the monad. The monad as pure continuity cannot 
be considered to be the assimilation of the many by the one essence so feared by Aquinas; rather, it is an 
infinity (or ‘immensity’) concentrated into a singularity. It is what Deleuze calls ‘pure difference’,89 a 
difference of a highly, densely concentrated sort, to the extent in which it becomes inextricably difficult 
to prise distinct entities apart. Natural law kicks in at this point in order to mount a defence of the 
borderlines and fault lines between beings. It involves the process of limiting uncontained difference 
through the ‘contraction’ of perceptions. The process of contraction reduces difference, as natural law 
reduces pure continuity, to the ‘set’. Hence, pure difference is contracted to the common circulation of 
objects90 that exists in the world; there is a minimisation of difference to that which is orderable. In this 
contraction, the perception of things as stabilised and determinate can only be considered provisional. 
The process of holding entities in a stabilised form takes on a definitive duration.91 However, natural law, 
through the unique task of man, aims to extend this contracted perception of the manifold indefinitely. 
When perceptions are narrowed to the level in which things assume an orderable quality, borderlines 
between the positions in the chain can be (re-)erected. The importance of natural law is that it sets the 
contraction at such a level as to defend against the destabilising influences of pure continuity, in addition 
to securing an optimal level of diversity compatible with the stability and security of the chain.   
 The repair work of man dictates the need to capture and absorb new kinds of beings, in order to 
place them in their most appropriate position in the chain. This is the ongoing work of man’s perception 
and interpretation, as he conforms to natural law by ensuring the consolidation of the chain. In perceiving 
new beings, thoughts are ‘rallied and drawn together again, that they may be known’92 within the ‘inner 
assembly’ of the mind of man. Obtaining knowledge requires the ‘taming’ of as yet unseen objects, to 
ensure that they confirm and affirm the transcendent conception of the chain (contra the immanent justice 
of the shaman; see below). Man passes through the common world of objects so as to compare the 
ontological chain with its really existing state. To reduce reality to the former is to ensure that objects are 
‘spatially imprisoned’93 and the movements of beings heavily restricted. This involves the political work 
of man: in governing the world, he is implicated, in a necessary way, in the process of ordering the 
manifold of beings into a coherent spatial arrangement or organisation. The work of governance, the 
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stewardship of creatures, involves constructing social and material reality in such a way that it accords 
with the representation of the chain. The interconnection between the representation of the chain and the 
social and political practice of man’s ongoing attempts at ordering the world, suggest the quality of space 
as a ‘concrete abstract’94 in Lefebvre’s terms (in the same manner as commodities). In this instance, the 
chain is abstract in its transcendent mode, but this also implies the perpetual inscription of a particular 
structure of social relations onto material reality or culture. In other terms, space is always produced as a 
social product in any given context.95 Production also entails reproduction through the ‘sustenance of 
continued reinforcement’.96 
To abide by natural law is to experience perceptions in their heavily contracted mode. These 
perceptions, extended indefinitely through duration, attempt to depict a time of the non-event. The 
Creation-event, which sets determinable reality in motion, becomes re-enacted as a protracted 
representation given validity by the universal legality of natural law. Thus, in the encounter with as yet 
un-ordered objects, perception reproduces these objects, stripped of their novelty, as elements seeking 
refuge within the ‘protective closure’97 of the chain. Every disparate element evokes the nostalgia of man, 
who sees all elements as signifiers of the ‘lost origins’ that brought him into being. Hence, all elements 
awaiting ordering have as a matter of course their disruptive dimension suppressed.  
 In the perpetual annexation of beings, those which await ordering (recall here Pope Benedict 
XVI’s controversial statement on his visit to Brazil, that the natives were ‘waiting for’ the arrival of the 
Europeans) go through the process of en-chainment. This is part of the de-politicised operations of 
managing the linkages that constitute reality. However, the modus operandi of man is such that power 
comes into play to enforce and police the correct ordering of the chain. Man is in the perfect position to 
exercise power, in that his capabilities and ‘causal force’ are far in excess of those of the creatures below 
him. In this investment of power, the chain itself comes to assume the form of what the geographer 
Doreen Massey identifies as a power-geometry98 – a geometry or structure which expressly prohibits the 
inter-transformability of its constituent cosmic parts. Policing the ordering of the chain coincides with the 
maintenance of relations of subordination and domination,99 resulting in all creatures of the manifold 
yielding to man. There is thus a distinction to be made within the power-geometry between two groups: 
those who are in a position of control and initiation in relation to flows and interconnections, and those 
who are ‘imprisoned’ through being on its receiving end. The former, or man in his majoritarian mode, 
can exercise both mobility and communication in order to regulate those of others.100 The latter’s (the 
creatures below man) consequent lack of influence only serves to reinforce the power ordering the chain 
as a whole. Thence, it would seem that man’s sole concession to the creatures below him is to preserve 
them in their diversity – commensurate with maintaining the lavish cosmic expansiveness and solidity of 
the chain.   
 Since all beings could be ordered within the chain, Aquinas was induced to express the view that 
nothing could be foreign to it.101 By implication, nothing unforeseeable or ‘strange’ may arise to disrupt 
or interrupt it. However, the hiatus or ‘time-gap’ that exists between objects appearing on the scene and 
being placed in the chain creates the opportunity for contestation. This involves drawing out the more 
‘unstable’ dimension of spatiality, which, while cohering within the arrangement of the chain, occurs at a 
level beneath the contracted perception associated with natural law. Hence, the provisional stabilisation 
of the manifold is always at war with objects/beings that strive to withdraw themselves from the chain, or 
arrive unexpectedly on the scene.102 Objects, which absent themselves by immerging into pure continuity, 
or emerge all too suddenly into the field of perception, seemingly from nowhere, continually put a 
spanner in the workings of the chain. This is essentially the reason why man must resort to force – to 
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invest the geometry of the chain with his power and ability to police positions, to ensure the stability of 
existing interconnections. 
 Where this power-politics is forced to reveal itself, opportunities to contest the arrangement of 
the chain become apparent. The Indian was uniquely situated to challenge the chain by tapping into the 
perceptions that go undetected from the point of view of natural law. This is because he was in a state of 
temporary free-fall from his position, which released him from the chain and weakened the linkages 
between him and his fellow men. This free-fall is the outcome of the nonconformist disposition of the 
Indian; he resisted the standard of perception demanded by natural law, and refused to assume that work 
which is proper to man. He was effectively ‘on strike’ in the most generic terms.  
 In Vitoria’s terms, the Indian’s ‘anti-social tendencies’103 made him a sort of permanent 
transgressor of natural law. His transgressive behaviour was ascribed to a misanthropic world-view (mis-
use or mis-appropriation of anthropos). Vitoria discerned the signs of this world-view in the native’s 
inhospitality towards the Spaniard. The correct disposition towards fellow men entailed the ‘seeking out 
of linkages’.104 Men must not, therefore, treat their fellows as foreigners or strangers,105 but as a welcome 
opportunity to affirm a common humanity and strengthen the linkages between men (Humanitas). 
Conversely, men should not act like a ‘wolf to his fellow man’.106 Furthermore, the seeking out of social 
relationships naturally has its economic expression in the reciprocal interest embodied in trade and 
commerce.107 
 The Indian’s repudiation of natural law then took on two fronts: the inability to comprehend the 
correct ordering of the chain (in practising cannibalism and so on), and the spurning of the linkages 
which connected him to a wider humanity. He became an outsider, and even worse, an outlaw hostile to 
mankind in his fundamental transgression of natural law. In not being able to take up an initial position in 
the chain, he found himself within that hiatus which defines the time of free-fall, prior to the onset of 
corrective discipline, and, furthermore, integration. It is the temporality in which a being awaits re-
positioning and re-ordering. In such a scenario, another option was available to him. He could take the 
opportunity to wander and roam away from his position – to seek alliances with the creatures that were 
positioned lower down in the chain. With his dis-location came the promise of tapping into another mode 
of spatiality, one which could be directed towards interrupting the ongoing (re)production of social and 
material relations necessary for the smooth running of the chain.   
 The Indian as ‘social bandit’ in his movement of free-fall, and in his dis-located position outside 
natural law, adopted the form of a Renegado108 (‘Renegade’, hostile) in relation to humanity. Renegados 
were those Spaniards, and more generally Europeans, who renounced their loyalty to Christianity, as well 
as their nation. For the most part, the transformation into roguery was achieved through converting to 
Islam, essentially becoming an apostate, but it could also be achieved by turning to piracy, or becoming a 
corsair. The Renegado was widely scorned as a sort of ‘becoming-Moor’ or ‘becoming-Turk’ (‘turn’d 
Turk’). It was precisely because of their status as a ‘becoming-other’ that they were seen as the worst sort 
of traitor – a creature ‘of hellish mystery’.109 The becoming-other of the Renegado implied not only 
turning one’s back on civilisation, but effectively declaring war ‘against the world’.110  
 The Renegado freed himself from his various allegiances, in order to take a radical new 
direction against his former countrymen. In a similar vein, the Indian adopted his position of free-falling, 
of other-being, to become a rebel towards humanity in the same way in which the Renegado was an 
enemy to civilisation. In other words, he was in rebellion against the entirety of the ‘natural world’ as 
ordered by natural law. In a similar manner to the pirate, he simply did not submit to the laws which 
humanity makes for its own security111 – those which consolidate the favoured position of man in the 
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chain of being. If humanity’s major work was to seek to preserve its position in the chain by being an en-
chainer, the Indian, like the pirate, could be thought to subscribe to ‘an extreme case of the zerowork 
mentality’,112  making light of the significance of man’s place in the chain. 
 The position of the Renegado would have excited jitters in the rulers of European nations, 
exactly because it withstood the interpretosis that operated through natural law. The becoming-other of 
the Renegado seemed to be a disavowal of origins, an act of defiance against the very selection-event that 
constituted the origins of nature; it was an affirmative manoeuvre to disregard the ‘correct’ interpretation 
of the world. And in many ways this is what it was: becoming-other denotes an expansion outwards of 
perception, from the contracted shell it assumes in natural law. The Renegado’s becoming-other 
necessitated a severance from origins, and in doing so he appeared to be infected by a disease or virus, 
which disseminated itself in all its immediacy. In fact, Islam was this very ‘moral plague’113 which 
spreads through one’s own ranks in uncontrollable fashion. Likewise, the Renegado’s piracy, an 
unsettling case of going rogue, indicated the transformation of many well-skilled sailors and captains into 
foreign agents ‘other’ to the law. With respect to the Indian, Vitoria’s insinuation of the danger of his 
‘becoming-wolf’, put otherwise, a foreigner to man’s position in the chain, alluded to the more generic 
worry of the uncontainable and un-orderable nature of becoming-other. This is further reinforced with the 
concerns over the Indian’s consumption of lowly creatures at the very bottom of the chain. The 
spontaneously spawning and proliferating unseemly beings of the soil (beetles, roots, etc.) seemed to 
bespeak some ‘nameless horror’,114 which, like the Renegado, belied a point of origin. The horrid 
creatures of the earth, along with the wolves of the night, appeared to hint at some extensive causal 
powers outside the bounds of the chain and the perception of natural law. For the free-falling Indian, and 
this was Vitoria’s worry, becoming-other in alliance with these creatures could provide a way out of the 
chain.115 
Chapter Five: Perspectivism and Shamanic Flight 
The Indian’s ontology (other-being) provided a method of liberating the manifold from its spatial 
imprisonment in the chain. In unifying the manifold of beings into a distinct order and scale, the chain 
suppressed a multiplicity of perspectives.116 The perspectives of the various beings of the manifold act as 
potential points of resistance which could be redirected towards that which grounds the chain – the 
contracted perception of natural law. Hence, with Indian Perspectivism, a challenge is issued to the 
solidity of the spatial arrangement. The Indian’s manner of perception entails the reading back of pure 
continuity into the chain – the turbulence or interruption that scrambles its explicit ordering. Moreover, 
Vitoria furnishes us with concepts that are ripe for subversion. In this subversion, the Indian’s own 
ontology encounters and radicalises (deconstructs) the concepts that are used in grounding the chain as 
representation. 
 From within the chain of being, the consolidation of subjectivity could be said to be the unique 
prerogative of man (as horizon). However, the Indian’s overriding concern was quite different; in his 
free-fall, he had in mind the liberation of all those creatures installed in their position below man. Those 
en-chained creatures are restricted to their designated (delimited) potentiality. This contrasts with the 
Indian mode of Perspectivism, in which ontological parity is extended to all beings. The manifold of 
beings, all possessing the same ontological status, is imbued with the same ‘cognitive disposition’117 or 
soul that resides in man. In other words, in Indian cosmology, the same spirit animates all and runs 
through the entire universe. With the chain, we will recall that the soul resides solely within man in 
respect to corporeal creatures, and in a purer form for the intelligent beings above him – angels, and so 
on, all the way up to the Godhead. The low creatures below man are granted their own restricted 
potentiality, but lack the ordered cognitivism that is the unique property of the soul. While orthodox 
theologians like Vitoria argued for the extension of ontological parity, at the level of the human being, to 
the Indian, the latter’s cosmology takes this a step further in granting it to all non-human beings. 
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 From the standpoint of Amerindian Perspectivism all beings have personhood or a ‘mind-in-
common’, not in the sense of a hive-mind but rather in the sense of a hypothetical origin in which 
everything was human, or better yet, nothing was not human. A considerable number of Amerindian 
cosmologies entertain the notion of a primordial humankind presupposed as the only matter with enough 
plasticity for the world in all its differing multiplicity to come to be formed of it.  
However, let us also note at this point the differing ways in which Andean and Central American 
indigenous Amerindian tribes incorporated a multiplicity of perspectives and different ways of 
understanding spatiality into their cosmologies. Beyond the Amazon Basin, we can look at the classical 
Nahuas (or the Aztecs), who inhabited the lands that now make up Mexico and El Salvador, as well as the 
Incas, with their empire centred in what is now Peru.  
Firstly, let us take a look at the Inca worldview, which was informed by such conceptions as the 
‘Pachamama’ and ‘Kamay’. We can start to comprehend these notions with reference to the Andean 
natural environment and its relation to Inca mythology; an exemplar being the assembling of the grand 
stonework of Machu Picchu out of its surrounding rocks and mountain ranges. The stonework of the city 
and its temples seems to recall the Inca narrative of the creator-god Con Tiqui Vivacocha, who is said to 
have fashioned some of the first human beings from great rocks. Interestingly enough, Con Tiqui, 
himself, assumes the form of an enigmatic and formless primordial figure – as a man without bones – 
arising out of Lake Titicaca.118 In other myths, the Incas are said to have been called forth from caves by 
the mythical founder of the first dynasty of the Kingdom of Cuzco, Manco Capac.119 The image 
presented in these creation stories of the emergence of the first people, hewn from rocks or appearing 
from caves, not only suggests the intimate proximity between the Incas and their environment, but it also 
points to the living forces behind what is commonly seen to be the ‘materials’ or resources of nature. This 
is apparent, for instance, with regards to Con Tiqui and even Manco Capac; mythical characters that 
literally materialise out of water. In fact, according to Omar Riveria, this connection between the natives 
and their natural environment can be deemed an ‘erotic’ one and crystallises itself through the Incas’ 
relationship with Pachamama.120 
Pachamama can be considered as the world, in the form of a ‘given arrangement of time, space 
and matter’ that ‘admits change, even cataclysm.’121 Put otherwise, it is pure relationality or the cosmic 
relations between ‘natural’ forces that generate space and time – an example of which can be thought of 
as the primordial relationship between earth and water, one that sustains all other cosmic relations. 
Pachamama also encompasses ‘historical’ forces (i.e. originating in man or his ancestors), but in essence 
is disruptive of the nature/culture disjunction as neither concept was recognised by the Incas.  
The significance of cosmic interrelations has already been alluded to, as in Inca mythology it is a 
reoccurring theme underlined by the manifestation of gods from water, and peoples from the rocks and 
caves, and Con Tiqui’s punishment of rebellion by holding back the rainfall.122 The last myth referred to 
also highlights an important dimension of Pachamama: in signifying the relationality of the world or 
cosmos, it also intimates the interplay between presencing and withdrawal – the means by which natural 
forces operate. These forces were ‘supportive’ of the Inca world, but were radically unpredictable and 
required a kind of romantic coaxing through their incorporation into the build environment, as opposed to 
the imposition of an alien ‘form’ upon them. To refer back to the stonework of Machu Picchu, the 
crafting of sacred rocks facilitated the presencing of natural forces/cosmic relations embodied in these 
rocks through the interface of the stonework, which did not imply a representational aesthetic. This 
presentation of natural forces in architectural design was subject to the notion of ‘Kamay’, in the sense of 
being ‘irrespective of form’ and thus exceeding ‘both visual form and stable structures of meaning’.123 
So, we may even say that Inca stonework was meant to incorporate the eventfulness of natural/cosmic 
forces or relations, rather than to negate it through seeking to control or manage it. The implication of this 
is was to preserve the contingency of cosmic forces, and the erotic relations the Incas enjoyed with them 
was an attempt to seek their consent and cooperation, which also demanded accepting the eventuality that 
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these forces would at times withdraw themselves or refuse to cooperate. The Incas therefore conserved 
their connection to the ‘cosmic source’ that is Pachamama through permitting the instability of the 
cosmos to manifest itself within their communities through natural forces operating on their own terms: 
that is through a response or reciprocity that is fragile and uncertain, the very opposite of the solidity of a 
binding contract.124      
 We can draw out from Inca cosmology the idea that law cannot simply be seen as a technology 
of power seeking to impose itself upon the cosmos as is the case of the ‘power-geometry of the chain of 
being and its associated natural law. The relationality of Pachamama admits unpredictably and a non-
negotiable requirement to pragmatically submit to this, in opposition to a natural law in which an 
instrumental mentality is decisive in controlling the mechanisms of the natural environment and the 
relations between creatures, both ontologically and practically. So unlike the law of the chain of being, 
which minimises the resistance of nature, Inca cosmology sought to harness this resistance through 
means of incorporation and erotic entanglements.   
 
To turn to the Nahuas, if we examine the Nahuatl creation myth through a few primary texts,125 we are 
able to uncover the fundamental cosmological questions that occupied them. These concern the temporal 
origin of the universe, the constitution of its spatial structure, and the role played by the sun in thus 
constituting it. Indeed, in dealing with the latter question the Nahuas came to identify themselves as the 
‘people of the sun’ such was their admiration for what they perceived to be its generative capacity as it 
traversed the sky along its circular route.  
It is, of course, the sun that gives rise to temporality and defines the passage of the ages in 
Nahuatl cosmology.126 The sun is closely associated with the supreme God Ometéotle, the source of 
cosmic energy and the origin of natural forces. As the first and most powerful divinity, he is the result of 
his own self-constitution. He is also a complex entity: as a dual-being encompassing both masculine and 
feminine features he constantly alternates between the role of ‘lord’ and ‘lady’; the former is attributed to 
his generative power exercised during the day over the earth and the latter to the pure beauty of the night 
sky with its ‘skirt’ of glittering stars.127 The Nahuatl narrative Historia de Mexicanos states that he 
conceives four sons, collectively entitled the Tezcatlepocas, each of whom is aligned with a primordial 
element: water, fire, earth and wind.128 The sons, as gods in their own right, come to establish the law of 
the cosmic cycle by determining the first four ages of the world.129 These ages are characterised by the 
ascendency of one god/element over the others, and it is the struggle between the prevailing god and his 
fellows that propels the cyclical evolution of the world; that is, the stationary sun demands the struggle 
between elements to stimulate its cycle. Thus, the god/element prevailing in his/its own delineated age 
only assumes a ‘precarious’ or ‘unstable’ position in view of the inevitable upheaval that marks the 
transition to a new earth/sun. The fifth age, which the Nahuas equated with the contemporary period, is 
unique in utilising the entire assembly of the elements that individually distinguished the previous four 
ages. Adding more details to the story, the Nahuatl myth Layenda de le Soles130 alludes to the four gods 
sacrificing themselves in order to reanimate the sun and to furnish it with its perpetual motion, leading to 
the age becoming known as the ‘4-movement-sun’,131 suitably emphasising the significance of movement 
for the Nahuas’ comprehension of the world.  
In this fifth age, the sun is sustained indefinitely through its continuous cyclical motion, and this 
movement can be understood, more precisely, as emerging through the spatialisation of time. The four 
sons, as compensation for their world-prolonging sacrifice, divide the age temporally amongst 
themselves. Not only do all the gods/elements take it in turns to rule during this one age, they scatter and 
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occupy a quadrant of the world and in so doing provide time with an orientation or direction. In other 
words, the elements each take up a quarter of the sky or the four corners of the Aztec universe132 (North, 
South, East, West) through which the sun passes on its course throughout the day. The four gods in their 
transformation unfold the universe by ushering in a new space-time, where spatiality is now defined by a 
dynamism, the likes of which is unparalleled compared to that which came before. These gods or cosmic 
forces utilise the earth as their ‘field of action’133 and in the process regenerate it as a world in which 
movement, maintained by its spatial orientation, is vital to life.   
In tying the ages of the universe to the cyclical motion of the sun and by implication the 
oscillation between night and day, the Nahuas’ cosmology was open to the dynamism inherent to a 
contingency that always returns just as the new day appears once again on the horizon; it is a contingency 
in the Nahuas’ universe that is embodied in the destructive as well as creative nature of the solar forces. 
The fixation on ‘return’ here is crucial, as it precludes the temptation to perceive law in terms of linear 
progression, or with the verticality of the above/ below relationship. (In fact, the Nahuatl myth depicts the 
earth as surrounded by the ‘celestial waters’ that display continuity with the heavens as they merge on the 
horizon.134) This manner of thinking is not so much preoccupied with imputing protective boundaries to 
law in order to shield it from the unknown, as is the case with the chain of being, where stability is 
synonymous with order that perpetuates itself through space and time, but more with revealing the 
profundity attached to the beginning of a new cycle. Hence, the fifth age is a novel cycle that 
incorporates, equally, the perspectives of the gods or the potency of the elements that reigned exclusively 
before. In fact it is the equitable division of the age between the gods/elements that allows for the 
continuous motion of the sun within the one era, thus provisionally averting its destruction. In this 
complex assembly of the age, in which no power dominates for long and the array of potentially 
conflicting perspectives keeps the law in motion, the overriding principle of law becomes struggle. 
Moreover, if each of the first four ages is marked by the reigning god striving to identify himself with the 
life-giving traits of the sun and the conflict with his fellows this implies, they are also marked by his 
ultimate demise as the sun averts capture by concealing itself and initiating the start of another cycle. The 
sun, as a moving point of orientation, intimates the adaptive nature of a cosmic law (as is the case with 
the elements or gods which seem to be animated only insofar as their quadrant is occupied by the sun) in 
which dynamism and movement is only possible with the struggle to keep up with the sun of a new day.  
 
To return to our discussion of Amerindian Perspectivism, perhaps more significant than what it posits as 
commonalities, is the means by which it conceives that difference is generated and perceived. In many 
ways this is the integral aspect of Indian ontology, in that it expressed a way in which one could tap into 
the pure continuity/difference lying in a perspectival dimension beneath that of the ordered chain. In its 
articulation of difference, Perspectivism radically inverts the corporeal/incorporeal or mind/body 
disjunction. In terms of natural law, the mind/soul is the element that is constructed through the onset of 
perfect normative structures and cultural habits, which enables the soul to flourish and develop 
(becoming into self-same being). Thus, as the argument went, the native with his lack of developed 
cultural institutions was hindered in his spiritual development for he lacked ‘will’ and had appetites in 
excess. This is another way of expressing the alleged inconstancy of the Indian soul. Conversely, within 
Christian theology-infused spatial models, all beings subsisting on earth have an equivalent corporeal 
form but the question is whether they have the sufficiently balanced, tempered, developed soul. There is 
therefore a strict parity or equivalence between all earthly forms when it comes to corporeality, as 
opposed to the variability of intelligence and willpower.  
 In contrast, with respect to Amerindian Perspectivism, the body is not given, but manufactured. 
The differing perspectives of a creature hinge upon the way in which its bodily position is constructed.135 
By bodily position here, we must understand the position taken up by the creature’s assumed corporeal 
form in relation to other creatures. In the case of the chain, we can refer to the bodily position that lower 
creatures take up in relation to the creatures below and above them in the chain. Hence, the ‘shape’ or 
body of a creature will depend on its relationship to the creatures around it. This helps to explain why the 
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dualism of ‘predator’ and ‘prey’ was so prevalent in Indian cosmology,136 and particularly for 
Perspectivism. The perspective of various creatures depended upon how it related to others. For example, 
a predator will have to ‘expand’ its perspective in order to comprehend and remain responsive to the 
movements of its prey. The predator’s bodily position – its deportment, agility and shape – accords with 
the perspective it must take in relation to its prey. It is these ‘intensities’, for the most part associated with 
the predator, which indicate a sensitivity to difference requiring the ‘wide lens’. In adopting a perception 
more conducive to the complex flow of the ‘sensible’, creatures start to tap into the potential world of 
other animals.137 Predatory animals are able to see more by remaining fully immersed within the present 
– they can perceive the events and singularities that constitute a fuller continuity of nature. Animals then 
perceive solely through becoming, as opposed to being. They have an invisible side (Viveiros de Castro 
calls this the ‘prosomorphic’ side138) to their character, which can be ascribed to a receptivity to 
becoming that induces continual modifications to its bodily position. We can say that the shape of the 
predatory animal shifts as it comes to reflect the continuity around it.   
 Since there is a sheer diversity of animal bodies, innumerable differing perspectives are 
generated. However, these lie concealed behind a bodily position. In which case, to comprehend the 
perspective of a creature, one must come to occupy its point of view.139 This can only occur if one in turn 
occupies its position – its corporeality within the chain.  
To disrupt the workings of the chain, the Indian had to form alliances with the creatures 
stationed lower down, below man. This essentially meant negotiating relationships with non-humans, and 
implied adopting their perspectives.140 From the standpoint of Perspectivism, all non-humans are virtually 
persons. That is to say, there is nothing to stop any being whatsoever from revealing itself as a person. 
Furthermore, it is experience which acts as the sole criterion for personhood – in other words, it is 
dependent upon the ‘transontological intensities’141 derived from bodily position. Hence, it is the 
relationship with becoming that determines a being’s personhood – indicative of an ability to tap into the 
continuity of nature. This much broader definition incorporated many creatures of the manifold within its 
purview.142  
 Animals that have attained the status of persons assume perspectives that could potentially be 
adopted by the Indian. Moreover, we can state that a multitude of hidden animal worlds143 reside within 
the chain. In this context, it was the Indian as shaman who was best placed to make the quantum leap into 
these concealed worlds. The shaman can be described as a cosmic politician who set out to adopt other 
perspectives, with the aim of incorporating non-human views into the making of administrative 
decisions.144 Moreover, shamans were migratory figures who ‘dis-accommodated’ themselves from their 
own home-world so they could comprehend an alternative point of view with the required clarity, that is 
to say without the interference caused by the default human perspective. Thence, the shaman’s purity of 
vision allowed him to remain open to the transformative perspectives of others.145 This qualified him to 
play the role of a representative or delegate on behalf of non-humans (most specifically predatory 
animals). After acting as an ‘active interlocutor in trans-specific dialogue’146 the shaman returned to his 
tribe to recount his travels, so participating in an exchange of points of view.  
The perennial return and travel to and from location (trans-locality) contributes to the shaman’s 
‘psychologically flexible’ and ‘deliberately destabilised’ character; through disassociation, he acquired 
powers to pass ‘into other states of consciousness’. With the honing of these capacities, he obtained 
certain insights specific to himself, for example, the ability to reside ‘simultaneously in different 
places’.147  
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 The shaman’s flight to other animal words, simultaneously occupying the position of animal in 
the chain and potentially that of man (albeit in temporary free-fall), was prohibited by natural law. His 
method of ‘working’ was proscribed as an attempt to descend to the lower creatures in order to harness 
and release potentiality from its en-chained position.148 To permit such a move was to risk the shaman 
deploying the hitherto contained potentiality of animal agents against the operators of the chain. In other 
words, if the unlimited, expansive potentiality of animals were to be realised, the links between creatures 
in the chain would all but dissolve into pure difference. The actions of the shaman were that of a political 
dissident – the Renegado – who contests the spatial arrangement of the terrestrial chain from the position 
of the un-ordered. 
 The treason inherent to the shaman’s actions had its roots in his insistence in reading the ‘book 
of nature’ differently. He interpreted the circulation of common objects rather differently from the 
‘contracted’ perception favoured by natural law. In the orthodoxy of natural law, all beings below man 
were objects that could be used instrumentally for the greater benefit of holding the chain together. These 
objects had a common trajectory as they were beholden to the law which governs the movement of 
physical entities – that of cause and effect. The trajectories of these objects were predictable, and kept 
strictly separated from each other, so as to be easily contained and out-manoeuvred by the cognitive 
capacity of man. All circulating common objects could therefore be imprisoned spatially, and made to 
conform to a representation. The shaman’s reading can be considered to be the inverse of the method 
deployed by natural law. In his perception, an object can be thought of as an ‘insufficiently’ interpreted 
subject. To properly gain knowledge of an object, one must be able to convert it into a subject. Thus, 
beings below man are worthy of personification; one needs to read their unique trajectories, articulated as 
narratives or personal histories. It is also worth noting at this juncture that the ‘readibility’ of space in the 
conventional sense of natural law only serves to conceal a deeper understanding of space as ‘deceptive 
and tricky’. While space can be designed in such a way as to render it ‘perfectly’ readable or transparent 
– that is, linked visually to a particular socio-political formation149, an alternative would be to read the 
world not as a set text but as a rough texture (see below). Hence, natural and urban spaces are more 
accurately portrayed as ‘over-inscribed’, in that  ‘everything therein resembles a rough draft, jumbled and 
self-contradictory. Rather than signs, what one encounters here are directions – multifarious and 
overlapping instructions.’ 150  
In giving up the majoritarian narrative of man,151 the shaman came to acutely discern the manner 
in which ‘lower’ life forms move through the spatiality of their world, from their own point of view. This 
was an implicit rejection of the positionality of man, in favour of a counter-positionality that denied an 
original fountainhead of subjectivity (God’s selection process), in order to affirm the irreducible 
subjectivities of the beings of the manifold.  
By way of illustration let us to go back to the perspective of the predator. We can imagine the 
movements of the predator as a symbiotic weaving and interweaving through space in the immediacy of 
the present, attuned with the trajectory of its prey. The predator’s method of constructing the space-time 
of his world generates social relations in excess of the predictable relations of cause and effect that 
ground the chain. Its intensive movements in response to its social relationships (the perspective of the 
prey, for example), constructive of its corporeality, remain unrecognisable and uncaught by the stunted 
perceptival net of natural law. 
Hitherto, in this initial account, we see that the shaman’s actions were overtly political (Deleuze 
describes a whole politics of becoming-animal). In disclosing non-human worlds, he facilitated the real 
emergence of space-time structures (or ‘dimensions’) that could attempt to separate from the chain, with 
the goal of eventual supersession. Evidently, each position in the chain could potentially posit itself as its 
own reality or world entire. This notion was hostile to the view of man as the horizon, as a centre that 
binds together and unifies the diverse trajectories of objects. Objects that become subjects threaten to 
scatter and evade the bindings of the chain. We shall return to this point in due course; however, firstly, 
let us elaborate upon the shaman’s mode of travel or flight between worlds.    
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 The shaman’s travel took him through the ‘twilight zones’152 of nature in search of alien worlds. 
Bearing in mind the indeterminable number of beings capable of personhood, the shaman seemed to 
voyage through a veritable galaxy153 of worlds. As mentioned, the shaman is said to ‘travel’, and this 
concept is fundamental to divining the method he utilised in the discovery of new worlds. Travel is the 
skill of practically seeking out ‘different openings in the fabric of the world’.154 It is a disposition of 
expectation, in encountering the strange, the new and previously unknown. It can be considered the mode 
of becoming-other (the form of the ‘other’ being a non-human person) of the shaman. The threshold 
between worlds that the shaman occupied can be rightly identified as the borderline between creatures in 
the chain of being. In natural law, one perceived the borderline as a strict barrier between differing 
ontological zones. From the viewpoint of Indian ontology, the borderline became a launch pad to another 
world; furthermore, to use a more fitting analogy, the borderline can be considered a passageway between 
worlds. Aquinas’ ‘passageway’ through the world of common objects (non-human beings) led to the 
contemplation of the world beyond, as well as of the Godhead.155 The Indian, however, made use of this 
passageway for very different ends. The passageway through non-human beings does not end with the 
maximum of God’s potentiality, but with a maximum of pure difference156 extracted from the never-
ending travel between a countless number of potential worlds. After all, the very purpose of the shaman’s 
voyages was to experience a maximum of encounters.157 Moreover, he could travel through worlds at 
such a gathering pace that everything blurred into one; perception was overwhelmed by pure continuity. 
In using the passageway as a sort of ‘wormhole’, the Indian trespassed into ontological zones in which 
man had no business being, unless it was for the instrumental ends of reasserting order. To put it in other 
terms, we can say that the Indian had transgressed the bounds of the chain by travelling, and vanishing, 
beyond the horizon to a place especially reserved for the Godhead. The task for majoritarian man was to 
ensure that the Indian was forced to complete a circumnavigation of the chain and so return to the place 
he had vacated, that is to say to take up the position appropriate to mankind (as the ‘horizon’). 
 For the shaman to engage in this prohibited act, that is to take on the perspective of the animal, 
he must travel the forbidden path along which the animal’s life unfolds. The path is the line of 
‘intension’158 in which the animal’s life unravels. It is the constant shifts in bodily position that are 
enacted by the animal, in the ongoing construction of its corporeality. The changing form of the animal 
can be thought of as inseparable from its sensitivity to the other creatures in its immediate milieu. To put 
it another way, we can suggest that predatory creatures welcome the event of the encounter, because that 
is indeed what they live for. For the Indian to traverse the path of animals is then to unleash the flow of 
becoming that overcomes the static points and positions within the chain. Perspectivism returns 
untrammelled movement to both the animal and the Indian himself, who cannot be held at checkpoints as 
the mode of being proper to them is to drift along paths.159 
In traversing animal worlds, the shaman took the opportunity to build alliances. In these ‘free 
floating’ or fluid alliances (alliance-becoming), he was best placed to link animal worlds to that of his 
own through a relationship of immanence, based upon ontological parity. What the shaman depicted back 
to the Indian world was not the ‘position’ occupied by the animal, but its changing corporeality – the 
‘paths’ the creature takes. To ‘abduct’ the subjectivity of the animal (becoming-animal), in order to depict 
its becoming, is to harness a force and direct it against the capturing capabilities of the chain. It is a 
process of un-shackling animals from the distinct gradations of the scale.  
 In travelling along paths, the shaman reaches intersections where one animal world encounters 
another. At these intersections, he switches paths, and makes the jump from one world to the next. In 
such a manner, the Indian continues from one encounter to the next,160 and his travels start to ‘take on 
speed’.161 The borderline between creatures becomes an indefinitely extended line that weaves through 
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all the beings of the manifold, as one world gradually transforms itself into another.162 In this 
maximisation of encounters, the shaman becomes imperceptible and invulnerable to the capturing 
capabilities of the chain, manifested through stabilised positions, distinct ontological zones and heavily 
regulated movements. Therefore, every Indian encounter with an animal world disrupts the ongoing 
maintenance and repair work of man.  
In becoming-imperceptible, the shaman comes to assume some of the ‘invisible’ traits of the 
animal. The discrete nature of the animal’s becoming is adopted as the becoming-animal of the shaman. 
In other words, the shape-shifting capacities of the Indian, his ability to widen perception beyond the 
point in which it bursts through its contraction in natural law, ends up annihilating ‘otherness’ itself (we 
can suggest here as an aside that the shaman seems to reach the ‘exit velocity’ required to leave a system 
or normative order).163 What this indicates is the onset of pure continuity between worlds. The shaman 
becomes inexorably immersed in the multiplicity of perspectives garnered from the animal worlds he 
roams through. In the words of Deleuze, he meets with an ‘infinity of modifications’164 in his traversal of 
alien worlds.  
This method of travel as becoming-imperceptible is crucial to an explication of the Indian’s 
epistemology – ‘magical observation’.165 The native’s mode of gaining knowledge of a specific being, in 
his capacity of observer, entails an understanding of what the observed being can tell him about other 
beings. In the terminology of possible worlds, to come to a comprehension of a particular animal’s world 
is to consider where it overlaps with the worlds of other creatures. In other words, what is paramount in 
observing an animal is to tease out its relations with others. This brings us back to the view that the 
Indian’s mode of knowledge involved treating the observed as a subject, a person one can relate to, and 
who furthermore has their very own relations. Thus, there were no ‘inanimate objects’ in Indian ontology, 
as all things were engendered through processes and social relations imperceptible to a default human 
perspective. The native was driven to personify ‘objects’, to disclose his becoming – that which was his 
being-in-common.166 To lay bare the relations that give rise to a being means, to some extent, becoming 
imperceptible in the role of observer.  
The observer’s becoming-imperceptible occurs through a process of intensified reflection,167 in 
which the observer ‘merges’ with the observed. For the observer to accrue knowledge, he must include 
the observed being within himself. Likewise, the observed includes the observer within itself. In this 
manner, the boundary between a being’s perception of itself and the other’s perception of it is 
‘suspended’.168 We can see here that ‘becoming-known’ is a shared process in which both the observer 
and observed are called upon to participate. As it is the same ‘soul’ that runs through everything, the 
observer’s knowledge of the observed can also be thought of as an attainment of self-knowledge, and vice 
versa. This is because what is perceived in the observed being is the pure continuity between the entire 
manifold of creatures, inclusive of the observer. So, for example, even the ‘rudest inanimate object’ can 
project outwards the relationships that constitute it; the object could be part of an animal’s world and so 
utilised as part of its culture.169 Thus, to come to know a being necessarily involves becoming-
imperceptible; to travel to one world initiates an unstoppable traversal through all other worlds. It is the 
perception of pure continuity which draws out the being-in-common, the ‘same soul’ of the manifold.   
The major contribution of natural law to the ontological ordering of the chain was to ensure that 
not only was travel between worlds forbidden, but all alien worlds remained inaccessible. The grounds 
for maintaining the containment and inaccessibility of possible worlds are hinted at by the previous 
argument. That is to say, once a non-human world is entered, travel is not easily stemmed, but only 
continues its unstoppable acceleration through a proliferating number of worlds. What was even more 
concerning for those advocates of natural law following in Aquinas’ steps, such as Vitoria, was that the 
Indian’s alliance with predators insinuated an inversion of the natural order of things. As the ‘primordial 
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takes on human form’,170 the Indian becomes allied with predators – such as (were)wolves – that are 
traditionally signifiers of evil171 because they occasionally wander into the privileged domain of man in 
order to prey upon him. Both beasts and Indians shared and participated in the widest possible 
perspective through which the guerrilla tactics172 of evasion (becoming-imperceptible) and resistance 
(disruption) can inflict damage on the capturing apparatuses of the power-geometry.             
Chapter Six: Meshworks Unchained 
Through the shamanic exploits of travelling, and trespassing on the domains of the ‘lower creatures’, an 
outside of the chain of being is effectively opened up. In disclosing an outside of natural law, the Indian 
exercised a mode of political dissidence comparable to that of the Renegado or the pirate by offering an 
alternative to the normative standards of ‘civilisation’. The Indian’s dissidence initially encompassed a 
two-fold process: of withdrawal from the position taken up by man in the chain, and of building alliances 
with those creatures below man. Indian Perspectivism extended ontological parity to all beings, which 
was considered an outright refusal to consolidate the subjectivity of man through the reduction of the 
other as far as possible to an object. This, in itself, constituted a violation of the ordering of the chain, and 
could be seen as an incitement to mutiny and insurrection through ‘arming’ the creatures of the manifold 
with their own agency (i.e. subjectivity).   
 The open insurgency173 that the Indian tried to provoke has its organising principle in an 
alternative form of autonomy to that prescribed by natural law for man. While for the latter, man’s 
potentiality is realised through his capacity for ordering the world around him, the Indian exercised his 
autonomy, and potentiality, through maximising his encounters with the unforeseeable – with as many 
others as possible. These encounters prevented the onset of a contracted, default human perspective. In 
travelling at such a pace beyond that which natural law denotes as perceivable and recognisable, the 
Indian actualises a ‘forbidden moment’ in which not only are positions ‘occupied’, but corresponding 
creatures are empowered to rise up through their chains. The process of un-shackling from the chain, 
leading to the uprising of creatures, intimates a ‘movement outside and beyond’.174 The animal surge that 
rises up and along paths, beyond that of their position in the chain, can be thought of as a moment of 
liberation from the power-geometry.  
 In travelling between positions – along the borderline between creatures – the Indian draws out 
Temporary Autonomous Zones.175 When traversing the borderlines, the place where creatures intersect, 
he generates liberated zones in un-shackling the animals he comes across from their position. These 
autonomous zones could be thought of as places in the chain where non-humans had been dislodged from 
their attachment to the chain by virtue of their unforeseeable encounter with the Indian (the event). The 
Indian-inspired Temporary Autonomous Zones incorporated non-human worlds or space-time areas 
which had previously been contained and concealed within the ordering of the chain. In the same manner 
as the pirate, sailing the high seas and coming across clandestine islands or ‘Pirate Utopias’176 in which 
they could seek refuge from the law, the native, in discovering alien worlds, generated liberated enclaves 
within the chain. From the standpoint of natural law, these zones appear as a manifestation of disorder 
that creeps into under-policed sections of the chain. Disciplinary action from man, in his majoritarian 
mode, is the chief initiative through which order can be re-asserted, and conceivably requires the invasion 
of non-human ontological zones. Conversely, the native’s zones embody a ‘recurring autonomy’,177 
which move on and vanish, to evade the violence of majoritarian man prior to the rewiring (resetting) of 
the power-geometry. The autonomy of majoritarian man is exercised over spatiality, in order to make it 
conform to the ordered arrangement of the representation. However, the shaman’s exercise of potentiality 
through flight and travel means he seeks to always occupy an autonomous zone somewhere; and in these 
zones non-humans possess as much agency, in their virtual manifestation as persons, as man in his 
capacity as the chain’s horizon.  
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 It is important that we now ask what these zones actually reveal. Firstly, let us refer back to the 
Indian’s use of the borderlines as an indefinitely extended superhighway, intersecting with the plethora of 
paths taken by various creatures. We can say that where the borderline intersected with the byways of 
others, it became hopelessly entangled – a meshwork.178 The entanglement of paths between beings 
(becoming, or alliance-becoming) can be thought of as a scrambling of the chain (‘creating a situation of 
indeterminacy’, as Hans Lindahl would have it179), whereby what was previously perceived as ordered is 
considered to have become completely un-ordered. The a-legal element here is suggested by the fact that 
entanglement can be considered an interruption, as well as contestation, of the interconnections and 
differentiations180 that order creatures of the chain in a progressive scale. The ordering of the chain 
dictates its normative prescriptive force, that which is directly challenged by its becoming-entangled – 
thus depleting its claimed normativity.181 Hence, actions which aid in making conspicuous a process of 
entangling, which re-order the interconnections of the chain in ways which cannot be initially 
accommodated, qualify not only as a transgression but as a move that could potentially result in the 
transformation182 of the chain as a whole. In other words, ordered parts of the chain transition into 
something altogether strange or other-worldly – into terra incognita.183 Entanglement is then the very 
opposite of enchainment. In which case, in lacking the Indian’s wider lens and ability to travel, opening 
up those possibilities invariably foreclosed by the ordering of the chain, majoritarian man finds he is 
unable to navigate the meshwork.  
 The density of the meshwork is derived from the entangled paths of beings, which constitute 
‘tissues’ of lines. Autonomous zones, generated through the process of un-shackling and de-positioning, 
provide the conditions for the uncompromising ‘relational field’184 of the meshwork to appear on the 
scene. The Indian’s power in liberating creatures from an ordered spatial arrangement, and being able to 
make sense of, or to experience, the meshwork, is an outcome of his Perspectivism. For the Indian, we 
can restate that the body is the element that is constantly being shaped. The body is constructed through a 
tissue of lines, which weaves and interweaves with its surroundings. Hence, the animal’s corporeality is a 
perpetual process of interaction and encounter with the paths of others. The tissue of lines that is formed 
through the entanglement with others ensures the corporeality is by its nature receptive to an infinite 
amount of modifications. The shape-shifting nature of corporeality is the consequence of lines/paths 
being woven together. Thus, the bodies of the manifold of creatures aid in the reciprocal construction of 
each other; the body ‘grows along the multiple paths of entanglement in the textured world’.185 
Additionally, the Indian deduces that large predatory animals in their travels adopt a bodily position that 
is best suited to experiencing, and perceiving the meshworks. They are overdetermined in coming to 
signify the resistance of beings of the manifold to the ordered spatiality of man. This is because they 
fiercely resist and guard against the imposition of an encroaching spatial arrangement. 
 Within the meshwork, no ‘pure’ objects can be said to exist. This is due to its being populated 
with an infinity of subjects which form, re-form and rise up without breach of the pure continuity 
between beings.186 Creatures can be understood as moments which fleetingly rise up through the 
meshwork, only to be re-submerged in pure continuity, as opposed to taking up fixed positions, such as in 
the chain. Needless to say, these subjects can be perceived by those who themselves are becoming-
imperceptible (such as the shaman in flight). Within the zones in which the meshworks emerge, the 
common circulation of objects of natural law (including, crucially, the legal-naturalistic understanding of 
exchange-related liberties, as in Luis de Molina’s187 theory of pricing, free will and grace in De Iustitia et 
Iure) is supplanted by the being-in-common of pure continuity (and difference). A continuity of 
commons rather than trade shows up here as the model for an alternative international law. 
The physical laws of cause and effect simply cannot penetrate and prise apart the unrecognisable 
subjects that cohere in the meshworks. As opposed to the genealogy of natural law, which traces back 
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effects to their original cause, the meshwork is the embodiment of an ‘overflowing middle’188 of 
multitudinous paths which become entanglements, and as such render it ‘anti-genealogical’.189  
 Alongside the autonomous zones in which meshworks start to surface, there exist many more 
regulated parts of the chain in which the spatial order persists, and beings remain attached to the chain. In 
the latter zones, repair work, policing and the violence of man keep the meshworks at bay. A more 
limited or restricted continuity holds sway – that which is compatible with natural law. However, the 
threat of the meshwork to natural law remains, as it seems to herald the return of the immanence that the 
chain is designed to expel. In other terms: the firm grounding of the chain is in danger of being 
submerged by the open seas, the vastness of the desert, and the thick texture of the Amazon forest. The 
risk for mainstream, anthropocentric and exchangeist international law is, in this respect, a shift in the 
geography of (socio-legal, Europo-epistemic, onto-theological) reason – one in which the Amazon 
becomes the (epi)centre of the world. Put otherwise, this would mean a shift from the geo-politics of 
reason (exemplified by Albertus Magnus) to biospheric reason in the (re)connection between Nature and 
Law.  
To conclude, the introduction of an ‘immanent humanity’190 between all beings of the manifold, 
imported via the Indian’s transgressive acts of arson against the chain, points towards a social universe 
with a vast, uncontainable array of social relationships, actors and perspectives. The meshwork, as the 
realisation of the flow of creatures released from the chain, seems to give a perceivable form to those 
interrelations – the immanent spatiality that seems to emanate forth from the earth.   
Conclusion 
The conceptual apparatus that is the chain of being, which dissolved the immanent connection between 
humans and the earth and then attempted to discipline or regulate the conflicts between humans resulting 
from that division, had its foundational proponent in St Thomas Aquinas and its highest point of 
elaboration in the thought of the sixteenth-century jurists and the theologians grouped under that so-
called School of Salamanca. The basis of Thomistic/Scholastic theorisation of the chain lay with the 
inadequacy of rival theological doctrines to keep out an immanence that threatened to creep in. In this 
thesis, we have identified immanence with the a-legality of the un-ordered seas and deserts, and 
ultimately with the texture of the becoming-Amazon of the planet. From the latter’s perspective 
(Amerindian Perspectivism) we have explored and conceptualised a shift in the horizon of international 
law, from the geo-politics of reason and the disciplining of the resulting conflicts between humans, 
towards ‘Anthropolemics’. This can be considered to be the questioning of the conflict(s) that result from 
the division between Human and Earth (the latter being reduced to the former’s interest-object, or 
‘resources’), which are often understood as conflicts over resources and for progress or development.  
In this conclusion, let us summarise the lessons drawn from our exploration of the conceptual 
apparatus of the chain of being and the Great Divide (between Creator and Creatures)191 as the alleged 
ground and foundation of the traditional ‘disciplinary’ practice and theory of international law, and 
project some lines for further investigation of the shift towards anthropolemics of international law in the 
Anthropocene.  
Popular medieval theories such as the Principle of Plenitude and the rational-world-ground 
model simply did not deal effectively with those vestiges of immanence192 from Aristotelian cosmology 
that continued to linger and threaten from within the emergent Christian view of the world and its 
conflicts. In many ways then, the chain was forged in the ongoing battle of purging medieval Christian 
theology of the more unpalatable aspects of Aristotelian thought. In that context Aquinas committed 
himself to one of the central projects of natural law theory – the strengthening of the Neo-Aristotelian 
framework of clear and determinate distinctions between beings, and correspondingly weakening the hold 
of an Aristotelianism of immanence, and eternal or infinite nature. In his adherence to the former 
framework, Aquinas could be considered to be following in the tradition of his teacher and mentor 
Albertus Magnus, from which he developed the notion of the chain of being.193   
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 In its Thomistic mode, natural law seemed to intimate a direction of travel – a movement 
towards a fully integrated spatial system of the natural world, and by implication a movement away from 
a disordering immanence signified by an un-orderable nature. The function of the chain was then to act as 
a bulwark against an anticipated outside – to defend against the return of an expelled immanence. Hence, 
the chain would have to be configured as a power-geometry in the sense of a cartography and a moral-
normative perspective. What that involved was the co-option of man’s power, utilised and directed to the 
enforcement of the natural order (as conceived of by natural law). With the obsolescence of the God of 
the Event, the humanistic foundations of natural law allowed Thomistic theology to cast man as the major 
force in policing the spatial arrangement of the chain.  
 The salience of the chain as a conceptual architecture was evinced during the legal Valladolid 
Debates, as well as the recourse of the School of Salamanca’s legal-theologians, such as the likes of 
Vitoria or Luis de Molina, during the Age of Discovery. It proved a method through which the previously 
unknown Indian could be placed, so as to bring him into the framework of European thought.194 
Moreover, he could be drawn ‘into the European order’.195 In being placed ontologically in the chain, the 
Indian was obliged to engage the same ordering capabilities as the rest of his species. Since man’s burden 
lay with his toil in maintaining the chain, the Indian had to pull his weight in the collective endeavour.  
 This was, of course, where the issues arose for the Indian. In his analysis of Indian cultures, 
Vitoria concluded that the Indian’s transgressive activities violated natural law; they demonstrated an 
inability to cognitively order the natural world. And indeed, in the Indian’s cosmology we find a 
transgressive mode of natural dissidence to the spatial ordering of the chain. The Indian’s Perspectivism, 
alongside the shaman’s travels and flight, hinted at a dissident mode of legality that burst the confines of 
natural law’s contracted perspective. At the heart of this was the Indian’s compulsion in seeking to travel 
through as many alien worlds as possible. This implied not only a process of dis-accommodation, of 
withstanding the onset of a default human perspective, but also a recurring moment of return from the 
beyond. Thus, the shaman could be thought of as a political dissident and outsider; in returning from 
having gleaned alternative perspectives, he was best placed to destabilise the constitution of society. 
Correspondingly, to hold off a majoritarian perspective, the shaman simply could not grant himself leave 
to remain in society. Through such procedures, he promised a radical de-humanisation and de-centring of 
legality.  
 In revealing the paradoxical and complex texture of the world the Indian’s cosmology lent itself 
to a rebellion against the well-ordered spatiality of natural law (as well as its posited version). Hence, in 
his travels, the shaman appeared to be groundless; no stable foundation could take root in the movement 
between the entangled paths and byways of the world. Clearly, this manoeuvre could only be interpreted 
from the emergent standpoint of international law as an assault on Anthropo-Europocentric 
representational schemas. Hence, the Indian’s dissidence enabled an outside of natural law to re-emerge, 
but on this occasion not from within the genealogy of Western ontology, but from without, i.e. as the 
enemy of mankind. The lurking danger of immanence returned once again. It was no wonder then that for 
Vitoria the anticipatory power-geometry of the chain allowed for the legitimisation of violence and 
disciplinary action against indigenous societies, in order to uphold the stability of the chain. In spite of 
the suppression of Amerindian cultures, the potential of the Indian’s dissidence enacted through un-
shackling others from the spatial order, forming alliances with non-humans, and harnessing the power of 
the earth, remains unabated today. The ‘vanishing’ (becoming-imperceptible) Indian remains a symbol of 
rebellion – an outsider who made the power of the outside his own. 
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Concluding Remarks 
It was very much the moment of encounter between the principal Iberian missionaries of the sixteenth 
century and the Amerindian that spawned the primary dualism of our manuscript – disciplinary and 
dissident modes of international law. Thus, it is fitting that we once again invoke the radical dualist 
metaphysics of Amerindian cosmology in these closing remarks for our final explication of the relation 
between the two modes. 
 In our structural analysis of international law, a persistent third term appears between the 
disciplinary and dissident. It is this mediator, which we have termed ‘immanent’ or liminal justice, that 
intimates the fundamental finitude of all legal institutions. The immanent law of justice takes up its 
standpoint between the inner being of positive law and that which constitutes its outside. It is necessarily 
a case of a collective-subject (demos, ethnos or alliance-becoming) seeking its own emancipation and, 
indeed, deterritorialisation. We have had opportunity to make reference to, in this regard, the people-
nation, the Indian as appropriator of anthropos, and the shaman as carrier of non-human perspectives. The 
collective-subject, in its various manifestations, can be said to occupy the fold-line, rendered visible, 
between modes of law, as it effectively expropriates the ‘cut’ between inside and outside, which is 
seemingly concealed by institutions of the disciplinary alliance-structure. In occupying this fold-line 
where justice is thought to properly reside, identified by Hans Lindahl as the ‘fault-line’ from which 
normative challenges are issued, the collective-subject can be thought to exist within the intensity of the 
situation (the struggle) while simultaneously projecting outwards the infinite possibilities of a horizon-in-
perpetual-motion. In this fashion, the collective-subject can look back in order to perceive the transitory 
nature of the interiority of law, which is seen to overtly uphold relations of injustice.  
In radical terms, the third term connects disciplinary institutions to the flows of cosmic 
multiplicity – of the triadic-outside. The structure of a positive international law is thus always in the 
process of being broken down through the experimentation, events and encounters induced by the 
collective-subject in search of justice. It involves the creativity of justice as struggle, which re-produces 
and re-creates law in its multiplicity, namely, in its dissident mode. This uncontained triadic-law not only 
detaches itself from the horizontal plane of transcendental law, it brings forth the un-orderable from 
within the very heart of legal institutions themselves. The ordering of spatiality and temporality, the 
limits and the thresholds of normativity, set and reset by disciplinary institutions, are contested in the 
instance of their confrontation with the un-ordered and un-orderable appearing in the guise of the stranger 
(xenomorph) or of a strange other-worldly order (xenonomy). So it would seem that international law is 
inevitably destined to come face to face with that which seems to it most strange, yet is most familiar – 
the a-legality of the earth and cosmos. In this encounter between cosmos and planetary law, the horizon 
of international law does not necessarily recede to the minimal (Kantian) duality of anchoring object and 
subject (as articulated in Part One), but extends indefinitely outwards and out of itself to embrace the 
eternal permutations of the stars.   
 Finally, let us say that the questions stemming from the encounter with the Amerindian continue 
to return and haunt international law from the Scottish Enlightenment right through to Kant in the guise 
of the stranger and other personifications of those hostile to the human – concerns still alive today in 
relation to the development-security complex, the un-ordered in the terrorist, migrant and refugee. In a 
sentence, international law can be conceived of as no more than the continuous negotiation of the space 
between the sky and the earth, with ‘us’ and ‘them’ trapped in the middle.   
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